85. Ibid., p. 132. Ibid., p. 132.

86. The communists' redistribution was carried out "in every province outside the Pusan perimeter; although it was hasty and done in wartime conditions, it cleared away cla.s.s structures and power that later made possible Rhee's land-redistribution programme-because the Americans would not fight merely to restore land to this cla.s.s that had ruled Korea for centuries" (Halliday and c.u.mings, The communists' redistribution was carried out "in every province outside the Pusan perimeter; although it was hasty and done in wartime conditions, it cleared away cla.s.s structures and power that later made possible Rhee's land-redistribution programme-because the Americans would not fight merely to restore land to this cla.s.s that had ruled Korea for centuries" (Halliday and c.u.mings, Korea, Korea, p. 87). Also see c.u.mings, p. 87). Also see c.u.mings, Origins Origins II, pp. 471472 and, especially, p. 760, where the author observes that the war "transformed South Korea; it was the partial equivalent of the revolution its social structure demanded but did not get in the previous five years. The revolution was capitalist and the war foreshortened and hastened it, above all by ending landlordism." II, pp. 471472 and, especially, p. 760, where the author observes that the war "transformed South Korea; it was the partial equivalent of the revolution its social structure demanded but did not get in the previous five years. The revolution was capitalist and the war foreshortened and hastened it, above all by ending landlordism."

87. Gregory Henderson, "Korea, 1950," in James Cotton and Ian Neary eds., Gregory Henderson, "Korea, 1950," in James Cotton and Ian Neary eds., The Korean War in History The Korean War in History (.Manchester: .Manchester University Press, 1989), pp. (.Manchester: .Manchester University Press, 1989), pp. 175176. 175176. In the Seoul of 1948, in contrast, Henderson wrote, "those leaning northward and those serving the south had then a kind of intimacy they no longer have. One was not quite so abruptly communist or anti-communist then. There was middle ground. All of the [South Korean security forces'] officers personally knew those who had either chosen the other side or leaned in some way toward it. Nor had they always disliked them. The fact that the-as we say in the United States-'Southern way of life' was a little more on the collabora-tory side while the North was steelier, more Spartan, more hard-bitten, more ideological and less yielding and opportunistic, all this was known and recognized although not usually thus baldly articulated." In the Seoul of 1948, in contrast, Henderson wrote, "those leaning northward and those serving the south had then a kind of intimacy they no longer have. One was not quite so abruptly communist or anti-communist then. There was middle ground. All of the [South Korean security forces'] officers personally knew those who had either chosen the other side or leaned in some way toward it. Nor had they always disliked them. The fact that the-as we say in the United States-'Southern way of life' was a little more on the collabora-tory side while the North was steelier, more Spartan, more hard-bitten, more ideological and less yielding and opportunistic, all this was known and recognized although not usually thus baldly articulated."

88. Baik II, p. 315. Baik II, p. 315.

One film, according to an official description, told of Jo Ok-hi, a woman party member who joined a partisan force opposing the occupying UN troops in her county. American troops supposedly captured her and "subjected her to every kind of torture in an attempt to wring out of her secrets about the partisan detachment. They pulled out all her fingernails. But the enemy always got the same answers: 'You fools! No one gets secrets from a Workers' Party member!' The bloodthirsty U.S. cannibals ... gouged out her eyeb.a.l.l.s, burned her with a red hot iron and cut off her b.r.e.a.s.t.s" (History of the Just War for the Liberation of the Fatherland of the Korean People (History of the Just War for the Liberation of the Fatherland of the Korean People [Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961], pp. 133134, cited by Kiwon Chung, "The North Korean People's Army and the Party," in Scalapino, [Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961], pp. 133134, cited by Kiwon Chung, "The North Korean People's Army and the Party," in Scalapino, Korea Today, Korea Today, p. 117). p. 117).

89. Hong Soon-il, "Refugee Village," Hong Soon-il, "Refugee Village," Korea Times, Korea Times, April 20, 1994. April 20, 1994.

90. "Despite the war-time destructiveness and psychological strains there "Despite the war-time destructiveness and psychological strains there 'were 'were few signs of social malaise in North Korea at the end of the war. There appeared to be little murder, theft and personal violence, although there few signs of social malaise in North Korea at the end of the war. There appeared to be little murder, theft and personal violence, although there 'were 'were growing signs of s.e.xual license, especially among the young. Thus, while there were points of popular dissatisfaction, basic [Korean Workers' Party] control over the people of North Korea was not in jeopardy. The Communist version of how the war began was still widely believed" (Paige and Lee, "Post-War Politics," p. 19). growing signs of s.e.xual license, especially among the young. Thus, while there were points of popular dissatisfaction, basic [Korean Workers' Party] control over the people of North Korea was not in jeopardy. The Communist version of how the war began was still widely believed" (Paige and Lee, "Post-War Politics," p. 19).

91. "The war-time experience was accompanied by the development of certain unfavourable att.i.tudes toward the KWP and the Soviet Union as "The war-time experience was accompanied by the development of certain unfavourable att.i.tudes toward the KWP and the Soviet Union as 'well 'well as by the growth of certain favorable att.i.tudes toward Communist China. The princ.i.p.al discontent with the KWP was that it had not been vigorous enough in its relief and reconstruction work. It was popularly regarded in this respect as the 'do-nothing' party. The Soviet Union suffered in popular esteem because it had not given greater a.s.sistance to the North Korean war effort. The North Koreans were aware that South Korea was free from Communist air attack and therefore hoped for direct retaliation by Soviet airpower against American attacks upon the North. The knowledge that Russian fighter pilots were flying defensively over North Korean territory and that the Russians as by the growth of certain favorable att.i.tudes toward Communist China. The princ.i.p.al discontent with the KWP was that it had not been vigorous enough in its relief and reconstruction work. It was popularly regarded in this respect as the 'do-nothing' party. The Soviet Union suffered in popular esteem because it had not given greater a.s.sistance to the North Korean war effort. The North Koreans were aware that South Korea was free from Communist air attack and therefore hoped for direct retaliation by Soviet airpower against American attacks upon the North. The knowledge that Russian fighter pilots were flying defensively over North Korean territory and that the Russians 'were 'were providing military and relief supplies did not satisfy the demand for deeper Soviet military commitment, including the partic.i.p.ation of Soviet infantry divisions. By contrast, the North Koreans providing military and relief supplies did not satisfy the demand for deeper Soviet military commitment, including the partic.i.p.ation of Soviet infantry divisions. By contrast, the North Koreans 'were 'were favorably impressed by Chinese military a.s.sistance. Mao Tse-tung's injunction to the Chinese soldiers in Korea to love the Korean Democratic People's Republic, the Korean Workers' Party, and the Korean people as your own government, party, and people-and treasure every mountain, every stream, every tree, and every blade of gra.s.s the same,' was widely respected and appreciated. This did not mean, however, that Korean-Chinese relations were without points of friction. There was some evidence of professional jealousy, for example, among North Korean army officers who had to take orders from Chinese commanders" (Paige and Lee, "Post-War Politics," pp. 1819). favorably impressed by Chinese military a.s.sistance. Mao Tse-tung's injunction to the Chinese soldiers in Korea to love the Korean Democratic People's Republic, the Korean Workers' Party, and the Korean people as your own government, party, and people-and treasure every mountain, every stream, every tree, and every blade of gra.s.s the same,' was widely respected and appreciated. This did not mean, however, that Korean-Chinese relations were without points of friction. There was some evidence of professional jealousy, for example, among North Korean army officers who had to take orders from Chinese commanders" (Paige and Lee, "Post-War Politics," pp. 1819).

