In another Vietnam-era a.n.a.lysis, Frank Baldwin asked (Without Parallel, (Without Parallel, pp. 1516), "What would have happened in Korea if the United States had not intervened?" His answer: "The war would have been over in two or three weeks with total casualties of perhaps less than 50,000. Several million people opposed to communism would have come under communist rule and probably, but not certainly, there would have been reprisals. A single communist Korean state would have been established, the unity of a millennium restored, and national energies immediately directed to urgent economic and social reconstruction." Baldwin listed negative consequences of the Korean War, including: "a very costly commitment to South Korea's security, reversal of the tentative policy of accommodation with the People's Republic of China and the subsequent twenty years of hostility to China, domestic mobilization and the creation of a garrison economy (Pentagon capitalism). ... The United States intervention prolonged the war by more than three years, bringing an estimated 4.5 million Korean, Chinese and American casualties. The United States achieved its objective of keeping the Southern half of the peninsula non-communist, but the Koreans remain divided almost three decades later." pp. 1516), "What would have happened in Korea if the United States had not intervened?" His answer: "The war would have been over in two or three weeks with total casualties of perhaps less than 50,000. Several million people opposed to communism would have come under communist rule and probably, but not certainly, there would have been reprisals. A single communist Korean state would have been established, the unity of a millennium restored, and national energies immediately directed to urgent economic and social reconstruction." Baldwin listed negative consequences of the Korean War, including: "a very costly commitment to South Korea's security, reversal of the tentative policy of accommodation with the People's Republic of China and the subsequent twenty years of hostility to China, domestic mobilization and the creation of a garrison economy (Pentagon capitalism). ... The United States intervention prolonged the war by more than three years, bringing an estimated 4.5 million Korean, Chinese and American casualties. The United States achieved its objective of keeping the Southern half of the peninsula non-communist, but the Koreans remain divided almost three decades later."

51. Halliday and c.u.mings, Halliday and c.u.mings, Korea, Korea, p. 204. A photo caption (p. 209) reads, "Kim Il-Sung and Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi, November 1958. The manifest contrast in personalities does not explain the different responses that the two leaders and the two revolutions evoked in the West. Yet the two wars had much in common, including the same enemy" p. 204. A photo caption (p. 209) reads, "Kim Il-Sung and Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi, November 1958. The manifest contrast in personalities does not explain the different responses that the two leaders and the two revolutions evoked in the West. Yet the two wars had much in common, including the same enemy"

Compare McCormack's argument quite a few years later that the character of the Communist Party of Vietnam "has long been completely different from that of North Korea. Leninist and authoritarian, to be sure, but even during the life of Ho Chi Minh the cult of the personality was abjured, and after his death in 1969, a collective leadership brought the nation to victory in the war against the United States without resort to the dismal monolithicity of opinion so vaunted in North Korea" ("Kim Country").

One might argue, further, that the contrast between the personalities of the two leaders alone was sufficiently stark to explain the different responses of many Americans. While Kim Il-sung might have sought since the 1930s to emulate the Indochinese leader, in the end he was no Ho Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh did not purge his colleagues; he won wars-instead of losing them and then concocting elaborate lies to pretend he had won them; he was a man of "goodness and simplicity" (see David Halberstam, Ho Ho [New York: Random House, 1971], especially pp. 1417; 42). [New York: Random House, 1971], especially pp. 1417; 42).

52. Baldwin, Baldwin, Without Parallel, Without Parallel, pp. 2324. pp. 2324.

53. From the "Statement of Purpose" of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, adopted March 2830, 1969, in Boston. The group sought "to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression and imperialism." The committee reportedly argued in 1970 (this according to op-ed contributor Stephen B. Young, "Vietnam War: Washington Was Right" From the "Statement of Purpose" of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, adopted March 2830, 1969, in Boston. The group sought "to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression and imperialism." The committee reportedly argued in 1970 (this according to op-ed contributor Stephen B. Young, "Vietnam War: Washington Was Right" [The Wall Street Journal, [The Wall Street Journal, November 13, 1995, p. 6]; I have not found the original source doc.u.ment) that "communism has generally proved itself dynamic and viable in developing nations." Regarding North Korea, that was a defensible argument in 1970. November 13, 1995, p. 6]; I have not found the original source doc.u.ment) that "communism has generally proved itself dynamic and viable in developing nations." Regarding North Korea, that was a defensible argument in 1970.

54. Baldwin, Baldwin, Without Parallel, Without Parallel, pp. 3132. pp. 3132.

55. Ibid., p. 35. Ibid., p. 35.

56. Journalists and other writers who visited the North got encouragement for such logic from North Korean officials. The officials made it very clear that if they should judge one's work unfair, one would not be welcome back in the country. Quite a few reporters failed the test and never Journalists and other writers who visited the North got encouragement for such logic from North Korean officials. The officials made it very clear that if they should judge one's work unfair, one would not be welcome back in the country. Quite a few reporters failed the test and never 'were 'were permitted to return. On the other hand, the officials were understandably pleased that several reporters and researchers who visited North Korea returned home to write almost unremittingly glowing accounts of the brave new world they had witnessed there. I think, for example, of a pair of Tokyo-based researcher-activists who campaigning for U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea and reconciliation with the North. I have lost my copy of their report for an American church group of a 1980 North Korea visit (they likewise misplaced their only copy as I learned when I contacted them in 2003); but I clearly recall reading it at the time with a feeling of amazement that so little about the country seemed to have troubled them. permitted to return. On the other hand, the officials were understandably pleased that several reporters and researchers who visited North Korea returned home to write almost unremittingly glowing accounts of the brave new world they had witnessed there. I think, for example, of a pair of Tokyo-based researcher-activists who campaigning for U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea and reconciliation with the North. I have lost my copy of their report for an American church group of a 1980 North Korea visit (they likewise misplaced their only copy as I learned when I contacted them in 2003); but I clearly recall reading it at the time with a feeling of amazement that so little about the country seemed to have troubled them.

However, sympathy with the North Koreans' revolutionary society did not always or necessarily translate into unstinting praise of the regime. As Frank Baldwin noted, "the apparently totalitarian controls and the personality cult of Kim Il-sung left even empathetic foreign observers puzzled and ambivalent about North Korea" (Without Parallel, (Without Parallel, p. 31). p. 31).

8. Flowers of His Great Love Are Blooming.

1. Scalapino and Lee, Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea Communism in Korea (see chap. 2, n. 28), p. (see chap. 2, n. 28), p. 677. 677.

