2. When I saw such soil I was reminded again of my home region of northwestern Georgia, these days considered largely unfit for agricultural uses more demanding than pasture or forest. When I saw such soil I was reminded again of my home region of northwestern Georgia, these days considered largely unfit for agricultural uses more demanding than pasture or forest.

3. Director Kim said annual rice harvests Director Kim said annual rice harvests 'were 'were up from around seven metric tons per 10,000 square meters ten years before to 8.5 and corn production was up from 6.5 tons to eight tons per 10,000 square meters. The great leader's "precious teachings" played a key role in all this, the director said: Kim Il-sung had personally visited the farm eighteen times, giving such advice as "Use more fertilizer." I asked how the country's president had become such an expert on farming. "The Great Leader and the Dear Leader are political activists," farm director Kim explained patiently. "They are clear in economic fields, and the Great Leader in particular cultivated some crops himself to develop production power." up from around seven metric tons per 10,000 square meters ten years before to 8.5 and corn production was up from 6.5 tons to eight tons per 10,000 square meters. The great leader's "precious teachings" played a key role in all this, the director said: Kim Il-sung had personally visited the farm eighteen times, giving such advice as "Use more fertilizer." I asked how the country's president had become such an expert on farming. "The Great Leader and the Dear Leader are political activists," farm director Kim explained patiently. "They are clear in economic fields, and the Great Leader in particular cultivated some crops himself to develop production power."

4. Tak, Kim, and Pak, Tak, Kim, and Pak, Great Leader Kim Jong Il, Great Leader Kim Jong Il, vol. 1 (see chap. 5, n. 15), pp. 198199. vol. 1 (see chap. 5, n. 15), pp. 198199.

5. Choe In Su, Choe In Su, Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Il, vol. 2 (see chap. 10, n. 43), pp. 9697. vol. 2 (see chap. 10, n. 43), pp. 9697.

6. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 2, p. 172. vol. 2, p. 172.

7. Foreign observers doubted it ever would be completed and considered it a white elephant. Foreign observers doubted it ever would be completed and considered it a white elephant.

8. That was Bruce c.u.mings, who recounts the story as follows: "In the mid-1980s, the American emba.s.sy in Seoul had the hallucination that my work was one cause of the incessantly anti-American student demonstrations of the period. This is pure nonsense, but it flew back into my face so many times that it may be pertinent to our story. The first volume of my Korean War study [see chap. 2, n. 25] circulated as an English-language That was Bruce c.u.mings, who recounts the story as follows: "In the mid-1980s, the American emba.s.sy in Seoul had the hallucination that my work was one cause of the incessantly anti-American student demonstrations of the period. This is pure nonsense, but it flew back into my face so many times that it may be pertinent to our story. The first volume of my Korean War study [see chap. 2, n. 25] circulated as an English-language samizdat samizdat in the early 1980s and then was translated (badly) by publishers who pirated the copyright, only to find the book banned by [South Korean dictator] Chun Doo Hwan. Nevertheless, it was usually available in the right bookstores. in the early 1980s and then was translated (badly) by publishers who pirated the copyright, only to find the book banned by [South Korean dictator] Chun Doo Hwan. Nevertheless, it was usually available in the right bookstores.

"In 1987 and 1988 I kept getting calls from the Voice of America or the U.S. Information Agency, asking me for taped interviews that would then be broadcast in Korea. My work was being distorted by the students, they said, and I should clear the record. The American director of the Fulbright program told me that I ought to come out to Korea and disabuse the students of their false impressions. Other American historians were invited under these or other auspices to travel to Korea and set the record straight on the Korean War and other things; a couple of them did not hesitate to please the powers that be by denouncing me as a radical if not a p.r.o.north Korean sympathizer.

"I never agreed to any of the official entreaties. Usually I would just not return their calls, but once or twice I opined that if Americans stopped backing dictators and began treating Koreans with dignity, the problem would go away and I would sink back into my ordinary obscurity" (c.u.mings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History [New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997], pp. 385386). [New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997], pp. 385386).

Kim Chullbaum (The Truth About the Korean War (The Truth About the Korean War [see chap. 5, n. 5], p. viii) describes the problem that many older South Koreans perceived: "[A]fter 1980, in our society, as far as the factional leaders who were pushed close to Marx-Leninism were concerned, the faction of young scholars who leaned toward the left wing and the radical students accepted the a.s.sertions of the revisionist scholars and, while calling for the war of national liberation promoted by Kim Il Sung, it is a fact that they aggravated the confusion of ideology and thought." [see chap. 5, n. 5], p. viii) describes the problem that many older South Koreans perceived: "[A]fter 1980, in our society, as far as the factional leaders who were pushed close to Marx-Leninism were concerned, the faction of young scholars who leaned toward the left wing and the radical students accepted the a.s.sertions of the revisionist scholars and, while calling for the war of national liberation promoted by Kim Il Sung, it is a fact that they aggravated the confusion of ideology and thought."

Historiographer James I. Matray in "Korea's Part.i.tion" (see chap. 4, 4, n. 1) notes that c.u.mings and co-author Jon Halliday in n. 1) notes that c.u.mings and co-author Jon Halliday in Korea: The Unknown War Korea: The Unknown War (see chap. (see chap. 4, 4, n. 60) "insist that South Korea initiated the Korean War, contending that the 'Fierce Tiger' unit of the ROK's Seventeenth Regiment on the Ongjin Peninsula launched an a.s.sault northward at around 0200 on 25 June 1950. Reviving [I. F.] Stone's interpretation, Halliday and c.u.mings claim that Rhee set a trap for North Korea. The South Korean attack would provoke a communist invasion and bring US military intervention, thereby setting the stage for the ROK conquest of North Korea. c.u.mings presents a detailed explanation of this trap theory'-and much more-in the second volume of his n. 60) "insist that South Korea initiated the Korean War, contending that the 'Fierce Tiger' unit of the ROK's Seventeenth Regiment on the Ongjin Peninsula launched an a.s.sault northward at around 0200 on 25 June 1950. Reviving [I. F.] Stone's interpretation, Halliday and c.u.mings claim that Rhee set a trap for North Korea. The South Korean attack would provoke a communist invasion and bring US military intervention, thereby setting the stage for the ROK conquest of North Korea. c.u.mings presents a detailed explanation of this trap theory'-and much more-in the second volume of his Origins of the Korean War. Origins of the Korean War. Despite the testimony of former communist military leaders, the North Koreans always have maintained that the ROK attacked first and initiated the war." Despite the testimony of former communist military leaders, the North Koreans always have maintained that the ROK attacked first and initiated the war."

