Instead, the number of North Korean workers in Siberia peaked at around 15,000 and then approximately 90 percent were sent home when Russia experienced a financial crisis in 1998. In April 2002, during a period when Pyongyang was focused on reinvigorating its economy, its national airline inst.i.tuted twice-weekly service between Pyongyang and Khabarovsk. North Korean Prime Minister Jo Chang-dok, on a trip that month to promote economic exchange, asked the Russians to accept at least ten thousand laborers. The request was denied.2

TWENTY-THREE.

Do You Remember That Time?

If any North Korean's story ought to be made into a sequel to Joseph h.e.l.ler's novel Catch-22, Catch-22, that might be Pak Su-hyon's. Pak was born on October 28, 1966, in Kyongsong, North Hamgyong Province, the son of a disabled father who was on welfare and a factory-worker mother. Considered to have a relatively "good" family background in the North Korean context, he grew up getting his ticket punched in all the right places for a young man eager to rise in station. He was a member of the leaders' bodyguard service-a super-loyal military unit, so large that Pak never personally encountered Kim Il-sung. Studying at a medical college in the east coast port city of Chongjin, Pak by the early 1990s was hungry like most other people but at least could look forward to a good career. But then his brother was caught stealing food. On the North Korean principle that the misdeeds of an individual call into question the loyalty of his whole family, Pak was forced out of college and reduced to working in the electrical factory that employed his mother. that might be Pak Su-hyon's. Pak was born on October 28, 1966, in Kyongsong, North Hamgyong Province, the son of a disabled father who was on welfare and a factory-worker mother. Considered to have a relatively "good" family background in the North Korean context, he grew up getting his ticket punched in all the right places for a young man eager to rise in station. He was a member of the leaders' bodyguard service-a super-loyal military unit, so large that Pak never personally encountered Kim Il-sung. Studying at a medical college in the east coast port city of Chongjin, Pak by the early 1990s was hungry like most other people but at least could look forward to a good career. But then his brother was caught stealing food. On the North Korean principle that the misdeeds of an individual call into question the loyalty of his whole family, Pak was forced out of college and reduced to working in the electrical factory that employed his mother.

Disillusioned, he defected to South Korea in 1993. When I met him on February 7, 1994, I encountered a pa.s.sionate and humorous man who was preparing to resume studies of traditional herbal medicine, which he had begun in the North. His stature was small; his face, pointed. The word "elfin" came to my mind. Wearing a generously cut new suit with wide lapels, grinning a survivor's "wry grin as he related some of the worst of his misfortunes, Pak listened intently to my questions and took his own notes on them before he replied to each. Here is his story, pieced together from his answers: The biggest problem now is the food shortage. There isn't enough food for the people. How can they have food for cattle and other livestock? That's why you didn't see any during your 1992 visit.

Until the 1970s it was all right. From 1976 to 1979 the food shortages started. Those shortages were even worse than the ones of the early 1990s. They cut the rice ration in half. We speculated it was due to lack of supplies donated by the Russians. Or it was used for something else instead of being distributed to the people. But in the 1976 to 1979 period, people still had hope. North Koreans believed very strongly in the ideology of Kim Il-sung. And from 1979 the government did resume supplying all the rations. Also from that year some people plowed their own land. That was the "privatization" movement.

Things did improve around the end of 1979. But in 1984 the government sent rice to South Korean flood victims. That caused a great shortage at home. Certain amounts of grain had been provided regularly to each household, but from that point supplies became irregular. When the 1989 youth festival came we worked up some hope because there were lots of food supplies for that one week of festivities-although, of course, the rural areas were not as favored as Pyongyang.

Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il said we would concentrate on improving agriculture and put factory workers into the fields. People believed in those intentions, but by 1992 we felt it was only words and had given up hope. Now people realize it's not going to get better. It's going to get worse year by year.

In the distribution of food grains to each household, they started subst.i.tuting all kinds of grain and even flour for rice. Sometimes the supplies didn't get through. From January to March you would get the food supply. Then for a long time they wouldn't give you any. Then later, in July, they would give you imported grain. Again, with the harvest, they would resume the supply. From March to July people would borrow food. In July they'd have to pay it back with the rations they got then, so they would have little left to eat. After coming to Seoul I saw a South Korean doc.u.mentary of the Korean War period. It was called, "Do you remember that time?" But in North Korea conditions were that same way again, forty years after the war.

Even when food was distributed, sometimes there wasn't enough for everyone in the village or neighborhood, so you would have to be on your guard to make sure your family would get its rations. They wouldn't give advance notice of when the distribution would be held, so little kids were a.s.signed to watch. If those children saw someone getting food supplies they would run home and shout, "It's time!" Previously, people had thought it was shameful for a man to line up for rice-that was women's work. That changed. It had become like a war. Lots of people would sleep in front of the distribution center waiting for the time.

In our family there are four brothers. I'm the second. The brother who got caught stealing food is the third brother. All of us were in the military. No family has sacrificed more. My third brother entered the service in 1989. He was maltreated in the military and caught pneumonia, so he was mustered out in the spring of 1991 and sent home. When he got home there was nothing to eat in the house.

Earlier, this had been a problem that everyone shared, which made it somehow more tolerable. But some people had become wealthy-they might have relatives in Yanbian, China, or in j.a.pan, who would help them out. My brother couldn't stand it, so in May of 1992 he went to the storeroom of a wealthy family who had relatives in Yanbian, and he stole grain. South Koreans are horrified by the thought of a thief. But in North Korea, two out of three people have stolen. The fields are collectivized. At harvest time people sneak in and poach food. It's the government's property, so they figure who ever gets there first gets the food. There are military guards, and lots of people are shot dead when they try that. If you're not shot, for stealing one handful of grain you can go to prison for maybe two or three years. Or you might go to a camp for unpaid labor in the fields for six months or so. North Koreans used to think field work was the lowest. A factory worker caught stealing food and sent to the fields thought he'd gotten the worst punishment. In 1991, Kim Jongil de creed that anyone stealing food would be sent to do farming. But the thing is, now people want want to go. to go.

I've stolen food many times. It would be hard to find a university student or soldier who had not stolen. Both men and women steal food. In the collective fields the managers would display posters saying, "This field is my field." The poster was supposed to encourage the farmers to work harder. But I took it to mean that this collective field was my my field. Even after four months in South Korea I have to be careful about what I eat because I've got stomach ulcers, like 80 to 90 percent of the North Korean population. The digestive juices flow, and there's no food in your stomach, so the juices eat through the wall of your stomach. Ulcers aren't even considered an illness, since everybody has them. field. Even after four months in South Korea I have to be careful about what I eat because I've got stomach ulcers, like 80 to 90 percent of the North Korean population. The digestive juices flow, and there's no food in your stomach, so the juices eat through the wall of your stomach. Ulcers aren't even considered an illness, since everybody has them.