92. Baik II, pp. 400, 405. To portray North Korea as the victor, Baik uses American military leaders' public expressions of regret over their side's failures. See pp. 404405. Baik II, pp. 400, 405. To portray North Korea as the victor, Baik uses American military leaders' public expressions of regret over their side's failures. See pp. 404405.

93. Kiwon Chung, "North Korean People's Army" p. 112. Kiwon Chung, "North Korean People's Army" p. 112.

94. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 3, p. 255. vol. 3, p. 255.

6. With the Leader Who Unfolded Paradise.

1. Baik II (see chap. 4, n. 24), pp. 428430, provides the meeting-hall anecdote. Baik says (pp. 421422) that Kim "considered that golden opportunities offered by the armistice should be fully used to promote the socialist revolution and socialist construction at full speed, in order to provide a firm guarantee for consolidating peace and completing the historic cause of the unification of the nation." Baik II (see chap. 4, n. 24), pp. 428430, provides the meeting-hall anecdote. Baik says (pp. 421422) that Kim "considered that golden opportunities offered by the armistice should be fully used to promote the socialist revolution and socialist construction at full speed, in order to provide a firm guarantee for consolidating peace and completing the historic cause of the unification of the nation."

2. Scalapino and Lee, Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea Communism in Korea (see chap. 2, n. 28), p. 425. (see chap. 2, n. 28), p. 425.

3. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 16, 1990, in Seiler, November 16, 1990, in Seiler, Kim Il-song 19411948 Kim Il-song 19411948 (see chap. 2, n. 18). (see chap. 2, n. 18).

4. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 18, 1990. November 18, 1990.

5. Baik II, p. 369. Baik II, p. 369.

6. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 18, 1990. November 18, 1990.

7. See Baik II, pp. 308, 388. See Baik II, pp. 308, 388.

8. Suh, Suh, Kim Il Sung Kim Il Sung (see chap. 2, n. 25) , pp. 105108, 127136. (see chap. 2, n. 25) , pp. 105108, 127136.

9. "The trials provided the supreme rationalization for defeat," as Scalapino and Lee say. The North's tribulations could be portrayed as "due not to the mistakes of the Kim group, but because traitors from within had given overt a.s.sistance to the enemy" "The trials provided the supreme rationalization for defeat," as Scalapino and Lee say. The North's tribulations could be portrayed as "due not to the mistakes of the Kim group, but because traitors from within had given overt a.s.sistance to the enemy" (Communism in Korea, (Communism in Korea, p. 451). p. 451).

10. Chay Pyung-gil, Following the Conclusion of the Serialization 'Yu Song-ch'ol's Testimony,' " Hankuk Ilbo, December 1, 1990, translated in Seiler, Kim Il-song 19411948. Chay Pyung-gil, Following the Conclusion of the Serialization 'Yu Song-ch'ol's Testimony,' " Hankuk Ilbo, December 1, 1990, translated in Seiler, Kim Il-song 19411948.

Bruce c.u.mings (Origins (Origins II [see chap. 3, n. 43], p. 830, n. 26) discusses the importance of this group: II [see chap. 3, n. 43], p. 830, n. 26) discusses the importance of this group: "To my knowledge only one source in all the published and unpublished literature on North Korea grasps the central importance of Kim's peculiar style of leadership, and that is the formerly cla.s.sified study done in the early 1960s by Evelyn McCune for the U.S. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research ('Leadership in North Korea: Groupings and .Motivations,' 1963). She correctly terms the relationship between Kim and his close allies 'a semi-chivalrous, irrevocable and unconditional bond ... under iron discipline.' It is a 'deeply personal' system, 'fundamentally hostile to complex bureaucracy' Kim and his allies 'were 'were generalists, jacks-of-all-trades who could run the government or command the army, show a peasant how to use new seeds or cuddle children in a school; Kim would dispatch them as loyal observers of officials and experts or specialists outside the inner core, that is, in the realm of impersonal bureaucracy. McCune thought correctly that the powerful glue holding the Kim group together made it much more formidable than typical Korean political factions, based on weaker patron-client relations and given to splintering in power struggles and personal compet.i.tion; thus it was able to a.s.sert dominance over rival groups rather easily. She also understood the concentric circle metaphor, providing a chart of the leadership radiating outward from Kim." generalists, jacks-of-all-trades who could run the government or command the army, show a peasant how to use new seeds or cuddle children in a school; Kim would dispatch them as loyal observers of officials and experts or specialists outside the inner core, that is, in the realm of impersonal bureaucracy. McCune thought correctly that the powerful glue holding the Kim group together made it much more formidable than typical Korean political factions, based on weaker patron-client relations and given to splintering in power struggles and personal compet.i.tion; thus it was able to a.s.sert dominance over rival groups rather easily. She also understood the concentric circle metaphor, providing a chart of the leadership radiating outward from Kim."

11. Kim Il-sung, Kim Il-sung, Selected Works, Selected Works, vol. 1 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1976), cited in Lim Un, vol. 1 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1976), cited in Lim Un, Founding of a Dynasty Founding of a Dynasty (see chap. 2, n. 59), pp. 221222. Kim's philosophy of life was, "Don't trust strangers," Lim observes. Thus, Kim not only purged his opposition "but precluded the entire potential of any possible formation of new opposition. For instance, once he pinpointed an object of elimination, he hunted its fellow travelers and collaborators and purged all of them. He further eradicated their relatives, business contacts, and even acquaintances. When an army general was purged so were his relatives, relatives on his wife's side, his leaders, staff, adjutants, drivers, and all relatives of these people, persons from the same home town and schoolmates, and so forth. The extent of the victimization spread like a creeping potato vine." (see chap. 2, n. 59), pp. 221222. Kim's philosophy of life was, "Don't trust strangers," Lim observes. Thus, Kim not only purged his opposition "but precluded the entire potential of any possible formation of new opposition. For instance, once he pinpointed an object of elimination, he hunted its fellow travelers and collaborators and purged all of them. He further eradicated their relatives, business contacts, and even acquaintances. When an army general was purged so were his relatives, relatives on his wife's side, his leaders, staff, adjutants, drivers, and all relatives of these people, persons from the same home town and schoolmates, and so forth. The extent of the victimization spread like a creeping potato vine."