While Western scholars' left-revisionism continued to inspire the anti-American left in South Korea, Matray says that in scholarly circles from around 1985 the movement had "peaked in popularity and begun to lose adherents." He notes that John Merrill (see chap. 4, 4, n. 80) "observed in 1989 that the question of who started the Korean War no longer was a matter of debate. The size and scope of the North Korean offensive argued powerfully that Pyongyang planned the invasion in advance. William Stueck agrees, emphasizing the international dimensions of the conflict in the most recent full-length account of the Korean War." This last is a reference to Stueck, n. 80) "observed in 1989 that the question of who started the Korean War no longer was a matter of debate. The size and scope of the North Korean offensive argued powerfully that Pyongyang planned the invasion in advance. William Stueck agrees, emphasizing the international dimensions of the conflict in the most recent full-length account of the Korean War." This last is a reference to Stueck, The Korean War: An International History The Korean War: An International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

9. Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Problems of Human Rights (3). Problems of Human Rights (3).

10. "As Korean people we have this great Leader. But our compatriots in South Korea are undergoing all sorts of terrible suffering, under the colonial rule of the U.S. imperialists, and looking to our great Leader, they are enduring hardships and struggling valiantly, thinking of the days when they too will be able to live happily with the fatherland reunited" (Baik II [see chap. "As Korean people we have this great Leader. But our compatriots in South Korea are undergoing all sorts of terrible suffering, under the colonial rule of the U.S. imperialists, and looking to our great Leader, they are enduring hardships and struggling valiantly, thinking of the days when they too will be able to live happily with the fatherland reunited" (Baik II [see chap. 4, 4, n. 24], p. n. 24], p. 4). 4).

11. While a student in Jilin, Kim wrote in his memoirs, he and his comrades made a major alteration in communist doctrine. Instead of workers (and peasants) as the vanguard of the revolution, as .Marxist-Leninist teachings had held, "we defined the young people and students as const.i.tuting the fully-fledged main force of the revolution." The correctness of this view is shown by the importance of young people and students in social and political movements since the March 1 (1919) uprising. And, added Kim, "Young people and students are the main force of the revolution in South Korea, too." He cited the April 19 uprising of 1960, the Kw.a.n.gju uprising of 1980, and the popular protests that culminated in the 1987 government decision to resume free elections for president. While a student in Jilin, Kim wrote in his memoirs, he and his comrades made a major alteration in communist doctrine. Instead of workers (and peasants) as the vanguard of the revolution, as .Marxist-Leninist teachings had held, "we defined the young people and students as const.i.tuting the fully-fledged main force of the revolution." The correctness of this view is shown by the importance of young people and students in social and political movements since the March 1 (1919) uprising. And, added Kim, "Young people and students are the main force of the revolution in South Korea, too." He cited the April 19 uprising of 1960, the Kw.a.n.gju uprising of 1980, and the popular protests that culminated in the 1987 government decision to resume free elections for president.

12. In North and South Korea certain important social indicators, as reported by their respective governments, were virtually identical in the 1980s. Life expectancy at birth, in 1985, was 68 in the North and 69 in the South. In 1986 about 65 percent of each population lived in urban areas. Adult literacy rates over 98 percent were recorded in both Koreas in 1988 (Byoung-lo Philo Kim, In North and South Korea certain important social indicators, as reported by their respective governments, were virtually identical in the 1980s. Life expectancy at birth, in 1985, was 68 in the North and 69 in the South. In 1986 about 65 percent of each population lived in urban areas. Adult literacy rates over 98 percent were recorded in both Koreas in 1988 (Byoung-lo Philo Kim, Two Koreas in Development Two Koreas in Development [see chap. 1, n. 2], pp. 8891). [see chap. 1, n. 2], pp. 8891).

13. Author's conversation with one of the group's American hosts, June 1989. Author's conversation with one of the group's American hosts, June 1989.

14. In view of his obvious intelligence and ability, it is interesting to speculate that Kim Jong-su might have been the otherwise unidentified elder son from a "previous marriage" referred to in the succession rumor, mentioned in chapter 15, that Swedish Amba.s.sador Cornell In view of his obvious intelligence and ability, it is interesting to speculate that Kim Jong-su might have been the otherwise unidentified elder son from a "previous marriage" referred to in the succession rumor, mentioned in chapter 15, that Swedish Amba.s.sador Cornell (North Korea Under Communism (North Korea Under Communism [see chap. 9, n. 3], p. 124) heard from East European diplomats in Pyongyang in the mid-1970s. Although I was not aware of that rumor at the time I talked with my source, I did ask then whether Kim Jong-su was Kim Il-sung's firstborn. "There are probably a couple older than he is," the former official replied. [see chap. 9, n. 3], p. 124) heard from East European diplomats in Pyongyang in the mid-1970s. Although I was not aware of that rumor at the time I talked with my source, I did ask then whether Kim Jong-su was Kim Il-sung's firstborn. "There are probably a couple older than he is," the former official replied.

15. During his UN a.s.signment Kim Jong-su did stay in touch with at least one other journalist-researcher, Selig Harrison-and in situations that suggested once again that Kim had access to top leadership in Pyongyang. After speaking with Kim Jong-su, Harrison was invited to his second meeting with Kim Il-sung (Harrison, During his UN a.s.signment Kim Jong-su did stay in touch with at least one other journalist-researcher, Selig Harrison-and in situations that suggested once again that Kim had access to top leadership in Pyongyang. After speaking with Kim Jong-su, Harrison was invited to his second meeting with Kim Il-sung (Harrison, Korean End Game Korean End Game [see chap. 8, n. 3], pp. 211212 and 221222). [see chap. 8, n. 3], pp. 211212 and 221222).

21. If Your Brain Is Properly Oiled.

1. Cho Gap-jae, "Interview of Former High-level Official" (see chap. 9, n. 37). Cho Gap-jae, "Interview of Former High-level Official" (see chap. 9, n. 37).

2. "The average North Korean lives an incredibly simple and hardworking life but also has a secure and cheerful existence, and the comradeship between these highly collectivised people is moving to behold" (Andrew Holloway "The average North Korean lives an incredibly simple and hardworking life but also has a secure and cheerful existence, and the comradeship between these highly collectivised people is moving to behold" (Andrew Holloway A Year in Pyongyang A Year in Pyongyang [published in 2002 on the Internet Web site of Aidan Foster-Carter, http://www.aidanfc.net/a_year_in_pyongyang.html], chapter 3, p. 6). [published in 2002 on the Internet Web site of Aidan Foster-Carter, http://www.aidanfc.net/a_year_in_pyongyang.html], chapter 3, p. 6).

