Whatever transpired in the South, it seemed unlikely that the North Koreans would become convinced, in the course of negotiating sessions over a period of only weeks or months, that the United States had abandoned all its hostility to the regime. (That would represent the flip side of Washington's own inability to trust Pyongyang enough to drop its hostility.) Kelly addressed that by saying Washington did not necessarily expect to "resolve the nuclear problem in a matter of a few weeks or even a few months,"50 but patience inside the Belt-way certainly was not unlimited. but patience inside the Belt-way certainly was not unlimited.

What would happen if the engagement phase of "hawk engagement" failed to produce a resolution? Next would come the hawkish part, efforts to remove the regime-but how? It would be foolish for Americans to presume that they knew the will of the North Korean people, beyond the certainty that refusing to kowtow to the American devils remained a top priority. Still indoctrinated, still proud, North Korean citizens would welcome any would-be American military liberators with bullets and bombs, not flowers. Their society was not one that anyone outside the country would choose, but a great many North Koreans still endorsed much of its ideological foundation.51 There was the danger that if an unconvinced Kim refused to budge on the matter of his existing weapons of ma.s.s destruction, at least some in Washington would be tempted to seize on his obduracy as justification for war in one form or another. President Bush, in a February 2004 television interview, had provided a minimalist justification for the invasion of Iraq when he described Saddam Hussein as "a dangerous man" who "had the ability to make weapons, at the very minimum."52 Obviously a similar argument could be put forward to justify military action against Kim Jong-il. Kim had the ability to make weapons and, to at least that extent, was dangerous. Obviously a similar argument could be put forward to justify military action against Kim Jong-il. Kim had the ability to make weapons and, to at least that extent, was dangerous.

For the United States and any allied forces that might launch even a limited preventive attack-say, a "surgical" strike against identified nuclear facilities-initial success might not come anywhere near as cheaply in terms of casualties as in Iraq. North Korea's "response would be prompt," a Russian specialist in East Asian studies wrote in a Seoul newspaper following a visit to Pyongyang in July 2003. "After studying this matter for a long time, the North Korean leadership reached the conclusion that since a limited attack could lead to an even more lethal attack, they must respond immediately with all their strength before their military strength becomes ineffective." The target of their retaliatory attack could be Seoul, he wrote.53 Recall the vow Kim Jong-il was rumored to have made when he was promoted to marshal (see chapter 28), that he would "destroy the world" rather than accept military defeat. General Gary Luck, former commander in chief of U.S. forces in Korea, calculated that a second Korean war would cost a million lives and $1 trillion in damages and lost business. Recall the vow Kim Jong-il was rumored to have made when he was promoted to marshal (see chapter 28), that he would "destroy the world" rather than accept military defeat. General Gary Luck, former commander in chief of U.S. forces in Korea, calculated that a second Korean war would cost a million lives and $1 trillion in damages and lost business.54 A prudent U.S. administration obviously would stop to think very hard about whether it really needed to go to such extremes to remove all of Kim's weapons of ma.s.s destruction right away. In an imperfect world, would Washington eventually hold its nose and strike an interim deal guaranteeing a halt to North Korea's weapons' manufacture and export, demolishing the plants and establishing a thorough inspection regime-but leaving any already deployed nukes and missiles in place for the time being, pending development of the sort of trust neither side yet felt? While an improved tone at the June 2004 talks in Beijing might have pointed vaguely in that direction, little overt support for such a compromise could be heard in Washington.55 Then again, Washington was trying to speak with one voice about the proposition that Pyongyang had better forswear its nuclear ambitions now, or else. Then again, Washington was trying to speak with one voice about the proposition that Pyongyang had better forswear its nuclear ambitions now, or else.

The most desirable "or else," some in Washington seemed to feel, would be imposition by a united global community of sanctions far more stifling than the ones already in effect.56 The United States had accepted the entry into the unofficial nuclear club of India, Pakistan and Israel. Catching Pakistan red-handed in a global scheme of-wildly extravagant proliferation to various U.S. enemy countries, including North Korea, the George W Bush administration accepted a solution in which a single scientist took the rap and Islamabad promised it wouldn't happen again. Washington's rationale was to avoid doing anything that would destabilize Pakistan, whose own stockpiled bombs-even if the country ceased to proliferate-posed a grave long-term danger to the United States. An Islamic militant takeover of Pakistan and its atomic a.r.s.enal seemed a horrifying but real possibility down the road. Helping a friendly government stay in power there seemed almost a no-brainer.

But there was little sign of a substantial const.i.tuency in Washington for forming an alliance with North Korea-something that might be possible, in my view, since the two countries' fundamental needs could with some patience be reconciled-as a means of ensuring that Pyongyang's a.r.s.enal would not be used against U.S. interests.

If the United States should feel compelled to fight with North Korea, I had been saying and writing for a decade, the war should be fought with information rather than bullets. Defector Ko Jun, a former truck driver, told me in a 1998 interview, "If North Korea's citizens knew the outside world, how students demonstrate on campuses, 100 percent of the citizens would rise. They wouldn't care if they got shot. But they don't know how. They have no idea of the outside world." Bills pending in Congress in early 2004 called for such means of breaking the information barrier as dropping radios into North Korea and broadcasting longer each day in the Korean language over AM and FM. frequencies.57 Fortunately there was the precedent of some pretty nasty states, the former Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites, that had changed their ways on their own--without foreign occupation or the direct application of outside force-at least in part thanks to outside broadcasting. Fortunately there was the precedent of some pretty nasty states, the former Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites, that had changed their ways on their own--without foreign occupation or the direct application of outside force-at least in part thanks to outside broadcasting.

Expanding broadcasts was a good idea regardless of the overall policy that might be chosen, I felt, if the broadcasters kept to straight news and did not resort to shrill and one-sided propaganda. Even if the United States chose to avoid suddenly destabilizing the North Korean regime, it still would make sense to try to improve the people's understanding of the outside world. In any case, successes in changing hearts and minds via broadcasting would be relatively gradual, c.u.mulative.

As drafted by a private organization concerned with religious freedom, the Senate bill in particular had many flaws. It would inject congressional micromanagement into policy decisions beyond the competence of the U.S. legislative branch. The draft went so far as to settle upon an economic model-the Vietnamese model-for North Korea to follow. And it called for active U.S. efforts to reunify Korea-at a time when South Korea wanted only to postpone unification. It sought, in short, to legislate regime change.