Even though I had to steal food, I didn't question the ideology. The education system makes you think of politics and real life as two separate matters. So I thought that, even though life was hard, our ideology was sound.

I was in Chongjin Medical School studying traditional herbal medicine. I had studied almost four years when, in July of 1992, my brother was caught and sent to prison. The family whose grain was stolen asked me to replace the stolen grain. I replied: "My brother is in prison. How can you ask me for the grain?" We had a brawl and they said, "How can such a person as this be a university student?" They tattled to the authorities and I was expelled from med school. That was the time when communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was collapsing. Universities were enforcing strict discipline. Kim Jong-il said, "Now's the time for action. Punish the ones who should be punished." When I was expelled in 1993, about twelve others were expelled at the same time.

In your later career, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il would judge you according to three qualifications: Had you been a party member? A university graduate? In bodyguard service? I was a party member. After bodyguard service I was on the way to earning my university degree. So I had figured my life would be great. But getting expelled from the university ended my dreams. That's why I defected. At the time when I was joining the bodyguard service, Kim Il-sung had warned, "Trust is everything. Don't betray us and we won't betray you-but if you ever become a traitor then we want you out of our sight."

I had kept my part of the bargain. I didn't have big doubts while I was in the bodyguard service. And in university all they talk about is the continuance of socialism. I agreed that socialism was the only ideology for our country. My major doubts came only when I was expelled.

The authorities said I could come back and try to be readmitted the following year. But they knew I had no way of leading my life after my expulsion. Generally if you are expelled from university they send you to the mines. I didn't do anything for two months, then went to a factory. A high official helped me avoid being sent to the mines. During those two months' rest before going to the factory, I thought a lot and realized that ideology is irrelevant to the lives of ordinary people. What's important is the people's lives. As long as life is good, any regime is all right. I turned my back on the regime in an instant.

Most people's opinions of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il haven't changed. Most ordinary people don't know about the extravagant lives of those two, or about their faults. They blame high officials under the Kims for their problems. They believe Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are ?well-intentioned but that high officials working under them don't carry out their policies properly. But those high officials do know all the faults of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. I've talked to some officials. While ordinary people blame them, high officials blame Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.

But you have to be very careful about saying anything critical, even to someone you consider your close friend. No one can say anything about the Kim family dynasty for example. One word equals prison. Oh, people who knew each other well might remark that Kim Il-sung's regime was more totalitarian than Hitler's-but being more totalitarian than Hitler wouldn't be considered necessarily a bad thing. People like one-party rule. Kim Il-sung explained that European socialist countries fell because of the multi-party system.

I had one friend with whom I was especially close. We had known each other for a very long time, and our families also knew each other well. Our fathers worked together. My friend was also expelled, from Pyongyang University in 1993 because of family background. He had come home in hopes of defecting to South Korea. We were able to open up to each other after getting drunk. In bantering fashion one of us said, "Let's go to South Korea." We realized we meant it. We didn't tell our families or even our girlfriends.

At first we planned very secretly to go via China on September 15, 1993, but we didn't have the money so we decided to wait. I sold some things-antique porcelains-to a Chinese trader who came to North Korea, and then we had the money. We crossed the border into China October 1. There are lots of military guards at the border, so it's very difficult to get across. We bribed a guard, saying we would just go across and return the same day. For that we spent 4,000 won, won, enough for one TV set on the black market. It's about four years' salary for a university graduate. enough for one TV set on the black market. It's about four years' salary for a university graduate.

Even after we crossed the border to Yanbian in China it still wasn't easy. We visited friends and relatives but couldn't tell them our real plan. We told them we would be going back to North Korea. A relative gave us some money and we went to Tianjin port in China, where we stowed away on a ship that people said was going to Inchon in South Korea. A crewman found us but sympathized and hid us again. We showed ourselves when the ship was in sight of Inchon.

There was a lot to surprise me about South Korea. In North Korea I had read about South Korea's world-record accident rate and had felt critical of the South Koreans, considering them disorderly and violent. At the time I couldn't imagine a place with so many cars, or I would have understood. I was shocked to see such huge numbers of South Koreanmade cars on the streets. And I was actually impressed with the traffic order compared with the chaos of China, where cars drive wherever the drivers want.

I like Seoul. I had not imagined it would have all these high-rise buildings. I'm surprised there is a place like this in the world. I'm very fortunate to realize before I die that there is a place like this. I'm sorry for North Koreans who will die without learning about such a life.

I first looked at people's shoes, because in North Korea shoes are often stolen. South Koreans are much taller than North Koreans. And I noticed that compared with North Koreans, South Koreans are heavy. They have more meat on them, look like they have drunk a lot of milk. If there's a war between North and South, the North Koreans don't have a chance, physically. South Koreans have nice complexions. In North Korea it's very hard to find a beer belly, but here everybody's stomach is bulging out.

I was shocked, also, at the reaction of South Koreans to foreigners. In North Korea everybody looks up to foreigners. In Seoul they don't pay that much attention.

I saw a sign after I arrived in South Korea that said, "Love Your Neighbor as Yourself." I was astonished to think that South Koreans had the concept of love.

When foreigners visit, North Koreans have to pretend that their stomachs are full and that they lead wonderful lives. Pamphlets instruct people how to behave in front of foreigners. In fact, even during 197679, despite the food shortages, I believed that North Korea was better off than the South. But as the years went by, South Korea became a very prominent country while North Korea declined. Now, except for really uneducated people, most people know that South Korea is a much more powerful country in world politics. They're very distressed by the knowledge.

I was in Kim Il-sung's bodyguard service from May 1982 to August 1989. To be a bodyguard, you don't volunteer. You have to be selected. Fortunately my family background was very stable. At the time, I felt delighted. It was a great honor.

One forbidden thing I was able to get away with as a bodyguard was listening to radio stations other than the official one. Starting in the 1990s lots of radios got into North Korea from China. You could buy them in the dollar stores. Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung also give radios as presents. When you bought one, the government person would fix it so that only one frequency could be listened to. But high officials, national security and military people, can get radios without such blockage, both short-wave and regular AM-FM radios. As for a radio stuck on one frequency, of course you can reverse that. However, they check it periodically. If they find you've altered it, they'll take it away. A lot of people alter their radios, listen, then change them back before the next inspection.