12. Baik II, pp. 378380. Baik II, pp. 378380.

13. Ibid., p. 456. Ibid., p. 456.

14. Yoon T. Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Development During the Post-War Period," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., Yoon T. Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Development During the Post-War Period," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., North Korea Today North Korea Today (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 54. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 54.

15. "[B]etween 1946 and 1965 the share of industry and agriculture as components of national income was almost exactly reversed: from 16.8 percent and 63.5 percent to 64.2 percent and 18.3 percent" (Aidan Foster-Carter, "North Korea. Development and Self Reliance: A Critical Appraisal," in Gavan McCormack and John Gittings, eds., "[B]etween 1946 and 1965 the share of industry and agriculture as components of national income was almost exactly reversed: from 16.8 percent and 63.5 percent to 64.2 percent and 18.3 percent" (Aidan Foster-Carter, "North Korea. Development and Self Reliance: A Critical Appraisal," in Gavan McCormack and John Gittings, eds., Crisis in Korea Crisis in Korea [London, Spokesman Books, 1977], p. 81). [London, Spokesman Books, 1977], p. 81).

16. Joseph Sang-hoon Chung, Joseph Sang-hoon Chung, The North Korean Economy: Structure and Development The North Korean Economy: Structure and Development (Stanford, Calif: Hoover Inst.i.tution Press, 1974), p. 145. (Stanford, Calif: Hoover Inst.i.tution Press, 1974), p. 145.

17. Kuark, "Industrial Development," p. 61. Kuark, "Industrial Development," p. 61.

18. Van Ree, Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone Socialism in One Zone (see chap. 4, n. 1), p. 182. (see chap. 4, n. 1), p. 182.

Suh (Kim Il Sung, (Kim Il Sung, p. 140) mentions a Soviet loan of 1 billion rubles in 1953, along with an extension of repayment time for previous Soviet loans. The same year the Chinese provided a loan of 8 trillion yuan. "The Chinese p. 140) mentions a Soviet loan of 1 billion rubles in 1953, along with an extension of repayment time for previous Soviet loans. The same year the Chinese provided a loan of 8 trillion yuan. "The Chinese 'were 'were more generous than the Soviet Union and canceled all North Korean debts to China, including materials supplied by the Chinese during the Korean War from 1950 to 1953." more generous than the Soviet Union and canceled all North Korean debts to China, including materials supplied by the Chinese during the Korean War from 1950 to 1953."

19. "North Korea has been generally free from the kind of factionalism, frequent revolutions, corruption, inept.i.tude, inflation, unemployment, and so on that demoralized and undermined many an emerging economy" (Chung, "North Korea has been generally free from the kind of factionalism, frequent revolutions, corruption, inept.i.tude, inflation, unemployment, and so on that demoralized and undermined many an emerging economy" (Chung, The North Korean Economy, The North Korean Economy, p. 158). Chung says Kim's tight dictatorial control brought a stability that probably contributed to economic development even as it dampened private incentives. p. 158). Chung says Kim's tight dictatorial control brought a stability that probably contributed to economic development even as it dampened private incentives.

20. Baik II, p. 448. Baik II, p. 448.

21. Although in 1945 Kim was reported to have asked to be called by the plain t.i.tle Although in 1945 Kim was reported to have asked to be called by the plain t.i.tle dongmoo dongmoo (comrade), Paige and Lee report that in the 1950s "[a]t least one high official has been fired from his post" for referring to Kim as (comrade), Paige and Lee report that in the 1950s "[a]t least one high official has been fired from his post" for referring to Kim as dongmoo dongmoo instead of instead of t'ongji, t'ongji, the honorific version ("Post-War Politics" [see chap. 5, n. 58], p. 28). the honorific version ("Post-War Politics" [see chap. 5, n. 58], p. 28).

22. "In the nine years since the fighting stopped, North Korea has become something of a showcase, with plenty of window-dressing and propaganda for Communism in Asia" (Kuark, "Industrial Development," p. 51). "In the nine years since the fighting stopped, North Korea has become something of a showcase, with plenty of window-dressing and propaganda for Communism in Asia" (Kuark, "Industrial Development," p. 51).

23. Kim Il-sung, "On Communist Education," November 28, 1958, quoted in Kim Chang-soon, "North Korea Today" Kim Il-sung, "On Communist Education," November 28, 1958, quoted in Kim Chang-soon, "North Korea Today" Vantage Point Vantage Point (March 1979): p. 12. (March 1979): p. 12.

24. Baik II, p. 423. Baik II, p. 423.

Proponents of NorthSouth Korean coexistence, Kim Il-sung said on November 3, 1954, "seem to think that the responsibility for the revolution in South Korea rests entirely upon the South Korean people and that we, the people in North Korea, are not responsible for liberating the South. This is nothing but an attempt to justify the division of the country and perpetuate it. Such a tendency must be thoroughly done away with." See "On Our Party's Policy for the Further Development of Agriculture," in Kim Il Sung, Selected Works, Selected Works, cited in Scalapino and Lee, cited in Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, vol. 1, p. 545. vol. 1, p. 545.

25. Baik II, p. 438. Baik II, p. 438.

26. Kim Il-sung, "Sasang saopeso kyojojuuiwa hyongsikchuuirul t'oejihago chuch'erul hw.a.n.gnip hal te taehayo" ("On Exterminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Independence in Ideological Work" Kim Il-sung, "Sasang saopeso kyojojuuiwa hyongsikchuuirul t'oejihago chuch'erul hw.a.n.gnip hal te taehayo" ("On Exterminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Independence in Ideological Work"), in Kim Il-song Sonjip (Km Il-sung Selected Works) IV Kim Il-song Sonjip (Km Il-sung Selected Works) IV (Pyongyang: Korean Workers' Party Press, 1960), p. 343, translated in Glenn D. Paige and Dong Jun Lee, "The Post-War Politics of Communist Korea," in Scalapino, (Pyongyang: Korean Workers' Party Press, 1960), p. 343, translated in Glenn D. Paige and Dong Jun Lee, "The Post-War Politics of Communist Korea," in Scalapino, North Korea Today North Korea Today (see chap. 3, n. 11), pp. 2627. Paige and Lee note, "Such thinking as this may [underlie] apparent Korean sympathy for the Chinese emphasis on widespread wars of 'national liberation. (see chap. 3, n. 11), pp. 2627. Paige and Lee note, "Such thinking as this may [underlie] apparent Korean sympathy for the Chinese emphasis on widespread wars of 'national liberation.