3. "The claim of the Pyongyang regime to have attained the goal of 8 millionton grain production is belied by the prevalence of pellagra victims caused largely by malnutrition throughout North Korea. A shortage of food grains that forces the North Korean population to eat large quant.i.ties of maize with little intake of animal protein makes North Koreans vulnerable to the disease" (Lee Won-joon, "Changes in North Korea's Agricultural and Fishery Policies," "The claim of the Pyongyang regime to have attained the goal of 8 millionton grain production is belied by the prevalence of pellagra victims caused largely by malnutrition throughout North Korea. A shortage of food grains that forces the North Korean population to eat large quant.i.ties of maize with little intake of animal protein makes North Koreans vulnerable to the disease" (Lee Won-joon, "Changes in North Korea's Agricultural and Fishery Policies," Vantage Point Vantage Point [July 1979]: pp. 7, 9). Researchers in the American South found in 1937 that the missing substance in the diets of pellagra victims is not protein, per se, but the vitamin niacin, which is "plentiful in red meat, fish, poultry, green leafy vegetables and, as it happens, brewer's yeast" (Howard Markel, "The New Yorker Who Changed the Diet of the South, [July 1979]: pp. 7, 9). Researchers in the American South found in 1937 that the missing substance in the diets of pellagra victims is not protein, per se, but the vitamin niacin, which is "plentiful in red meat, fish, poultry, green leafy vegetables and, as it happens, brewer's yeast" (Howard Markel, "The New Yorker Who Changed the Diet of the South," New York Times, August 12, 2003, p. D5). August 12, 2003, p. D5).

4. Testimony of Kang Myong-do (see chap. 1, n. 7). Testimony of Kang Myong-do (see chap. 1, n. 7).

5. This interview took place August 20, 1992, in Honolulu. Recall the story of Chong Ki-hae, the returnee from j.a.pan whose new life in the North Korean "motherland" we chronicled in chapter 6. A reduction in the grain ration came in the early 1970s, Chong told me, confirming that part of Professor An's timeline. The cuts were described as "patriot rice" but explained as having been mandated by poor harvests. Farm districts had not been able to meet their harvest quotas, although they had This interview took place August 20, 1992, in Honolulu. Recall the story of Chong Ki-hae, the returnee from j.a.pan whose new life in the North Korean "motherland" we chronicled in chapter 6. A reduction in the grain ration came in the early 1970s, Chong told me, confirming that part of Professor An's timeline. The cuts were described as "patriot rice" but explained as having been mandated by poor harvests. Farm districts had not been able to meet their harvest quotas, although they had reported reported having met or exceeded them, Chong told me. having met or exceeded them, Chong told me.

6. I interviewed him on February 8, 1994, in Seoul. Ko told me he had been born on February 13, 1961, in Kimchaek City, an industrial city in North Hamgyong Province. I interviewed him on February 8, 1994, in Seoul. Ko told me he had been born on February 13, 1961, in Kimchaek City, an industrial city in North Hamgyong Province.

7. According to high-level defector Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, "As Kim Jong-il began to rise to power, North Korean leaders began to insist that the anti-j.a.panese partisan struggle led by Kim Il-sung took place over a wide area spanning Northeast China and the Korean peninsula rather than only in Northeast China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist party. North Korean leaders claimed that proof of this could be found all over North Korea in the form of 'slogan trees'-trees on which Kim Il-sung wrote anti-j.a.panese slogans such as Down with j.a.panese imperialism' and 'Long live Korean independence.' The idea probably came from stories told by independence fighters who recalled that while hiding in the forest they had stripped the bark off the trees to write slogans such as 'Long live Korean independence.' But strangely no such slogan trees According to high-level defector Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, "As Kim Jong-il began to rise to power, North Korean leaders began to insist that the anti-j.a.panese partisan struggle led by Kim Il-sung took place over a wide area spanning Northeast China and the Korean peninsula rather than only in Northeast China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist party. North Korean leaders claimed that proof of this could be found all over North Korea in the form of 'slogan trees'-trees on which Kim Il-sung wrote anti-j.a.panese slogans such as Down with j.a.panese imperialism' and 'Long live Korean independence.' The idea probably came from stories told by independence fighters who recalled that while hiding in the forest they had stripped the bark off the trees to write slogans such as 'Long live Korean independence.' But strangely no such slogan trees 'were 'were discovered in Northeast China, the main stage of the partisan struggle. The trees discovered in Northeast China, the main stage of the partisan struggle. The trees 'were 'were discovered only in North Korea, and over 10,000 of them at that. Back then, the partisan fighters most probably sent only one or two spies to the Korean peninsula at a time. And they would not have sent spies to northern Korea just to strip the bark off trees and discovered only in North Korea, and over 10,000 of them at that. Back then, the partisan fighters most probably sent only one or two spies to the Korean peninsula at a time. And they would not have sent spies to northern Korea just to strip the bark off trees and 'write 'write slogans on them. The spies would have been busy avoiding the watchful eyes of the j.a.panese police as they engaged in secretive intelligence work, so where on earth would they have found the time to strip the bark off trees and make the ink to slogans on them. The spies would have been busy avoiding the watchful eyes of the j.a.panese police as they engaged in secretive intelligence work, so where on earth would they have found the time to strip the bark off trees and make the ink to 'write 'write slogans on the trees with brushes?" This fabrication "was probably done through the Party History Center, a bureau in the central party under the personal supervision of Kim Jong-il," slogans on the trees with brushes?" This fabrication "was probably done through the Party History Center, a bureau in the central party under the personal supervision of Kim Jong-il," 'wrote 'wrote Hw.a.n.g. He acknowledged that he himself from 1987 had been in a supervisory position over the Party History Center. However, he said, "I did not involve myself in the Research Center projects. My duties stopped at reviewing the doc.u.ments and offering my opinion on current issues. Once I quietly asked a member of the Research Center, 'You say more than 700 slogan trees were discovered on the Moranbong in Pyongyang. But when we were schooling in Pyongyang we often climbed the Moranbong to have lunch, and we never saw any markings on the trees. Isn't the sudden discovery of hundreds of slogan trees going a bit too far?' To which the official answered, 'The slogan trees on Monanbong are different. The partisans did not strip the bark off them to write slogans with brushes but carved markings on them with knives as means of communicating with one another.' I was too flabbergasted to question him any further." Knowing that there were only about 60 Koreans in the Eighty-eighth Special Brigade, Hw.a.n.g wrote, "helps us deduce the size of the armed rebellion against j.a.panese rule. So how could so many people have climbed Moranbong and left communication signals on hundreds of trees?" (Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Hw.a.n.g. He acknowledged that he himself from 1987 had been in a supervisory position over the Party History Center. However, he said, "I did not involve myself in the Research Center projects. My duties stopped at reviewing the doc.u.ments and offering my opinion on current issues. Once I quietly asked a member of the Research Center, 'You say more than 700 slogan trees were discovered on the Moranbong in Pyongyang. But when we were schooling in Pyongyang we often climbed the Moranbong to have lunch, and we never saw any markings on the trees. Isn't the sudden discovery of hundreds of slogan trees going a bit too far?' To which the official answered, 'The slogan trees on Monanbong are different. The partisans did not strip the bark off them to write slogans with brushes but carved markings on them with knives as means of communicating with one another.' I was too flabbergasted to question him any further." Knowing that there were only about 60 Koreans in the Eighty-eighth Special Brigade, Hw.a.n.g wrote, "helps us deduce the size of the armed rebellion against j.a.panese rule. So how could so many people have climbed Moranbong and left communication signals on hundreds of trees?" (Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Problems of Human Rights [I] Problems of Human Rights [I] [see chap. 2, n. 1]). [see chap. 2, n. 1]).