Listening to KBS from Seoul, it struck me that while North Korea's broadcasts would often criticize South Korean President Kim Young-sam, the South Korean broadcasts didn't say much at all about Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. Nothing bad was said. Once, though, I did hear some criticism. A broadcast quoted a French reporter as saying Kim Il-sung had put a lot of political offenders into prison. I was very surprised. Of course, I knew about that. But how did people in France know so much about North Korea?

Real change started-with the 1989 youth festival. During 1989 a lot of foreigners came into North Korea. We heard about that. And lots of music ca.s.sette tapes were brought in [from the ethnic Korean region of] Yanbian in China. Foreigners brought their culture. That aroused curiosity. The regime loosened up a little. When Kim Il-sung realized that people were getting a bit free, he put the lid back on. That aroused more curiosity: Why were we being suppressed?

I'll tell you about an incident at Kim Il-sung University. Some sons of high officials were having parties, playing jupae, jupae, a Korean card game. They also danced the disco style they had learned from watching the foreigners during the youth festival. Besides dancing and drinking, they got naked with women and a Korean card game. They also danced the disco style they had learned from watching the foreigners during the youth festival. Besides dancing and drinking, they got naked with women and played jupae played jupae on their naked stomachs. When Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il heard of it, they kicked them out of the university. on their naked stomachs. When Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il heard of it, they kicked them out of the university.

In the old days people used to shout "Long live Kim Il-sung!" But after hearing this disco music, people would shake their hips. Not only in Pyongyang but in other places as well, people were getting wild. In the late 1980s, a song called "Huiparam," meaning "Whistle," came out. It was the kind of song that made people want to move their bodies. But the government suppressed the original song and changed the rhythm before re-releasing it.

You wonder how news and pop culture got all the way out to North Hamgyong Province? Most North Koreans don't rely on broadcasts. Instead, news spreads very quickly via the grapevine. Whenever officials weren't around, everyone danced, and even sang South Korean songs. I did, too.

The slogan about university life was the same as in the 1960s: If you're cold and hungry, you study more because your mind is clear. Meals were rice and soy sauce or beancurd. The soup was saltless, tasteless. There was no heating. Actually there wasn't enough time for study. We had to do our labor, in the fields and elsewhere. Most students study their major subject plus Kim Il-sung ideology. You would be expelled if you didn't do well in ideology. I used to give speeches in the university about how great the Great Leader was. I was a member of the Propaganda Club. But I used to read novels and study English surrept.i.tiously during the Kim Il-sung ideology cla.s.s. If I got caught, they would accuse me, saying: "Your ideology is wrong." There are special spies-I don't know how many. Party secretaries act as their controllers. We don't know which people are spies, so we can't really trust each other.

I think North Korean university graduates would cope all right with reunification. Students in North Korea don't really have aspirations while they're in the university because, even if they study very hard, the government decides where to a.s.sign them. When students return from abroad, I hear they get two months of re-indoctrination. And wherever they go, someone is with them, so they can't talk. And they've signed contracts saying they will not talk about what they saw overseas. Still, it gets around.

Things will be worse for my family now, but even if I had stayed in North Korea I couldn't have been much help to the family. I have a new vision now. I'm waiting for reunification and then I think I'll be of more help to my family. But I believe the regime will not collapse without outside influence, such as the flow of foreign culture. Otherwise, unless high officials turn their backs on Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and stage a coup, there won't be any collapse. Now, looking from South Korea, I can see so many reasons to believe the Northern regime has to collapse-but when I was in North Korea I never thought such a thing. So why should others there think so? The authorities have this special magic: If there's a war even the criminals in North Korea would unite and fight for the country. I like the American plan to start Radio Free Asia and broadcast in Korean to North Korea. I hope it would help North Koreans open their eyes to the faults of the regime. If the regime does collapse, it won't happen peacefully as in Russia. If people turn against the regime there will be bloodshed. They'll kill the high officials.

In my home area only about 30 to 40 percent of factory capacity is in use. People still go to the factory sites each day, though. They may cut the gra.s.s and do maintenance work. I don't know how the living standard could decline much more. People figure there has to be a war or something. The government told us all the resources had to be devoted to military needs to prepare for a war. I think about six months' worth of food is stored up for war. I heard that from people in the military. I don't know about fuel. People believe that if there is a war, and if reunification comes, the sacrifice will have been worthwhile. The problem is, people want war. They believe they are living this hard life because there's going to be a war. If there's going to be a war, why not just get it over with? They believe they'll die either way from hunger or war. So the only solution is war. What Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are saying now is that even if foreign nations force economic sanctions on the nuclear issue, we can survive. The ordinary people say "OK, let's have a great harvest."

Foreigners and South Koreans believe it's the North Koreans who will bring war. But ordinary North Koreans believe the Americans will invade them. I used to believe the Americans were ruthless, scary people. If anything went wrong in North Korea, it was "because of the Americans." Still, North Koreans underestimate the United States. Despite the Americans' global policeman role, the North Korean mentality holds that Americans are no threat if a war breaks out. The real threat is j.a.pan, they think. They have experience with the Americans in the Korean War and say, "We can beat them again, any time." Most people, civilian and military alike, think that way But university students know that the U.S. has great power. In university we study international inst.i.tutions like the United Nations. And a lot of high officials when they talk say that war is out of the question.

TWENTY-FOUR.

Pickled Plum in a Lunch Box Why would a nuclear reactor for peaceful use be built with no electrical power transmission grid; a heavy-water reactor without an adjoining commercial reactor? Why would the plant complex include a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility of the sort used to produce bomb-grade plutonium? Those were key questions Western and South Korean a.n.a.lysts raised about the mysterious North Korean reactor complex that had risen beside a winding river at Yongbyon, about 55 miles north of Pyongyang. Logical explanations that sprang to mind were that: (A) North Korean leaders were trying to make atomic bombs, or (B) they wanted their antagonists to think they might be doing so. Concern in Washington and Seoul grew as American and French satellite photos showed the complex taking shape. But without sending in inspectors there was no way to prove that the reactor was for weapons production.