27. See Scalapino and Lee, See Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, pp. 461462; 543548. As for the policy in the immediate post-liberation period, the authors report (pp. 300301) that within a year after liberation, American and South Korean officials had begun to hear from informers about a "communist master plan" for South Korea. Under this plan, it was alleged, communists in the South would spin off front groups that would publicly take issue with the communists and a.s.sume a pose of neutrality. The Southern communists, pretending to be weakened by such maneuvers, would then offer to compromise, joining the rightists and "neutrals" in a united-front government. Believing that the communists' share of power was small, the Americans would accept this united-front government and withdraw their troops from the South. Then disguised communists planted in the security forces would take advantage of made-to-order controversies and disorders to come forth, restore order and seize power. pp. 461462; 543548. As for the policy in the immediate post-liberation period, the authors report (pp. 300301) that within a year after liberation, American and South Korean officials had begun to hear from informers about a "communist master plan" for South Korea. Under this plan, it was alleged, communists in the South would spin off front groups that would publicly take issue with the communists and a.s.sume a pose of neutrality. The Southern communists, pretending to be weakened by such maneuvers, would then offer to compromise, joining the rightists and "neutrals" in a united-front government. Believing that the communists' share of power was small, the Americans would accept this united-front government and withdraw their troops from the South. Then disguised communists planted in the security forces would take advantage of made-to-order controversies and disorders to come forth, restore order and seize power.

28. Korea Times, Korea Times, May 12 1995, and my June 1995 conversation with Park Jin, presidential spokesman. May 12 1995, and my June 1995 conversation with Park Jin, presidential spokesman.

29. See Baik II, p. 510, and Kiwon Chung, "The North Korean People's Army and the Party," in Scalapino, See Baik II, p. 510, and Kiwon Chung, "The North Korean People's Army and the Party," in Scalapino, North Korea Today, North Korea Today, pp. 118119. pp. 118119.

Note that in the five-year plan promulgated in 1956, "[s]pecial steps 'were 'were taken to deal with new war preparations and subversive plots being intensified by U.S. imperialism and its stooges, for which [Kim Il-sung] stressed the need to enhance the roles of home, police and judicial organs, and bring to light and destroy every kind of enemy subversive scheme as quickly as possible" (Baik II, p. 491). taken to deal with new war preparations and subversive plots being intensified by U.S. imperialism and its stooges, for which [Kim Il-sung] stressed the need to enhance the roles of home, police and judicial organs, and bring to light and destroy every kind of enemy subversive scheme as quickly as possible" (Baik II, p. 491).

30. "Personally I think if we could get a neutralized Korea that I would buy it. I do worry though as to whether we would be able to help a neutralized Korea sufficiently so the ROKs [South Koreans] wouldn't go Communist in a fairly short time" (Frank C Nash, a.s.sistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, quoted in a decla.s.sified, formerly top-secret "Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of StateJoint Chiefs of Staff .Meeting," June 16, 1953, in "Personally I think if we could get a neutralized Korea that I would buy it. I do worry though as to whether we would be able to help a neutralized Korea sufficiently so the ROKs [South Koreans] wouldn't go Communist in a fairly short time" (Frank C Nash, a.s.sistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, quoted in a decla.s.sified, formerly top-secret "Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of StateJoint Chiefs of Staff .Meeting," June 16, 1953, in Foreign Relations of the United States 19521954, Foreign Relations of the United States 19521954, vol. XV: vol. XV: Korea, Korea, pt. 2 [Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1984], p. 1187). pt. 2 [Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1984], p. 1187).

31. Ibid., pp. 11931194. Ibid., pp. 11931194.

32. NSC 154/1, ibid., pp. 13411344. NSC 154/1, ibid., pp. 13411344.

33. NSC 157/1, "U.S. Objective with Respect to Korea Following an Armistice," ibid., pp. 13441346. NSC 157/1, "U.S. Objective with Respect to Korea Following an Armistice," ibid., pp. 13441346.

34. Paige and Lee, "Post-War Politics," p. 27. Paige and Lee, "Post-War Politics," p. 27.

35. Kim, Kim, With the Century With the Century (see chap. 2, n. 2), vol. 3, p. 429. (see chap. 2, n. 2), vol. 3, p. 429.

36. "Victorious History of Chongryun," "Victorious History of Chongryun," People's Korea, People's Korea, 20 May 1995. In j.a.panese the group is called "Chosen Soren." 20 May 1995. In j.a.panese the group is called "Chosen Soren."

37. "[B]etween 1959 and 1974," says Foster-Carter, "92,000 Koreans left j.a.pan to settle permanently in the DPRK .... Of these, 75,000 or over 80 per cent went in the short period 19591962." ("Development and Self Reliance," p. 104). He cites a Chongryon source quoted in "[B]etween 1959 and 1974," says Foster-Carter, "92,000 Koreans left j.a.pan to settle permanently in the DPRK .... Of these, 75,000 or over 80 per cent went in the short period 19591962." ("Development and Self Reliance," p. 104). He cites a Chongryon source quoted in Sekai, Sekai, no. 3 (1975), p. 190, for the overall figures. For the 19591962 figures he cites G. A. De Vos and W. O. Wetherall, no. 3 (1975), p. 190, for the overall figures. For the 19591962 figures he cites G. A. De Vos and W. O. Wetherall, j.a.pan's Minorities, j.a.pan's Minorities, rev. ed. (London: Minority Rights Group Report no. 3, September 1974). Foster-Carter also cites De Vos and Wetherall (p. 15) for this observation: "North Korea most effectively courted ... j.a.pan's Koreans in ethnic education and national identification, in contrast with the South Korean Government, which provided practically no a.s.sistance and seemed at times, in alliance with the j.a.panese Ministry of Education, even opposed to such concerns." And he cites Jonathan Unger ("Foreign Minorities in j.a.pan," rev. ed. (London: Minority Rights Group Report no. 3, September 1974). Foster-Carter also cites De Vos and Wetherall (p. 15) for this observation: "North Korea most effectively courted ... j.a.pan's Koreans in ethnic education and national identification, in contrast with the South Korean Government, which provided practically no a.s.sistance and seemed at times, in alliance with the j.a.panese Ministry of Education, even opposed to such concerns." And he cites Jonathan Unger ("Foreign Minorities in j.a.pan," Journal of Contemporary Asia, Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 307) for these further indications of the comparative appeal of North Korea over South Korea during this period: "In 1960, 445,000 of j.a.pan's Koreans designated North Korea as their mother-country, while only 163,000 opted for South Korea-despite the fact that almost all of j.a.pan's Koreans originated from Korea's South." vol. 3, no. 3, p. 307) for these further indications of the comparative appeal of North Korea over South Korea during this period: "In 1960, 445,000 of j.a.pan's Koreans designated North Korea as their mother-country, while only 163,000 opted for South Korea-despite the fact that almost all of j.a.pan's Koreans originated from Korea's South."