The bills would authorize handing tens of millions of dollars to nongovernment organizations, which would be entrusted with performing aid work or public diplomacy (that's a euphemism for propaganda) on behalf of the U.S. government. Prominent among the organizations apparently in line to receive such grants were certain religious groups, commendably in the vanguard of a growing movement to expose North Korea's human rights violations and help the victims. Such groups also had a separate agenda. Their other and deeper interest beyond promoting human rights was in preaching religion, typically evangelical Christianity, to North Koreans. When they prepared balloon drops of small transistor radios, the packets also included Bible literature. The Senate bill's drafter, especially, apparently sought to encourage groups to tap into President Bush's proposed spending of tax funds on "faith-based initiatives."58 Recall how missionary zeal was mixed up in the final voyage of the General Sherman, General Sherman, which got the U.S.-Korean relationship off to such a tragic start in 1866 (see chapter 2). I much preferred that religious groups continue to rely on free-will private contributions to finance their good works. Tax funds allocated for aid and public diplomacy directed to North Koreans could best be administered by dedicated, professional experts. The sort of communication expertise called for had resided in the U.S. Information Agency-until the end of the Cold War prematurely signaled that the agency was no longer needed, and it was disbanded. In view of America's enormous problems with foreign opinion-not only in North Korea but in the Muslim world and pretty much everywhere else, as well-I felt the time had come when the government should revive the agency, recall some of its retirees and put their experience to work. As for U.S. government food aid to North Koreans, it could continue to be funneled through the UN's World Food Program. which got the U.S.-Korean relationship off to such a tragic start in 1866 (see chapter 2). I much preferred that religious groups continue to rely on free-will private contributions to finance their good works. Tax funds allocated for aid and public diplomacy directed to North Koreans could best be administered by dedicated, professional experts. The sort of communication expertise called for had resided in the U.S. Information Agency-until the end of the Cold War prematurely signaled that the agency was no longer needed, and it was disbanded. In view of America's enormous problems with foreign opinion-not only in North Korea but in the Muslim world and pretty much everywhere else, as well-I felt the time had come when the government should revive the agency, recall some of its retirees and put their experience to work. As for U.S. government food aid to North Koreans, it could continue to be funneled through the UN's World Food Program.

Whatever the ultimate decision might be, Americans could not afford to decide another war-and-peace question on the basis of misunderstanding and false information. A clearheaded, factual approach was needed. Thus I was concerned as I watched many people fail to let the facts get in the way of stories that cast Kim Jong-il as an offender in every category-as evil incarnate.

An example seemed to be a lobbying campaign that persuaded President Bush to impose sanctions against North Korea in September 2003 for what some human rights groups alleged was "human trafficking."59 Their case looked weak. First there was that old canard about "forced" labor by North Koreans in Siberia. (See chapter 22 for my view that sending guest workers to Russia had far more positive than negative implications, from the standpoint of freedom and human rights.) Second, North Korean refugee women were being sold as wives and concubines to Chinese men. The evidence presented by human rights groups actually pointed mainly to Chinese nationals, acting on Chinese soil, as the guilty parties in such trafficking. Their case looked weak. First there was that old canard about "forced" labor by North Koreans in Siberia. (See chapter 22 for my view that sending guest workers to Russia had far more positive than negative implications, from the standpoint of freedom and human rights.) Second, North Korean refugee women were being sold as wives and concubines to Chinese men. The evidence presented by human rights groups actually pointed mainly to Chinese nationals, acting on Chinese soil, as the guilty parties in such trafficking.60 Pyongyang had not authorized the women's flight to China and authorities had shown disapproval of such liaisons by forcibly terminating the pregnancies of women who returned to North Korea-a human rights abuse doc.u.mented far more thoroughly than was any official North Korean involvement in the trafficking of the women. Pyongyang had not authorized the women's flight to China and authorities had shown disapproval of such liaisons by forcibly terminating the pregnancies of women who returned to North Korea-a human rights abuse doc.u.mented far more thoroughly than was any official North Korean involvement in the trafficking of the women.61 A Washington psychiatrist who had done profiling work for the CIA decided that Kim suffered from "a serious mental illness." In a draft report circulated in Washington and "widely quoted in news media accounts, the psychiatrist backed his long-distance psychoa.n.a.lysis with a lengthy recital from the public record of negative information about Kim Jong-il.62 We have seen that Kim grew up as a pampered prince, permitted to have his way on whatever his little heart might desire. That, the doctor said, inclined him toward a narcissistic personality. I had no argument there. But then, surmising that even the mature Kim Jong-il (by then in his sixties) must have felt inadequate compared with his father, the profiler followed that train of thought to suggest that Kim's narcissism qualified as what he described as the most dangerous form, the malignant version. Justifying that extreme call, he sweep-ingly characterized the North Korean ruler as so self-absorbed and grandiose that he completely lacked capacity to empathize-not only with enemies including Americans, South Koreans and j.a.panese but also with his own people. We have seen that Kim grew up as a pampered prince, permitted to have his way on whatever his little heart might desire. That, the doctor said, inclined him toward a narcissistic personality. I had no argument there. But then, surmising that even the mature Kim Jong-il (by then in his sixties) must have felt inadequate compared with his father, the profiler followed that train of thought to suggest that Kim's narcissism qualified as what he described as the most dangerous form, the malignant version. Justifying that extreme call, he sweep-ingly characterized the North Korean ruler as so self-absorbed and grandiose that he completely lacked capacity to empathize-not only with enemies including Americans, South Koreans and j.a.panese but also with his own people. No No capacity to empathize? The doctor had overlooked plenty of evidence that this was an exaggeration. capacity to empathize? The doctor had overlooked plenty of evidence that this was an exaggeration.63 I hoped that Americans, whenever they might start to hear a loud chorus of political and opinion leaders calling for the invasion of one more country led by one more dangerous "madman," would subject the diagnosis to elementary scrutiny. I'm no doctor, but I thought Kim Jong-il was was crazy-like a fox. To scare off invaders and extort aid, he and his publicists had encouraged enemies to believe that the Dear Leader--who was in fact genuinely peculiar-might be seriously nuts and on that account should not be provoked. I thought it would be helpful if Western a.n.a.lysts, rather than breathlessly buying into the seriously nuts part, looked more closely before making up their minds. As Seoul-based Pyongyang-watcher Michael Breen put it, "while being neutral in the face of bad leadership is unacceptable, being objective is essential in a.s.sessing it." crazy-like a fox. To scare off invaders and extort aid, he and his publicists had encouraged enemies to believe that the Dear Leader--who was in fact genuinely peculiar-might be seriously nuts and on that account should not be provoked. I thought it would be helpful if Western a.n.a.lysts, rather than breathlessly buying into the seriously nuts part, looked more closely before making up their minds. As Seoul-based Pyongyang-watcher Michael Breen put it, "while being neutral in the face of bad leadership is unacceptable, being objective is essential in a.s.sessing it."64 Missing in the accounts by those who demonized Kim was any hint that there might be two sides to the story.65 Surely there are unrelievedly evil people. Saddam Hussein's s.a.d.i.s.tic sons Uday and Qusay perhaps qualified. But I could not fit the real Kim Jong-il comfortably into the role of total monster. Having studied Kim rather intensively for years, I would describe him as an often insensitive and brutal despot who had another side that was generous and-increasingly, as he matured-charming. He was an incompetent economic manager during the decades when stubbornness or insecurity kept him from risking needed changes in the system. But then, having found somewhere a new decisiveness, he had become the apparent sponsor of reform efforts. Sale of his regime's weapons of ma.s.s destruction to other enemy nations could cause the United States, both at home and in its role as global policeman, immense problems-but for a price he appeared "willing to relinquish at least his capacity to make and sell them. Surely there are unrelievedly evil people. Saddam Hussein's s.a.d.i.s.tic sons Uday and Qusay perhaps qualified. But I could not fit the real Kim Jong-il comfortably into the role of total monster. Having studied Kim rather intensively for years, I would describe him as an often insensitive and brutal despot who had another side that was generous and-increasingly, as he matured-charming. He was an incompetent economic manager during the decades when stubbornness or insecurity kept him from risking needed changes in the system. But then, having found somewhere a new decisiveness, he had become the apparent sponsor of reform efforts. Sale of his regime's weapons of ma.s.s destruction to other enemy nations could cause the United States, both at home and in its role as global policeman, immense problems-but for a price he appeared "willing to relinquish at least his capacity to make and sell them.