2. "Very recently, some reduction of military expenditures appears to have been undertaken" in the North, Scalapino and Lee wrote just after the joint communique appeared (p. 684). They argued however (pp. 678679) that "current North Korean policy does not represent an abandonment of past pledges to liberate' the South. In intent, at least, the shift is a tactical one, with greater emphasis to be placed in the immediate future upon a political-diplomatic offensive designed to put the [Park Chung-hee] government on the defensive with its own people by making a strenuous bid for the 'peace, unification and national independence' vote in the South. Thus, the Communists advance a liberal exchange program, advocate substantial military reductions, emphasize peaceful unification, and focus attention upon getting rid of the American presence in South Korea. All available evidence suggests that Kim Il-song hopes to utilize the new era to penetrate the South more deeply politically, setting aside military efforts at this point. If this accords with the present international environment, it also accords ... with the current needs of the North-where intensive militarization and extreme tension had reached a point of greatly diminished returns. Secure in the control of their own society, with a complete monopoly of organization and media in the North, the Communists hope to cultivate 'people to people' relations so as to exploit the looser, more open political system of the South. Already they have caused a considerable tightening of the latter system in response." "Very recently, some reduction of military expenditures appears to have been undertaken" in the North, Scalapino and Lee wrote just after the joint communique appeared (p. 684). They argued however (pp. 678679) that "current North Korean policy does not represent an abandonment of past pledges to liberate' the South. In intent, at least, the shift is a tactical one, with greater emphasis to be placed in the immediate future upon a political-diplomatic offensive designed to put the [Park Chung-hee] government on the defensive with its own people by making a strenuous bid for the 'peace, unification and national independence' vote in the South. Thus, the Communists advance a liberal exchange program, advocate substantial military reductions, emphasize peaceful unification, and focus attention upon getting rid of the American presence in South Korea. All available evidence suggests that Kim Il-song hopes to utilize the new era to penetrate the South more deeply politically, setting aside military efforts at this point. If this accords with the present international environment, it also accords ... with the current needs of the North-where intensive militarization and extreme tension had reached a point of greatly diminished returns. Secure in the control of their own society, with a complete monopoly of organization and media in the North, the Communists hope to cultivate 'people to people' relations so as to exploit the looser, more open political system of the South. Already they have caused a considerable tightening of the latter system in response."

3. Selig S. Harrison argues on pp. 118119 of Selig S. Harrison argues on pp. 118119 of Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002) that the "danger of a war triggered by 'misunderstanding and inadvertence' has been magnified by a basic transformation that has taken place in Operations Plan 5027, the Pentagon's official scenario for the conduct of any new conflict in Korea. During the first decades after the 1953 armistice, Op Plan 5027 envisaged a replay of the Korean War. The United States and South Korea had a limited objective: repelling a North Korean invasion and reestablishing the DMZ at the thirty-eighth parallel. In this defensive strategy, Seoul was to be evacuated. American and South Korean forces would pull back in phases to the Han River, which bisects the capital. In 1973, however, the United States proclaimed a new "Forward Defense" concept in which U.S. forces would seize Kaesong, a key North Korean city close to the DMZ, while round-the-clock B-52 strikes would stop a North Korean advance north of Seoul, ending the war in nine days. In response to this new strategy and the accompanying forward deployment of U.S. and South Korean artillery along the southern edge of the DMZ, North Korea moved its own artillery forward, where it has remained ever since." (A further, "more dramatic" shift in the U.S. strategy was to come in 1992, as Harrison notes.) (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002) that the "danger of a war triggered by 'misunderstanding and inadvertence' has been magnified by a basic transformation that has taken place in Operations Plan 5027, the Pentagon's official scenario for the conduct of any new conflict in Korea. During the first decades after the 1953 armistice, Op Plan 5027 envisaged a replay of the Korean War. The United States and South Korea had a limited objective: repelling a North Korean invasion and reestablishing the DMZ at the thirty-eighth parallel. In this defensive strategy, Seoul was to be evacuated. American and South Korean forces would pull back in phases to the Han River, which bisects the capital. In 1973, however, the United States proclaimed a new "Forward Defense" concept in which U.S. forces would seize Kaesong, a key North Korean city close to the DMZ, while round-the-clock B-52 strikes would stop a North Korean advance north of Seoul, ending the war in nine days. In response to this new strategy and the accompanying forward deployment of U.S. and South Korean artillery along the southern edge of the DMZ, North Korea moved its own artillery forward, where it has remained ever since." (A further, "more dramatic" shift in the U.S. strategy was to come in 1992, as Harrison notes.) 4. Kang Myong-do's testimony in Kang Myong-do's testimony in JoongAng Ilbo JoongAng Ilbo (see chap. 2, n. 7). (see chap. 2, n. 7).

5. See Nathan N. White, See Nathan N. White, U.S. Policy Toward Korea: a.n.a.lysis, Alternatives and Recommendations U.S. Policy Toward Korea: a.n.a.lysis, Alternatives and Recommendations (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 58 ff (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 58 ff 6. Author's August 1996 interview with Ahn Choong-hak. For a U.S. Army Korea specialist's description of the response to the axe-killings, see James V Young, Author's August 1996 interview with Ahn Choong-hak. For a U.S. Army Korea specialist's description of the response to the axe-killings, see James V Young, Eye on Korea: An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations, Eye on Korea: An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations, edited and with introduction by William Stueck (College Station, Texas: Texas A & M University Press, 2003), pp. 2126. edited and with introduction by William Stueck (College Station, Texas: Texas A & M University Press, 2003), pp. 2126.

7. "Such shifting policies as those of President Carter's zigzag on maintaining American ground forces in South Korea have reminded [South Koreans] of Truman-Acheson's lukewarm commitment to the defense of South Korea, which was at least partly responsible for the Korean War of 1950 to 1953. .Many Koreans think it terribly ironic and inconsistent for the United States to divide the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel in 1945, then fail to unify the country, refuse to train and equip South Korean troops (unlike the Soviets in North Korea), and withdraw its troops and phase out its commitment in South Korea- then get reinvolved when the North attacked the South and modernize the South Korean forces (under Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon), then cause anxiety about the reliability of the American commitment (under Carter) and, finally, rea.s.sert a firm pledge for the security of their country (under Reagan)" (Wayne Patterson and Hilary Conroy "Duality and Dominance," in Patterson and Lee, "Such shifting policies as those of President Carter's zigzag on maintaining American ground forces in South Korea have reminded [South Koreans] of Truman-Acheson's lukewarm commitment to the defense of South Korea, which was at least partly responsible for the Korean War of 1950 to 1953. .Many Koreans think it terribly ironic and inconsistent for the United States to divide the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel in 1945, then fail to unify the country, refuse to train and equip South Korean troops (unlike the Soviets in North Korea), and withdraw its troops and phase out its commitment in South Korea- then get reinvolved when the North attacked the South and modernize the South Korean forces (under Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon), then cause anxiety about the reliability of the American commitment (under Carter) and, finally, rea.s.sert a firm pledge for the security of their country (under Reagan)" (Wayne Patterson and Hilary Conroy "Duality and Dominance," in Patterson and Lee, One Hundred Years One Hundred Years [see chap. 2, n. 6] pp. 1011). [see chap. 2, n. 6] pp. 1011).