Pyongyang had signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985- but then had not carried out its treaty obligation to permit full International Atomic Energy Agency inspection of its nuclear facilities. North Korean spokesmen trotted out increasingly elaborate defenses of the refusal to accept IAEA inspection. But "the more they dig their heels in, the more you think they really have something to hide," a Western diplomat in Seoul said. It seems that, when North Korea signed the NPT, parts of the Yongbyon facility were already in place. There were reports that Moscow had demanded that Pyongyang sign the treaty as a condition for the export of Soviet power reactors similar to the one at Chern.o.byl, for use not at Yongbyon but elsewhere in the country. North Korea under the terms it had agreed to was then expected to sign an IAEA safeguards agreement by June 1987. That turned out, coincidentally to be a month when South Korea was consumed in rioting that offered Pyongyang its best hope in years of seeing an indigenous southern uprising or revolution, a situation that the North might then exploit. Instead the chaos of that month led to the collapse of the South's military dictatorship and the introduction of democratic elections. The IAEA safeguards signing deadline kept slipping, and it was April 9, 1992, before North Korea's rubber-stamp Supreme People's a.s.sembly ratified an agreement. Even then Pyongyang refused to accept "overall" inspection of any and all facilities, including some of the newer construction at Yongbyon. Only years later would a high-ranking defector, Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, report that North Korea in 1991, before accepting the IAEA safeguards agreement, had carried out underground nuclear weapons testing.1 Mean-while, in the West and South Korea the reports that the North might be developing the bomb at Yongbyon came with greater frequency. Few details were made public. Washington did not care to show the precise capabilities of its satellite and other intelligence. "I gather they can identify a pickled plum in a lunch box," said a j.a.panese researcher.2 Still the reports were persistent enough that North Korea in February 1990 felt compelled to respond. A comment distributed by its Korean Central News Agency strongly denied that Pyongyang was producing nuclear weapons. It said the focus should be not on the North but on the South, where it alleged the United States kept some one thousand nuclear weapons. The publicity was "helping the bad and attacking the good," the KCNA complained. Still the reports were persistent enough that North Korea in February 1990 felt compelled to respond. A comment distributed by its Korean Central News Agency strongly denied that Pyongyang was producing nuclear weapons. It said the focus should be not on the North but on the South, where it alleged the United States kept some one thousand nuclear weapons. The publicity was "helping the bad and attacking the good," the KCNA complained.

For a while, the people paying attention were mainly officials and specialists. From shortly after the reactor complex was started, global media focused on the dramatic end of the Cold War-not on the continuing danger from a lone, unreconstructed Stalinist holdout. From August 1990, media and public interest shifted to the first Persian Gulf crisis. The North Korean nuclear issue simmered along, drawing only sporadic outside attention. But then j.a.pan turned up the heat near the end of 1990 by moving abruptly toward diplomatic recognition of Pyongyang-recognition that Tokyo planned to couple with financial aid worth billions of dollars to the cash-strapped regime. Alarmed American and South Korean officials warned that such aid could help the Kims strengthen a military already ranked the world's fifth largest, its forces forward-deployed along the South Korean border in what the U.S. military claimed was an offensive posture. Washington quietly sent a delegation of intelligence people to Tokyo with stacks of satellite photos of the suspicious reactor complex. Chastened Tokyo officials backtracked and handed Pyongyang a list of tough preconditions for normalization-including acceptance of the IAEA safeguards. Even that flap didn't get very big headlines outside Asia. But once Saddam Hussein was beaten, for the time being, in April 1991, anyone asking where other potential Saddams might be lurking was pointed in Kim Il-sung's direction.

Kang Myong-do, son-in-law of North Korean Prime Minister Kang Song-san, gave a Seoul newspaper, JoongAng Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, his take on the situation in 1995, after he defected to the South. "If you really want to know the North Korea problem," Kang said, "you have to know the apprehension the ruling cla.s.s feels. Their fears started with the August 1976 tree-cutting incident at the Demilitarized Zone. At that moment they were on the verge of war. North Koreans believed they would lose because South Korea had one thousand U.S. nuclear weapons and the North Koreans had none. I think that was when Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il decided they needed to develop nuclear weapons." Yuri Andropov, the KGB boss who became the top Soviet leader in 1982, "wanted conflict with the United States so he sent a secret message saying, 'The Soviet Union will help you, so attack.' From that moment, the Russians suggested a North Korean nuclear development project. They sent about seventy nuclear specialists to North Korea. The specialists stayed until August 1993. I heard of Andropov's urging when I was at the People's Armed Forces. In 1992, North Korea acquired two nuclear submarines from the Soviet Union, saying they-would be used for sc.r.a.p. But they-weren't sc.r.a.pped." his take on the situation in 1995, after he defected to the South. "If you really want to know the North Korea problem," Kang said, "you have to know the apprehension the ruling cla.s.s feels. Their fears started with the August 1976 tree-cutting incident at the Demilitarized Zone. At that moment they were on the verge of war. North Koreans believed they would lose because South Korea had one thousand U.S. nuclear weapons and the North Koreans had none. I think that was when Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il decided they needed to develop nuclear weapons." Yuri Andropov, the KGB boss who became the top Soviet leader in 1982, "wanted conflict with the United States so he sent a secret message saying, 'The Soviet Union will help you, so attack.' From that moment, the Russians suggested a North Korean nuclear development project. They sent about seventy nuclear specialists to North Korea. The specialists stayed until August 1993. I heard of Andropov's urging when I was at the People's Armed Forces. In 1992, North Korea acquired two nuclear submarines from the Soviet Union, saying they-would be used for sc.r.a.p. But they-weren't sc.r.a.pped."

North Korea, Kang said, set up its nuclear system with Kim Pong-yeul, a graduate of a Soviet military academy, as the "key person in the Moscow-Pyongyang nuclear pipeline. Because he leans toward Russia, he's not very close to Kim Jong-il. But his ties to the Soviets made him valuable. The people in charge of nuclear policy are officials of vice-ministerial rank in the Central Committee Information Department. Mr. Chang and Mr. Choe of the Research Department are in charge of nuclear policy. They are in their 50s. The nuclear strategy procedure is for Kim Jong-il to give an order to Kim Yong-sun, who instructs the Research Department to collect data and formulate policy proposals. The proposals go to the Research Department head, Kwon Hi-kyong, and to Kim Yong-sun, who is in charge of spy activities in South Korea. They discuss it, send it to Kim Jong-il, revise it and do final drafts. In 1992, they absorbed the Workers' Party International Department into the Research Department's North American Division. They wanted to use the nuclear issue as a way of bettering relations between North Korea and the United States. Kim Yong-sun had been in charge of the International Division.3 Kim Dae-ho, one of the teenaged gang fighters featured in chapter 12, matured enough to become a model soldier and was able to land a job with many special benefits including extra food rations. However, it was a job that turned out to have some serious disadvantages. Starting in 1985, he treated waste water at the Atomic Energy April Industry, so named because it had been founded in the month of Kim Il-sung's birthday. Situated in Tongsam-ri, North Pyongan Province, April Industry was a uranium processing facility. The waste water that Kim Dae-ho treated had been used in uranium processing. He put limestone into the water, causing the solids to sink to the bottom, and then sluiced the somewhat cleaner water into the river system.