North Korea's human rights situation truly piled atrocity upon atrocity as readers of chapters 14, 16 and 34 know. The system in which secret police fed political prisoners to the gulag was his father's creation, but Kim Jong-il had either actively or pa.s.sively preserved it. There was precious little on the positive side of the ledger page to balance the horrors of the camps. After complaints by human rights groups, the regime had closed some of those. But the prisoners had been transferred to locations that were more remote, where the eyes of the outside world could not penetrate. The most favorable inference from that incident was that Kim could be moved by outside opinion. Then there were his moderating instructions to "avoid creating internal enemies" and his encouragement of more attention to legality. In the end, still, there was no sign that he had come close to phasing out the camps and the oppressive system of surveillance.

I wondered what Kim might be persuaded to do now that he was changing his country's ideology. In my most optimistic daydream I imagined a very high-level envoy from a U.S. president or presidential nominee meeting Kim, perhaps in the early autumn of an election year, and saying, "Mr. Chairman, I know that you would like to meet with the man I represent. With your permission I will speak frankly on that point. In view of what we have learned about treatment of North Korean citizens who are deemed to have deviated politically from the official line, it would be hard for him to agree to meet with you. There is growing public concern in the United States regarding that situation.

"You and I have discussed measures that might begin to resolve our other mutual problems. But you are asking that we not insist upon your country's immediate nuclear disarmament. You ask that we accept simply a freeze of your capacity to make such weapons during a period of-watching and waiting, while the two sides develop mutual trust. Without a breakthrough on human rights, I have to tell you, it would be politically difficult to justify a deal that offered no more than the Agreed Frame-work of 1994 had provided-a deal, moreover, that would hinge on trust. Let me also suggest that it would be difficult for you. you. to trust our professions of non-hostility in such circ.u.mstances. After all, you might think, whenever American public opinion became seriously aroused by news of the human rights situation here, a policy reversal in Washington could lead to renewed hostility. So let's talk about how we might fast-forward the development of trust." to trust our professions of non-hostility in such circ.u.mstances. After all, you might think, whenever American public opinion became seriously aroused by news of the human rights situation here, a policy reversal in Washington could lead to renewed hostility. So let's talk about how we might fast-forward the development of trust."

In my daydream Kim Jong-il would listen intently as the interpreter turned those words into Korean, before the American envoy continued: "The man who sent me understands that many of the prisoners were incarcerated originally because their att.i.tudes and cla.s.s backgrounds, or those of their parents or grandparents, were considered unsuitable in the sort of economy and social system your country was building from the 1940s. He knows of your reported instruction to 'avoid making internal enemies.' He knows about the adjustments you have begun to make to modernize the economic system. He wonders whether you might have contemplated going farther to create a role for the surviving political prisoners-and their jailers-as free people working in the new economic enterprises that you expect to see formed. If you were to free the prisoners, he would meet with you gladly."

We have seen how decisively (or, if you prefer, impetuously) Kim Jong-il had reacted to frank but polite talk in his meetings in 2000 with Kim Dae-jung and Madeleine Albright. His responses in person had been a far cry from the usual b.l.o.o.d.y-minded stone-walling his subordinates resorted to when they negotiated on his behalf.66 At the conclusion of our hypothetical envoy's human-rights pitch, I imagined the Dear Leader grinning conspira-torially and asking, "So he wants me to make him the Great Emanc.i.p.ator here in the DPRK, in time for what your political writers call an 'October surprise'?" The envoy at this point would smile and reply, a bit playfully "What's wrong with your letting him take some of the credit? But seriously he wants At the conclusion of our hypothetical envoy's human-rights pitch, I imagined the Dear Leader grinning conspira-torially and asking, "So he wants me to make him the Great Emanc.i.p.ator here in the DPRK, in time for what your political writers call an 'October surprise'?" The envoy at this point would smile and reply, a bit playfully "What's wrong with your letting him take some of the credit? But seriously he wants you. you. to be the Great Emanc.i.p.ator." to be the Great Emanc.i.p.ator."

And then, who knows? Kim might turn to one of his functionaries and say, "Get the State Security and Public Security chiefs into my office immediately. Call the governors in from all the provinces for a meeting tonight to plan for turning those camps into ordinary communities. I'll probably regret this, but I'm taking down the fences--within the month."

Such an approach would be a long shot indeed, but something of the sort seemed to me worth a try. The polite talk would be essential. A former U.S. president would have the appropriate stature to serve as envoy. "In dealing with a nation that is attempting to reform, the form matters as much as the content," writes political scientist David C. Kang. "You can't tell tell a Korean anything, but suggestions of a solution might be met by receptive ears." a Korean anything, but suggestions of a solution might be met by receptive ears."67 One could dislike or even loathe Kim Jong-il. In my personal opinion, North Korea and the rest of the world would have been far better off if the boy called Yura had drowned in that wading pool with his little brother Shura back in 1948. Under the circ.u.mstances existing as of early 2004, however, it was no more relevant to ponder what might have been than to decide whether one liked or disliked the Dear Leader. What was essential, I thought, was to avoid overlooking anything about Kim that might point the way to a satisfactory, non-military resolution.