38. Interviewed June 1994 in Seoul, Chong was among several j.a.panese-Koreans who defected from North Korea to South Korea. Available evidence strongly suggests that a very high percentage of repatriates from j.a.pan had found their experiences in North Korea to be highly unsatisfactory. Interviewed June 1994 in Seoul, Chong was among several j.a.panese-Koreans who defected from North Korea to South Korea. Available evidence strongly suggests that a very high percentage of repatriates from j.a.pan had found their experiences in North Korea to be highly unsatisfactory.

39. This detail comes from an interview (Seoul, June 1994) with another defector, Kim Myong-chol, who was born in the North the year Chong emigrated from j.a.pan. This detail comes from an interview (Seoul, June 1994) with another defector, Kim Myong-chol, who was born in the North the year Chong emigrated from j.a.pan.

40. Baik II, p. 547. Baik II, p. 547.

41. See Baik II, pp. 497516. Also see Chong-sik Lee, "Land Reform, Collectivisation and the Peasants in North Korea," in Scalapino, ed., See Baik II, pp. 497516. Also see Chong-sik Lee, "Land Reform, Collectivisation and the Peasants in North Korea," in Scalapino, ed., North Korea Today, North Korea Today, pp. 6581. In another article in the same volume, "North Korea's Agricultural Development During the Post-War Period," Yoon T. Kuark observes (p. 91) that the Chollima movement was less radical than China's Great Leap, and that Pyongyang quickly drew back from some of the more extreme measures it did impose-although the radical land collectivization remained in force. pp. 6581. In another article in the same volume, "North Korea's Agricultural Development During the Post-War Period," Yoon T. Kuark observes (p. 91) that the Chollima movement was less radical than China's Great Leap, and that Pyongyang quickly drew back from some of the more extreme measures it did impose-although the radical land collectivization remained in force.

42. Baik II, p. 515. Baik II, p. 515.

43. Ibid., pp. 505506. Ibid., pp. 505506.

44. Kuark, "Agricultural Development," p. 91, citing North Korean official sources. Kuark, "Agricultural Development," p. 91, citing North Korean official sources.

45. Baik II, p. 503. Baik II, p. 503.

46. "Since entering the 1960s, coinciding with the Seven Year Plan, the pace of overall economic progress as measured by national income began to drop sharply. Average annual rate of growth in national income declined to 8.9 percent during 196167 [as opposed to an average growth rate of 16.6 percent for the entire 195467 period]. The fact that no mention was made of the status of national income (as well as agricultural output) for 1970 in Kim Il-song's speech to the Fifth Congress suggests that the Seven Year Plan target of raising national income to "Since entering the 1960s, coinciding with the Seven Year Plan, the pace of overall economic progress as measured by national income began to drop sharply. Average annual rate of growth in national income declined to 8.9 percent during 196167 [as opposed to an average growth rate of 16.6 percent for the entire 195467 period]. The fact that no mention was made of the status of national income (as well as agricultural output) for 1970 in Kim Il-song's speech to the Fifth Congress suggests that the Seven Year Plan target of raising national income to 2.7 2.7 times the 1960 level by 1970 (originally by 1967) was not fulfilled" (Chung, times the 1960 level by 1970 (originally by 1967) was not fulfilled" (Chung, North Korean Economy North Korean Economy [see chap. 6, n. 16], p. 155). [see chap. 6, n. 16], p. 155).

47. I am grateful to Prof. Youngok Seo-Kim for pointing out this information. I am grateful to Prof. Youngok Seo-Kim for pointing out this information.

48. Grain dealers had been eliminated in 1954. See Lee, "Land Reform," p. 78. Grain dealers had been eliminated in 1954. See Lee, "Land Reform," p. 78.

49. Baik II, pp. 555556. Baik adds (p. 556), "On the contrary, the workers and peasants who could not live well are now satisfied and never complain, because their livelihood has been improved." Baik II, pp. 555556. Baik adds (p. 556), "On the contrary, the workers and peasants who could not live well are now satisfied and never complain, because their livelihood has been improved."

50. Byoung-Lo Philo Kim, Byoung-Lo Philo Kim, Two Koreas Two Koreas (see chap. 1, n. 2), p. (see chap. 1, n. 2), p. 66. 66.

51. Amba.s.sador Walter P. McConaughy "Telegram from the Emba.s.sy in Korea to the Department of State," April 11, 1961, Doc.u.ment No. 210 Amba.s.sador Walter P. McConaughy "Telegram from the Emba.s.sy in Korea to the Department of State," April 11, 1961, Doc.u.ment No. 210 in Foreign Relations of the United States 19611963, vol. XXII in Foreign Relations of the United States 19611963, vol. XXII (Washington, D.C: Department of State, 1996), http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusXXII/201to240.html. (Washington, D.C: Department of State, 1996), http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusXXII/201to240.html.

52. Karl Mener, "Seeing Is Believing," in Karl Mener, "Seeing Is Believing," in Impressions of Korea Impressions of Korea (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 23. (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 23.

53. Joan Robinson, "Korean Miracle," Joan Robinson, "Korean Miracle," Monthly Review Monthly Review (January 1965): pp. 545548, quoted in Chung, (January 1965): pp. 545548, quoted in Chung, North Korean Economy, North Korean Economy, p. 151. Chung comments, "Calling the North Korean feat a miracle perhaps overstates the case but nevertheless dramatizes her achievements as evidenced by various indicators: rapid growth and the absolute level (total and per capita) of national income and of strategic industrial products (per capita output of 1,184 kilowatt hours of electricity 1,975 kilograms of coal, and 158 kilograms of steel in 1970); a long-term change in the composition of national income in favor of industry; change in the structure within the industrial sector in favor of heavy industry, especially the machinery sector; change in the commodity composition of foreign trade and evidence of significant import subst.i.tution as well as impressive growth in exports; shifts in the occupational distribution of population in favor of secondary industry at the expense of the primary; increasing urbanization of population; and so on." p. 151. Chung comments, "Calling the North Korean feat a miracle perhaps overstates the case but nevertheless dramatizes her achievements as evidenced by various indicators: rapid growth and the absolute level (total and per capita) of national income and of strategic industrial products (per capita output of 1,184 kilowatt hours of electricity 1,975 kilograms of coal, and 158 kilograms of steel in 1970); a long-term change in the composition of national income in favor of industry; change in the structure within the industrial sector in favor of heavy industry, especially the machinery sector; change in the commodity composition of foreign trade and evidence of significant import subst.i.tution as well as impressive growth in exports; shifts in the occupational distribution of population in favor of secondary industry at the expense of the primary; increasing urbanization of population; and so on."