"The authorities claim they're concerned about the environment but it's not the case," Kim Dae-ho told me. "The trees next to the river died and so did all the fish. Workers' white blood cell counts were down. They had liver problems and their hair fell out. In 1990, I had to work in vanadium processing, using sulfuric acid. I worked in that for about a week. For a long time blood seeped out of my mouth. Even now if I put something in my mouth and suck on it I can see blood."

Eighty percent pure by the time the plant finished with it, the uranium then was taken to Yongbyon for further purification. "At Yongbyon they made it 100 percent pure and used it for power generation," Kim Dae-ho said. "They used it in the experimental reactors. In October 1986 and February 1987, I visited Yongbyon. In 1986, I heard from workers that someone working there got exposed to plutonium rays in the reactor. His whole body deteriorated. In 1988 Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il inspected Yongbyon. I heard they gave the workers presents such as j.a.panese TVs as a re-ward for achieving the extraction of plutonium, but I have no idea if it was weapons grade. It was also in 1988 that I heard about a special military unit for nuclear development that had been a.s.signed to make a storage place and store plutonium."

In 1988, Kim Dae-ho transferred to Namchon in North Hw.a.n.ghae Province, which he described as "the other place besides April Industry where they processed uranium. That year while I was there I got a Toshiba color TV from Kim Jong-il. Color sets were a big deal. The government didn't sell them. In the black market one cost 4,500 or 5,000 won won -five or six years' pay. I got mine for being a good, steady worker-nothing to do with plutonium." -five or six years' pay. I got mine for being a good, steady worker-nothing to do with plutonium."

As Kang Myong-do suggested, the nuclear weapons issue needed to be seen against a background of a generally perceived lessening of the North Korean military threat. It was not that Pyongyang's military was shrinking. Rather, Seoul increasingly had the resources to counter it. By the time the project to build A-bombs at Yongbyon began in earnest in the 1980s, it was becoming clear that South Korea's economy-was growing so fast that the North's military superiority soon would be a thing of the past. The Kims evidently thought they needed nuclear weapons for a variety of purposes: to keep alive the possibility of reuniting the peninsula by force, on their terms; to deter South Korea and its American ally from trying to reunify on their their terms; and to force concessions from the United States and other countries. Even with a nuclear equalizer, the Kims were confronted with more and more compelling evidence that they could not win a second Korean war. Everybody "would lose grievously not least the North. Perhaps the most daunting evidence was Operation Desert Storm, in which American equipment like what the Americans and South Koreans were deploying south of the Demilitarized Zone was credited "with having chewed up Soviet-supplied Iraqi equipment similar to what North Korea had bought. terms; and to force concessions from the United States and other countries. Even with a nuclear equalizer, the Kims were confronted with more and more compelling evidence that they could not win a second Korean war. Everybody "would lose grievously not least the North. Perhaps the most daunting evidence was Operation Desert Storm, in which American equipment like what the Americans and South Koreans were deploying south of the Demilitarized Zone was credited "with having chewed up Soviet-supplied Iraqi equipment similar to what North Korea had bought.

Some observers still worried that Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait proved that irrational or foolhardy dictators do start wars, even when it should be obvious they will lose. The question often asked was whether Kim Il-sung was rational. Certainly there was plenty of evidence suggesting megalomania in the giant statues and portraits of the Great Leader everywhere in Pyongyang. Like Saddam, Kim wanted to hear nothing but good news from his minions and consequently was given a distorted version of events. But, rea.s.suringly, in the four decades since he had started the immensely destructive Korean War, Kim had not started another one-although there could be little doubt he had been tempted several times.

At the beginning of the crisis North Korea's suspected bomb-building capability was less a military threat than a threat to the concept and practice of nuclear non-proliferation. "North Korean nuclear weapons are for deterrence, not offense," Kang Myong-do told me. "They don't have enough strength to strike." But the lessons of China, India and Pakistan strongly suggested that if North Korea were allowed to get away with refusing to allow inspection of Yongbyon, then both South Korea and j.a.pan would feel strong pressure to acquire their own nukes. Neither would have much trouble with the technical aspects if they went ahead, and the chain reaction might not end with them.

Kim's challenge to the non-proliferation regime was not merely an implied one. His regime launched an uncharacteristically sophisticated public relations campaign against the NPT, blasting the treaty as partial to nuclear powers such as the United States and unfair to have-not, non-nuclear nations. Indeed, even if the NPT was all that stood between the world and Armageddon, it never could stand close scrutiny in terms of equity. If Pyongyang should persist in its refusal to admit inspectors and halt any bomb development, the whole non-proliferation structure might start to unravel.

The preferred means to move Pyongyang were diplomatic. But in case diplomacy should fail, a slip of the tongue by South Korea's defense minister in April of 1991 offered one clue that at least some thought had been given to a preemptive strike to take out the Yongbyon facility, as Israel had done to Iraq's Osirak facility in 1981.