8. I interviewed him on February 15, 1994, in Seoul. I interviewed him on February 15, 1994, in Seoul.

9. See "Summing Up of the 1970s," p. 16: "As north Korea declares the attainment of the goals with no statistical backing, its agricultural situation is hard to figure out. A clue to answering the agricultural question came when President Kim addressed a meeting of county-level responsible secretaries of the Party in October 1979. He was quoted as having said: The Juche farming method is faced with a limit and we should cultivate more land to produce more grains." See "Summing Up of the 1970s," p. 16: "As north Korea declares the attainment of the goals with no statistical backing, its agricultural situation is hard to figure out. A clue to answering the agricultural question came when President Kim addressed a meeting of county-level responsible secretaries of the Party in October 1979. He was quoted as having said: The Juche farming method is faced with a limit and we should cultivate more land to produce more grains."

10. I interviewed him on November 1, 1993. He told me he had been born on July 14, 1953, and had defected on May 2, 1991. I interviewed him on November 1, 1993. He told me he had been born on July 14, 1953, and had defected on May 2, 1991.

11. I interviewed him on February 17, 1994, in Seoul. I interviewed him on February 17, 1994, in Seoul.

22. Logging In and Logging Out.

1. See, for example, Giles Whittell, "Kim Sells Workers to Gulags in Debt Deal" (London: The Times, Aug. 6, 2001). See, for example, Giles Whittell, "Kim Sells Workers to Gulags in Debt Deal" (London: The Times, Aug. 6, 2001).

2. See Anatoly Medetsky "North Korea Seeks Closer Ties with Russian Far East," Vladivostok-datelined dispatch from the a.s.sociated Press, April See Anatoly Medetsky "North Korea Seeks Closer Ties with Russian Far East," Vladivostok-datelined dispatch from the a.s.sociated Press, April 4, 4, 2002; "North Korea Opens New Air Route to Russian Far East," Seoul-datelined Reuters dispatch, April 5, 2002; "North Koreans in Russian Far East," Khabarovsk-datelined article in 2002; "North Korea Opens New Air Route to Russian Far East," Seoul-datelined Reuters dispatch, April 5, 2002; "North Koreans in Russian Far East," Khabarovsk-datelined article in JoongAng Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, July 23, 2002. July 23, 2002.

23. Do You Remember That Time?

No notes.

24. Pickled Plum in a Lunch Box.

1. Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop on July 3, 2003, told South Korea's National a.s.sembly that he had heard about the testing directly from Kim Jong-il and Kim's aides. See "S. Korea Clears Top Defector for U.S. Visit," Reuters dispatch from Seoul, July 18, 2003. For an extensive chronology of the first nuclear crisis see "IAEA-North Korea: Nuclear Safeguards and Inspections" (Monterey Calif.: Monterey Inst.i.tute of International Studies, Center for Nuclear Studies, 2002), http://cns. miis.edu/research/korea/nuc/iaea7789.htm. Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop on July 3, 2003, told South Korea's National a.s.sembly that he had heard about the testing directly from Kim Jong-il and Kim's aides. See "S. Korea Clears Top Defector for U.S. Visit," Reuters dispatch from Seoul, July 18, 2003. For an extensive chronology of the first nuclear crisis see "IAEA-North Korea: Nuclear Safeguards and Inspections" (Monterey Calif.: Monterey Inst.i.tute of International Studies, Center for Nuclear Studies, 2002), http://cns. miis.edu/research/korea/nuc/iaea7789.htm.

2. I heard this pungent description from Katsumi Sato, the editor of I heard this pungent description from Katsumi Sato, the editor of Gendai Korea. Gendai Korea.

3. Testimony of Kang Myong-do (see chap. 2, n.7). When I interviewed Kang after his remarks had been published in Testimony of Kang Myong-do (see chap. 2, n.7). When I interviewed Kang after his remarks had been published in JoongAng Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, I asked him how he had known about the nuclear program. He replied that a Yongbyon official had told him. "We knew each other for about ten years. He's a close friend of my elder brother. Lots of high officials didn't know for sure about the nuclear program, but we were always curious. So I just casually asked him. I guess he never thought I'd defect." At the time I spoke with Kang, his a.s.sertions were getting little support from the South Korean and U.S. governments. There seemed to be a tendency both in Seoul and in Washington to play down the sophistication and productivity of the North Korean nuclear program. The fear seemed to be that acknowledgment that the North was well along in its program, with a number of nuclear weapons probably completed, would force a major policy reappraisal. "The South Koreans were afraid I'd say it again," Kang told me. "In fact, I believe totally in what I said." Kang indicated that he and his information had received something of a cold shoulder from the Americans- because, he presumed, Washington had not thought it politic to come out and say that North Korea already had a functioning nuclear weapons program. Before defecting to South Korea he had made contact with U.S. officials, he said. "I went to the U.S. Emba.s.sy in Germany and turned over a letter I had written to President Bill Clinton, offering policy recommendations on the nuclear issue. But I had to wait a couple of days before someone in the U.S. government came to talk with me. Since the Americans were in talks with Pyongyang at the time, I thought maybe they were sending me back to North Korea. The U.S. wanted to say that the North did not have nuclear weapons at that time. I know that the Americans know better, know that there are in fact nuclear weapons in North Korea." I asked him how he had known about the nuclear program. He replied that a Yongbyon official had told him. "We knew each other for about ten years. He's a close friend of my elder brother. Lots of high officials didn't know for sure about the nuclear program, but we were always curious. So I just casually asked him. I guess he never thought I'd defect." At the time I spoke with Kang, his a.s.sertions were getting little support from the South Korean and U.S. governments. There seemed to be a tendency both in Seoul and in Washington to play down the sophistication and productivity of the North Korean nuclear program. The fear seemed to be that acknowledgment that the North was well along in its program, with a number of nuclear weapons probably completed, would force a major policy reappraisal. "The South Koreans were afraid I'd say it again," Kang told me. "In fact, I believe totally in what I said." Kang indicated that he and his information had received something of a cold shoulder from the Americans- because, he presumed, Washington had not thought it politic to come out and say that North Korea already had a functioning nuclear weapons program. Before defecting to South Korea he had made contact with U.S. officials, he said. "I went to the U.S. Emba.s.sy in Germany and turned over a letter I had written to President Bill Clinton, offering policy recommendations on the nuclear issue. But I had to wait a couple of days before someone in the U.S. government came to talk with me. Since the Americans were in talks with Pyongyang at the time, I thought maybe they were sending me back to North Korea. The U.S. wanted to say that the North did not have nuclear weapons at that time. I know that the Americans know better, know that there are in fact nuclear weapons in North Korea."