Another scholar's summary: "[E]ven if one makes allowances for Communist propaganda and window-dressing ... it appears indisputable to this author that North Korea has made greater economic strides during the post-war period as a whole than has South Korea. In the industrial sector there is good reason to take at face value the Communist claim that 'in 1959 the North produced ten times as much steel as South Korea and five times more cement.' ... It remains to be seen, however, whether the Communists can surpa.s.s j.a.pan's per capita per capita industrial production in ten years as the ambitious premier, Kim Il-song, prophesied in 1959. ... In a nutsh.e.l.l, the recent economic offensive of the Communist North, with the usual dazzle of unconfirmable statistics, may have a grave impact upon the people of South Korea in their current plight. For there is no better bait to poverty-stricken people than economic advance" (Kuark, "Industrial Development," pp. 63, industrial production in ten years as the ambitious premier, Kim Il-song, prophesied in 1959. ... In a nutsh.e.l.l, the recent economic offensive of the Communist North, with the usual dazzle of unconfirmable statistics, may have a grave impact upon the people of South Korea in their current plight. For there is no better bait to poverty-stricken people than economic advance" (Kuark, "Industrial Development," pp. 63, 64). 64).

54. Baik II, pp. 28, 29. This book was published in the 1960s but the characterization of Kim and his destiny is not unlike what could be heard in the '50s. Baik II, pp. 28, 29. This book was published in the 1960s but the characterization of Kim and his destiny is not unlike what could be heard in the '50s.

55. Ibid., p. 138. Ibid., p. 138.

Dae-Sook Suh observes, "The fundamental reason for the North Korean endeavor to build up the image of Kim Il-song as the father of the Korean revolution is, primarily, his non-Korean revolutionary past. He fought under a Communist army and became a Communist, but it was with the Chinese, and possibly the Russians, not with the Korean Communists. In the Korean Communist movement and among Korean Communist leaders, Kim Il-song is an alien who advanced through the ranks of the Chinese Communist revolutionaries in .Manchuria and was educated and trained by the Chinese Communists as one of their own, not as a delegate or a representative of Korean Communists among the Chinese. Kim's revolutionary past is a remarkable one, considering that he was only thirty-three in 1945-even if it was in the Chinese army. He was a Korean, a Communist, and he fought against the j.a.panese, scoring some important victories in .Manchuria against them. It is his effort to build the image of a towering mountain from a molehill past that brings the perplexities, denunciations and doubts of his Communist revolutionary past" (Suh, Korean Communist Movement Korean Communist Movement [see chap. 2, n. 56], p. 293). [see chap. 2, n. 56], p. 293).

56. Kim Il-sung Square opened in 1954 (Baik II, p. 457). Kim Chaek, who had died during the Korean War, was one of the few leaders besides Kim Il-sung whose names were carried on inst.i.tutionally. Kim Chaek had a steel works and the city in which it was situated named after him, as well as the leading technical college, in Pyongyang. Kim Il-sung Square opened in 1954 (Baik II, p. 457). Kim Chaek, who had died during the Korean War, was one of the few leaders besides Kim Il-sung whose names were carried on inst.i.tutionally. Kim Chaek had a steel works and the city in which it was situated named after him, as well as the leading technical college, in Pyongyang.

57. Lankov, Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung From Stalin to Kim Il Sung (see chap. 4, note 45), pp. 154193. (Some extended quotations are from an earlier, ma.n.u.script version of that chapter.) Evaluating the outcome of this open challenge to Kim Il-sung s power, Lankov says (p. 193) that it "determined the direction of North Korean development over the following decades. Before 1956 the country had been a typical 'people's democracy' in many respects not unlike the regimes of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, but after 1956 it began to transform itself into a much more idiosyncratic Communist state: thoroughly controlled, extremely militarized, devoted to a fanatical personality cult and a particular type of ideology, and far removed from 'orthodox' Marxism-Leninism. The very term for this ideology, (see chap. 4, note 45), pp. 154193. (Some extended quotations are from an earlier, ma.n.u.script version of that chapter.) Evaluating the outcome of this open challenge to Kim Il-sung s power, Lankov says (p. 193) that it "determined the direction of North Korean development over the following decades. Before 1956 the country had been a typical 'people's democracy' in many respects not unlike the regimes of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, but after 1956 it began to transform itself into a much more idiosyncratic Communist state: thoroughly controlled, extremely militarized, devoted to a fanatical personality cult and a particular type of ideology, and far removed from 'orthodox' Marxism-Leninism. The very term for this ideology, 'chuch'e [juche], 'chuch'e [juche], was coined on the eve of the 1956 crisis, in December 1955." was coined on the eve of the 1956 crisis, in December 1955."

58. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 18 and November 20, 1990. November 18 and November 20, 1990.

59. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 1, preface. vol. 1, preface.

Bruce c.u.mings Bruce c.u.mings (Origins (Origins II [see chap. 3, n. 43], p. 292) criticizes use of the terms "Stalinist" and "oriental despot" to describe Kim Il-sung when "there is no evidence in the North Korean experience of the ma.s.s violence against whole cla.s.ses of people or the cla.s.sic, wholesale purge' that characterized Stalinism, and that has been particularly noteworthy in the land reform campaigns in China and North Vietnam and the purges of the Cultural Revolution." II [see chap. 3, n. 43], p. 292) criticizes use of the terms "Stalinist" and "oriental despot" to describe Kim Il-sung when "there is no evidence in the North Korean experience of the ma.s.s violence against whole cla.s.ses of people or the cla.s.sic, wholesale purge' that characterized Stalinism, and that has been particularly noteworthy in the land reform campaigns in China and North Vietnam and the purges of the Cultural Revolution."