The nuclear issue remained obscure until a bungled diplomatic foray by a j.a.panese politician forced Washington to turn up the heat.4 In September 1990, Shin Kanemaru visited Pyongyang as co-leader of a political parties' delegation that also included a j.a.panese socialist leader. A master of domestic politics, a powerful behind-the-scenes elder in j.a.pan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party, Kanemaru was a diplomatic tyro. Kim Il-sung by all accounts charmed his pants off, inviting him for repeated tete-a-tetes and pushing a sudden campaign for normalization of diplomatic relations. Kim hoped to counter the forays of South Korean President Roh Tae-woo into the communist bloc, where Roh was establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow and trade relations with Beijing. Western policy basically favored "cross-recognition" in which the respective allies of each of the two Koreas would recognize the other Korea as a means of increasing contact and reducing tensions. But Kanemaru was too eager and just about gave away the store. He agreed to normalize quickly and, in the process, to "compensate" the North for the effects of j.a.pan's 19101945 colonization of the Korean peninsula. In fact he spoke in favor of generous "reparations" for the damage j.a.pan had inflicted on North Korea not only during but also In September 1990, Shin Kanemaru visited Pyongyang as co-leader of a political parties' delegation that also included a j.a.panese socialist leader. A master of domestic politics, a powerful behind-the-scenes elder in j.a.pan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party, Kanemaru was a diplomatic tyro. Kim Il-sung by all accounts charmed his pants off, inviting him for repeated tete-a-tetes and pushing a sudden campaign for normalization of diplomatic relations. Kim hoped to counter the forays of South Korean President Roh Tae-woo into the communist bloc, where Roh was establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow and trade relations with Beijing. Western policy basically favored "cross-recognition" in which the respective allies of each of the two Koreas would recognize the other Korea as a means of increasing contact and reducing tensions. But Kanemaru was too eager and just about gave away the store. He agreed to normalize quickly and, in the process, to "compensate" the North for the effects of j.a.pan's 19101945 colonization of the Korean peninsula. In fact he spoke in favor of generous "reparations" for the damage j.a.pan had inflicted on North Korea not only during but also after after its time as colonial overlord there. its time as colonial overlord there.

In the West, Kim Il-sung was seen as a fearsome dictator, but in person by all accounts he was charismatic. Kanemaru was so moved by all of Kim's attentions and, presumably, by lingering j.a.panese national guilt over the treatment of the Koreans that at one point during a press conference in Pyongyang he wept.5 It was in that atmosphere that Kanemaru, at the behest of his accompanying Foreign Ministry advisors and only perfunctorily, raised the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons development. Kim denied everything, insisting that all he had at Yongbyon was a research facility. He said he would accept inspection if U.S. nuclear weapons in the South would also be inspected. He literally asked Kanemaru to "trust me." That pretty much disposed of the nuclear issue for the time being. It wasn't even mentioned in the joint communique issued at the close of the meetings. It was in that atmosphere that Kanemaru, at the behest of his accompanying Foreign Ministry advisors and only perfunctorily, raised the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons development. Kim denied everything, insisting that all he had at Yongbyon was a research facility. He said he would accept inspection if U.S. nuclear weapons in the South would also be inspected. He literally asked Kanemaru to "trust me." That pretty much disposed of the nuclear issue for the time being. It wasn't even mentioned in the joint communique issued at the close of the meetings.

Kanemaru's diplomatic foray enraged South Korea, which he had not consulted ahead of time. In Seoul it quickly aroused suspicions of an ulterior motive: Tokyo, fearing a united Korea next door, was trying to prop up Kim's regime with cash so that j.a.pan could play a divide-and-conquer role on the Korean peninsula and reap the commercial advantages of being seen as a North Korean friend. One South Korean official, speaking privately to me after several gla.s.ses of Scotch whiskey in the Oak Room of Seoul's Hilton Hotel, raged, "North Korea was almost on the brink of going down the drain! And these j.a.panese coming into the picture, they are willing to provide more than five billion dollars-G.o.ddammit!-thereby making it difficult for the country to be unified!"6 Embarra.s.sed over Kanemaru's commitment to a sudden policy shift that did not accord with their plans, j.a.panese foreign policy professionals sought to restore bureaucratic control over foreign policy. They emphasized that this had been only a political party delegation, not an official one, and therefore Kanemaru's promise was not binding. To provide them the needed ammunition, Washington, according to an account that first appeared from j.a.pan's Jiji Press wire service, sent in an intelligence delegation led by a high-ranking military officer to brief officials of the j.a.panese Foreign Ministry Defense Agency and Cabinet Research Agency-the main civilian intelligence organization-for three days from October 31.7 The Jiji account was the first detailed report made public on what the North Koreans had at Yongbyon as shown in the U.S. KH11 satellite photos and the American intelligence people's briefing. Jiji cataloged: (1) a research reactor built by the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, and given to North Korea, mainly used for basic research; (2) a small reactor, of 1950s Soviet technology, in use at Yongbyon since 1987, capable of producing seven kilograms of plutonium per year-enough for one bomb-although it was not known if it had been used to do that; (3) a larger reactor in the 50200 mega-watt range, of French 1950s technology, under construction in Yongbyon since 1984 and expected to be completed in 1994, which would be capable of producing 18 to 50 kilograms of plutonium a year or enough for two to five Nagasaki-sized bombs; (4) a factory to produce enriched uranium (North Korea mined natural uranium); (5) a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant with high chimneys and meter-thick walls to keep radioactivity from escaping, almost completed and expected to be in full use in 1995; (6) remains of a pre-1988 low-level explosion experiment; (7) Kim Il-sung's mountain resort villa nearby. The bottom line: Jiji quoted the U.S. briefer as telling his j.a.panese listeners that North Korea would be able to develop nuclear weapons by 1995.

Although the world still had both eyes on the Persian Gulf, specialists involved were in earnest by then about doing something to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons development. Various approaches began to get considerable attention. One of the more promising was to use Pyongyang-Tokyo normalization and the money North Korea would get from Tokyo as the carrot. After Kanemaru flew to Seoul to apologize to an angry President Roh Tae-woo for his hasty approach, the professional diplomats again took the driver's seat in Tokyo and parked j.a.pan on that firm, quid-pro-quo approach. The first rounds of government-to-government normalization talks, in Pyongyang in February 1991 and in Tokyo a little later, made clear that signing the IAEA safeguards agreement was a precondition Tokyo had set for normalization.

The carrot was thought potentially effective because the North Korean economy-was in serious trouble. Kim Chang-soon, an early defector from the North who presided over Seoul's Inst.i.tute of North Korean Studies, told me that during 1991's opening months there had been some 150 reports of crowds-perhaps 200 people at a time-gathering to protest food shortages in various parts of North Korea. He cited reports from Korean residents of j.a.pan whose relatives had moved back to North Korea some years previously. The country had not had a b.u.mper harvest since the 1970s, Kim noted, and grain rations often had been arriving late or not at all. This also affected what on the surface appeared to be good military morale, he said: "Naturally some of the soldiers sneak into farm villages and steal food." Kim Chang-soon told me it would be very difficult for the low-level protests he cited to grow larger and coordinated. North Koreans were kept to their work groups and locales; they lacked the freedom of movement and communication it would take to develop a ma.s.s movement. But although the North Korean leadership was not in imminent danger of overthrow by the ma.s.ses, he said, "they are in a very difficult position and they have to compromise with the j.a.panese. ... They really are badly in need of j.a.panese money."