8. Bradley K .Martin, "Mansfield Says Troops Would Go to Korean War," Bradley K .Martin, "Mansfield Says Troops Would Go to Korean War," Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, March 2, 1978. March 2, 1978.

9. Bradley K Martin, "Korea Maneuvers Test U.S. Mood," Bradley K Martin, "Korea Maneuvers Test U.S. Mood," Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, March 19, 1978. The United States always insisted that Team Spirit was not provocative but essentially a defensive type of exercise. March 19, 1978. The United States always insisted that Team Spirit was not provocative but essentially a defensive type of exercise.

10. Bradley K. Martin, "U.S., South Korea 'Kind of Outflanked' by North's Willingness," Bradley K. Martin, "U.S., South Korea 'Kind of Outflanked' by North's Willingness," Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, March 1, 1979. March 1, 1979.

11. "Suddenly the estimate of North Korean capabilities was almost doubled," Carter told Harrison in an interview in 2000 (see "Suddenly the estimate of North Korean capabilities was almost doubled," Carter told Harrison in an interview in 2000 (see Korean Endgame, Korean Endgame, p. 179). "I have always felt that the intelligence community played fast and loose with the facts, but I couldn't prove it." Carter earlier had said much the same to Don Oberdorfer p. 179). "I have always felt that the intelligence community played fast and loose with the facts, but I couldn't prove it." Carter earlier had said much the same to Don Oberdorfer (The Two Koreas (The Two Koreas [Reading, Ma.s.s.: Addison-Wesley 1997], p. 103). [Reading, Ma.s.s.: Addison-Wesley 1997], p. 103).

Young (Eye on Korea, (Eye on Korea, pp. 3956) provides a detailed account of officials' ultimately successful effort to derail the troop-withdrawal plan. He offers no support for the proposition that the intelligence was doctored: "The findings were initially challenged by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA, but in every case our army a.n.a.lysts pp. 3956) provides a detailed account of officials' ultimately successful effort to derail the troop-withdrawal plan. He offers no support for the proposition that the intelligence was doctored: "The findings were initially challenged by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA, but in every case our army a.n.a.lysts 'were 'were able to conclusively defend their findings, methodology, and conclusions" (p. 42). Young proudly acknowledges, nevertheless, that the effort to persuade Carter to change his mind was an all-out one. Among the civilians involved, notably a.s.sistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, a bureaucratic strategy emerged: "declare support for Carter's plan officially and publicly while delaying its actual implementation" to buy time for Congress to put its foot down (p. 48). able to conclusively defend their findings, methodology, and conclusions" (p. 42). Young proudly acknowledges, nevertheless, that the effort to persuade Carter to change his mind was an all-out one. Among the civilians involved, notably a.s.sistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, a bureaucratic strategy emerged: "declare support for Carter's plan officially and publicly while delaying its actual implementation" to buy time for Congress to put its foot down (p. 48).

12. The Chinese example already may have inspired Kim to seek accommodation with Seoul in the early 1970s. See Scalapino and Lee, The Chinese example already may have inspired Kim to seek accommodation with Seoul in the early 1970s. See Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, p. 678. p. 678.

13. Bradley K. .Martin, "North Korea Eyes Ping-Pong Diplomacy," Bradley K. .Martin, "North Korea Eyes Ping-Pong Diplomacy," Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, April 22, 1978. Nearly a year later, as the tournament opening approached, the same operative told me, "Whether some important persons are included in your delegation, we don't know." Clearly he hoped that there would be. And he volunteered a suggestion that U.S. congressmen visiting China that month might drop into Pyongyang. Bradley K .Martin, "Side Visit to North Korea Suggested for Congressmen Who Will Be in China," April 22, 1978. Nearly a year later, as the tournament opening approached, the same operative told me, "Whether some important persons are included in your delegation, we don't know." Clearly he hoped that there would be. And he volunteered a suggestion that U.S. congressmen visiting China that month might drop into Pyongyang. Bradley K .Martin, "Side Visit to North Korea Suggested for Congressmen Who Will Be in China," Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, April 20, 1979. April 20, 1979.

14. Bradley K Martin, "North Korea Asks South to Talk Unity" (February 6); "Korean Reunification-Talk Furor May Produce at Least New Meetings" (February 13); "North, South Korea Agree on Time for Talks" (February 14); "North and South Korea Agree on Meeting Site" (February 16); "Friendly Approach Taken by North Koreans at Talks" (February 18); "2 Koreas Talk Detente" (February 23); "Big Question: Is North Korea's 'Smile Offensive' More than Skin Deep?" (March 3); "The Two Koreas Play Diplomatic Ping-Pong" (April 15), Bradley K Martin, "North Korea Asks South to Talk Unity" (February 6); "Korean Reunification-Talk Furor May Produce at Least New Meetings" (February 13); "North, South Korea Agree on Time for Talks" (February 14); "North and South Korea Agree on Meeting Site" (February 16); "Friendly Approach Taken by North Koreans at Talks" (February 18); "2 Koreas Talk Detente" (February 23); "Big Question: Is North Korea's 'Smile Offensive' More than Skin Deep?" (March 3); "The Two Koreas Play Diplomatic Ping-Pong" (April 15), Baltimore Sun, 1979. Baltimore Sun, 1979.

15. Editor-in-chief Andre Fontaine of Editor-in-chief Andre Fontaine of Le Monde, Le Monde, visiting Pyongyang in 1974 along with a French television crew, had heard similar stories of divided families. Some North Koreans told Fontaine their parents visiting Pyongyang in 1974 along with a French television crew, had heard similar stories of divided families. Some North Koreans told Fontaine their parents 'were 'were on the other side of the DMZ-whether dead or alive, they did not know. Fontaine's party, planning to go on from there to Seoul, asked if the North Koreans had messages they would like to have pa.s.sed on to relatives in the South. "Don't do that!" they responded. Fontaine a.s.sumed their alarm at the notion showed their fear of "the consequences of any attempt to establish contact with family in South Korea" (Andre Fontaine, "A Postcard from Pyongyang," on the other side of the DMZ-whether dead or alive, they did not know. Fontaine's party, planning to go on from there to Seoul, asked if the North Koreans had messages they would like to have pa.s.sed on to relatives in the South. "Don't do that!" they responded. Fontaine a.s.sumed their alarm at the notion showed their fear of "the consequences of any attempt to establish contact with family in South Korea" (Andre Fontaine, "A Postcard from Pyongyang," j.a.pan Times, j.a.pan Times, July 24, 1994). July 24, 1994).

16. Bradley K. Martin, "Pyongyang Offers U.S. Guarantees," Bradley K. Martin, "Pyongyang Offers U.S. Guarantees," Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, May 8, 1979. May 8, 1979.

