55. Deane, Deane, I Was a Captive, I Was a Captive, pp. 6869. pp. 6869.

56. Baik II, p. 223. Baik II, p. 223.

57. Ibid., p. 128. On p. 118 Baik claims that the land reform bill was "drawn up by Comrade Kim Il Sung himself," and on p. 134 that Kim "formulated" the labor law. Any role by Soviet occupation officials goes unmentioned. Ibid., p. 128. On p. 118 Baik claims that the land reform bill was "drawn up by Comrade Kim Il Sung himself," and on p. 134 that Kim "formulated" the labor law. Any role by Soviet occupation officials goes unmentioned.

58. Ibid., pp. 124125. Ibid., pp. 124125.

59. Kim for his first couple of years in power was still "an affectionate and attractive person with normal thought," says Lim Un in his critical biography. "It was later that he was infected with megalomania, transmogrification into a cruel dictator and an incurable person" Kim for his first couple of years in power was still "an affectionate and attractive person with normal thought," says Lim Un in his critical biography. "It was later that he was infected with megalomania, transmogrification into a cruel dictator and an incurable person" (Founding of a Dynasty, (Founding of a Dynasty, p. 50). The pseudonymous Lim, whose controversial ma.n.u.script in Korean was published in a j.a.panese translation and a rather poor English translation, is identified as a former longtime colleague of Kim's who had been "active at the core" of the Kim regime, but who had gone into exile in the Soviet Union. Since publication it has been reported that Lim Un is a pseudonym for Ho Jin, identified as vice-chairman of Moscow's a.s.sociation of Soviet Koreans. A "Soviet Korean" was an ethnic Korean who had been living in the Soviet Union at the time of Korean liberation and had been sent by the Soviet government to help its military occupation administration develop the new regime in North Korea. Kim eventually purged many such "Soviet Koreans," and those purged generally returned to the Soviet Union. p. 50). The pseudonymous Lim, whose controversial ma.n.u.script in Korean was published in a j.a.panese translation and a rather poor English translation, is identified as a former longtime colleague of Kim's who had been "active at the core" of the Kim regime, but who had gone into exile in the Soviet Union. Since publication it has been reported that Lim Un is a pseudonym for Ho Jin, identified as vice-chairman of Moscow's a.s.sociation of Soviet Koreans. A "Soviet Korean" was an ethnic Korean who had been living in the Soviet Union at the time of Korean liberation and had been sent by the Soviet government to help its military occupation administration develop the new regime in North Korea. Kim eventually purged many such "Soviet Koreans," and those purged generally returned to the Soviet Union.

Hoki Ishihara, president of the Tokyo publisher Jiyusha, explained in an interview with my a.s.sociate Hideko Takayama (November 1994) that Ho Jin approached him in .Moscow after Ishihara had served for some years as chairman of a j.a.pan-Soviet roundtable conference. "It seemed that Ho Jin had been watching us for some time," Ishihara said. Ho Jin told Ishihara about his ma.n.u.script, invited the publisher to his Moscow home and asked him to take the ma.n.u.script out of the country. Ishihara accepted and enlisted the Moscow bureau of Mainichi Shimbun Mainichi Shimbun to get the sensitive doc.u.ment out via pouch. It went first to Denmark and then to Ishihara's home in Tokyo, the publisher recalled. When he left Moscow, Ishihara carried out with him the photographs that ill.u.s.trate the text in the published version. Once back in Tokyo, Ishihara said, he asked a friend at the South Korean emba.s.sy in Tokyo to introduce him to a translator. to get the sensitive doc.u.ment out via pouch. It went first to Denmark and then to Ishihara's home in Tokyo, the publisher recalled. When he left Moscow, Ishihara carried out with him the photographs that ill.u.s.trate the text in the published version. Once back in Tokyo, Ishihara said, he asked a friend at the South Korean emba.s.sy in Tokyo to introduce him to a translator.

The South Korean government took a hand in distributing the book after translation and publication, as is shown by the bookplate in the copy belonging to the library of the Foreign Correspondents' Club of j.a.pan, which says the copy was donated by the [South] Korean Emba.s.sy.

Prof. Haruhisa Ogawa of Tokyo University visited Moscow in 1990 and saw Ho Jin, who was living there. Professor Ogawa said in an interview with Hideko Takayama (November 1994) that beyond Ho's own direct knowledge, the book reflects experiences related to him by his seniors, such as Yu Song-chol and Yi Sang-jo. (Perhaps that was one reason for using a pseudonym and making the narrator and purported author a composite character.) He began writing it in 1973, in Korean, and spent nearly ten years on the project. Professor Ogawa said he also learned, in an interview with Ho's brother in Tashkent, that the publication had embarra.s.sed the .Moscow government, which in 1982 was competing with Beijing for influence in North Korea while not yet recognizing South Korea. The KGB questioned Ho, the brother told Professor Ogawa. As for the origin of Ho's pen name, Lim Un is the site of the Ho family's ancestral home in southern Korea, Professor Ogawa was told.

Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, in Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, say (p. 327, fn. 29) that "Lim Un" obtained most of the materials for the book from Yu Song-chol and Yi Sang-jo. They base that conclusion on an interview with Yu. say (p. 327, fn. 29) that "Lim Un" obtained most of the materials for the book from Yu Song-chol and Yi Sang-jo. They base that conclusion on an interview with Yu.

In June of 1995 Russian scholars told me that Ho Jin was still living in Moscow, where he was operating a theater.

Lankov (From Stalin to Kim Il Sung) (From Stalin to Kim Il Sung) gives a different name for the author: Ho Un-bae. When I queried him by e-mail, Lankov was kind enough to reply: "The person in question normally called himself Ho Un-bae, but the name of Ho Jin was used frequently as well. I do not know how he came to have two names, but they were used interchangeably" gives a different name for the author: Ho Un-bae. When I queried him by e-mail, Lankov was kind enough to reply: "The person in question normally called himself Ho Un-bae, but the name of Ho Jin was used frequently as well. I do not know how he came to have two names, but they were used interchangeably"

Scholars have reacted to the "Lim Un" book in various ways. Seiler (Kim Il-song 1941-1948, (Kim Il-song 1941-1948, p. 14) writes, "This book, a compilation of interviews conducted with exiled Soviet-Koreans who played pivotal roles in the establishment of the Kim Il-song regime, corroborates much of what other Soviet-Koreans and former Soviet officials are revealing now on the background of Kim and the founding of his regime." He notes, however, that in some academic quarters the work "has been dismissed as yet another personal vendetta against Kim." p. 14) writes, "This book, a compilation of interviews conducted with exiled Soviet-Koreans who played pivotal roles in the establishment of the Kim Il-song regime, corroborates much of what other Soviet-Koreans and former Soviet officials are revealing now on the background of Kim and the founding of his regime." He notes, however, that in some academic quarters the work "has been dismissed as yet another personal vendetta against Kim."