A deal with North Korea would involve Tokyo's payment of the equivalent of billions of dollars. Tokyo knew how much clout it had acquired. I spoke with Katsumi Sato, editor of Gendai Korea Gendai Korea and a leading j.a.panese Pyongyang-watcher. Because of fuel shortages that resulted from a Soviet decision to move away from bartering oil on favorable terms to Pyongyang, Sato noted, factories were closed and ships could not sail. With its zero credit rating, when Pyongyang looked around for a quick financial fix the only possibility in sight was j.a.pan and the aid and, perhaps, trade that normalization would bring. "j.a.pan is actually the casting vote," said Sato. "Whether they live or die is up to j.a.pan." and a leading j.a.panese Pyongyang-watcher. Because of fuel shortages that resulted from a Soviet decision to move away from bartering oil on favorable terms to Pyongyang, Sato noted, factories were closed and ships could not sail. With its zero credit rating, when Pyongyang looked around for a quick financial fix the only possibility in sight was j.a.pan and the aid and, perhaps, trade that normalization would bring. "j.a.pan is actually the casting vote," said Sato. "Whether they live or die is up to j.a.pan."

Pyongyang wanted more than just Tokyo's diplomatic recognition and aid, though. It wanted development of higher-level relations with the United States-to counter Seoul's approach to Moscow and Beijing and bypa.s.s Seoul. If it should succeed in getting all of those in exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons card, its ploy would have to be counted as successful.

One diplomatic approach that was mainly stick, favored by Seoul, was to line up international support for demands that Pyongyang cease and desist. The nuclear powers were on board for that. Moscow had abandoned its agreement to export reactors, by most accounts in order to back its demand that Pyongyang sign the safeguards agreement and admit inspectors. (Some said the export halt was merely a sort of factory recall: Moscow wanted to fix the flaws in the Chern.o.byl-type reactor before proceeding with exports.) In reality, if Pyongyang was already past the point of needing help to continue its weapons program, Moscow's embargo would have little more than political effect. Even that could be important, though, as Moscow was such an old ally of Pyongyang's and the growing estrangement between them was painful.

Several things occurred to heat up the North Korean nuclear issue further. In February 1991, a bilateral committee set up by the East-West Center in Honolulu and the Seoul Forum for International Affairs issued a recommendation that U.S. nuclear weapons could be removed from South Korea without endangering that country's security. Members of the group included former high officials from both countries: a former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, a former South Korean defense minister, a former U.S. a.s.sistant secretary of state for Asia and the Pacific and a former South Korean amba.s.sador to the United States. Their argument was that South Korea could remain under the American nuclear umbrella without having the weapons physically in South Korea, thanks to the development of longer-range, precision weapons. They also argued that there would be political advantages for the South in being able to say the weapons were not present. The United States, for its part, could continue its not always followed "NCND" (neither confirm nor deny) policy regarding the presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea. North Korea had been seeking to link the demands for IAEA inspection of its facilities to its own demand that U.S. nukes be withdrawn or inspected. The committee rejected that as an apples-and-oranges linkage, but at the same time appeared to recognize the public relations reality: it would be just as well not to have to try to explain to non-specialists why Kim's proposal was off the mark if indeed there was no compelling military reason to keep the U.S. nukes on Korean soil.

To learn that public relations reality, one had only to visit a South Korean campus and talk to just about any student. The presence of U.S. troops, and their nuclear weapons, was a hot-b.u.t.ton issue with them, but most knew or cared little about North Korean nukes. South Korea's government had cried wolf so often about North Korean schemes for imminent conquest that young South Koreans simply ignored reports of North Korean nuclear weapons production. North Korea, long known for its heavy-handed propaganda, had learned to play skillfully on the nationalistic sentiments of South Korea's young.

The North also had gotten its act together in propaganda directed outside Korea. An English-language booklet, "U.S. Nuclear Threat to North Korea," was published in March 1991 in the name of a magazine called Korea Report, Korea Report, an organ of Pyongyang's unofficial "emba.s.sy" in Tokyo, the International Affairs Bureau of the Central Standing Committee of the Chongryon. It was a thoroughly professional piece of research that read as if it might have been prepared by a Western scholar or peace activist. No author was listed, but I suspected that the Korean residents' group or someone in Pyongyang acting through the group had commissioned just such a person to do it. There was one place where a reference to American "impudence" seemed to have been inserted by one of the old guard propagandists, but otherwise the doc.u.ment stuck to an unemotional approach that worked very well. an organ of Pyongyang's unofficial "emba.s.sy" in Tokyo, the International Affairs Bureau of the Central Standing Committee of the Chongryon. It was a thoroughly professional piece of research that read as if it might have been prepared by a Western scholar or peace activist. No author was listed, but I suspected that the Korean residents' group or someone in Pyongyang acting through the group had commissioned just such a person to do it. There was one place where a reference to American "impudence" seemed to have been inserted by one of the old guard propagandists, but otherwise the doc.u.ment stuck to an unemotional approach that worked very well.

The booklet made the linkage argument about as persuasively as it could have been made. It skillfully turned Pyongyang's refusal to allow inspection into a valiant defense of the rights of the less powerful countries against the superpowers. The booklet recited a history of U.S. planning for the use of nuclear weapons in Korea in the Korean War and listed in startling detail the various nuclear weapons the United States was alleged to keep in the South. "South Korea is the only place in the world where nuclear weapons face a non-nuclear 'foe,' namely North Korea," it said. The booklet called for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, to be accomplished through talks among North and South Korea and the United States. (The other side pointed out that American nuclear weapons faced Russian weapons just a few miles from North Korean territory in the Vladivostok area. Washington was suspicious of local nuclear-free zones generally and argued that in order to work they must include all the nuclear-power neighbors.) The booklet attacked the "unfairness" of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The United States had issued a blanket guarantee that any non-nuclear nation that signed the NPT would not be attacked first with American nuclear weapons unless it allied itself with N-powers attacking the United States or its allies. Pyongyang demanded that this "Negative Security a.s.surance" be made specific and legally binding toward North Korea in particular, another of the demands the booklet set out. There was also a UN Security Council resolution of 1968 promising immediate action by the permanent members of the council to aid any non-nuclear power attacked by a nuclear power. But "the non-nuclear powers, while welcoming these guarantees, do not regard them as providing a complete guarantee," the booklet said. Non-nuclear powers wanted more "effective" international guarantees.