4. See "Nuclear Jitters, See "Nuclear Jitters," Newsweek, April 29, 1991. April 29, 1991.

5. Defector Ahn Hyuk, a former table tennis champion, noted in an interview that Kanemaru was taken to Kim Il-sung's most lavish villa, Hamneun Majeonho, near the seaside. "There are a couple of buildings there, one for Kim Il-sung and one for his guest. About an hour before Kanemaru awoke each day, Kim Il-sung would go to the front of his building and walk around, waiting. Kanemaru was really snowed by Kim's eagerness." (Ahn a.s.serted that Kanemaru was not the only foreign visitor of whom Kim made a fool. Billy Graham, the American evangelical preacher, "also succ.u.mbed to all that pampering. Kim Il-sung probably was being kind to him in order to get some Christian donations funneled to North Korea.") Kim Il-sung around that time was publishing his memoirs, laced with accounts of j.a.panese bad behavior. He recalled, for example, that when Koreans in 1930s .Manchuria, faced with j.a.panese "punitive" campaigns, fled to the hills, even a baby's cry could give them away to the enemy. One woman hugged her baby too hard to keep it from crying; when the enemy withdrew, she found it was dead. "To avoid such accidents, some women used to dose their babies with opium to keep them fast asleep. Unable to endure the ceaseless atrocities perpetrated by the 'punitive' troops, some women even gave their beloved babies to strangers. ... Bourgeois humanists may mock the maternal love of communists, asking how a woman could be so cruel towards her baby or be so irresponsible with its life. But they must not hold these women responsible for the deaths of their infants. If they knew how many bitter tears were shed as these women buried the soft bodies of their babies in dry leaves and left their babies in the care of strangers, they would condemn and hate the j.a.panese imperialist who sent their human butchers to Jiandao. The crime of trampling upon the maternal love of this country's women was committed by none other than the fiends of j.a.panese militarism. If she is to make amends for her past, j.a.pan must repent of these crimes. ... In demanding evidence of their past crimes, the rulers of j.a.pan continue to mock the memory of millions of Koreans who were slaughtered by their army" Defector Ahn Hyuk, a former table tennis champion, noted in an interview that Kanemaru was taken to Kim Il-sung's most lavish villa, Hamneun Majeonho, near the seaside. "There are a couple of buildings there, one for Kim Il-sung and one for his guest. About an hour before Kanemaru awoke each day, Kim Il-sung would go to the front of his building and walk around, waiting. Kanemaru was really snowed by Kim's eagerness." (Ahn a.s.serted that Kanemaru was not the only foreign visitor of whom Kim made a fool. Billy Graham, the American evangelical preacher, "also succ.u.mbed to all that pampering. Kim Il-sung probably was being kind to him in order to get some Christian donations funneled to North Korea.") Kim Il-sung around that time was publishing his memoirs, laced with accounts of j.a.panese bad behavior. He recalled, for example, that when Koreans in 1930s .Manchuria, faced with j.a.panese "punitive" campaigns, fled to the hills, even a baby's cry could give them away to the enemy. One woman hugged her baby too hard to keep it from crying; when the enemy withdrew, she found it was dead. "To avoid such accidents, some women used to dose their babies with opium to keep them fast asleep. Unable to endure the ceaseless atrocities perpetrated by the 'punitive' troops, some women even gave their beloved babies to strangers. ... Bourgeois humanists may mock the maternal love of communists, asking how a woman could be so cruel towards her baby or be so irresponsible with its life. But they must not hold these women responsible for the deaths of their infants. If they knew how many bitter tears were shed as these women buried the soft bodies of their babies in dry leaves and left their babies in the care of strangers, they would condemn and hate the j.a.panese imperialist who sent their human butchers to Jiandao. The crime of trampling upon the maternal love of this country's women was committed by none other than the fiends of j.a.panese militarism. If she is to make amends for her past, j.a.pan must repent of these crimes. ... In demanding evidence of their past crimes, the rulers of j.a.pan continue to mock the memory of millions of Koreans who were slaughtered by their army" (With the Century, (With the Century, vol. 3 [see chap. 2, n. 2], pp. 1415). vol. 3 [see chap. 2, n. 2], pp. 1415).

6. While hardliners such as that official may have continued to hope for a quick collapse of the Kim regime, many other South Koreans had replaced that wish with caution born of observing the rocky road Germany had been treading. There seemed to be more South Koreans who would be happy enough to see a military government take over in North Korea and emulate the period of rapid economic development that the South had experienced under its own military government. That could bring the North more into the world that the South knew and reduce the ultimate burden to the South whenever the two might merge. While hardliners such as that official may have continued to hope for a quick collapse of the Kim regime, many other South Koreans had replaced that wish with caution born of observing the rocky road Germany had been treading. There seemed to be more South Koreans who would be happy enough to see a military government take over in North Korea and emulate the period of rapid economic development that the South had experienced under its own military government. That could bring the North more into the world that the South knew and reduce the ultimate burden to the South whenever the two might merge.

7. j.a.panese officials in two of those agencies confirmed that Americans briefed them but declined to comment on details including dates and who the briefers were. j.a.panese officials in two of those agencies confirmed that Americans briefed them but declined to comment on details including dates and who the briefers were.

8. Address by Korea University Professor (later South Korean foreign minister) Han Sung-joo at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of j.a.pan, Tokyo, May 12, 1992. Address by Korea University Professor (later South Korean foreign minister) Han Sung-joo at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of j.a.pan, Tokyo, May 12, 1992.