I felt that in my years of studying Kim I had succeeded to some extent in my goal of getting into the mind of that traditional Oriental despot, who happened to be my own age. A key perhaps the the key I concluded, was the importance of maintaining face. For years I had believed that Kim Jong-il remained determined to win-to rule all of Korea. Lately though, I had come to think that his real bottom line was to avoid humiliation. I remembered and pondered anew his odd 1998 remark (see chapter 29) about South Korean President Kim Young-sam's refusal to attend the funeral of Kim Il-sung: "If he had come, he might have taken over North Korea and become president of a united Korea. What an idiot!" Perhaps Kim Jong-il wished he could have carried out his father's dying wishes and brought into being the long-discussed federation or confederation, in which the two separate states could coexist, trade and gradually merge into one. In any case, the remark did not sound to me like the words of a ruler determined that he would either win or destroy the world. Kim did not, after all, speak of victory. It sounded more like the words of a ruler who could not accept the loss of his own and his country's face. As one of his negotiators put it in December 2003: to the North Koreans, capitulation meant "death itself." key I concluded, was the importance of maintaining face. For years I had believed that Kim Jong-il remained determined to win-to rule all of Korea. Lately though, I had come to think that his real bottom line was to avoid humiliation. I remembered and pondered anew his odd 1998 remark (see chapter 29) about South Korean President Kim Young-sam's refusal to attend the funeral of Kim Il-sung: "If he had come, he might have taken over North Korea and become president of a united Korea. What an idiot!" Perhaps Kim Jong-il wished he could have carried out his father's dying wishes and brought into being the long-discussed federation or confederation, in which the two separate states could coexist, trade and gradually merge into one. In any case, the remark did not sound to me like the words of a ruler determined that he would either win or destroy the world. Kim did not, after all, speak of victory. It sounded more like the words of a ruler who could not accept the loss of his own and his country's face. As one of his negotiators put it in December 2003: to the North Koreans, capitulation meant "death itself."68 If that part was right, it followed that negotiated solutions to the United States' and other countries' problems with Kim should be possible. He could compromise if they also compromised-and if they showed respect rather than hostile contempt. Verification could be negotiated. Defector Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, who had almost nothing good to say about Kim, was skeptical when a Washington Times Washington Times reporter asked whether the Dear Leader could be trusted to keep an agreement on nuclear weapons. But Hw.a.n.g conceded, "People can change, and conditions can force a person to follow a certain path." reporter asked whether the Dear Leader could be trusted to keep an agreement on nuclear weapons. But Hw.a.n.g conceded, "People can change, and conditions can force a person to follow a certain path."69

THIRTY-SEVEN.

Sing of Our Leader's Favors for Thousands of Years How much longer could North Korea survive as a separate country? Although no one knew, as of early 2004 it seemed that the answer might turn out to be: a while yet.

After all, it was by no means clear that forces favoring speedy Korean reunification were strong enough to prevail any time soon. Each of the major players, on and off the peninsula, had interests in seeing division continue. For Beijing, continued existence of a separate North Korea would leave a communist party-ruled buffer state between the Yalu River and the U.S. troops in South Korea. In Washington the Pentagon liked the idea of keeping U.S. troops in Asia, but countries willing to play host to them had dwindled in number. A separate South Korea might well be more willing than a unified Korea to tolerate a contingent of GIs. Moscow could derive some satisfaction from seeing a former Soviet client state remain outside the American sphere of influence. Even in Tokyo people might sleep better knowing that the Koreans, whose resentment of j.a.pan formed a common bond between North and South, had yet to manage the creation of a politically and militarily united country. For South Korea, continued division would postpone the dreaded time of reckoning when Seoul would have to attempt to develop the northern part of the peninsula quickly enough to keep a horde of hungry and homeless job-seekers from rushing south.

Would a separate North Korea continue to change internally, as rapidly as in the period since 1998 or even faster? To the extent that Pyongyang could find ways to proceed with its planned experiments in special zones, it did not seem unreasonable to guess that the country would change economically. Especially once long-forbidden information from outside became widely available, it could change politically as well. Still, political changes might come more slowly than economic ones-in that regard following the Chinese pattern rather than the Russian one. Mean-while, for the reasons discussed in chapter 36, coup-dreaming outsiders might think better of the notion that a new, military leadership should be installed.

Under such circ.u.mstances, the Kim dynasty might last long enough to crown a successor to Kim Jong-il. At dinner with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in 2000, Kim signaled that this was his plan. When Albright asked if there were other models he had considered emulating besides Sweden (itself a const.i.tutional monarchy), Kim replied: "Thailand maintains a strong royal system and has preserved its independence through a long, turbulent history, yet has a market economy. I am also interested in the Thai model."1 Pyongyang began soon after to prepare the world for the next succession. A long essay in the party newspaper Nodong Shinmun Nodong Shinmun for October 2, 2002, spun out an elaborate claim that Kim Jong-il had been the right choice to succeed his father precisely because he was "a partisan's son," specifically the son of Kim Il-sung. (The emphasis on the blood tie was far greater than had been the case when Kim Jong-il was put forth initially. Then, the propagandists' argument was that he just happened to be the most capable man for the job, regardless of his lineage.) for October 2, 2002, spun out an elaborate claim that Kim Jong-il had been the right choice to succeed his father precisely because he was "a partisan's son," specifically the son of Kim Il-sung. (The emphasis on the blood tie was far greater than had been the case when Kim Jong-il was put forth initially. Then, the propagandists' argument was that he just happened to be the most capable man for the job, regardless of his lineage.) The Nodong Shinmun Nodong Shinmun article then quoted an article, printed in an unnamed j.a.panese newspaper (perhaps one published by Chongryon), ent.i.tled, "The Korean Revolution Carried Out From the Son's Generation to the Grandson's Generation." It said, "Already a long time ago President Kim Il-sung expressed his determination to win the final victory of the Korean revolution by his son, if not by himself, or by his grandson, if not by his son. President Kim Il-sung reportedly expressed this determination at the secret camp on Mount Paektu in the spring of 1943." article then quoted an article, printed in an unnamed j.a.panese newspaper (perhaps one published by Chongryon), ent.i.tled, "The Korean Revolution Carried Out From the Son's Generation to the Grandson's Generation." It said, "Already a long time ago President Kim Il-sung expressed his determination to win the final victory of the Korean revolution by his son, if not by himself, or by his grandson, if not by his son. President Kim Il-sung reportedly expressed this determination at the secret camp on Mount Paektu in the spring of 1943."2 The appearance of the Nodong Shinmun Nodong Shinmun article indicated that Kim Jong-il had decided it was time for people to start thinking about his ultimate successor. Recall that it was shortly after Kim Il-sung turned sixty that he made his choice of Kim Jong-il known to high-level intimates. Kim Jong-il himself turned sixty on February 16, 2002. article indicated that Kim Jong-il had decided it was time for people to start thinking about his ultimate successor. Recall that it was shortly after Kim Il-sung turned sixty that he made his choice of Kim Jong-il known to high-level intimates. Kim Jong-il himself turned sixty on February 16, 2002.