Even more controversial was a long and comprehensive article published in Seoul in the March 1991 issue of the monthly magazine Wolgan Cho-son, Wolgan Cho-son, written by a leading South Korean investigative reporter, Cho Gap-jae. Cho argued forcefully that South Korea's military should not simply watch quietly to see whether diplomacy succeeded in persuading Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program. It should be adding to the pressure, planning a last-resort preemptive strike. He said both South Korean and American military people were at least considering such a strike. Cho recalled that Washington had made life miserable for the late South Korean President Park Chung-hee until Park gave up his own nuclear weapons program in the 1970s in exchange for a U.S. promise to protect the South and keep the North from developing nukes. That sort of pressure in the long run could be hard for Kim Il-sung, too, to resist-but if he timed it right Kim had much to gain by hitting up j.a.pan and the United States for payment once he agreed to accept inspection. Even then the North would retain superiority over the South in terms of being able to crank up a nuclear program again if the situation demanded it, Cho wrote. Still, "a compromise involving a with- drawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea together with a termination of nuclear development by North Korea is the most possible and most peaceful solution under the current conditions." written by a leading South Korean investigative reporter, Cho Gap-jae. Cho argued forcefully that South Korea's military should not simply watch quietly to see whether diplomacy succeeded in persuading Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program. It should be adding to the pressure, planning a last-resort preemptive strike. He said both South Korean and American military people were at least considering such a strike. Cho recalled that Washington had made life miserable for the late South Korean President Park Chung-hee until Park gave up his own nuclear weapons program in the 1970s in exchange for a U.S. promise to protect the South and keep the North from developing nukes. That sort of pressure in the long run could be hard for Kim Il-sung, too, to resist-but if he timed it right Kim had much to gain by hitting up j.a.pan and the United States for payment once he agreed to accept inspection. Even then the North would retain superiority over the South in terms of being able to crank up a nuclear program again if the situation demanded it, Cho wrote. Still, "a compromise involving a with- drawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea together with a termination of nuclear development by North Korea is the most possible and most peaceful solution under the current conditions."

Lest anyone think South Korea was fully resigned to permanent non-nuclear status, Cho wrote that "an extremely small circle" of South Koreans was thinking ahead to Korean unification and a world in which a unified Korea would face "hypothetical enemies" such as j.a.pan, China and the Soviet Union. Those Southerners were wondering whether Pyongyang shouldn't be allowed to continue with its nuclear weapons development. Such thinking, of course, was a nightmare to the anti-proliferation mavens in Washington and elsewhere.

The Cho article was on many people's minds in April of 1991 when Defense Minister Lee Jong-koo told a group of journalists that the country ought to work out "punitive measures" in case North Korea persisted in its nuclear-weapons development. Mixing up his Israeli raids, he spoke of an "Entebbe" solution. Entebbe is in Uganda, and that wasn't the nuclear weapons case. But Lee got in plenty of hot water anyhow. Pyongyang called his remarks a "declaration of war" and opposition parties demanded he be sacked because he had hurt the chances for North-South rapprochement. The government tried to hush the whole thing up, asking newspapers not to write about it, and Lee himself withdrew his remarks. The incident ill.u.s.trated, among other things, the fact that nuclear weapons were not that much talked about in South Korea. There was a kind of taboo, it was said.

Besides nukes there were North Korea's chemical and biological weapons. "They have one of the five biggest stocks of chemical and biological weapons," Kim Chang-soon of Seoul's Inst.i.tute of North Korean Studies told me. "I can't go into details, but from the Mount k.u.mgang area on the Eastern front they can use such weapons, taking advantage of seasonal winds, and destroy a corps of enemy forces [three divisions] in an hour. That's part of the North's aim for supremacy. They aim at quick attack and quick resolution. Their idea is to resolve everything before the U.S. side makes preparations to help us out."

North Korea also had Scud missiles, which were of particular interest in 1991 after Saddam Hussein had used them. Cha Young-koo, an arms control expert at the Korea Inst.i.tute for Defense a.n.a.lysis, noted that Saddam's use of Scuds was mainly intended to try to draw Israel into the Gulf War. A renewed Korean War would not offer a similar temptation to provoke a neighbor, Cha told me. But if North Korea should fire Scuds at South Korea in peacetime, "it means they want war," he said. "And in wartime if they use Scud missiles, we'll use our our missiles, with the a.s.sistance of the United States." missiles, with the a.s.sistance of the United States."

The Wolgan Choson Wolgan Choson article said that the North Korean newer-model Scuds had been made broad enough in diameter to carry low-tech nuclear warheads of the type that could be achieved by countries just joining the club and unable yet to miniaturize. So the presence of the Scuds presumably pointed to a viable nuclear delivery system. article said that the North Korean newer-model Scuds had been made broad enough in diameter to carry low-tech nuclear warheads of the type that could be achieved by countries just joining the club and unable yet to miniaturize. So the presence of the Scuds presumably pointed to a viable nuclear delivery system.

The many good reasons for removing U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea finally persuaded President George H. W. Bush. Pyongyang mean-while had a number of apparent reasons to use the occasion to open up its relations with South Korea, as Seoul's business interests hoped. The controversy over suspected nuclear weapons development had turned Kim Il-sung into the international bogeyman to replace Saddam Hussein for the time being. Even as Pyongyang desperately wished to normalize relations with j.a.pan, Tokyo had made clear that normalization must await Pyongyang's submission to international inspection of its nuclear facilities.

North Korea evidently intended to announce it would comply but no sooner than necessary. It may have seemed to Pyongyang that its interest lay in distracting attention from the nuclear issue to buy time-perhaps for further development and concealment of-what already had been done-before permitting international inspections. Perhaps the leadership thought that taking a constructive approach to issues regarding the North-South relationship would provide just such a distraction. It was also a way to produce an accomplishment that could be cited in the upcoming April 15 celebration of Kim Il-sung's eightieth birthday.

For whatever combination of such reasons, members of the Northern delegation to a December premier-level meeting in Seoul said they had orders from no less than the Great Leader himself not to come back empty-handed.8 They even held out the possibility of a summit meeting between Kim Il-sung and South Korean President Roh Tae-woo. They went home bearing an agreement of "reconciliation, nonaggression, exchanges and cooperation" between North and South. Within a few days South Korea had traded cancellation of the 1992 Team Spirit exercise for North Korea's agreement to permit IAEA inspection. On December 18, South Korean President Roh was able to announce that no nuclear weapons were in South Korea. The two Koreas then concluded an agr