One scholar who has dismissed the work is Bruce c.u.mings, who refers to Lim as a "mysterious high-level defector" and observes that "Lim takes it upon himself to refute every anomaly in the record. ... This is the surest evidence of any that the book was ghost-written in Seoul" (Origins (Origins II, p. 591; p. 884 n.). II, p. 591; p. 884 n.).

As for being a "defector," perhaps the term can be used. However, it was not to South Korea but to the USSR, his home country, that Lim/Ho fled. And while The Founding of a Dynasty The Founding of a Dynasty is a bitter book, I do not find it informed by Seoul-style anti-communism. To the contrary, the author's voice consistently comes through as that of a dedicated Soviet communist of Korean extraction, horrified by what he views as Kim Il-sung's perversion of sacred Soviet-communist doctrine. He contrasts Kim's personality cult and lavish lifestyle with the behavior of Lenin, who once stopped a comrade's speech to scold the speaker for praising him-and who refused special rations during a food shortage, fainting from hunger in his office one day (p. 318). is a bitter book, I do not find it informed by Seoul-style anti-communism. To the contrary, the author's voice consistently comes through as that of a dedicated Soviet communist of Korean extraction, horrified by what he views as Kim Il-sung's perversion of sacred Soviet-communist doctrine. He contrasts Kim's personality cult and lavish lifestyle with the behavior of Lenin, who once stopped a comrade's speech to scold the speaker for praising him-and who refused special rations during a food shortage, fainting from hunger in his office one day (p. 318).

As c.u.mings s remark about refuting every anomaly suggests, the book does show evidence of considerable access to research materials, especially in the portions concerning periods after Lim/Ho would have left North Korea. However, I see no reason to a.s.sume on that basis that the book was ghostwritten in South Korea. Presumably, considerable materials on North Korea were available in the Soviet Union, particularly to former high-level officials such as Yu and Yi and to an official of the a.s.sociation of Soviet Koreans, such as Ho Jin. And the USSR had definite ideological and other disagreements with Pyongyang during the period before and after Ho left North Korea, disputes regarding which Lim/Ho consistently argues the Soviet case.

Dutch scholar Erik van Ree relies to a great extent on Russian sources for his 1989 study, Socialism in One Zone. Socialism in One Zone. He describes Lim Un (p. 30) as "very favorably disposed towards the USSR" and adds that Lim's "factual information on the Soviet military establishment is, according to my a.s.sessment, generally correct. ... Lim's account is, moreover, the most detailed and lively version available to my knowledge." He describes Lim Un (p. 30) as "very favorably disposed towards the USSR" and adds that Lim's "factual information on the Soviet military establishment is, according to my a.s.sessment, generally correct. ... Lim's account is, moreover, the most detailed and lively version available to my knowledge."

While the English version reveals many lapses, especially in clarity, I, too, find that much of the work rings true, both in its account of the facts and in its a.s.sessment of Kim Il-sung. (Kim "was mediocre, but there is no doubt that he was real," Lim says on page 148, summing up his lengthy and persuasive reb.u.t.tal of the many theories advanced by others calling Kim a "fake.") 60. The South Korean ruling group, according to a 1948 CIA a.n.a.lysis, "has been forced to support imported expatriate politicians such as Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku. These, while they have no pro-j.a.panese taint, are essentially demagogues bent on autocratic rule" (cited in Jon Halliday and Bruce c.u.mings, The South Korean ruling group, according to a 1948 CIA a.n.a.lysis, "has been forced to support imported expatriate politicians such as Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku. These, while they have no pro-j.a.panese taint, are essentially demagogues bent on autocratic rule" (cited in Jon Halliday and Bruce c.u.mings, Korea: The Unknown War Korea: The Unknown War [London: Viking, 1988], p. 23). c.u.mings [London: Viking, 1988], p. 23). c.u.mings (Origins (Origins II, pp. 190192) also observes, "The object of every Korean ruler is to inculcate proper ideas in everyone in the realm, to push a uniform pattern of thought to the point that it becomes a state of mind, and therefore impervious to logic and argument. This is taken to be the essence and ideal of stable rule." II, pp. 190192) also observes, "The object of every Korean ruler is to inculcate proper ideas in everyone in the realm, to push a uniform pattern of thought to the point that it becomes a state of mind, and therefore impervious to logic and argument. This is taken to be the essence and ideal of stable rule."

61. Halliday and c.u.mings Halliday and c.u.mings (Korea, (Korea, p. 57) note that the intent of eliminating non-leftist political opposition "was the same as that of the right wing in the South, to squash alternative centers of power." The Northerners, however, "did it much more effectively because of their superior organization and the general weakness of the opposition." p. 57) note that the intent of eliminating non-leftist political opposition "was the same as that of the right wing in the South, to squash alternative centers of power." The Northerners, however, "did it much more effectively because of their superior organization and the general weakness of the opposition."

62. Pak Pyong-so, quoted in Suh, Pak Pyong-so, quoted in Suh, Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung, p. 78. p. 78.

63. Quoted in Scalapino and Lee, Quoted in Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, p. 360. p. 360.

64. Ibid., p. 382. Ibid., p. 382.

65. Ibid., p. 348. Ibid., p. 348.

66. Speech at the meeting ratifying the united-front policy and creating the North Korean Workers' Party, quoted in c.u.mings, Speech at the meeting ratifying the united-front policy and creating the North Korean Workers' Party, quoted in c.u.mings, Origins Origins I, p. 420. Although his regime enacted a women's rights law outlawing sale of women into concubinage and prost.i.tution, Kim himself was no stranger to I, p. 420. Although his regime enacted a women's rights law outlawing sale of women into concubinage and prost.i.tution, Kim himself was no stranger to kisaeng kisaeng houses. houses.

67. Van Ree, Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, Socialism in One Zone, pp. 157 and 197, cites two such speeches, in April and August of 1946. pp. 157 and 197, cites two such speeches, in April and August of 1946.

68. See Scalapino and Lee, See Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, pp. 298311. pp. 298311.

69. David Halberstam observes that "the postwar drawing of lines between the communists and the Western powers probably had a historical inevitability to it. Two great and uncertain powers were coming to terms with each other ... like two blind dinosaurs wrestling in a very small pit" David Halberstam observes that "the postwar drawing of lines between the communists and the Western powers probably had a historical inevitability to it. Two great and uncertain powers were coming to terms with each other ... like two blind dinosaurs wrestling in a very small pit" (The Best and the Brightest (The Best and the Brightest [New York: Random House, 1972], p. 106). [New York: Random House, 1972], p. 106).

More specifically, Van Ree's a.n.a.lysis (Socialism in One Zone, (Socialism in One Zone, p. 275) is that the Russians "showed remarkably little interest in moves toward Korean reunification via the Soviet-American negotiations." Reunification would have meant shared influence throughout Korea and "Moscow found American influence in the northern zone more threatening than it found its own in the southern zone attractive." p. 275) is that the Russians "showed remarkably little interest in moves toward Korean reunification via the Soviet-American negotiations." Reunification would have meant shared influence throughout Korea and "Moscow found American influence in the northern zone more threatening than it found its own in the southern zone attractive."