17. Bradley K. Martin, "U.S. Joins Appeal to North on Korea Unification Talks" and "South Korean Leader Park, like Carter, Finds Support Eroding," Bradley K. Martin, "U.S. Joins Appeal to North on Korea Unification Talks" and "South Korean Leader Park, like Carter, Finds Support Eroding," Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, July 1, 1979. July 1, 1979.

18. Bradley K. Martin, "Seoul Could Attend Talks, North Says" (July 11) and "North Korean Voices U.S.-talk Confidence" (July 25), Bradley K. Martin, "Seoul Could Attend Talks, North Says" (July 11) and "North Korean Voices U.S.-talk Confidence" (July 25), Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, 1979. 1979.

19. Bradley K Martin, "Quick Resolution of Korean Standoff Unlikely," Bradley K Martin, "Quick Resolution of Korean Standoff Unlikely," Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, August 12, 1979. August 12, 1979.

20. The recollection is from a North Korean defector to the South, who is quoted in The recollection is from a North Korean defector to the South, who is quoted in The Korea Times, The Korea Times, July 12, 1994. July 12, 1994.

21. Bradley K Martin, "Where Is the Large North Korean Army Unit?" Bradley K Martin, "Where Is the Large North Korean Army Unit?" Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, May 11, 1980. For this report I contacted U.S. officials in Seoul and Hideko Takayama in Tokyo contacted j.a.panese officials. On May 13, the U.S. Department of State issued a statement to the press dismissing the South Korean claims: "From our information we see no movement of troops in North Korea out of the usual and we see no movement which would lead us to believe that some sort of attack upon the South is imminent" (Young, May 11, 1980. For this report I contacted U.S. officials in Seoul and Hideko Takayama in Tokyo contacted j.a.panese officials. On May 13, the U.S. Department of State issued a statement to the press dismissing the South Korean claims: "From our information we see no movement of troops in North Korea out of the usual and we see no movement which would lead us to believe that some sort of attack upon the South is imminent" (Young, Eye on Korea, Eye on Korea, p. 98). p. 98).

22. The former official was Kim Jong-min, quoted in Cho, "Interview of Former High-level Official of DPRK Ministry of Public Security Who Defected to South Korea" (see chap. 6, n. 88). The former official was Kim Jong-min, quoted in Cho, "Interview of Former High-level Official of DPRK Ministry of Public Security Who Defected to South Korea" (see chap. 6, n. 88).

One aspect of U.S. policy after the incident began was to "[c]ontinue signals that the U.S. will defend South Korea from North Korean attack." U.S. forces in Korea were beefed up with AWACs early warning aircraft and naval units. (Young, Eye on Korea, Eye on Korea, p. 103). p. 103).

23. Bradley K .Martin, "Kw.a.n.gju Revisited," Bradley K .Martin, "Kw.a.n.gju Revisited," Far Eastern Economic Review, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 26, 1994, and Bradley K. .Martin, "Yun Sang Won: The Knowledge in Those Eyes," in Henry Scott-Stokes and Lee Jai Eui, eds., May 26, 1994, and Bradley K. .Martin, "Yun Sang Won: The Knowledge in Those Eyes," in Henry Scott-Stokes and Lee Jai Eui, eds., The Kw.a.n.gju Uprising The Kw.a.n.gju Uprising (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 87105. (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 87105.

24. Bradley K. Martin, "N. Korea Halts U.S. Courtship with Anti-Reagan Blast," Bradley K. Martin, "N. Korea Halts U.S. Courtship with Anti-Reagan Blast," Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, April 15, 1982. April 15, 1982.

25. If it is any consolation for Washington, outgoing U.S. officials have had the opportunity to use an impending change of administration as an opportunity to try to wring concessions from Pyongyang by playing "good cop/bad cop," warning that the next administration would be tougher so it would be wise to make a deal immediately. Democrats have tended to take advantage of such opportunities. This is precisely what the Johnson Administration did to win the release of the If it is any consolation for Washington, outgoing U.S. officials have had the opportunity to use an impending change of administration as an opportunity to try to wring concessions from Pyongyang by playing "good cop/bad cop," warning that the next administration would be tougher so it would be wise to make a deal immediately. Democrats have tended to take advantage of such opportunities. This is precisely what the Johnson Administration did to win the release of the Pueblo Pueblo crew after the 1968 election. And it is what the Clinton Administration attempted late in 2000 as the inauguration of George W. Bush loomed-but without great result. crew after the 1968 election. And it is what the Clinton Administration attempted late in 2000 as the inauguration of George W. Bush loomed-but without great result.

Part of the problem for the United States has been that very few of its officials have focused entirely on North Korea, even for the length of their time in office. And officials with responsibilities covering the larger Asian region often have had other things on their minds. I met thena.s.sistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke at a Tokyo reception shortly after my 1979 North Korea trip and immediately mentioned the trip, naively thinking he might be interested in hearing about it since very few Americans then could claim such an experience. Holbrooke didn't miss a beat. He gazed past me, spied someone more important across the room, turned and strode rapidly away.

9. He Gave Us Water and Sent Us Machines.

1. Katsumi Sato, editor of Katsumi Sato, editor of Gendai Korea Gendai Korea and a leading j.a.panese Korea-watcher, told me the Pak story in a 1991 interview. Sato said he had heard from several North Korean sources that the vice-premier was sent to a Workers' Party school for ideological reeducation; if he had not been a relative of President Kim's, his punishment would have included loss of his job and authority. Sato suggested, "The point is, everybody has seen this sort of thing happen, and therefore n.o.body working for Kim and his son will tell them the truth." and a leading j.a.panese Korea-watcher, told me the Pak story in a 1991 interview. Sato said he had heard from several North Korean sources that the vice-premier was sent to a Workers' Party school for ideological reeducation; if he had not been a relative of President Kim's, his punishment would have included loss of his job and authority. Sato suggested, "The point is, everybody has seen this sort of thing happen, and therefore n.o.body working for Kim and his son will tell them the truth."