9. See Don Oberdorfer, See Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Ma.s.s.: Addison-Wesley 1997), pp. 260271. Oberdorfer, a former (Reading, Ma.s.s.: Addison-Wesley 1997), pp. 260271. Oberdorfer, a former Washington Post Washington Post diplomatic correspondent, offers in chapters 11, 12 and 13 a detailed account of diplomacy concerning the North's nuclear weapons, based on his interviews with partic.i.p.ants and doc.u.ments he obtained by invoking the Freedom of Information Act. A more recent work by three partic.i.p.ants is Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman and Robert L. Gallucci, diplomatic correspondent, offers in chapters 11, 12 and 13 a detailed account of diplomacy concerning the North's nuclear weapons, based on his interviews with partic.i.p.ants and doc.u.ments he obtained by invoking the Freedom of Information Act. A more recent work by three partic.i.p.ants is Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C: Brookings Inst.i.tution Press, 2004). (Washington, D.C: Brookings Inst.i.tution Press, 2004).

25. I Die, You Die.

1. "Seven N.K. Defectors Go Missing Over Two-Year Period: Daily," Yonhap news agency, February 15, 2002, FBIS doc.u.ment i.d. 0grscgs02ah5r9. "Seven N.K. Defectors Go Missing Over Two-Year Period: Daily," Yonhap news agency, February 15, 2002, FBIS doc.u.ment i.d. 0grscgs02ah5r9.

26. Yen for the Motherland.

1. The interview was conducted in April 1989. The interview was conducted in April 1989.

27. Winds of Temptation May Blow.

1. Bradley K. Martin, "Why South Korea Favors Propping Up the North," Bradley K. Martin, "Why South Korea Favors Propping Up the North," Global Finance Global Finance (July 1992): pp. (July 1992): pp. 4447. 4447.

2. Korea Times Korea Times (Seoul), November 26, 1992, p. 9, citing a report by Korea Trade Promotion Corp. (KOTRA). North Korea does not release trade statistics. The KOTRA figures are compilations of two-way trade data from sixty-one countries. North Korea's global exports dropped 24.8 percent and imports 9.9 percent for 1991, according to a KOTRA report cited in (Seoul), November 26, 1992, p. 9, citing a report by Korea Trade Promotion Corp. (KOTRA). North Korea does not release trade statistics. The KOTRA figures are compilations of two-way trade data from sixty-one countries. North Korea's global exports dropped 24.8 percent and imports 9.9 percent for 1991, according to a KOTRA report cited in Korea Times Korea Times for November 20, 1992, p. 9. for November 20, 1992, p. 9.

3. Unnamed South Korean officials estimated that the North Korean economy had shrunken by 3.7 percent in 1990, 5.2 percent in 1991 and about 5 percent in 1992, according to a report in Unnamed South Korean officials estimated that the North Korean economy had shrunken by 3.7 percent in 1990, 5.2 percent in 1991 and about 5 percent in 1992, according to a report in Korea Times, Korea Times, January 8, 1993, p. 9. More alarming still was a Kyodo News Service report January 8, 1993, p. 9. More alarming still was a Kyodo News Service report (j.a.pan Times, (j.a.pan Times, April 1, 1993) datelined Beijing, which indirectly quoted "reports compiled by East European and Russian diplomats in Pyongyang" as saying the shrinkage in 1992 might have amounted to 30 percent. April 1, 1993) datelined Beijing, which indirectly quoted "reports compiled by East European and Russian diplomats in Pyongyang" as saying the shrinkage in 1992 might have amounted to 30 percent.

4. While North Korea claimed to have produced between eight and nine million tons of food grains in 1991, Russian experts estimated actual production at five million tons, according to Marina Trigubenko, director of the Asia Research Center at the Russian Academy of Sciences. At a seminar sponsored by Seoul's Korea Rural Economic Inst.i.tute, Trigubenko said the North would have a hard time feeding its 21 million people even with its programs to control population growth and reclaim some 300,000 hectares for farming While North Korea claimed to have produced between eight and nine million tons of food grains in 1991, Russian experts estimated actual production at five million tons, according to Marina Trigubenko, director of the Asia Research Center at the Russian Academy of Sciences. At a seminar sponsored by Seoul's Korea Rural Economic Inst.i.tute, Trigubenko said the North would have a hard time feeding its 21 million people even with its programs to control population growth and reclaim some 300,000 hectares for farming (Korea Times, (Korea Times, October 30, 1992). October 30, 1992).

5. Korea Times, Korea Times, October 23, 1992. October 23, 1992.

6. Conversation with a European investor, 1992. Conversation with a European investor, 1992.

7. A South Korean a.n.a.lyst observed in 1987 that as older men A South Korean a.n.a.lyst observed in 1987 that as older men 'were 'were forced out of high military posts, their replacements tended to be Mangyongdae alumni, such as general staff chief Oh Guk-ryol; his deputy, Kim Gw.a.n.g-hwan; navy chief of staff Kim Il-chol; Lieutenant Generals Choe Song-wuk and Li bong-won, party military commission members; and Kim Du-nam, director of the party military bureau. Other Mangyongdae alumni who did well as the junior Kim's power increased were Kim Hwan, who became a party politburo member; Paek Hak-rim, minister of public security; Pak Yong-suk, a party bureau director; Yun Gi-jong, party finance bureau director; and several provincial party chiefs (Yoo Sok-ryol, "The Rise of Kim Jong-il and the Heir-succession problem," pt. II, forced out of high military posts, their replacements tended to be Mangyongdae alumni, such as general staff chief Oh Guk-ryol; his deputy, Kim Gw.a.n.g-hwan; navy chief of staff Kim Il-chol; Lieutenant Generals Choe Song-wuk and Li bong-won, party military commission members; and Kim Du-nam, director of the party military bureau. Other Mangyongdae alumni who did well as the junior Kim's power increased were Kim Hwan, who became a party politburo member; Paek Hak-rim, minister of public security; Pak Yong-suk, a party bureau director; Yun Gi-jong, party finance bureau director; and several provincial party chiefs (Yoo Sok-ryol, "The Rise of Kim Jong-il and the Heir-succession problem," pt. II, Vantage Point Vantage Point [December 1987]: p. 8). [December 1987]: p. 8).

8. Yoo Sok-ryol, Yoo Sok-ryol, True Story of Kim Jong Il True Story of Kim Jong Il (see chap. 3, n. 61), p. 11. (see chap. 3, n. 61), p. 11.

9. Ibid. Ibid.

10. Han spoke at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of j.a.pan on May 22, 1992. In 1978 South Korean scholar Chae Pyung-il had written, "(N)orth Korean society, moving into the welfare-distribution era, cannot escape from the liberal movement-liberalism by Communist standards. The emergence of the new generation in high government posts as well as the growing number of technical-managerial specialists in production units is bringing about new organizational behavior in North Korean society. .Many though not all, of the new generation have become more realistic, often pragmatic" (Chay Pyung-gil, "The Policy Directions of the North Korea Regime," Han spoke at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of j.a.pan on May 22, 1992. In 1978 South Korean scholar Chae Pyung-il had written, "(N)orth Korean society, moving into the welfare-distribution era, cannot escape from the liberal movement-liberalism by Communist standards. The emergence of the new generation in high government posts as well as the growing number of technical-managerial specialists in production units is bringing about new organizational behavior in North Korean society. .Many though not all, of the new generation have become more realistic, often pragmatic" (Chay Pyung-gil, "The Policy Directions of the North Korea Regime," Vantage Point Vantage Point [November 1978]: p. 13). [November 1978]: p. 13).