Kathryn Weathersby put it more succinctly in the 1995 conference paper cited earlier: "Once Korea was divided at the 38th parallel into Soviet and American occupation zones, the chances for unification of the peninsula became very slim. ... The Americans would only accept a government hostile to communists and the Soviets would only accept a government thoroughly sympathetic to .Moscow. The goals of the two great powers were thus mutually exclusive."

For a contrasting view, that "Soviet doc.u.ments seriously undermine the argument that .Moscow was responsible for the deadlock perpetuating Korea's division," see Matray "Korea's Part.i.tion."

70. Suh, Suh, Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung, p. 97. p. 97.

71. According to the North's account, Kim charmed Southern delegates into becoming born-again believers in him as Korea's rightful leader. Rightist South Korean leader Kim Ku, for example, was "converted," was "captured by his character and personality," was "reborn as an enlightened human being in the rays of the shining sun of the nation, Comrade Kim Il Sung" (Baik II, pp. 243251). Suh dismisses such claims, saying, "Nothing could be further from the truth" According to the North's account, Kim charmed Southern delegates into becoming born-again believers in him as Korea's rightful leader. Rightist South Korean leader Kim Ku, for example, was "converted," was "captured by his character and personality," was "reborn as an enlightened human being in the rays of the shining sun of the nation, Comrade Kim Il Sung" (Baik II, pp. 243251). Suh dismisses such claims, saying, "Nothing could be further from the truth" (Kim Il Sung, (Kim Il Sung, p. 366). p. 366).

72. "Since two years of direct negotiations with the Soviet Union in Korea had failed to bring agreement on peninsulawide elections, the American move was actually intended to obtain a UN sanction for U.S.-sponsored elections in the South-the political division of Korea" (Frank Baldwin, in his introduction to "Since two years of direct negotiations with the Soviet Union in Korea had failed to bring agreement on peninsulawide elections, the American move was actually intended to obtain a UN sanction for U.S.-sponsored elections in the South-the political division of Korea" (Frank Baldwin, in his introduction to Without Parallel, Without Parallel, p. 11). p. 11).

73. Baik II, p. 225. Baik II, p. 225.

74. Yu Song-chol's testimony, Yu Song-chol's testimony, Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 9, 1990. November 9, 1990.

75. New York Times, New York Times, March 2, 1950, quoted in Robert R. Simmons, "The Korean Civil War," in Baldwin, March 2, 1950, quoted in Robert R. Simmons, "The Korean Civil War," in Baldwin, Without Parallel, Without Parallel, p. 143. p. 143.

76. "[T]he moral condemnation and one-sided portrayal of North Korea as 'aggressive' and 'bellicose' was a cold war contrivance. a.s.suming that North Korea started the Korean War, one man's 'aggression' is another's patriotic duty to restore national unity" (Baldwin, "[T]he moral condemnation and one-sided portrayal of North Korea as 'aggressive' and 'bellicose' was a cold war contrivance. a.s.suming that North Korea started the Korean War, one man's 'aggression' is another's patriotic duty to restore national unity" (Baldwin, Without Parallel, Without Parallel, p. 32). p. 32).

77. Goncharov, Lewis and Xue say Goncharov, Lewis and Xue say (Uncertain Partners, (Uncertain Partners, p. 152) that in buying into Kim's invasion plan "the Soviet dictator would be pursuing his goals on several levels-to expand the buffer zone along his border, to create a springboard against j.a.pan that could be used during a future global conflict, to test the American resolve, to intensify the hostility between Beijing and Washington, and, finally and foremost, to draw U.S. power away from Europe." p. 152) that in buying into Kim's invasion plan "the Soviet dictator would be pursuing his goals on several levels-to expand the buffer zone along his border, to create a springboard against j.a.pan that could be used during a future global conflict, to test the American resolve, to intensify the hostility between Beijing and Washington, and, finally and foremost, to draw U.S. power away from Europe."

78. Scalapino and Lee, Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, p. 393. p. 393.

79. In early 1950 Yu Song-chol's KPA operations bureau received intelligence reports suggesting that Rhee would attack the North in August, after the summer rainy season In early 1950 Yu Song-chol's KPA operations bureau received intelligence reports suggesting that Rhee would attack the North in August, after the summer rainy season (Hankuk Ilbo, (Hankuk Ilbo, November 9, 1990). That does not necessarily refer to a full-scale invasion but could refer to yet another of the series of lesser attacks that each side had launched against the other. November 9, 1990). That does not necessarily refer to a full-scale invasion but could refer to yet another of the series of lesser attacks that each side had launched against the other.

c.u.mings notes the border clashes along with other fighting in his argument that the question of who started the shooting on June 25, 1950, is secondary, since it was merely a phase in a revolution that had been in process on the Korean peninsula since 1945. "The basic issues over which the war in 1950 was fought were apparent immediately after liberation, within a three-month period, and led to open fighting that eventually claimed more than one hundred thousand lives in peasant rebellion, labor strife, guerrilla warfare, and open fighting along the thirty-eighth parallel-all this before the ostensible Korean War began. In other words, the conflict was civil and revolutionary in character, beginning just after 1945 and proceeding through a dialectic of revolution and reaction. The opening of conventional battles in June 1950 only continued this war by other means" (c.u.mings, Origins Origins I, pp. x.x.xxi). In an interview after the Soviet archives had started to yield their information pointing to Stalin's role, c.u.mings told Prof. Paik Nak-chung of Seoul National University that "by 1949 if not earlier, both Korean states thought that war was the way-perhaps the only way-to settle the national division. ... Even if new information should disclose a North Korean invasion apart from any southern provocation June 25, that would still not mean the North 'started' the conflict, only that it took the existing armed conflict to a new and more destructive phase" I, pp. x.x.xxi). In an interview after the Soviet archives had started to yield their information pointing to Stalin's role, c.u.mings told Prof. Paik Nak-chung of Seoul National University that "by 1949 if not earlier, both Korean states thought that war was the way-perhaps the only way-to settle the national division. ... Even if new information should disclose a North Korean invasion apart from any southern provocation June 25, that would still not mean the North 'started' the conflict, only that it took the existing armed conflict to a new and more destructive phase" (Korea Herald, (Korea Herald, January 20, 1993, excerpting from an unspecified recent issue of January 20, 1993, excerpting from an unspecified recent issue of Korea Journal). Korea Journal).

While c.u.mings advances understanding by focusing on civil origins of the conflict, his "only" seems a curiously mild way to talk about an invasion that led to the deaths of millions of people. Somewhat in contrast to the way he minimizes the importance of the question of who invaded whom, c.u.mings emphasizes that it was the South that had made the first moves toward the creation of separate regimes, in the final three months of 1945. "We could argue, of course that a separate northern regime was inevitable. But the sequence remains undeniable: the south moved first" (Origins (Origins I, p. 403). I, p. 403).