Hungarian scholar Balazs Szalontai ("The Dynamic of Repression: The Global Impact of the Stalinist .Model, 19441953" [see chap. 4, n. 45]) says that Kim's purges during this period 'were 'were "comparable to the attack Stalin had launched on the intra-party opposition in 19261928, and even to the Great Terror of 1937, 1938, but its methods proved rather different. First of all, the number of party members expelled between July 1957 and July 1958 did not exceed 4,000, i.e., less than one per cent of the total membership. By contrast, the Soviet "comparable to the attack Stalin had launched on the intra-party opposition in 19261928, and even to the Great Terror of 1937, 1938, but its methods proved rather different. First of all, the number of party members expelled between July 1957 and July 1958 did not exceed 4,000, i.e., less than one per cent of the total membership. By contrast, the Soviet proverka proverka of 1935 had resulted in the expulsion of 9.1 per cent of party members. On the other hand, the enforced partic.i.p.ation of the whole membership in the screening process certainly filled each KWP member with fear and a sense of insecurity. ... [P]arty members, a.s.sembled in groups, had to practise criticism and self-criticism. If a person proved unable to name two witnesses testifying that he had not been involved in any anti-regime activity since the outbreak of the Korean War, his self-criticism would not be accepted. Since one was prohibited from naming relatives, friends, or acquaintances as his witnesses, the psychological pressure thus created became extremely intense. In the second half of 1958 the regime purged the provincial party committees and People's Committees, replacing most of their chairmen, and at the end of the year it organized a public trial in each province. The courts usually meted out death sentences (executions of 1935 had resulted in the expulsion of 9.1 per cent of party members. On the other hand, the enforced partic.i.p.ation of the whole membership in the screening process certainly filled each KWP member with fear and a sense of insecurity. ... [P]arty members, a.s.sembled in groups, had to practise criticism and self-criticism. If a person proved unable to name two witnesses testifying that he had not been involved in any anti-regime activity since the outbreak of the Korean War, his self-criticism would not be accepted. Since one was prohibited from naming relatives, friends, or acquaintances as his witnesses, the psychological pressure thus created became extremely intense. In the second half of 1958 the regime purged the provincial party committees and People's Committees, replacing most of their chairmen, and at the end of the year it organized a public trial in each province. The courts usually meted out death sentences (executions 'were 'were also public), and in some cases the incited audience beat the accused unconscious. The methods ... had more in common with .Maoist practices than with Soviet Stalinism. Nevertheless, the events that happened in North Korea between 1957 and 1969 had a logic somewhat similar to that of the Soviet purges of 19261938." also public), and in some cases the incited audience beat the accused unconscious. The methods ... had more in common with .Maoist practices than with Soviet Stalinism. Nevertheless, the events that happened in North Korea between 1957 and 1969 had a logic somewhat similar to that of the Soviet purges of 19261938."

60. Kim's official biographer obviously had Khrushchev and company in mind when he wrote scathingly of those communists who "baulked at the struggle against imperialism, and putting principles aside, entered into compromises with it. Spreading illusions about the nature of imperialism, in particular U.S. imperialism, they did everything within their power to dampen the revolution ary struggles of the peoples seeking social and national liberation" (Baik II, p. 485). Kim's official biographer obviously had Khrushchev and company in mind when he wrote scathingly of those communists who "baulked at the struggle against imperialism, and putting principles aside, entered into compromises with it. Spreading illusions about the nature of imperialism, in particular U.S. imperialism, they did everything within their power to dampen the revolution ary struggles of the peoples seeking social and national liberation" (Baik II, p. 485).

61. See van Ree, See van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, Socialism in One Zone, pp. 121122. This sort of att.i.tude can be seen throughout Lim Un's book, pp. 121122. This sort of att.i.tude can be seen throughout Lim Un's book, The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea-An Authen tic Biography of Kim Il-song, The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea-An Authen tic Biography of Kim Il-song, which is one of the reasons for doubting Bruce c.u.mings's suggestion that it is actually a South Koreanproduced work. which is one of the reasons for doubting Bruce c.u.mings's suggestion that it is actually a South Koreanproduced work.

Suh observes (Kim Il Sung, (Kim Il Sung, p. 108) that "Soviet-Koreans lost much when the Soviet Union withdrew and did not return to fight for [North] Korea during the Korean War." p. 108) that "Soviet-Koreans lost much when the Soviet Union withdrew and did not return to fight for [North] Korea during the Korean War."

62. c.u.mings (Origins I [see chap. 2, n. 25], p. xxv) says that Soviet policy in North Korea "failed to create a docile satellite state . . . because the Soviets sponsored a group of radical nationalists who had cut their teeth in anti-j.a.panese conflict and who chafed under Soviet controls." c.u.mings (Origins I [see chap. 2, n. 25], p. xxv) says that Soviet policy in North Korea "failed to create a docile satellite state . . . because the Soviets sponsored a group of radical nationalists who had cut their teeth in anti-j.a.panese conflict and who chafed under Soviet controls."

63. Kim complained in his memoirs that misguided North Koreans even referred to Ri Su-bok, a communist hero of the Korean War battle to retake Heartbreak Ridge, as "the Korean Matrosov," a reference to a Soviet war hero (Kim, Kim complained in his memoirs that misguided North Koreans even referred to Ri Su-bok, a communist hero of the Korean War battle to retake Heartbreak Ridge, as "the Korean Matrosov," a reference to a Soviet war hero (Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 3, p. 333). vol. 3, p. 333).

In China, Mao Zedong had reached a similar stage of dissatisfaction with the tendency of many of his colleagues to imitate Soviet practice. As his personal physician writes, "[inst.i.tutional and organizational arrangements were being copied without regard to the special circ.u.mstances of China. ... It was this disaffection with his own party that would fester for years and grow, leading finally to the catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution" (Dr. Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao's Personal Physician The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao's Personal Physician [New York: Random House, 1994], pp. 118119). [New York: Random House, 1994], pp. 118119).

64. October 13, 1945, speech to Five Province Conference, cited by Scalapino and Lee, October 13, 1945, speech to Five Province Conference, cited by Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, p. 330. Judging from pp. 253254, there may be some question whether the "Comrade Kim" who was speaking was Kim Il-sung, but on p. 330 Scalapino and Lee say this speech is found in a different version in Kim's selected works, published in 1963. In any case, this was not an isolated example. Scalapino and Lee refer on p. 347 to Kim's "lengthy and obsequious eulogies of the Russians." p. 330. Judging from pp. 253254, there may be some question whether the "Comrade Kim" who was speaking was Kim Il-sung, but on p. 330 Scalapino and Lee say this speech is found in a different version in Kim's selected works, published in 1963. In any case, this was not an isolated example. Scalapino and Lee refer on p. 347 to Kim's "lengthy and obsequious eulogies of the Russians."

65. Van Ree, Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, Socialism in One Zone, p. 159. p. 159.

66. Nodong Shinmun, Nodong Shinmun, July 2, 1950, as cited by c.u.mings, July 2, 1950, as cited by c.u.mings, Origins Origins II, p. 633. II, p. 633.

67. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 3, p. 333. vol. 3, p. 333.

68. Van Ree, Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, Socialism in One Zone, p. 165. The author adds, "In the 194550 period Soviet radio broadcasts p. 165. The author adds, "In the 194550 period Soviet radio broadcasts 'were 'were relayed at least three times a day to North Korea. Soviet news was distributed through the North Korean news agency. In 1947 English was discontinued in all senior middle schools; Russian became a compulsory subject. There was a large influx of Soviet literature and films. From 19468 a total of ten million books relayed at least three times a day to North Korea. Soviet news was distributed through the North Korean news agency. In 1947 English was discontinued in all senior middle schools; Russian became a compulsory subject. There was a large influx of Soviet literature and films. From 19468 a total of ten million books 'were 'were published in North Korea. In one of his 1948 speeches Kim Il Sung revealed that after the merger of the parties the Central Committee of the North Korean Workers' Party published nearly three million books of propaganda and on .Marxism-Leninism, including the translation of Stalin's notorious history of the Soviet communist party. We can safely a.s.sume that of these three million political books a substantial portion published in North Korea. In one of his 1948 speeches Kim Il Sung revealed that after the merger of the parties the Central Committee of the North Korean Workers' Party published nearly three million books of propaganda and on .Marxism-Leninism, including the translation of Stalin's notorious history of the Soviet communist party. We can safely a.s.sume that of these three million political books a substantial portion 'were 'were translations from Russian." Besides, "Moscow had a strong-an unfriendly observer would say strangling-economic leverage in the form of its quasi-monopoly on Pyongyang's foreign trade." translations from Russian." Besides, "Moscow had a strong-an unfriendly observer would say strangling-economic leverage in the form of its quasi-monopoly on Pyongyang's foreign trade."

69. Van Ree, Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, Socialism in One Zone, p. 168. p. 168.

70. A typical account in a 1976 A typical account in a 1976 Nodong Shinmun Nodong Shinmun (Workers' Daily) article by Yi Chan-gol says, "The great leader Comrade Kim Il-sung issued orders to all commanders and soldiers of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army to defeat the j.a.panese imperialists." This force then "delivered the decisive blow to the j.a.panese Kwantung Army" in Manchuria before moving to Korea, where it "finally defeated the j.a.panese completely and liberated the whole country" (quoted in Lim Un, (Workers' Daily) article by Yi Chan-gol says, "The great leader Comrade Kim Il-sung issued orders to all commanders and soldiers of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army to defeat the j.a.panese imperialists." This force then "delivered the decisive blow to the j.a.panese Kwantung Army" in Manchuria before moving to Korea, where it "finally defeated the j.a.panese completely and liberated the whole country" (quoted in Lim Un, Founding of a Dynasty, Founding of a Dynasty, p. 109). p. 109).

An official biography is slightly more generous to the Russians: "On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union finally declared war on j.a.pan. General Kim Il-sung, who had already completed his operational plan for the final decisive offensives against j.a.pan, immediately ordered the mobilization of all units under the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. ... In the face of the strong attack by the Korean People's Revolutionary Army and the Soviet Army j.a.pan's 'impregnable defense line' guarding the border collapsed like a wall of clay and the main forces of the Kwantung Army so proud of its might, 'were 'were completely crushed" (Baik I [see chap. 4, n. 25], pp. 529530). completely crushed" (Baik I [see chap. 4, n. 25], pp. 529530).

71. Seiler (p. Seiler (p. 46) 46) cites an August 26, 1991, interview article in cites an August 26, 1991, interview article in JoongAng Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, a leading Seoul daily, in which the Soviet occupation chief, Maj. Gen. Nikolai Lebe-dev, recalled that Kim had asked him directly, "Commander, sir, please make it so that it appears as though the anti-j.a.panese partisans partic.i.p.ated in the war of liberation." Lebedev declined. a leading Seoul daily, in which the Soviet occupation chief, Maj. Gen. Nikolai Lebe-dev, recalled that Kim had asked him directly, "Commander, sir, please make it so that it appears as though the anti-j.a.panese partisans partic.i.p.ated in the war of liberation." Lebedev declined.

72. Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Problems of Human Rights (1) Problems of Human Rights (1) (see chap. 2, n. 1). (see chap. 2, n. 1).

73. Suh, Suh, Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung, p. 104. He adds, "They claim that it was Kim who returned triumphantly and founded the Communist republic of the North. These a.s.sertions deserve no refutation." p. 104. He adds, "They claim that it was Kim who returned triumphantly and founded the Communist republic of the North. These a.s.sertions deserve no refutation."

74. "If, in North Korea, one "If, in North Korea, one 'were 'were to say that 'Korea was liberated from the yoke of j.a.panese imperialism by the Soviet Russian army' the reaction would be most curious to observe," Lim Un to say that 'Korea was liberated from the yoke of j.a.panese imperialism by the Soviet Russian army' the reaction would be most curious to observe," Lim Un 'wrote 'wrote in his 1982 book. "Those between their teens and 30s in age will give a confident answer that it is propaganda of imperialists and the domineering cla.s.s. It is a malicious lie ... . Korea was liberated by the People's Revolutionary Army led by comrade Kim Il-song. Those Koreans in their 40's and 50s will say that from the memory of our childhood, we think the Soviet army liberated Korea. But in looking back upon those days, they will say meekly that they thought the Korean People's Revolutionary Army liberated the fatherland. Those above the age of 50 would not give any answer. For them silence is the only answer, as if to agree with the statement that Korea was liberated by the Soviet army" (Lim Un, in his 1982 book. "Those between their teens and 30s in age will give a confident answer that it is propaganda of imperialists and the domineering cla.s.s. It is a malicious lie ... . Korea was liberated by the People's Revolutionary Army led by comrade Kim Il-song. Those Koreans in their 40's and 50s will say that from the memory of our childhood, we think the Soviet army liberated Korea. But in looking back upon those days, they will say meekly that they thought the Korean People's Revolutionary Army liberated the fatherland. Those above the age of 50 would not give any answer. For them silence is the only answer, as if to agree with the statement that Korea was liberated by the Soviet army" (Lim Un, Founding of a Dynasty, Founding of a Dynasty, p. 265). p. 265).

75. Suh reports that Pyongyang museum curators literally cropped the likeness of Kim's Chinese superior from a photograph showing Kim with guerrillas Suh reports that Pyongyang museum curators literally cropped the likeness of Kim's Chinese superior from a photograph showing Kim with guerrillas (Kim Il Sung, (Kim Il Sung, pp. 810). pp. 810).

76. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November November 4, 4, 1990. 1990.

77. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 20 and 26, 1990. November 20 and 26, 1990.