2. "One of the important factors in South Korean success is the introduction of the ma.s.s mobilization movement in the 1970s, which South Korea probably borrowed from the successful experience of the North Korean ma.s.s movement during the 1950s. This moral incentive worked quite well because it was practiced for a relatively short period of time. Through the measure, the gap between urban and rural income narrowed. Both Korean experiences suggest that a ma.s.s mobilization technique based on moral incentive can be a successful measure, as long as it is only implemented for about seven to ten years. The idea is that in human nature any firm determination cannot last too long a time. ... Mobilization of the general populace, even if successful for a short period, has economic limitations in the long run. It proves to be more advantageous at the early stage development where development can be achieved by expansion of the utilization of natural resources and unemployed labor. Except in the areas of such highly labor-intensive projects as food processing, irrigation facilities, and construction of unpaved roads, continued subst.i.tution of labor for capital will produce, after a point, very small or near-zero marginal output, so that it seems to fall behind in productivity and efficiency at the later stage of intensive development where productivity must be raised through more advanced technology" (Kim, "One of the important factors in South Korean success is the introduction of the ma.s.s mobilization movement in the 1970s, which South Korea probably borrowed from the successful experience of the North Korean ma.s.s movement during the 1950s. This moral incentive worked quite well because it was practiced for a relatively short period of time. Through the measure, the gap between urban and rural income narrowed. Both Korean experiences suggest that a ma.s.s mobilization technique based on moral incentive can be a successful measure, as long as it is only implemented for about seven to ten years. The idea is that in human nature any firm determination cannot last too long a time. ... Mobilization of the general populace, even if successful for a short period, has economic limitations in the long run. It proves to be more advantageous at the early stage development where development can be achieved by expansion of the utilization of natural resources and unemployed labor. Except in the areas of such highly labor-intensive projects as food processing, irrigation facilities, and construction of unpaved roads, continued subst.i.tution of labor for capital will produce, after a point, very small or near-zero marginal output, so that it seems to fall behind in productivity and efficiency at the later stage of intensive development where productivity must be raised through more advanced technology" (Kim, Two Koreas in Development Two Koreas in Development [see chap. 1, n. 2], pp. [see chap. 1, n. 2], pp. 147149). 147149).

3. "[T]he critical factor for the failure in the first seven-year plan in the 1960s was troubled relations with the Soviet Union, the major capital and technology supplier to Pyongyang. Under the six-year plan in the 1970s, North Korea brought in capital from Western countries, including West Germany, France and j.a.pan." See "Pyongyang Continues to Rely on Juche Economic Policy," "[T]he critical factor for the failure in the first seven-year plan in the 1960s was troubled relations with the Soviet Union, the major capital and technology supplier to Pyongyang. Under the six-year plan in the 1970s, North Korea brought in capital from Western countries, including West Germany, France and j.a.pan." See "Pyongyang Continues to Rely on Juche Economic Policy," Vantage Point Vantage Point (August 1994): p. 3. (August 1994): p. 3.

Sweden was a major supplier, receiving orders for hundreds of millions of kroners' worth of goods. Besides factory equipment, the North Koreans ordered 1,000 Volvo sedans (including the one I rode in for most of my 1979 visit, after rejecting as too expensive to rent a higher-status black .Mercedes that my hosts first provided). Swedish companies pressed successfully for the establishment of an emba.s.sy in Pyongyang. For a delightful and informative account of the first amba.s.sador's two tours of duty, see Eric Cornell, North Korea Under Communism: Report of an Envoy to Paradise, North Korea Under Communism: Report of an Envoy to Paradise, translated by Rodney Bradbury (London: Rout-ledgeCurzon, 2002). translated by Rodney Bradbury (London: Rout-ledgeCurzon, 2002).

4. South Korean scholar Byoung-Lo Philo Kim observes, "Both South and North Korea experienced an authoritarian transformation of the const.i.tutions and states in 1972. ... In North Korea, a new 'socialist' const.i.tution was promulgated. The new const.i.tution declared Kim's political thought, South Korean scholar Byoung-Lo Philo Kim observes, "Both South and North Korea experienced an authoritarian transformation of the const.i.tutions and states in 1972. ... In North Korea, a new 'socialist' const.i.tution was promulgated. The new const.i.tution declared Kim's political thought, juche, juche, to be the ideology of the state. The formal authoritarian adaptation of both Korean states in 1972 was the result not only of the economic situation per se of each side in the late 1960s, but of the 'comparison effect' formed by the awareness of each other through the Red Cross Conference in 1972. ... North Korea contrasts with South Korea in that economic growth slowed down in the late 1960s. Economic activity, which depended on only ma.s.s mobilization, needed to be revitalized by introducing Western capital, which led to a more authoritarian transformation of and surveillance within North Korea so as not to be exposed to the external world" to be the ideology of the state. The formal authoritarian adaptation of both Korean states in 1972 was the result not only of the economic situation per se of each side in the late 1960s, but of the 'comparison effect' formed by the awareness of each other through the Red Cross Conference in 1972. ... North Korea contrasts with South Korea in that economic growth slowed down in the late 1960s. Economic activity, which depended on only ma.s.s mobilization, needed to be revitalized by introducing Western capital, which led to a more authoritarian transformation of and surveillance within North Korea so as not to be exposed to the external world" (Two Koreas in Development (Two Koreas in Development [see chap. 1, n. 2], pp. 123124). [see chap. 1, n. 2], pp. 123124).

5. "The economists are considered to be fulfilling only secondary and administrative functions," said a former North Korean newspaper editor, who had defected to the South and become a prominent a.n.a.lyst of Pyongyang affairs (Kim Chang Soon, "Korea Today" "The economists are considered to be fulfilling only secondary and administrative functions," said a former North Korean newspaper editor, who had defected to the South and become a prominent a.n.a.lyst of Pyongyang affairs (Kim Chang Soon, "Korea Today" Vantage Point Vantage Point [.March 1979]: p. 12). [.March 1979]: p. 12).

6. "Except for minor and scattered cases of innovations which tend to be stop-gap devices, the North Korean system has not diverged fundamentally from the Sta-linistic command system. ..." "Except for minor and scattered cases of innovations which tend to be stop-gap devices, the North Korean system has not diverged fundamentally from the Sta-linistic command system. ..." (Chung, North Korean Economy (Chung, North Korean Economy [see chap. 6, n. 16], p. 155). "Unlike the Soviet Union and other East European countries which tended to decentralize business management gradually, North Korea adopted in 1961 a policy of further centralizing and tightening up entrepreneurial control and management" (Cha, "Financial Structure of North Korea" [see chap. 7, n. 13], p. 3). [see chap. 6, n. 16], p. 155). "Unlike the Soviet Union and other East European countries which tended to decentralize business management gradually, North Korea adopted in 1961 a policy of further centralizing and tightening up entrepreneurial control and management" (Cha, "Financial Structure of North Korea" [see chap. 7, n. 13], p. 3).

7. Speech quoted in "Bankers Given 5-Point Guideline," Speech quoted in "Bankers Given 5-Point Guideline," Vantage Point Vantage Point (January 1979): pp. 23, 24. (January 1979): pp. 23, 24.

8. Byoung-Lo Philo Kim estimates South Korean per capita GNP of $518 versus $605 in North Korea in 1975, the last time he thinks the South was behind Byoung-Lo Philo Kim estimates South Korean per capita GNP of $518 versus $605 in North Korea in 1975, the last time he thinks the South was behind (Two Koreas in Development, (Two Koreas in Development, p. p. 66). 66).