11. Kim Dal-hyon was in charge of the External Economic Commission at the time of our visit. In a cabinet reshuffle on December 11, 1992, he retained his deputy premier's rank and was given the chair of the State Planning Commission. Premier Yon Hyon-muk was replaced by Kang Song-san, who had been premier once before, from 1984 to 1986. Viewed as a reformer, Kang had governed North Hamgyong Province as chief secretary in the interim following his first stint as premier and recently had pushed the plan for a special economic zone in the Tumen River area, which is part of that province (Reuters report, Kim Dal-hyon was in charge of the External Economic Commission at the time of our visit. In a cabinet reshuffle on December 11, 1992, he retained his deputy premier's rank and was given the chair of the State Planning Commission. Premier Yon Hyon-muk was replaced by Kang Song-san, who had been premier once before, from 1984 to 1986. Viewed as a reformer, Kang had governed North Hamgyong Province as chief secretary in the interim following his first stint as premier and recently had pushed the plan for a special economic zone in the Tumen River area, which is part of that province (Reuters report, Korea Herald, Korea Herald, December 12, 1992; Agence France-Presse and Yonhap reports, December 12, 1992; Agence France-Presse and Yonhap reports, Korea Times, Korea Times, December 12, 1992). December 12, 1992).

12. I later heard that this sort of virtuoso show of memory and comprehensive thinking at a press conference had been highly thought of among officials in the former Soviet Union. I later heard that this sort of virtuoso show of memory and comprehensive thinking at a press conference had been highly thought of among officials in the former Soviet Union.

13. Korea Times, Korea Times, October 21, 1992. October 21, 1992.

14. Korea Herald, Korea Herald, March 13, 1993. March 13, 1993.

15. In a lecture on "The Unified German Economy and Its Implications on a Unified Korean Economy" delivered at Seoul's Research Inst.i.tute for National Unification, August 26, 1992, World Bank Chief Economist Lawrence H. Summers observed, "There is a political dynamic that was unfortunate for gradual reform in East Germany and is in North Korea. Namely, there was a reason for Poland to exist quite apart from its being communist. There was no reason for East Germany to exist except for its being communist. There is no reason for North Korea to exist except for the fact that it is communist. That is why East Germany stayed harder-line longer than Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia despite the blandishments of significant amounts of financial a.s.sistance from West Germany and that is why I suspect North Korea is unlikely to make a move toward a market system." In a lecture on "The Unified German Economy and Its Implications on a Unified Korean Economy" delivered at Seoul's Research Inst.i.tute for National Unification, August 26, 1992, World Bank Chief Economist Lawrence H. Summers observed, "There is a political dynamic that was unfortunate for gradual reform in East Germany and is in North Korea. Namely, there was a reason for Poland to exist quite apart from its being communist. There was no reason for East Germany to exist except for its being communist. There is no reason for North Korea to exist except for the fact that it is communist. That is why East Germany stayed harder-line longer than Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia despite the blandishments of significant amounts of financial a.s.sistance from West Germany and that is why I suspect North Korea is unlikely to make a move toward a market system."

16. Kim, Kim, With the Century With the Century (see chap. 2, n. 2), vol. 3, p. 221. (see chap. 2, n. 2), vol. 3, p. 221.

17. Pyongyang had long championed a federal system as a stage in reunification. The developments in Germany, if anything, hardened the North's demand that Korean reunification permit maintenance of separate political-economic-social systems in North and South. Pyongyang had long championed a federal system as a stage in reunification. The developments in Germany, if anything, hardened the North's demand that Korean reunification permit maintenance of separate political-economic-social systems in North and South.

18. It was picked up and rebroadcast on South Korea's KBS, October 23, 1992. It was picked up and rebroadcast on South Korea's KBS, October 23, 1992.

19. International Herald Tribune, International Herald Tribune, January 29, 1993, p. 3. Aidan Foster-Carter ("Korea's Coming Reunification: Another East Asian Superpower?" published by The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, April 1992) estimated Seoul would need to come up with $9$10 billion to invest in the merger each year for a decade, plus $6$16 billion a year in subsidies. January 29, 1993, p. 3. Aidan Foster-Carter ("Korea's Coming Reunification: Another East Asian Superpower?" published by The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, April 1992) estimated Seoul would need to come up with $9$10 billion to invest in the merger each year for a decade, plus $6$16 billion a year in subsidies.

20. Reported Reported in Korea Times, in Korea Times, Yonhap dispatch, August 18, 1991. Yonhap dispatch, August 18, 1991.

21. South Korean government estimates for 1991 are $6,498 and $1,064, respectively. South Korean government estimates for 1991 are $6,498 and $1,064, respectively. Korea Annual 1992 Korea Annual 1992 (Seoul: Yonhap News Agency), pp. 177, 276. (Seoul: Yonhap News Agency), pp. 177, 276.

22. Korea Times, Korea Times, January 29, 1993. January 29, 1993.

23. In a campaign appearance December 3, Chung told a group of Korean journalists he would become a "unification" president, using the Souths economic superiority to push inter-Korean exchange and, within five years, absorb the North into the Souths free-market economy In a campaign appearance December 3, Chung told a group of Korean journalists he would become a "unification" president, using the Souths economic superiority to push inter-Korean exchange and, within five years, absorb the North into the Souths free-market economy (Korea Herald, (Korea Herald, December 4, 1992, p. 2). December 4, 1992, p. 2).

24. The South Korean press in January 1993 quoted an unnamed government source as saying North Korea was planning "investment fairs" in Minneapolis and other major American cities, targeted mainly at ethnic Korean investors The South Korean press in January 1993 quoted an unnamed government source as saying North Korea was planning "investment fairs" in Minneapolis and other major American cities, targeted mainly at ethnic Korean investors (Korea Times, (Korea Times, January 26, 1993). January 26, 1993).

28. Sea of Fire.

1. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 1, p. 12 (see chap. 2, n. 2). vol. 1, p. 12 (see chap. 2, n. 2).