80. This part of Khrushchev's recollection is translated from tapes studied by John Merrill. See Merrill, This part of Khrushchev's recollection is translated from tapes studied by John Merrill. See Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark, Del.: University of Delaware Press, 1989), p. 25. (A nearly identical translation is in Nikita Khrushchev, (Newark, Del.: University of Delaware Press, 1989), p. 25. (A nearly identical translation is in Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, Khrushchev Remembers, translated and edited by Strobe Tal-bott [New York: Bantam Books, 1970], p. 401.) Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, quoting it translated and edited by Strobe Tal-bott [New York: Bantam Books, 1970], p. 401.) Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, quoting it (Uncertain Partners, (Uncertain Partners, p. 138), say it appears to relate to Kim's first visit to Moscow, in 1949, not his 1950 visit. p. 138), say it appears to relate to Kim's first visit to Moscow, in 1949, not his 1950 visit.

81. These doc.u.ments These doc.u.ments 'were 'were translated by Kathryn Weathersby and published in articles in translated by Kathryn Weathersby and published in articles in Bulletin of the Cold War History Project, Bulletin of the Cold War History Project, nos. 4 and 5 (1995), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C nos. 4 and 5 (1995), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C As for Kim's political worries about the mood of his subjects, recall that the wing of the Workers' Party whose members hailed from the South still had strength in North Korea.

82. Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, p. 137, citing a 1966 Soviet Foreign Ministry top-secret account of the Korean War. On page 143 they say the visit lasted from March 30 to April 25. p. 137, citing a 1966 Soviet Foreign Ministry top-secret account of the Korean War. On page 143 they say the visit lasted from March 30 to April 25.

83. Khruschev, Khruschev, Khrushchev Remembers, Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 401402. pp. 401402.

Regarding the North's economic reasons for planning a war, Suh says (Kim Il Sung, (Kim Il Sung, pp. 114 ff), "One cause of the war that has often been neglected is the economic situation in the North. Kim had completed two one-year economic plans for 1947 and 1948, which he claimed were resounding successes. By the time of the Korean War, he had inst.i.tuted a two-year economic plan for 19491950 which was in considerable difficulty. ... Kim may have been advised by his comrades of the futility of trying to develop an independent North Korean economy with only half the labor force of the South while military conquest of the South and economic plans for all Korea seemed so close at hand." pp. 114 ff), "One cause of the war that has often been neglected is the economic situation in the North. Kim had completed two one-year economic plans for 1947 and 1948, which he claimed were resounding successes. By the time of the Korean War, he had inst.i.tuted a two-year economic plan for 19491950 which was in considerable difficulty. ... Kim may have been advised by his comrades of the futility of trying to develop an independent North Korean economy with only half the labor force of the South while military conquest of the South and economic plans for all Korea seemed so close at hand."

84. See Weathersby's 1995 conference paper, "Limits to Revisionist Interpretations." See Weathersby's 1995 conference paper, "Limits to Revisionist Interpretations."

85. One Korea specialist wrote, "If the United States should have to fight Russia, the rugged mountains of Korea, some 5,000 miles from .Moscow, would be the last possible place chosen for battle with the Soviets. The military argument for the withdrawal of every American soldier from Korea is unanswerable. In war with Russia, Korea would not be a Bataan but a Guam, with every soldier lost to the enemy in a few days. That is the military picture-if we should have to fight Russia. If we don't, then this is not the military picture. Today there seem to be no signs that war is coming in the immediate future. If that is so, then it seems that political rather than military considerations should govern the withdrawal of the last few United States troops still remaining in Korea. .Many observers believe that the North Korean communist army will not attack the south so long as American soldiers are there to get in the way" (Harold J. n.o.ble, "Korea Must Stay Half Free," One Korea specialist wrote, "If the United States should have to fight Russia, the rugged mountains of Korea, some 5,000 miles from .Moscow, would be the last possible place chosen for battle with the Soviets. The military argument for the withdrawal of every American soldier from Korea is unanswerable. In war with Russia, Korea would not be a Bataan but a Guam, with every soldier lost to the enemy in a few days. That is the military picture-if we should have to fight Russia. If we don't, then this is not the military picture. Today there seem to be no signs that war is coming in the immediate future. If that is so, then it seems that political rather than military considerations should govern the withdrawal of the last few United States troops still remaining in Korea. .Many observers believe that the North Korean communist army will not attack the south so long as American soldiers are there to get in the way" (Harold J. n.o.ble, "Korea Must Stay Half Free," New Leader, New Leader, June 18, 1949). June 18, 1949).

86. David Halberstam, David Halberstam, The Fifties The Fifties (New York: Ballantine Books, 1994), pp. 6567. "As Acheson once noted," Halberstam adds, "the foreign policy of the United States in those years immediately after the war could be summed up in three sentences: '1. Bring the boys home; 2. Don't be Santa Claus; 3. Don't be pushed around.'" (New York: Ballantine Books, 1994), pp. 6567. "As Acheson once noted," Halberstam adds, "the foreign policy of the United States in those years immediately after the war could be summed up in three sentences: '1. Bring the boys home; 2. Don't be Santa Claus; 3. Don't be pushed around.'"

87. Goncharov spoke of the doc.u.ment on June 13, 1995, in the author's presence, at the Seoul conference "Rethinking the Half Century of Liberation," sponsored by Korea Press Center and the Graduate School of Journalism and Ma.s.s Communication of Korea University. Goncharov spoke of the doc.u.ment on June 13, 1995, in the author's presence, at the Seoul conference "Rethinking the Half Century of Liberation," sponsored by Korea Press Center and the Graduate School of Journalism and Ma.s.s Communication of Korea University.

88. See c.u.mings, See c.u.mings, Origins Origins II, for a lengthy and rather compelling recital of the evidence. On pp. II, for a lengthy and rather compelling recital of the evidence. On pp. 6466 6466 c.u.mings argues that the American policy of seeking containment in Korea through the United Nations instead of unilaterally-a policy he dates to several years before the June 25, 1950, outbreak of full-scale war- "was essentially the product of the State [Department]-military stalemate over how to defend southern Korea. Instead of an internationalism that abjured containment-the standard interpretation-American policy garbed containment in internationalist clothes. ... Acheson could bring the prestige of the UN to bear on his desire to maintain American credibility in Korea, in the face of military and congressional unwillingness to back the $600 million [aid] program for Korea. He later noted that the problem was turned over to the UN because the military was pressing to get its troops out of Korea, something that 'we delayed until June 29, 1949. " c.u.mings argues that the American policy of seeking containment in Korea through the United Nations instead of unilaterally-a policy he dates to several years before the June 25, 1950, outbreak of full-scale war- "was essentially the product of the State [Department]-military stalemate over how to defend southern Korea. Instead of an internationalism that abjured containment-the standard interpretation-American policy garbed containment in internationalist clothes. ... Acheson could bring the prestige of the UN to bear on his desire to maintain American credibility in Korea, in the face of military and congressional unwillingness to back the $600 million [aid] program for Korea. He later noted that the problem was turned over to the UN because the military was pressing to get its troops out of Korea, something that 'we delayed until June 29, 1949. "

89. See c.u.mings, See c.u.mings, Origins Origins II, pp. 4261. On the question of Korea's military-strategic importance, c.u.mings notes that not everyone in the Pentagon agreed that it was negligible. The War Department's director of intelligence said Korea "had 'high strategic value to the USSR,' completing 'a perfect outer perimeter protecting the Siberian Maritime Province' and especially the base of Vladivostok; it put Soviet ground and air forces 'within easy striking distance of the heart of the j.a.panese islands'" (p. 59). II, pp. 4261. On the question of Korea's military-strategic importance, c.u.mings notes that not everyone in the Pentagon agreed that it was negligible. The War Department's director of intelligence said Korea "had 'high strategic value to the USSR,' completing 'a perfect outer perimeter protecting the Siberian Maritime Province' and especially the base of Vladivostok; it put Soviet ground and air forces 'within easy striking distance of the heart of the j.a.panese islands'" (p. 59).