9. At a hothouse growing vegetables for the residents of Pyongyang, most of the workers likewise were women. "Our principle is, if it's easy work we give preference to women because they are not so physically strong," an official told me. Hothouse gardening was considered light work. At a hothouse growing vegetables for the residents of Pyongyang, most of the workers likewise were women. "Our principle is, if it's easy work we give preference to women because they are not so physically strong," an official told me. Hothouse gardening was considered light work.

10. Forty-five percent in 1981, according to the Souths National Unification Board. By 1989 (as demographers Nicholas Eberstadt and Judith Banister reported in Forty-five percent in 1981, according to the Souths National Unification Board. By 1989 (as demographers Nicholas Eberstadt and Judith Banister reported in North Korea: Population Trends and Prospects North Korea: Population Trends and Prospects [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990]), the far greater partic.i.p.ation of women in the North's workforce was reflected in a total partic.i.p.ation rate for both men and women of 78.5 percent. That compares with an official South Korean workforce partic.i.p.ation rate for the same year of 58.3 percent (Byoung-Lo Philo Kim, [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990]), the far greater partic.i.p.ation of women in the North's workforce was reflected in a total partic.i.p.ation rate for both men and women of 78.5 percent. That compares with an official South Korean workforce partic.i.p.ation rate for the same year of 58.3 percent (Byoung-Lo Philo Kim, Two Koreas in Development, Two Koreas in Development, p. 92). p. 92).

11. This factory evidently was one of the installations most frequently visited by the Great Leader. A guide at the industrial and agricultural exhibition in Pyongyang told me, "The respected and beloved leader Chairman Kim Il-sung visited 199 units 699 times in the fields of heavy industrial factories," which averages out to about three and a half visits per factory. This factory evidently was one of the installations most frequently visited by the Great Leader. A guide at the industrial and agricultural exhibition in Pyongyang told me, "The respected and beloved leader Chairman Kim Il-sung visited 199 units 699 times in the fields of heavy industrial factories," which averages out to about three and a half visits per factory.

The pride shown by hosts at factories, farms, and schools in the president's historic visits to give "on-the-spot guidance" seemed unaffected, although close questioning of recipients of those visits usually revealed that the leader had offered little more than compliments, words of encouragement and general suggestions.

12. I got a similar answer at a suburban hothouse, officially a state farm, which produced off-season vegetables and fruits for Pyongyang residents. "I'm not a specialist in financial matters," said a management official whom I asked to tell me the annual budget. I got a similar answer at a suburban hothouse, officially a state farm, which produced off-season vegetables and fruits for Pyongyang residents. "I'm not a specialist in financial matters," said a management official whom I asked to tell me the annual budget.

13. Baik II (see chap. 4, n. 24), p. 161. Baik II (see chap. 4, n. 24), p. 161.

14. "Although lagging far behind industry and ridden with seemingly insurmountable obstacles, growth in agriculture has not been unimpressive. However, self-sufficiency in food has not yet been achieved; North Korea is a substantial net importer of food" "Although lagging far behind industry and ridden with seemingly insurmountable obstacles, growth in agriculture has not been unimpressive. However, self-sufficiency in food has not yet been achieved; North Korea is a substantial net importer of food" (Chung, North Korean Economy, (Chung, North Korean Economy, pp. 151152). pp. 151152).

Cornell reports (North Korea Under Communism, (North Korea Under Communism, p. p. 44) 44) having heard during the mid-1970s from East European diplomats that "food production in the country was only sufficient for twenty-five daily rations a month." having heard during the mid-1970s from East European diplomats that "food production in the country was only sufficient for twenty-five daily rations a month."

15. "At an expanded plenary session of the Party's Kangwon Provincial Committee held on October 56 in Wonsan, the capital of the province, Kim put emphasis on farming, fishing and industry. 'For effective transportation of farming tools in the countryside,' Kim said at the meeting, 'more trucks and tractors are needed in the province.' He also said that every household should plant at least two persimmon trees in its yard to increase the production of fruits.' He praised the great achievements' of East Coast farmers despite various adversities and personally set the next year's production goal for grains" ("Kim .Makes On-the-Spot Guidance Tours," "At an expanded plenary session of the Party's Kangwon Provincial Committee held on October 56 in Wonsan, the capital of the province, Kim put emphasis on farming, fishing and industry. 'For effective transportation of farming tools in the countryside,' Kim said at the meeting, 'more trucks and tractors are needed in the province.' He also said that every household should plant at least two persimmon trees in its yard to increase the production of fruits.' He praised the great achievements' of East Coast farmers despite various adversities and personally set the next year's production goal for grains" ("Kim .Makes On-the-Spot Guidance Tours," Vantage Point Vantage Point [November 1978]: p. 26). [November 1978]: p. 26).

16. Kim supposedly spent fifteen days at the more famous Chongsan-ri in 1960, thinking through what was later named the "Chongsan-ri .Method." A foreign journalist visiting that farm eighteen years later heard a guide explain that method, "still used today," involved "the cadres coming to the workplace to stimulate the ardor and the creativity of the peasants." See " 'Market Economy Doesn't Apply to Our Country': Visit to NK .Model Farm," AFP dispatch in Kim supposedly spent fifteen days at the more famous Chongsan-ri in 1960, thinking through what was later named the "Chongsan-ri .Method." A foreign journalist visiting that farm eighteen years later heard a guide explain that method, "still used today," involved "the cadres coming to the workplace to stimulate the ardor and the creativity of the peasants." See " 'Market Economy Doesn't Apply to Our Country': Visit to NK .Model Farm," AFP dispatch in Korea Times, Korea Times, May 4, 1995. May 4, 1995.

17. "Summing Up of the 1970s," "Summing Up of the 1970s," Vantage Point Vantage Point (December 1979), quoting North Korean Premier Li Jong-ok. The plan's goal was to increase electrical power generation to 5660 billion kilowatt hours, coal production to 7080 million tons, steel production to 7480 million tons and the grain harvest to 10 million tons. (December 1979), quoting North Korean Premier Li Jong-ok. The plan's goal was to increase electrical power generation to 5660 billion kilowatt hours, coal production to 7080 million tons, steel production to 7480 million tons and the grain harvest to 10 million tons.

18. At the time, examined in historical context, that seemed to some foreign a.n.a.lysts a strong possibility. For example, "South Korea ... for all its belated 'miracle growth,' is a house built on sand, utterly vulnerable to the storms of the world economy, a cla.s.sic example of extreme dependency. The crucial point is that, contrary to the advocates of so-called 'export-led growth,' there is no evidence of any Third World country having attained self-sustaining growth on the basis of an open export economy" (Foster-Carter, "Development and Self Reliance" [see chap. 6, n. 15], pp. 8586). Foster-Carter added (p. 98), "Far from signifying an economy in deep trouble, they [North Korea's debts] may paradoxically testify to its long-run advance and strength despite short-term problems of cash flow." At the time, examined in historical context, that seemed to some foreign a.n.a.lysts a strong possibility. For example, "South Korea ... for all its belated 'miracle growth,' is a house built on sand, utterly vulnerable to the storms of the world economy, a cla.s.sic example of extreme dependency. The crucial point is that, contrary to the advocates of so-called 'export-led growth,' there is no evidence of any Third World country having attained self-sustaining growth on the basis of an open export economy" (Foster-Carter, "Development and Self Reliance" [see chap. 6, n. 15], pp. 8586). Foster-Carter added (p. 98), "Far from signifying an economy in deep trouble, they [North Korea's debts] may paradoxically testify to its long-run advance and strength despite short-term problems of cash flow."