2. Kim Dong-hyeon, Choi Hong-yeol, and Lee Cheong, "Testimony of 1st Lt. Lim Yong-son, who had distributed antiKim Il-sung pamphlets and escaped from North Korea in August 1993," Kim Dong-hyeon, Choi Hong-yeol, and Lee Cheong, "Testimony of 1st Lt. Lim Yong-son, who had distributed antiKim Il-sung pamphlets and escaped from North Korea in August 1993," Wolgan Choson, Wolgan Choson, 1993. 1993.

3. Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Problems of Human Rights (2) Problems of Human Rights (2) (see chap. 6, n. 104). (see chap. 6, n. 104).

4. Ibid. Ibid.

5. Korea Times, Korea Times, February 3, 1993, p. 9. February 3, 1993, p. 9.

6. Quote of unnamed partic.i.p.ant provided by Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency, picked up by Agence France-Presse and carried in Quote of unnamed partic.i.p.ant provided by Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency, picked up by Agence France-Presse and carried in Korea Times, Korea Times, March 18, 1993. March 18, 1993.

7. Lee Chong-guk was interviewed also by the j.a.panese weekly Lee Chong-guk was interviewed also by the j.a.panese weekly Shukan Post Shukan Post for an article that appeared in the June 3, 1994, issue. When I interviewed him he confirmed the information in that article. for an article that appeared in the June 3, 1994, issue. When I interviewed him he confirmed the information in that article.

A skeptical a.n.a.lysis of North Korea's chemical warfare ability may be found on pp. 129130 of Selig Harrison's Korean Endgame Korean Endgame (see chap. 8, n. 3). (see chap. 8, n. 3).

8. Jon Halliday and Bruce c.u.mings, Jon Halliday and Bruce c.u.mings, Korea: The Unknown War Korea: The Unknown War (see chap. 4, n. 60), pp. 214217, sum up reasons why the North Koreans would feel themselves on the defensive. (see chap. 4, n. 60), pp. 214217, sum up reasons why the North Koreans would feel themselves on the defensive.

9. Whether he did or not, "it's his game to win or lose," as Han Sung-joo, South Korea's foreign minister, said in an appearance at the Seoul Foreign Correspondents' Club on March 18, five days after the North's announcement. Whether he did or not, "it's his game to win or lose," as Han Sung-joo, South Korea's foreign minister, said in an appearance at the Seoul Foreign Correspondents' Club on March 18, five days after the North's announcement.

10. Agence France-Presse dispatch, Agence France-Presse dispatch, Korea Times, Korea Times, March 3, 1993. March 3, 1993.

11. Choe Pyong-gil, "Yu Song-chol's Testimony" (see chap. 2, n. 18). Choe Pyong-gil, "Yu Song-chol's Testimony" (see chap. 2, n. 18).

12. In his March 18 appearance at the Seoul Foreign Correspondents' Club. In his March 18 appearance at the Seoul Foreign Correspondents' Club.

13. Reuters dispatch, Reuters dispatch, j.a.pan Times, j.a.pan Times, April 1, 1993. April 1, 1993.

14. Kennedy discussed the concept in an interview reported in a Reuters article Kennedy discussed the concept in an interview reported in a Reuters article (Korea Herald, (Korea Herald, March 2, 1993) about his new book, March 2, 1993) about his new book, Preparing for the 21st Century. Preparing for the 21st Century.

15. One diplomat from a former Soviet-bloc country told the author that Deputy Premier Kim Dal-hyon, a relative of the ruling family, had received his chemistry training in Romania-where, ironically, one of his teachers was Elena Ceausescu. One diplomat from a former Soviet-bloc country told the author that Deputy Premier Kim Dal-hyon, a relative of the ruling family, had received his chemistry training in Romania-where, ironically, one of his teachers was Elena Ceausescu.

16. a.s.sociated Press dispatch from Tokyo quoting Korean Central News Agency a.s.sociated Press dispatch from Tokyo quoting Korean Central News Agency Korea Times, Korea Times, March 23, 1993. March 23, 1993.

17. Vladimir Ivanov, a Russian expert, cautioned in a July 1992 conversation that Washington would be mistaken to push for the collapse of the North Korean regime-a policy that he felt could invite a military response from Pyongyang. A fellow at Harvard's Center for International Affairs, Ivanov recommended that American policy makers encourage the youthful, reformist elements in North Korea. He estimated that only about 10 percent of the elite were dyed-in-the-wool Kim Il-sung loyalists. Of the remaining 90 percent, half-the old-were irrelevant, he said. "A policy attacking the 10 percent fanatics hurts the 45 percent young elite," people who could be reformists, Ivanov said. One caveat is that Ivanov spoke from the perspective of someone who had lived through the fall of the Soviet Union. Cynicism among the Soviet elite had been rife. Vladimir Ivanov, a Russian expert, cautioned in a July 1992 conversation that Washington would be mistaken to push for the collapse of the North Korean regime-a policy that he felt could invite a military response from Pyongyang. A fellow at Harvard's Center for International Affairs, Ivanov recommended that American policy makers encourage the youthful, reformist elements in North Korea. He estimated that only about 10 percent of the elite were dyed-in-the-wool Kim Il-sung loyalists. Of the remaining 90 percent, half-the old-were irrelevant, he said. "A policy attacking the 10 percent fanatics hurts the 45 percent young elite," people who could be reformists, Ivanov said. One caveat is that Ivanov spoke from the perspective of someone who had lived through the fall of the Soviet Union. Cynicism among the Soviet elite had been rife.

18. See "Interview of Former High-level Official" (see chap. 6, n. 88) in which Kim Jong-min, interviewed under a pseudonym, said: See "Interview of Former High-level Official" (see chap. 6, n. 88) in which Kim Jong-min, interviewed under a pseudonym, said: "North Korea's elite or economic experts view South Korea's economic development as the result of President Park Chung-hee's efforts. They view the Park period as being very significant."

Q. On what basis do they arrive at that conclusion?

A. "There is a publication in North Korea ent.i.tled 'Secret Communication' [pitongsin]. [pitongsin]. Cadre who receive this know most of what is going on concerning South Korean politics. 'Secret Communication' carries South Korean broadcasts or newspaper articles without any doctoring. Cadre who receive this know most of what is going on concerning South Korean politics. 'Secret Communication' carries South Korean broadcasts or newspaper articles without any doctoring.

"Those who receive and read 'Secret Communication' range from cadre who are subject to ratification by the secretariat down to unit responsible persons. Provincial party level responsible secretaries are known to receive this publication as well. It is delivered daily, and is turned back in after being read. The contents are primarily South Korean top news stories as well as international political issues."

Q. Do experts a.n.a.lyze economic policies of the Park Chung-hee era?

A. "Of course, individually they interpret them as they like; however, no one dares talk about it in public. Even when I was in North Korea, there were some who individually liked President Park Chung-hee. They even listened to his speeches."