90. Ibid., p. 161. Ibid., p. 161.

91. Arguing Acheson's case for him, c.u.mings says Arguing Acheson's case for him, c.u.mings says (Origins (Origins II, p. 428) that II, p. 428) that "telegraphing" to the Soviets that Washington intended defense of particular places aside from the big ones, j.a.pan and Germany, "would be the height of stupidity." Why? c.u.mings does not elaborate here. Did Acheson envision a predatory Moscow using the information to bring about, by remote control, a in a place-such as Korea-that would tie U.S. forces down so that they could not defend against a later blow planned in Europe? Later (p. 430), c.u.mings suggests the possibility that the speech was purposely ambiguous to keep .Moscow and Pyongyang guessing.

92. c.u.mings c.u.mings (Origins (Origins II II, pp. 615619) says it is legitimate to speculate that "a small group of officials in Tokyo and Washington saw the attack coming, prepared to meet it, and then let it happen-while keeping Congress in the dark, then and thereafter." He approvingly quotes Stone: "The hypothesis that invasion was encouraged politically by silence, invited militarily by defensive formations, and finally set off by some minor lunges across the border when all was ready would explain a great deal" (I.F. Stone, pp. 615619) says it is legitimate to speculate that "a small group of officials in Tokyo and Washington saw the attack coming, prepared to meet it, and then let it happen-while keeping Congress in the dark, then and thereafter." He approvingly quotes Stone: "The hypothesis that invasion was encouraged politically by silence, invited militarily by defensive formations, and finally set off by some minor lunges across the border when all was ready would explain a great deal" (I.F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War The Hidden History of the Korean War [New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952]; paperback, 1970, p. [New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952]; paperback, 1970, p. 44). 44). c.u.mings states outright c.u.mings states outright (Origins (Origins II, p. 602) that Acheson "wanted the communists to strike first along the containment periphery." II, p. 602) that Acheson "wanted the communists to strike first along the containment periphery."

c.u.mings makes the comparison of the Korea and Pearl Harbor theories, observing that "even a lifetime of research would not prove definitively that Roosevelt was either guilty or innocent of 'maneuvering the j.a.panese,' and the same is true of Acheson and Korea. We do not have signals intelligence that would suggest American advance knowledge of North Korean action, a major lacuna that we do have for Pearl Harbor" (Origins (Origins II, p. 435). II, p. 435).

Maneuvering by Acheson was not c.u.mings's preferred scenario for how the invasion came about. Rather, in Origins Origins II, he favored the theory that South Korean troops striking north provoked a counterattack by North Korean troops who had been hoping and planning for just such a provocation so that they could unleash a full-fledged invasion in response. Evidence since publication of that book has shown that awaiting a Southern provocation "with the riveted mix of alarm and relish of a cobra lying in wait" II, he favored the theory that South Korean troops striking north provoked a counterattack by North Korean troops who had been hoping and planning for just such a provocation so that they could unleash a full-fledged invasion in response. Evidence since publication of that book has shown that awaiting a Southern provocation "with the riveted mix of alarm and relish of a cobra lying in wait" (Origins (Origins II, p. 574) had indeed been Kim Il-sung's posture earlier-because Stalin had told him not to attack first- but that Kim, tired of waiting for Rhee to hand him a provocation, had persuaded Stalin to back his unprovoked invasion. II, p. 574) had indeed been Kim Il-sung's posture earlier-because Stalin had told him not to attack first- but that Kim, tired of waiting for Rhee to hand him a provocation, had persuaded Stalin to back his unprovoked invasion.

By the way, in this chapter and others that follow I use the term "revisionist" as a neutral descriptive term, not as a value judgment. I would estimate that I agree about as often as I disagree with positions taken by many of the Korea scholars to whom the term has been applied. As one of my best teachers at Princeton, the eminent historian James M. McPherson, writes, historians "know that revision is the lifeblood of historical scholarship. History is a continuing dialogue between the present and the past. Interpretations of the past are subject to change in response to new evidence, new questions asked of the evidence, new perspectives gained by the pa.s.sage of time. There is no single, eternal and immutable 'truth' about past events and their meaning. The unending quest of historians for understanding the past-that is, 'revisionism'-is what makes history vital and meaningful" ("Revisionist Historians," from the President's column of the September 2003 Perspectives, The Newsmagazine of the American Historical a.s.sociation, http://www.theaha.org/perspectives/issues/2003/0309/0309pre1.cfm). Perspectives, The Newsmagazine of the American Historical a.s.sociation, http://www.theaha.org/perspectives/issues/2003/0309/0309pre1.cfm).

93. Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, p. 142, cite Lim Un p. 142, cite Lim Un (Founding of a Dynasty, (Founding of a Dynasty, p. 181) as saying that Kim, after the Acheson speech, "was convinced that 'the U.S. would not enter the Korean War,' or 'even if they did enter the war, they would not hold sway over the destiny of the war.' " The authors add, speech, we believe that Kim used the speech to bolster his case with Stalin irrespective of what his 'true' att.i.tude to the speech may have been." p. 181) as saying that Kim, after the Acheson speech, "was convinced that 'the U.S. would not enter the Korean War,' or 'even if they did enter the war, they would not hold sway over the destiny of the war.' " The authors add, speech, we believe that Kim used the speech to bolster his case with Stalin irrespective of what his 'true' att.i.tude to the speech may have been."

For a contrary view see c.u.mings, Origins Origins II, pp. 410. c.u.mings argued- before the Russian archives yielded their evidence-that "[e]ven the premise has always been stupefyingly improbable: that Stalin, of all people, or for that matter Kim Il Sung, would be misled by a public speech into thinking the United States would not defend South Korea. Stalin's usual modus operandi was probably to put negatives in front of Acheson's public statements, as a first cut at discerning enemy intentions. A dialectical logic of interacting opposites would immediately course through his mind on reading the speech: Acheson says he won't defend them, so probably he will; maybe he means it; in any case he's trying to mislead us; maybe by pretending to believe him we can suck the Americans into a stupid war, so on and so forth." II, pp. 410. c.u.mings argued- before the Russian archives yielded their evidence-that "[e]ven the premise has always been stupefyingly improbable: that Stalin, of all people, or for that matter Kim Il Sung, would be misled by a public speech into thinking the United States would not defend South Korea. Stalin's usual modus operandi was probably to put negatives in front of Acheson's public statements, as a first cut at discerning enemy intentions. A dialectical logic of interacting opposites would immediately course through his mind on reading the speech: Acheson says he won't defend them, so probably he will; maybe he means it; in any case he's trying to mislead us; maybe by pretending to believe him we can suck the Americans into a stupid war, so on and so forth."