In the normal scheme of things in a Confucian society, the eldest son would be expected to carry on the family enterprise. Younger sons are, essentially, spares. But having multiple wives traditionally has complicated matters. The ruler's favorite wife is in a good position to push the case of her own son.

In April 2001, j.a.panese public security authorities got word from a friendly foreign intelligence service that a person believed to be Kim Jong-nam, the eldest son of Kim Jong-il, would travel to Tokyo from Singapore on May 1. The pa.s.senger manifest of a j.a.pan Airlines flight from Singapore that day listed a man who was going by a Chinese-sounding name, Pang Xiong. With him were three traveling companions: two women and a four-year-old boy. Security officials at Tokyo's Narita Airport approached the four at the immigration desk and took the man into an Immigration Bureau room to question him. He refused to answer at first, but after an hour or so he told them, "I'm Kim Jong-il's son." He explained that the group just wanted to visit Tokyo Disneyland. The date of birth given on his forged Dominican Republic pa.s.sport, May 10, 1971, was Kim Jong-nam's birth date. The man said he had paid $2,000 each for the pa.s.sports. His had been stamped to record entries into j.a.pan the previous year. Questioning went on for several hours. At one point the man announced that he was hungry, peeled off a 10,000-yen note (worth around eighty dollars) from a wad of large U.S. and j.a.panese bills and asked that someone be sent out for food.

After spending the night at the airport, the travelers were transferred to a detention center for illegal immigrants. (The aliens who normally were confined in the center tended to be poor job-seekers from Southeast and South Asia.) Mean-while j.a.panese officials wrangled over whether to (a) arrest the man and question him at length while trying to confirm the ident.i.ties of all the group members, as the police and the Justice Ministry preferred, or (b) simply deport the group, which was the preference of the Foreign Ministry. Radio Moscow had quoted a denial by the North Korean emba.s.sy in Moscow that Kim Jong-il's son had traveled to j.a.pan with a forged pa.s.sport. Thus it was clear that prolonging the inquiry would irritate Pyongyang. Along with the boy, who was thought to be his son, the man stayed in the facility for male detainees and uncomplainingly ate the regular meals provided. Officials noted the detainee's "gentlemanly manner."

Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka, who wanted to avoid troubles with Pyongyang, won the argument on May 4 and the government decided to deport the group without charges. "Now that we have saved face for North Korea, there may be some positive reaction from the North," a government official told the newspaper Yomiuri. Yomiuri. The travelers then left the detention center for the airport and a flight to Beijing. The man who said he was Kim Jong-nam thanked immigration officials "for taking care of us." At various times during his detention he had spoken to his captors in j.a.panese and in English. The travelers then left the detention center for the airport and a flight to Beijing. The man who said he was Kim Jong-nam thanked immigration officials "for taking care of us." At various times during his detention he had spoken to his captors in j.a.panese and in English.3 Thanks to journalists' cameras at the airport, the world then got a good look at this possible heir to the North Korean throne. Not as unusual in his appearance as Kim Jong-il, he nevertheless showed in his round face and paunchy body a clear enough family resemblance. (A South Korean newspaper columnist observed that the man walked like Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung.4) There were several skin discolorations-perhaps moles or birthmarks-on his face. On his chin was a light stubble of beard, seen on enough other occasions to suggest that this was intended as a fashion statement. He wore his hair in a crew cut. His spectacles were the oblong metal-framed granny gla.s.ses favored by hip young Asians. He was dressed as a tourist, in a black knit shirt under a brown, quilted vest. He wore a gold neck chain and a gold wrist-watch.

As for the man's retinue, the child wore jeans; new, white sneakers; and a red, white and blue jacket. (Those were the colors of the North Korean flag.) One of the women, a bit chubby and with a slight double chin, was holding the boy's hand and seemed to be in charge of him. Her beige leather bag and high-heeled shoes matched and they looked expensive. The other woman was sleeker and wore sungla.s.ses. Her shiny black bag was large enough to hold business papers.

An immigration official testifying later before a j.a.panese parliamentary committee identified the matronly looking woman as Kim Jong-nam's wife, Shin Jong-hui, reportedly a daughter of the president of the North Korean airline, Air Koryo. The official identified the slimmer woman as Yi Kyong-hui, one of Shin's relatives. News reports said the bags both women carried were of the Louis Vuitton brand while the man's watch was a diamond-studded Rolex.5 Kim Jong-nam's mother was Song Hye-rim, an actress who had made her screen debut in Border Village. Border Village.6 Kim Jong-il met her in the 1960s, after he started hanging around at the studios, and began living with her. Besides being several years older than Kim Jong-il, Song was already married to another man and had a young daughter. After a divorce, Kim had the husband sent abroad to work. "From what I heard, my aunt was disappointed in her marriage and was quite taken by Kim Jong-il," her nephew, Li Il-nam, wrote decades later. Kim Jong-il met her in the 1960s, after he started hanging around at the studios, and began living with her. Besides being several years older than Kim Jong-il, Song was already married to another man and had a young daughter. After a divorce, Kim had the husband sent abroad to work. "From what I heard, my aunt was disappointed in her marriage and was quite taken by Kim Jong-il," her nephew, Li Il-nam, wrote decades later.

Kim Il-sung had hidden his own extramarital affairs while publicly espousing conventional family values. Kim Jong-il, according to Song's nephew's account, worried about the Great Leader's reaction to the potentially scandalous situation he had gotten himself into. But the young father seems to have welcomed paternity. One story has it that he was so excited to learn that the new baby was a son that he honked his car horn to awaken everyone in the hospital.7 Li told of several instances that suggested Kim Jong-il was a doting father. Once when the child was two or three and dining with his father, he asked, "Papa, is it good?" "Of course," Kim Jong-il replied. "Everything tastes good when you are around." Li told of several instances that suggested Kim Jong-il was a doting father. Once when the child was two or three and dining with his father, he asked, "Papa, is it good?" "Of course," Kim Jong-il replied. "Everything tastes good when you are around."