19. "A rapid expansion in investment in human capital, especially in technical education, ... must have substantially contributed toward productivity gains. North Korea was reportedly successful in eradicating illiteracy within a few years after the division of Korea. ... Since 1967 North Korea went even farther by adopting a free nine-year compulsory system of education with greater emphasis on technical education, the first such program in the Far East. (Both China and j.a.pan have six-year compulsory systems with tuition partially free.) Beyond the level of primary education, North Korea has exerted all-out efforts to increase the supply of technical-scientific personnel by expanding the enrollment at and resources of technological colleges, vocational schools, and 'factory colleges,' and by sending selected groups of students abroad (primarily to the Soviet Union) for scientific and technical education. The whole educational system seems to be geared to the goals of industrialization" (Chung, "A rapid expansion in investment in human capital, especially in technical education, ... must have substantially contributed toward productivity gains. North Korea was reportedly successful in eradicating illiteracy within a few years after the division of Korea. ... Since 1967 North Korea went even farther by adopting a free nine-year compulsory system of education with greater emphasis on technical education, the first such program in the Far East. (Both China and j.a.pan have six-year compulsory systems with tuition partially free.) Beyond the level of primary education, North Korea has exerted all-out efforts to increase the supply of technical-scientific personnel by expanding the enrollment at and resources of technological colleges, vocational schools, and 'factory colleges,' and by sending selected groups of students abroad (primarily to the Soviet Union) for scientific and technical education. The whole educational system seems to be geared to the goals of industrialization" (Chung, North Korean Economy, North Korean Economy, pp. 158159). Chung cites statistics showing the numbers of engineers, technicians and specialists increasing from 21,872 in 1953 to 293,506 in 1964. Source: pp. 158159). Chung cites statistics showing the numbers of engineers, technicians and specialists increasing from 21,872 in 1953 to 293,506 in 1964. Source: Choson chungang yongam, 1965 Choson chungang yongam, 1965 (Korean Central Yearbook) (Pyongyang, Korean Central News Agency, 1965), p. 482. (Korean Central Yearbook) (Pyongyang, Korean Central News Agency, 1965), p. 482.

20. Baik II, pp. 359360. Baik II, pp. 359360.

21. Viewing the home as "the hotbed of outdated inst.i.tutions, outdated ideology and outdated customs," the state undermined the family's role through a variety of policies. The virtual abolition of private land ownership-and its inheritance- was the most obvious. That chipped away at the authority of the family patriarch in a country where Confucian patriarchal teachings had reigned supreme for centuries. Korean custom required city-dwelling families to return regularly to their hometowns and villages for ancestral memorial services-which were also reunions promoting close family ties. But the regime's system of restrictions on freedom of movement, perhaps the most stringent in the world, took a heavy toll on such observances. The old custom in which parents arranged their children's marriages gave way to a new system in which the party's intervention superseded that of the parents ("Building a Socialist Culture," Viewing the home as "the hotbed of outdated inst.i.tutions, outdated ideology and outdated customs," the state undermined the family's role through a variety of policies. The virtual abolition of private land ownership-and its inheritance- was the most obvious. That chipped away at the authority of the family patriarch in a country where Confucian patriarchal teachings had reigned supreme for centuries. Korean custom required city-dwelling families to return regularly to their hometowns and villages for ancestral memorial services-which were also reunions promoting close family ties. But the regime's system of restrictions on freedom of movement, perhaps the most stringent in the world, took a heavy toll on such observances. The old custom in which parents arranged their children's marriages gave way to a new system in which the party's intervention superseded that of the parents ("Building a Socialist Culture," The Principles of Kim Il-sungism The Principles of Kim Il-sungism [Propaganda Bureau of the Unification Revolutionary Party Central Committee, 1974], p. 182, cited in Park Yong-hon, "Cultural Policy of North Korea," [Propaganda Bureau of the Unification Revolutionary Party Central Committee, 1974], p. 182, cited in Park Yong-hon, "Cultural Policy of North Korea," Vantage Point Vantage Point [August 1979]: pp. 1011). [August 1979]: pp. 1011).

22. One defector in a 1994 interview a.s.sured me that what I had seen out the school window was typical. See chap. 21 for his remarks. One defector in a 1994 interview a.s.sured me that what I had seen out the school window was typical. See chap. 21 for his remarks.

23. Kim, Kim, With the Century With the Century (see chap. 2, n. 2), vol. 3, pp. 302303. (see chap. 2, n. 2), vol. 3, pp. 302303.

24. Kim Il-sung's youthful organ playing may help to explain the curious taste in music that, since liberation, has channeled the talents of countless North Korean youngsters into playing the accordion-a portable version of the instrument that would have been found in a small Korean church in those days, the pump organ. The Kim Il-sung regime's ties to Eastern European communist countries where the accordion was in favor, and the frequent cultural exchanges accompanying those ties, may also have been a factor. Kim Il-sung's youthful organ playing may help to explain the curious taste in music that, since liberation, has channeled the talents of countless North Korean youngsters into playing the accordion-a portable version of the instrument that would have been found in a small Korean church in those days, the pump organ. The Kim Il-sung regime's ties to Eastern European communist countries where the accordion was in favor, and the frequent cultural exchanges accompanying those ties, may also have been a factor.

25. Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, The Problems of Human Rights in North Korea (3), The Problems of Human Rights in North Korea (3), trans. Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights (Seoul: NKnet, 2002), http://www.nknet.org/en/keys/lastkeys/2002/9/04.php. trans. Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights (Seoul: NKnet, 2002), http://www.nknet.org/en/keys/lastkeys/2002/9/04.php.

26. "His teachings covered the whole realm of literature and the arts. They became the programmatic guide for each branch in upholding its Party spirit, cla.s.s spirit and popular spirit and raising its artistic quality. The 'golden arts' which peoples of the world admire today had their new beginning immediately after liberation under his wise guidance, and by his boundless effort and proper guidance, the northern half has now come to full bloom in its national culture, built and consolidated on the democratic base, rock-firm" (Baik II, p. 223). "His teachings covered the whole realm of literature and the arts. They became the programmatic guide for each branch in upholding its Party spirit, cla.s.s spirit and popular spirit and raising its artistic quality. The 'golden arts' which peoples of the world admire today had their new beginning immediately after liberation under his wise guidance, and by his boundless effort and proper guidance, the northern half has now come to full bloom in its national culture, built and consolidated on the democratic base, rock-firm" (Baik II, p. 223).

27. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 1, p. 5. vol. 1, p. 5.

28. Kim, "Building a Socialist Culture," in Park Yong-hon, "Cultural Policy," p. 2. Kim, "Building a Socialist Culture," in Park Yong-hon, "Cultural Policy," p. 2.

29. "Stalinist ideology did have one thing to teach the Koreans that fit like a glove with their own preconceptions. This was the Platonism of Stalin, the architectonic, engineering-from-on-high quality that marked his thought and his praxis. Stalin was a hegemon in the era of late' heavy industrialization, and his discourse, like his name, clanked with an abased, mechanical imagery that valued pig iron over people, machines over bread, bridges over ideas, the leader's will over the democratic instincts of Marx. When he had Zhdanov impose his suffocating doctrine of socialist realism on the cultural realm in 1932, the metaphor of choice was that artists and writers should be 'engineers of the soul,' and that may serve as a general metaphor for Stalin's rule. "Stalinist ideology did have one thing to teach the Koreans that fit like a glove with their own preconceptions. This was the Platonism of Stalin, the architectonic, engineering-from-on-high quality that marked his thought and his praxis. Stalin was a hegemon in the era of late' heavy industrialization, and his discourse, like his name, clanked with an abased, mechanical imagery that valued pig iron over people, machines over bread, bridges over ideas, the leader's will over the democratic instincts of Marx. When he had Zhdanov impose his suffocating doctrine of socialist realism on the cultural realm in 1932, the metaphor of choice was that artists and writers should be 'engineers of the soul,' and that may serve as a general metaphor for Stalin's rule.

"Koreans think a maximum leader should be an engineer of the soul, too, but through exemplary behavior instead of by ramming it down your throat. They think a leader should be benevolent instead of brutish. And they think good ideas come from right thought-rectification of the mind-proceeding from the leader down through the ma.s.ses, who learn the teaching by rote mastery of received wisdom. These Confucian residues melded with Soviet doctrines to make Kim a kind of benevolent Stalin, the fount of ideas, leading to a profound idealism and voluntarism at opposites with the materialism of Marx. The Koreans still refer to artists as engineers of the soul. They still surround Kim with a cult of personality. They still depict him as the source of all good ideas. This aspect of Stalinism stuck like glue in Korea, and if it had not existed in .Moscow, it would have had to be invented in Pyongyang" (c.u.mings, Origins Origins II [see chap. 3, n. 43], pp. 296297). II [see chap. 3, n. 43], pp. 296297).

30. Kim, "Building a Socialist Culture." Kim, "Building a Socialist Culture."

31. Thirty percent of all artistic creations were supposed to deal with revolutionary tradition-meaning "Kim Il-sung s exploits in his struggle against the j.a.panese and the idolization of Kim and his clan," according to a South Korean scholar's a.n.a.lysis. Another 30 percent should deal with war, including the North Korean People's Army's heroic struggle in the Korean War. That left 40 percent divided between socialist development of the country and unification of the peninsula (Lee Han-gu, "The State of Literature and Arts in North Korea," Thirty percent of all artistic creations were supposed to deal with revolutionary tradition-meaning "Kim Il-sung s exploits in his struggle against the j.a.panese and the idolization of Kim and his clan," according to a South Korean scholar's a.n.a.lysis. Another 30 percent should deal with war, including the North Korean People's Army's heroic struggle in the Korean War. That left 40 percent divided between socialist development of the country and unification of the peninsula (Lee Han-gu, "The State of Literature and Arts in North Korea," Vantage Point Vantage Point [December 1983]: pp. 45). [December 1983]: pp. 45).

32. The regime's "folklorists" employed a similar procedure to appropriate surface elements of the Korean folklore tradition. But when South Korean folklorists met their Northern counterparts to compare notes at a time of tentative detente in the 1970s the Southerners The regime's "folklorists" employed a similar procedure to appropriate surface elements of the Korean folklore tradition. But when South Korean folklorists met their Northern counterparts to compare notes at a time of tentative detente in the 1970s the Southerners 'were 'were "confused and dismayed," one of them wrote later (Kim Yol-gyoo, "A Survey of the Character of North Korean Folklore," "confused and dismayed," one of them wrote later (Kim Yol-gyoo, "A Survey of the Character of North Korean Folklore," Vantage Point Vantage Point [.March 1988]: pp. 510). "A glance through the papers and other materials prepared and published by north Korean students of folklore disappointed us in the south beyond measure. It was not so much a feeling of despair as a sense of betrayal that gripped us. The folklore as presented by the north Korean publications was anything but folklore." Even the nursery rhymes glorified Kim Il-sung. For example, "in the course of an instruction trip, Kim Il-sung happened to see a group of children who were learning their lessons, while singing songs. Kim made some comments on the spot, and the contents of the comments were instantly woven into the lyrics of the song. It became an 'instruction song.' A north Korean folklorist proudly mentioned the episode in his published paper." [.March 1988]: pp. 510). "A glance through the papers and other materials prepared and published by north Korean students of folklore disappointed us in the south beyond measure. It was not so much a feeling of despair as a sense of betrayal that gripped us. The folklore as presented by the north Korean publications was anything but folklore." Even the nursery rhymes glorified Kim Il-sung. For example, "in the course of an instruction trip, Kim Il-sung happened to see a group of children who were learning their lessons, while singing songs. Kim made some comments on the spot, and the contents of the comments were instantly woven into the lyrics of the song. It became an 'instruction song.' A north Korean folklorist proudly mentioned the episode in his published paper."

The sense of betrayal reflected a feeling that something binding the two halves of the peninsula together had been tossed out in the North. "Koreans used to sing the time-honored song 'Oh, the moon, oh the moon, the bright moon,' perform the traditional mask dance, and play yut. yut. As long as they enjoy these activities together, the division of the country into the south and north might come to an end. We felt as if Koreans in both parts of the land would share the same feelings of family ties when they kneel before the altar of ancestor worship at the tomb of their forefathers. Such feelings must turn out to be true. When a glance at the materials from north Korea made it known to us that such an expectation was a mere illusion we were confused and dismayed. As far as I felt, the north Korean folklore was a folklore alien to me. Part of it had a veneer redolent of its sameness of our folklore heritage, but the substance was totally different from that of ours." The South Korean folklorist was horrified to find poems and tales preoccupied with "labor efficiency, animosity aimed at struggle and blind devotion to the cult of personality of Kim Il-sung." As long as they enjoy these activities together, the division of the country into the south and north might come to an end. We felt as if Koreans in both parts of the land would share the same feelings of family ties when they kneel before the altar of ancestor worship at the