94. Nikita Khrushchev, "The Korean War," Nikita Khrushchev, "The Korean War," Ogonek, Ogonek, p. 28, cited in Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, p. 28, cited in Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, p. 143; also translated in p. 143; also translated in Khrushchev Remembers, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 401. p. 401.

Russian scholars Aleksandr Orlov and Viktor Gavrilov, in an article whose t.i.tle translates as "The Long Echo of the Korean War" (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye,. Moscow, October 1218, 2001 [summary at http://www.nautilus. org/napsnet/dr/0110/oct17.html]) say that the U.S. military response was a complete surprise to .Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang.

95. During talks in Moscow in January 1950, Stalin "told Mao that a 'confrontation with the United States is inevitable, but for us it would be favorable to delay its beginning. At present, war is not feasible, because we have just tested the atomic bomb, the country is exhausted, and the people of the USSR would not understand and support such a war' " (Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, During talks in Moscow in January 1950, Stalin "told Mao that a 'confrontation with the United States is inevitable, but for us it would be favorable to delay its beginning. At present, war is not feasible, because we have just tested the atomic bomb, the country is exhausted, and the people of the USSR would not understand and support such a war' " (Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, p. 108). Noting that the hydrogen bomb was not yet a part of the American a.r.s.enal, the authors cite political scientist David Holloway's conclusion "that Stalin had decided that the maximum danger of an American strike would come around 1954, and that the Soviet Union might be wise to back, though not to wage, a preemptive war before then." Stalin's remark to Mao, they write, "suggests that Stalin was leaning toward what might be called a limited preemptive conflict" (ibid., pp. 108109). p. 108). Noting that the hydrogen bomb was not yet a part of the American a.r.s.enal, the authors cite political scientist David Holloway's conclusion "that Stalin had decided that the maximum danger of an American strike would come around 1954, and that the Soviet Union might be wise to back, though not to wage, a preemptive war before then." Stalin's remark to Mao, they write, "suggests that Stalin was leaning toward what might be called a limited preemptive conflict" (ibid., pp. 108109).

Goncharov, Lewis and Xue say (pp. 130 ff.) that Mao, although he approved in principle Kim Il-sung's plan for forcible reunification, was a reluctant partner at first. He wanted to focus his resources on reconstructing his civil warravaged country and, by invading Taiwan, fully uniting it. Stalin, however, insisted that he needed China to back up North Korea so that the USSR could remain in the background-since a more visible Soviet role might bring on World War III prematurely.

96. Ibid., p. 146. The authors say Mao, evidently more worried than when he had messaged Stalin earlier, raised to Kim the possibility of U.S. intervention, "and this time in a way that did not exclude the possibility. Mao asked him whether he would like China to send troops to the Sino-Korean border if the Americans did become involved." Kim replied that he could win the war within a month, before the United States could intervene, and thus he "rejected the need for sending Chinese troops to the border and appeared confident that the Soviet a.s.sistance in hand or in the pipeline was all that would be needed." Ibid., p. 146. The authors say Mao, evidently more worried than when he had messaged Stalin earlier, raised to Kim the possibility of U.S. intervention, "and this time in a way that did not exclude the possibility. Mao asked him whether he would like China to send troops to the Sino-Korean border if the Americans did become involved." Kim replied that he could win the war within a month, before the United States could intervene, and thus he "rejected the need for sending Chinese troops to the border and appeared confident that the Soviet a.s.sistance in hand or in the pipeline was all that would be needed."

Also see Son Key-young, "Kim Il-sung .Masterminded Korean War," Korea Times, Korea Times, July 21, 1994, and Yonhap News Agency dispatches from .Moscow published in the July 21, 1994, and Yonhap News Agency dispatches from .Moscow published in the Korea Times: Korea Times: "Russian Natl TV Airs Doc.u.mentary Proving NK Provoked Korean War," May 24, 1994, and "Stalin, Mao Gave Their Blessings to Kim Il-sung s Korean War Plan," August 8, 1993. "Russian Natl TV Airs Doc.u.mentary Proving NK Provoked Korean War," May 24, 1994, and "Stalin, Mao Gave Their Blessings to Kim Il-sung s Korean War Plan," August 8, 1993.

On Mao's need for Soviet aid as the decisive factor in his acceptance of Stalin's request, see George Wehrfritz, "History Lessons, Take Two," Newsweek International, Newsweek International, July 14, 1997, pp. 2830. The article cites articles by a Chinese revisionist historian, writing under the pen name Qingshi, in the Chinese Communist Party magazine July 14, 1997, pp. 2830. The article cites articles by a Chinese revisionist historian, writing under the pen name Qingshi, in the Chinese Communist Party magazine Hundred Year Tide. Hundred Year Tide.

97. Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, pp. 132133, citing reports from Kim to Stalin, and p. 140, citing interviews to the effect that "Stalin appears to have been taken in." As the authors note, John Merrill has argued that Kim in tensified guerrilla activities in the South and exaggerated the successes of those operations as part of his campaign to persuade Stalin that the success of a south ward invasion was a.s.sured. Merrill, pp. 132133, citing reports from Kim to Stalin, and p. 140, citing interviews to the effect that "Stalin appears to have been taken in." As the authors note, John Merrill has argued that Kim in tensified guerrilla activities in the South and exaggerated the successes of those operations as part of his campaign to persuade Stalin that the success of a south ward invasion was a.s.sured. Merrill, Korea, Korea, pp. 187188. pp. 187188.

Goncharov, Lewis and Xue also marvel (p. 146) at "how skillfully Kim had achieved his ends by playing on the complicated relations between Stalin and Mao. We would predict that if any transcripts of conversations turn up, they will reveal a pattern of Kim exaggerating Stalin's support to Mao, and vice versa. In the process, Kim was restricting his own future options and his ability to hedge against failure."

98. Interview in Interview in U.S. News and World Report, U.S. News and World Report, May 5, 1950. May 5, 1950.

99. c.u.mings, c.u.mings, Origins Origins II, p. 431. II, p. 431.