Kim kept Song Hye-rim and little Jong-nam with him in a palatial mansion, the No. 15 Residence, which was staffed by around 100 servants and 500 bodyguards. (Eight cooks worked there. One had been trained in j.a.pan and specialized in sukiyaki, a favorite of Kim's.) Song Hye-rim's mother; her widowed sister, Song Hye-rang; and the sister's two children, the boy Li Il-nam and a girl, Li Nam-ok, came and went in the household for varying periods. Song Hye-rang and her children all later left North Korea and gave public accounts of their lives in the palace.8 At home, Kim referred to Song Hye-rim as yobo, yobo, "wife, according to her sister, while to others he introduced her in the Korean way as "my son's mother." But around 1973, while living with Song Hye-rim and their son Jong-nam, Kim Jong-il got involved with Kim Yong-suk, who would become his recognized wife. (Sister Song Hye-rang has argued that it is a mistake to refer to Hye-rim as a mistress: "Outsiders say Kim Yong-suk is the lawful wife, but it has no other meaning than that she was acknowledged by President Kim Il-sung.") "wife, according to her sister, while to others he introduced her in the Korean way as "my son's mother." But around 1973, while living with Song Hye-rim and their son Jong-nam, Kim Jong-il got involved with Kim Yong-suk, who would become his recognized wife. (Sister Song Hye-rang has argued that it is a mistake to refer to Hye-rim as a mistress: "Outsiders say Kim Yong-suk is the lawful wife, but it has no other meaning than that she was acknowledged by President Kim Il-sung.") Kim Jong-il deputized his sister to break the news to Song that she would never be able to become his recognized wife and must leave the No. 15 Residence, according to Li Il-nam's account. The sister, Kim Kyong-hui, would take care of Jong-nam, she told the boy's mother, while Song herself would be provided for throughout her life. Song was terrified that she was about to have her son taken from her, so she ran away with the boy. But the two were soon found and brought back to No. 15.

Having grown up motherless, Kim Jong-il was moved by Song's determination not to leave the child, the nephew related. Kim, whom Li described as "a cultured person and a thinker," also retained an intellectual bond with the former actress. He reserved mansion number 15 as the home of that family. (Kim had other mansions, of course, and around 1982 he built one designated No. 55 as his new official residence.) But during the decades that remained to her Song was to be hospitalized in Moscow for long periods, treated for ailments that reportedly included depression, nervous exhaustion, diabetes and hypertension.9 Whatever health problems were involved in her move, high-ranking defector Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop alleged that there was another factor: Kim Jong-il exiled her in an effort to stifle gossip within North Korea about their relationship. "Naturally, rumors started spreading among the North Korean students studying in the USSR," Hw.a.n.g wrote. "Kim Jong-il ordered the security commander of the People's Army to punish the gossipers. The commander interrogated the North Korean students living in Moscow, and executed all the students who simply replied that they knew that Song Hye-rim was living in Moscow." Whatever health problems were involved in her move, high-ranking defector Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop alleged that there was another factor: Kim Jong-il exiled her in an effort to stifle gossip within North Korea about their relationship. "Naturally, rumors started spreading among the North Korean students studying in the USSR," Hw.a.n.g wrote. "Kim Jong-il ordered the security commander of the People's Army to punish the gossipers. The commander interrogated the North Korean students living in Moscow, and executed all the students who simply replied that they knew that Song Hye-rim was living in Moscow."10 Like-wise because of concern about gossip, Kim Jong-nam as a boy was isolated in the No. 15 Residence, lacking the relationships with playmates his own age that even his father had known. In partial compensation Kim Jong-il appeared at No. 15 for supper three times a week, emerging as if by magic from a tunnel that connected the residence to his office. When he slept in the mansion, after working late, he liked to creep into his little son's bed. Kim Jong-il pampered the boy as Kim Il-sung had pampered him. Even after Li had become a student in Moscow, he had to return to Pyongyang each May to join in the annual grand celebration of the new little prince's birthday. At No. 15 Residence Jong-nam had a playroom full of electronic game machines. On his birthday aides packed the playroom with clothes, shoes, diamond-studded wrist-watches, model guns and other foreign-made goods. "They had a special team to purchase birthday goods for Jong-nam," Li wrote. Li had a toothache once. The dentist had run out of the gold needed for a top-quality filling. When Jong-nam learned of that he opened his safe and handed his older cousin a 10-kilogram gold bar, telling him to use some of it for his dental work. The safe also contained wads of U.S. bills, Li said.11 Apparently the boy was denied nothing. Once when he suffered a toothache of his own, he defiantly said that his price for going to the dentist would be a car as big as his father's. Soon "a dark blue Cadillac was delivered to No. 15," according to Li. "I used to spend a lot of time with Jong-nam on my summer vacations. We would ride in the Cadillac when we went along on inspection tours." Jong-nam was permitted to read South Korean books and watch both South Korean and j.a.panese television. When he was eight, the boy took a liking to one South Korean comedian and ordered the mansion retainers to bring the entertainer to him. Fortunately they did not kidnap the comedian. Instead they searched until they found a North Korean farmer who looked just like him and had the farmer trained in comic routines before presenting him to Jong-nam. The impersonation worked briefly but Jong-nam soon saw through it. "I know this is fake," he said, leaving for his room.12 In 1979, the year Jong-nam turned eight, his thirteen-year-old female cousin Li Nam-ok moved into No. 15 Residence to become the boy's full-time playmate and Kim Jong-il's "adopted daughter." In a 1998 interview with the prestigious j.a.panese monthly Bungei Shunju Bungei Shunju she offered further details on life in the household, beyond those provided by her older brother Il-nam. (The brother had been only a visitor in the palace. He was usually away- first at a North Korean boarding school and eventually in Moscow, where he continued his studies while living with his ailing aunt Song Hye-rim.) "We did not use dollar bills for wallpaper, but we did have a very comfortable life," Li Nam-ok said. "Kim Jong-il was a man who loved a comfortable life." she offered further details on life in the household, beyond those provided by her older brother Il-nam. (The brother had been only a visitor in the palace. He was usually away- first at a North Korean boarding school and eventually in Moscow, where he continued his studies while living with his ailing aunt Song Hye-rim.) "We did not use dollar bills for wallpaper, but we did have a very comfortable life," Li Nam-ok said. "Kim Jong-il was a man who loved a comfortable life."

Nam-ok's mother and grandmother, who were Jong-nam's aunt and grandmother, also moved in. The boy's aunt became his teacher. The grandmother looked after him for a while, but as he grew older and livelier it was hard for her to keep up. "After that I was by him all the time," Nam-ok said.

Otherwise, Jong-nam's isolation continued. "We sometimes went around the city in a chauffeur-driven Benz, but we were not allowed to get out of the car," she said. "Attendants always came with us when we went outside." Still, she thought her cousin had some idea of the reality of the common people's lives. "We could make guesses by looking at people from a moving car. Besides, there were employees at the official residence and we could hear stories from them. Jong-nam was a very curious person. My view is that he knows a lot."