100. Both comments quoted by c.u.mings Both comments quoted by c.u.mings (Origins (Origins II, pp. 420 and 503), who adds on the latter page that "Koreans viewed Dulles's speech as, in Chong Il-gwon's words, evidence of 'an absolute guarantee' to defend the ROK" II, pp. 420 and 503), who adds on the latter page that "Koreans viewed Dulles's speech as, in Chong Il-gwon's words, evidence of 'an absolute guarantee' to defend the ROK"

101. Yu, who was present at the meeting in Moscow, told the Goncharov-Lewis-Xue team in an interview that Kim argued, "(1) it would be a decisive surprise attack and the war would be won in three days; (2) there would be an uprising of 200,000 Party members in South Korea; (3) there were guerrillas in the southern provinces of South Korea; and (4) the United States would not have time to partic.i.p.ate" Yu, who was present at the meeting in Moscow, told the Goncharov-Lewis-Xue team in an interview that Kim argued, "(1) it would be a decisive surprise attack and the war would be won in three days; (2) there would be an uprising of 200,000 Party members in South Korea; (3) there were guerrillas in the southern provinces of South Korea; and (4) the United States would not have time to partic.i.p.ate" (Uncertain Partners, (Uncertain Partners, p. 144). On p. 146, the authors describe Kim as likewise telling Mao during their meeting in May 1950 that North Korea "would achieve victory within a month, and that the United States could not deploy its forces before then." p. 144). On p. 146, the authors describe Kim as likewise telling Mao during their meeting in May 1950 that North Korea "would achieve victory within a month, and that the United States could not deploy its forces before then."

102. "Stalin had no incentive to question Kim's arguments, but he gave the go-ahead on the basis of Soviet interests and on the condition that Mao agree. ... Stalin was willing to support Kim only if the possibility of a Soviet-American clash in Korea would be excluded. He determined that the way to do this was to implicate Mao in the decision and thereby make him bear the full burden for ensuring Kim's survival if the Americans intervened. A Sino-American war, should it erupt in Korea, would have the added benefit of widening the break between Beijing and the West" (Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, p. 214). "Stalin had no incentive to question Kim's arguments, but he gave the go-ahead on the basis of Soviet interests and on the condition that Mao agree. ... Stalin was willing to support Kim only if the possibility of a Soviet-American clash in Korea would be excluded. He determined that the way to do this was to implicate Mao in the decision and thereby make him bear the full burden for ensuring Kim's survival if the Americans intervened. A Sino-American war, should it erupt in Korea, would have the added benefit of widening the break between Beijing and the West" (Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, p. 214).

103. Kim and Stalin, if they were both mistaken on U.S. capability, were not necessarily mistaken on the same grounds since their interests were different. However, they may well have held some common a.s.sumptions. For speculation on the grounds for Stalin's judgment, see Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Kim and Stalin, if they were both mistaken on U.S. capability, were not necessarily mistaken on the same grounds since their interests were different. However, they may well have held some common a.s.sumptions. For speculation on the grounds for Stalin's judgment, see Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, pp. 151152: "Stalin would have concluded from press reports and intelligence that, though the Americans might want to aid Taiwan or even South Korea, it would take them many months to ama.s.s and get that aid to the western Pacific. The timing was on Kim's side if he moved quickly and decisively. In the worst case, U.S. intervention would lead to a clash between Beijing and Washington and a denial of Taiwan to the Chinese Communists. The resulting rise in Sino-American hostilities would only increase Mao's reliance on Stalin. pp. 151152: "Stalin would have concluded from press reports and intelligence that, though the Americans might want to aid Taiwan or even South Korea, it would take them many months to ama.s.s and get that aid to the western Pacific. The timing was on Kim's side if he moved quickly and decisively. In the worst case, U.S. intervention would lead to a clash between Beijing and Washington and a denial of Taiwan to the Chinese Communists. The resulting rise in Sino-American hostilities would only increase Mao's reliance on Stalin.

"Furthermore, Stalin was well aware that the United States would be most reluctant to go to war with the Soviet Union over Korea. With an army that had been sharply reduced after World War Two, it could not run the risk of Soviet retaliation against Western Europe or j.a.pan. .Moreover, the Soviet leader reportedly minimized the danger of any such escalation because he had bought Kim Il Sung's argument that a North Korean attack would touch off a revolution in the South, making for a quick and easy consolidation of control.

"Thus, we would argue, it was a mixture of short- and long-term estimates of the U.S. posture in Asia, as of April 1950, that finally led Stalin to become directly involved in Kim's military designs."

On p. 214 the authors add, "In our view, the decision to go to war cannot be laid alone to Stalin's pressure [on Mao], or to Kim's adventurism, or to a SovietNorth Korean (let alone Sino North Korean) conspiracy. In fact the decision came in bits and pieces and was never coordinated or even thoroughly scrutinized by the three states. It was reckless war-making of the worst kind. Each of three Communist leaders was operating on premises that were largely concealed and facts that were fabricated or at best half true."

5. Iron-Willed Brilliant Commander.

1. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 9, 1990, in Seiler, November 9, 1990, in Seiler, Kim Il-song 19411948 Kim Il-song 19411948 (see chap. 2, n. 18). (see chap. 2, n. 18).

Goncharov, Lewis and Xue say (Uncertain Partners (Uncertain Partners [see chap. 4, n. 1], p. 149) that Kim and Mao at this point were in a race to finish war preparations first and fire the first shot in their reunification campaigns, since China could not fight a war on two fronts as it would have to do if it joined North Korea in fighting the United States while invading Taiwan. If China failed to act first it would have to wait. China did fail to build up its invasion troops opposite Taiwan by the summer of 1950 as planned (p. 152)-and thus had to wait for decades without getting another chance at Taiwan. The authors add (p. 153) that while Mao knew Kim was preparing for war, "there are good reasons to accept the conclusion of Korean and Chinese authors that Mao was not informed about the details of the Korean plans or the timing of the a.s.sault. ... Keeping Mao out of the picture was Kim's intention. A striking fact about the two months before the war is that the North Koreans-and the Soviets-took steps to keep the Chinese in the dark about their military preparations." [see chap. 4, n. 1], p. 149) that Kim and Mao at this point were in a race to finish war preparations first and fire the first shot in their reunification campaigns, since China could not fight a war on two fronts as it would have to do if it joined North Korea in fighting the United States while invading Taiwan. If China failed to act first it would have to wait. China did fail to build up its invasion troops opposite Taiwan by the summer of 1950 as planned (p. 152)-and thus had to wait for decades without getting another chance at Taiwan. The authors add (p. 153) that while Mao knew Kim was preparing for war, "there are good reasons to accept the conclusion of Korean and Chinese authors that Mao was not informed about the details of the Korean plans or the timing of the a.s.sault. ... Keeping Mao out of the picture was Kim's intention. A striking fact about the two months before the war is that the North Koreans-and the Soviets-took steps to keep the Chinese in the dark about their military preparations."