Kim Jong-nam "has a good mind and sense of humor," Nam-ok said. "He is very energetic. He is a permanent optimist and a pleasant young man who can laugh all day long from morning to evening. He also has an artistic sense like his father's." Jong-nam, she added, "was a very early riser and led a well-regulated life. He always found something to do. He liked to draw pictures when young. He watched movies and read many books." Like his father, Jong-nam loved watching movies and videos for days on end. He "was very much interested in taking videos, too."

When her interviewers asked how the boy had reacted to being isolated in the palace, Nam-ok said he had accepted the situation "because that was what his father had decided for him. He was totally submissive to his father and never criticized-what Kim Jong-il decided for him." Jong-nam's mother, her aunt, "was p.r.o.ne to sickness and was often away from home in Moscow for medical treatments. But Kim Jong-il poured his very deep love into his son in childhood, so I don't think the child felt lonely. His mother's absence was covered up by his father's presence. Besides, he did get to see his mother on a regular basis." Kim Jong-il occasionally shouted at the children when they disobeyed but he always had a reason for raising his voice and he never used violence at home.

Kim Jong-il encouraged his son's play with toy battleships and guns- all North Korean boys were expected to be militaristic in their play. He even gave the boy a real pistol at one point, instructing him to keep it locked up in his safe when he was not training with it. Jong-nam became "a sharpshooter," according to his cousin. Kim Jong-il encouraged the children to exercise so that they could grow taller. "He was very proud of his son, who is tall," Nam-ok said.13 Kim Jong-il did have other family responsibilities elsewhere, even beyond the official family he had established with Kim Yong-suk, with whom he had a daughter. He got involved with a woman named Ko Yong-hui and in 1981 she gave birth to a son, Kim Jong-chol. The Dear Leader and Ko set up yet another mansion household. Jealous members of the Song family took to calling Papa's new favorite "Hammer Nose."14 Coincidentally or not, it was around then that Kim Jong-nam was sent abroad for schooling. In 1980 he briefly tried one Soviet school but complained that the toilets were too dirty. Thereafter, he alternately attended Swiss and Soviet schools. For a while the boy posed as the son of the North Korean amba.s.sador to Switzerland. Already good at mathematics, he eventually became fluent in French, English and Russian. Accompanying him were his cousin Nam-ok and her mother. His mother generally was with them when they lived in Moscow and Geneva. They lived comfortably in villas in those cities and Song Hye-rim was able to save substantial sums out of what Kim Jong-il gave her. The youngsters habitually returned to Pyongyang during school vacations.15 The children were exposed to non-North Korean news media-in Geneva, to Western media-and what they saw by no means always agreed with Pyongyang's official version of events. However, Nam-ok said, "when there were contradictions between what he had been told in Pyongyang and what he learned in Geneva, Jong-nam wanted to believe in what he had been told in his country because he was loyal to his father and to the Motherland. When something happened and North Korea was blamed for it, North Korea always denied the accusation, and he believed what North Korea said."16 Kim Jong-nam saw little of his grandfather in person as he was growing up. According to some a.n.a.lysts, this was because of the Great Leader's disapproval-or feeling that he should disapprove-of the illicit relationship in which the boy had been conceived. Li Nam-ok said she did not know Kim Il-sung's thinking, having met him only once as a little girl when she was chosen to present flowers to him. For whatever reason, she said, the youngster saw his grandfather "not at all." She suggested that the decision was more Kim Jong-il's than Kim Il-sung's: "Probably Kim Jong-il did not want to show his private life to his father."17 According to Nam-ok's older brother, Il-nam, Kim Jong-il found an opportunity to clear up the question of his first son's pedigree. Kim Il-sung had fathered a boy with his young nurse and turned to Jong-il to advise on how to handle the potentially messy situation. Kim Jong-il arranged for his newborn half-brother, who was named Hyon, to be registered as the son of one of the siblings of Chang Song-taek, Jong-il's brother-in-law and confidant. That instance of male bonding between first and second generations boded well for the status of the third. When told of Kim Jong-nam's existence the Great Leader, according to Li Il-nam, "was angry at first, but he could not be harsh" in view of his own situation. Kim Il-sung, meeting Kim Jong-nam for the first time when the boy was a chubby and jolly four-year-old, "immediately liked him and gave him the name Jong-nam." He recognized the child as his first grandson, although he never acknowledged the boy's mother as his daughter-in-law.18 * * *

After he left school in Switzerland and returned to Pyongyang, Kim Jong-nam-a young man by then-still found himself isolated in his home, tightly restricted as to when he could leave the house and where he could go.

Cousin Li Nam-ok defected to Europe in 1992 "to live my own life." In her interview with Bungei Shunju, Bungei Shunju, the j.a.panese magazine, she told of an incident that occurred shortly before her defection in which Kim Jong-il cut off the food supplies to their mansion, because she and Jong-nam had gone out without permission. Kim Jong-il was so strict because, she explained, he "wanted to keep his private life hidden from the eyes of the public." The Dear Leader "did not like other people to talk about him and make him a target of gossip or rumor," she said. "He did not want people to know that he lived with my aunt or that he had a child from her. He did not like to draw attention." the j.a.panese magazine, she told of an incident that occurred shortly before her defection in which Kim Jong-il cut off the food supplies to their mansion, because she and Jong-nam had gone out without permission. Kim Jong-il was so strict because, she explained, he "wanted to keep his private life hidden from the eyes of the public." The Dear Leader "did not like other people to talk about him and make him a target of gossip or rumor," she said. "He did not want people to know that he lived with my aunt or that he had a child from her. He did not like to draw attention."

She seemed to hint that there might be some truth in reports that the young man at that stage in his life was undisciplined, and that Kim Jong-il was trying to rein in his son's h.e.l.l-raising. "No doubt there was a change in his att.i.tude toward his son," she said. But she put it in the context of East Asian child-rearing practices, in which children typically find their parents catering to their every whim or tantrum-and then reach an age at which suddenly they are expected to learn to live by society's rules. "Jong-nam being no longer a six-year-old kid, Kim Jong-il decided he should deal more strictly with, and demand more of, his son. In that sense his att.i.tude did change, but I do not think that meant he did not love his son anymore." If her a.n.a.lysis was correct, note that Jong-nam by the time Kim Jong-il cracked down on him was already around twenty. The more usual age to undergo such a forced transformation would be five or six.19 Defector Kang Myong-do, son-in-law of a prime minister, said that Kim Jong-nam during his early manhood, like his father before him, had become known for showing too much of a liking for cars, nightlife and women. Kang told the South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo JoongAng Ilbo that in 1993 a rumor went around among the Pyongyang elite that Jong-nam had grabbed his bodyguard's gun and pointed it at another man with whom he was quarreling publicly over a woman. that in 1993 a rumor went around among the Pyongyang elite that Jong-nam had grabbed his bodyguard's gun and pointed it at another man with whom he was quarreling publicly over a woman.20 I heard from Oh Young-nam, a former captain in State Security, what Oh described as his own eye-witness account of not only one but two such incidents. Oh's family home was across the street from Pyongyang's Koryo Hotel, he said. Lesser beings outside the young prince's circle who used the Koryo Hotel coffee shop "had to bow to Kim Jong-nam and leave the shop" whenever he entered. "We did not like the extravagant way that Kim Jong-nam lived," Oh told me. "I know Kim Jong-nam. He is younger than I am. Kim Jong-nam wears a military-style uniform even though he was not in any part of the service. He just dresses like that. On his shoulder flaps he wears four stars, suggesting he's head of the joint chiefs. He goes around flaunting his power, saying he'll be the next after Kim Jong-il. I didn't like the way Kim Jong-il ran the country but I couldn't imagine Kim Jong-nam taking over.