Newsweek's George Wehrfritz ("History Lessons, Take Two" [see chap. 4, n. 96], p. 30), reports that a revised history by a Chinese scholar writing under the pen name Qingshi and using both Chinese and Soviet sources begins "with Stalin playing China against North Korea to serve his own interests. In 1949 Mao asked for 200 Russian warplanes and pilots to support an invasion of Taiwan. ... Stalin was supportive but noncommittal. What Mao didn't know, says Qingshi, was that the Soviets had trained and supplied North Korea's military in preparation for an attack on South Korea. Indeed, Stalin urged Kim to seek Mao's approval only because he a.s.sumed, correctly, that Mao needed Soviet aid too much to say no. Stalin got his way. The invasion came five weeks after Kim's Beijing visit. Within hours the Americans vowed to turn back communist aggression in South Korea. To thwart Chinese adventurism, the U.S. Seventh Fleet sailed into the Taiwan Strait to shield Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists in Taipei. Mao's planned invasion of Taiwan was thwarted. He quickly grew dismayed by events in Korea, particularly when Kim's a.s.sault crumbled after U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur's landing at Inchon on Sept. 15." George Wehrfritz ("History Lessons, Take Two" [see chap. 4, n. 96], p. 30), reports that a revised history by a Chinese scholar writing under the pen name Qingshi and using both Chinese and Soviet sources begins "with Stalin playing China against North Korea to serve his own interests. In 1949 Mao asked for 200 Russian warplanes and pilots to support an invasion of Taiwan. ... Stalin was supportive but noncommittal. What Mao didn't know, says Qingshi, was that the Soviets had trained and supplied North Korea's military in preparation for an attack on South Korea. Indeed, Stalin urged Kim to seek Mao's approval only because he a.s.sumed, correctly, that Mao needed Soviet aid too much to say no. Stalin got his way. The invasion came five weeks after Kim's Beijing visit. Within hours the Americans vowed to turn back communist aggression in South Korea. To thwart Chinese adventurism, the U.S. Seventh Fleet sailed into the Taiwan Strait to shield Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists in Taipei. Mao's planned invasion of Taiwan was thwarted. He quickly grew dismayed by events in Korea, particularly when Kim's a.s.sault crumbled after U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur's landing at Inchon on Sept. 15."

2. Baik II (see chap. 4, n. 24), pp. 267268. Baik II (see chap. 4, n. 24), pp. 267268.

3. Harold Joyce n.o.ble, Harold Joyce n.o.ble, Emba.s.sy at War, Emba.s.sy at War, edited with an introduction by Frank Baldwin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), p. 221. edited with an introduction by Frank Baldwin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), p. 221.

4. c.u.mings c.u.mings (Origins (Origins II [see chap. 3, n. 43], pp. 582583) tells of one American military intelligence officer whose warnings of enemy activity led to cancellation of pa.s.ses for the South Korean Army's Sixth Division. On that basis he writes, "So much for the North Koreans mounting an unexpected surprise attack against an Army on leave for the weekend. It is highly implausible that this advance information, and the 6th Division alert, would not have been communicated to other elements in the ROKA." Nevertheless, according to Yu Song-chol, it was for the very reason that many soldiers would be on leave that the Russians and North Koreans planned the invasion for June 25 II [see chap. 3, n. 43], pp. 582583) tells of one American military intelligence officer whose warnings of enemy activity led to cancellation of pa.s.ses for the South Korean Army's Sixth Division. On that basis he writes, "So much for the North Koreans mounting an unexpected surprise attack against an Army on leave for the weekend. It is highly implausible that this advance information, and the 6th Division alert, would not have been communicated to other elements in the ROKA." Nevertheless, according to Yu Song-chol, it was for the very reason that many soldiers would be on leave that the Russians and North Koreans planned the invasion for June 25 (Hankuk Ilbo, (Hankuk Ilbo, November 11, 1990). November 11, 1990).

5. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 9, 1990. A former KPA lieutenant colonel, Chu Yong-bok, quoted the chief of the operations directorate, Maj. Gen. Kim Kuang-hyob, as telling a.s.sembled officers on June 11, 1950, that the "maneuvers" they November 9, 1990. A former KPA lieutenant colonel, Chu Yong-bok, quoted the chief of the operations directorate, Maj. Gen. Kim Kuang-hyob, as telling a.s.sembled officers on June 11, 1950, that the "maneuvers" they 'were 'were about to engage in were so important that weaknesses and mistakes of the sorts that had been tolerated in previous exercises would be the subject of courts-martial this time (Chu Yong-bok, "I Translated Attack Orders Composed in Russian," in Kim Chullbaum, ed., about to engage in were so important that weaknesses and mistakes of the sorts that had been tolerated in previous exercises would be the subject of courts-martial this time (Chu Yong-bok, "I Translated Attack Orders Composed in Russian," in Kim Chullbaum, ed., The Truth About the Korean War: Testimony 40 Years Later The Truth About the Korean War: Testimony 40 Years Later [Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing Co., 1991], p. 117). It is not clear whether this policy was an original North Korean touch. Chu notes that the Russian-language "engineer operation orders" that he translated said: "If orders come down to begin an attack, the various engineer units will guarantee the technical preparedness of their divisions or regiments for the attack." This suggests that formal punishment for failures may have been Soviet Army operating procedure. [Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing Co., 1991], p. 117). It is not clear whether this policy was an original North Korean touch. Chu notes that the Russian-language "engineer operation orders" that he translated said: "If orders come down to begin an attack, the various engineer units will guarantee the technical preparedness of their divisions or regiments for the attack." This suggests that formal punishment for failures may have been Soviet Army operating procedure.

6. He and two other veteran military men He and two other veteran military men 'were 'were purged "amid rumors of a fiery denunciation of these men by Kim Il-song himself. ... Behind the spoken charges ... there was probably an unspoken one: the failure of the southern liberation campaign' " (Scalapino and Lee, purged "amid rumors of a fiery denunciation of these men by Kim Il-song himself. ... Behind the spoken charges ... there was probably an unspoken one: the failure of the southern liberation campaign' " (Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea Communism in Korea [see chap. 2, n. 28], pp. 614615). [see chap. 2, n. 28], pp. 614615).

7. Suh, Suh, Kim Il Sung Kim Il Sung (see chap. 2, n. 35), p. 121; Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, (see chap. 2, n. 35), p. 121; Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners Uncertain Partners (see chap. 4, n. 1), pp. 143144. (see chap. 4, n. 1), pp. 143144.

8. See Max Hastings, See Max Hastings, The Korean War The Korean War (London: Michael Joseph, Ltd., 1987), pp. 79, 105106. (London: Michael Joseph, Ltd., 1987), pp. 79, 105106.

9. Choe Hun-sik, "Lesson of the Korean War," Choe Hun-sik, "Lesson of the Korean War," Korea Herald, Korea Herald, June 24, 1994. June 24, 1994.

10. Hastings, Hastings, Korean War, Korean War, pp. 79, 105106. pp. 79, 105106.

11. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 13, 1990. November 13, 1990.

12. Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, p. 137, citing a top-secret 1966 Soviet Foreign Ministry report on the Korean War. p. 137, citing a top-secret 1966 Soviet Foreign Ministry report on the Korean War.

This is one point on which Yu's memory may have failed him, as he insisted that the planners, a.s.suming a quick Southern collapse after the capture of Seoul, had made no further plans. "Any war outside of three days was one that was not in the playbook of the KPA," he recalled. When it turned out that the Northern forces would have to keep fighting, they lacked operational plans, lacked linkage of artillery and infantry-lacked "even a basic strategy. Each division simply pushed southward on its own" (Hankuk Ilbo, (Hankuk Ilbo, November 14, 1990). Contradicting Yu on this point, Sergei Goncharov said during a conference in Seoul in June of 1995 that he had personally seen the operations plan in the Russian archives, and it did set out plans for the in