"He's violent. On April 26, 1993, the day after the anniversary of the establishment of the Korean People's Army Kim Jong-nam drank heavily went to the Koryo Hotel and shot the place up. A cabbie had parked in Kim Jong-nam's special parking place. King Jong-nam drove up in his car- license number 216822-and parked just behind the taxi." (Having been a traffic policeman, Oh had no difficulty remembering and spotting high officials' cars.) "Then he went in and shot up the ceiling of the lobby. After that he found the driver and kicked him in the shin." Oh witnessed the incident because, he said, "I walked across from my house to take a taxi, and that was when Kim Jong-nam roared up and started shooting."

On the second occasion, "around June of 1994 Kim Jong-nam went to the disco and started shooting. That night, I was there at the nightclub. Actually I was with Kang Myong-do's nephew. The manager of the nightclub was formerly part of the bodyguard service. I believe Kim Jong-nam and the manager had a relationship. Kim Jong-nam came in and shouted for everyone to leave. People like me did not leave so fast-I was irritated at this younger guy making such a demand. Kim Jong-nam is very rash, very impudent. Out of frustration, he started shooting.

"Kim Jong-nam continued to visit the coffee shop at the Koryo every day. Then he would go to the forty-fourth-floor restaurant of the hotel. Choe Yong-lim, who fought with Kim Jong-nam in the nightclub incident, is in prison now."

Oh's wife worked at the cashier's counter in the Koryo coffee shop, he told me. "One tower of the Koryo is for guests, the other for bodyguards. Kim Jong-il comes through the back door, the bodyguards' private entrance. The sixteenth floor in the right tower is exclusively for Kim Jong-il. Among Kim Jong-il's other children, his daughter also came often to the Koryo. She drove herself and didn't make a fuss."

Li Nam-ok said she never saw any explicit sign that Kim Jong-il planned for Kim Jong-nam to inherit his power. "Of course Jong-nam is Jong-il's eldest son, and it is always the oldest son who succeeds to the house," she told Bungei Shunju. Bungei Shunju. Thus Jong-nam was educated "to have self-awareness and sense of responsibility as the oldest son. But I cannot think preparations were being made for a transfer of power. Even if Kim Jong-il was warming up that thinking in his heart, he never would have revealed that to anyone else. I personally have great doubts he had that thinking." Thus Jong-nam was educated "to have self-awareness and sense of responsibility as the oldest son. But I cannot think preparations were being made for a transfer of power. Even if Kim Jong-il was warming up that thinking in his heart, he never would have revealed that to anyone else. I personally have great doubts he had that thinking."

Indeed, it seemed logical from what we knew of Kim Jong-il that he would not have made any overt moves to position his son or anyone else as his successor as long as Kim Il-sung remained alive. After all, a period of testing as his own father's successor remained before he could consider his consolidation of power totally successful. The image of the selfless, absolutely filial son that he projected before and after Kim Il-sung's death was subject to being tarnished if too many secrets of his private life became widely known. Such considerations might help to explain why he was determined to keep Jong-nam under wraps, at least for the time being.

And then there was the fact that Kim Jong-nam's family background left something to be desired. Aside from the scandalous aspects of his parents' original liaison, relatives on the maternal side had developed the intensely disloyal habit of defecting. The first to jump was male cousin Li Il-nam, who disappeared in 1982 while in Switzerland. Although the fact escaped public notice, he defected through the South Korean emba.s.sy there and moved to South Korea. There he underwent plastic surgery and changed his name. Over the succeeding years he told the authorities much of what he knew about Kim Jong-il and his household.

In 1992 Li Nam-ok, tired of being locked up in the fenced mansion compound with her cousin, made her own break, to Europe. "I'd wanted to study," she explained later. "But there was no way to learn or to work in North Korea. I'd just wanted to choose my own life."21 For several years before then, Kim Jong-nam had not even visited his mother in Moscow. There was suspicion among his relatives that Kim Jong-il had intensified his son's confinement out of fear the young man also would defect. For several years before then, Kim Jong-nam had not even visited his mother in Moscow. There was suspicion among his relatives that Kim Jong-il had intensified his son's confinement out of fear the young man also would defect.22 The Seoul authorities found Li Il-nam a good job with a broadcasting organization but he gave it up to go into business. The business failed. Adjudged a bankrupt, he served ten months in prison.23 In his effort to start again, Li Il-nam needed money. Having spoken not a word to his mother in ten years, he phoned her in Moscow and encouraged her to defect and publish a tell-all memoir. For her the notion was by no means out of the question. She had grown tired of the surveillance to which her family was subjected, even in Moscow. Il-nam taped his phone conversations with her, perhaps hoping to use what she told him in his own attempt to make money by showing himself once again as someone who possessed fresh and valuable information about North Korea. In his effort to start again, Li Il-nam needed money. Having spoken not a word to his mother in ten years, he phoned her in Moscow and encouraged her to defect and publish a tell-all memoir. For her the notion was by no means out of the question. She had grown tired of the surveillance to which her family was subjected, even in Moscow. Il-nam taped his phone conversations with her, perhaps hoping to use what she told him in his own attempt to make money by showing himself once again as someone who possessed fresh and valuable information about North Korea.24 Li's mother, Kim Jong-nam's aunt Song Hye-rang, did defect to an undisclosed country in the West. Out of the surviving members of the Song family only Kim Jong-nam and his mother, Song Hye-rim, did not not defect. (The grandmother had died and been buried in North Korea.) Although a flurry of press dispatches at the time her sister defected claimed that Hye-rim had gone with Hye-rang, in fact she continued to live in Moscow until she died in May 2002. Her niece explained that the former movie star had stayed put out of consideration for the future of her son, Kim Jong-nam. defect. (The grandmother had died a