Sunday morning I telephoned to Mr. Bryan at once and made an appointment to meet him at his home. I repeated my conversation with Bernstorff precisely as it had occurred, and Bryan believed, as I did, that it might pave the way to mediation. I suggested that he have the German amba.s.sador come to Washington and speak with him. He communicated with the German emba.s.sy, and Bernstorff arrived the following morning.

Bryan presented the subject to the President, who expressed himself as pleased with the possibility of a favorable outcome. The Secretary advised me to have a conference with the British amba.s.sador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, and with the French amba.s.sador, M. Jusserand. He had already informed them what had taken place and of my presence in Washington. Sir Cecil asked whether I would kindly come to the emba.s.sy, and I replied I would do so, and suggested that he arrange to have the French amba.s.sador also present. This he did.

When I reached the emba.s.sy, M. Jusserand had not yet arrived, and Sir Cecil and I indulged in reminiscences. He too had been in Constantinople during my first mission, as secretary of the British emba.s.sy. Soon we were joined by M. Jusserand, whom also I had known well for many years, for he had been in Washington since 1902, and I had seen much of him during my Cabinet days.

When we took up the proposal regarding which we had come together, both of these gentlemen agreed that it was deserving of serious attention, but Sir Cecil had little confidence in Bernstorff, who had been his colleague at Cairo, where they had represented their respective Governments. He asked whether I thought an amba.s.sador would make such a statement as Bernstorff's without authority from his Government. I replied that both he and M. Jusserand were better qualified to answer that question, upon which M. Jusserand said that he knew that no amba.s.sador under the German system would dare make such remarks without previous authority from his Government.

"That is so much the better," I commented.

Sir Cecil declared that German diplomacy was peculiar and that the Foreign Office had no conscience in disavowing statements by its amba.s.sadors if it suited Germany's purpose.

After we had gone over the whole subject, both amba.s.sadors stated that if it held one chance in a hundred of shortening the war, it was their duty to entertain it. I replied that I hoped they would entertain it cordially.

Jusserand in his usual happy manner said, "'Cordially,' that is a little too strong."

"Well, sympathetically, then," I said.

"Yes, sympathetically, yes." And with that we parted, both amba.s.sadors expressing their thanks and appreciation of my services.

I had been scrupulously careful to be absolutely accurate in all my statements, and it was therefore gratifying, after the Bryan-Bernstorff conference, to have the Secretary tell me that the amba.s.sador's report of the Scarboro incident was in every detail in accord with mine, and to have the amba.s.sador also confirm the correctness of Mr. Bryan's understanding from my report. Naturally I was anxious to avoid misunderstandings or misconceptions of any kind. The issue was too important.

Both Secretary Bryan and Amba.s.sador Bernstorff cabled to Berlin, and for the time the subject rested there. My remaining in Washington was unnecessary, and I returned to New York. But before leaving, I called by appointment at both the French and British emba.s.sies, which also had communicated events in detail to their Governments. Both amba.s.sadors expressed their high appreciation for my services and hoped I would keep in close touch with them regarding the matter, both for their sake and for the sake of our respective Governments. I told them I would regard myself as "messenger boy" for mediation. Sir Cecil replied, "Amba.s.sador extraordinary." He promised to keep me informed, and two days later wrote me:

I have not yet received any intimation from my Government, nor do I expect one unless something definite is before them. But I need not tell you how heartily my sympathy is with your humanitarian efforts, and you know Grey well enough to be sure that, while scrupulously faithful to all his engagements, he will do everything possible in the cause of peace.

Throughout these negotiations we took great care to keep the matter secret. Despite that fact it leaked out in some way, and the correspondent of the London "Times" reported it in such a way as to give the impression that I had been duped by the wily German amba.s.sador; and there were one or two other papers which took that view. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice was incensed at this interpretation and wrote me on October 3d:

I am sure no one who knows you and knows the facts would ever think that you were either duped or the secret agent of Germany. I am quite positive that Sir Edward Grey would never have such an idea.

What you did--and what I hope you will continue to do--is a work of pure philanthropy.

On October 15th he wrote me again on this subject, saying that when the London "Times" representative returned to Washington from New York, he would set him right as to the facts with a view to having the report corrected, and adding:

We used to say at school, "Blessed are the peace makers, for they get more kicks than half-pence!" It represents a melancholy truth, but, however, I am sure every well-thinking person must appreciate your beneficent efforts.

But in general the press of Great Britain expressed its appreciation of the services I had rendered in lifting the latch of the door to mediation.

A letter from Sir Edward Grey concerning the negotiations sheds important light upon the British att.i.tude:

FOREIGN OFFICE, LONDON, S.W.

_Sat.u.r.day, 26 September, 1914_

DEAR MR. STRAUS:

Thank you for your letter of the 9th. I am so busy that I have not time to write at any length; but do not let that make you suppose that I am out of sympathy with what you say.

First of all, however, we must save ourselves and the West of Europe, before we can exercise any influence elsewhere. The Prussian military caste has dominated Germany, and the whole of the West of Europe is in danger of being dominated by it. The German Government, in the hands of this military caste, prepared this war, planned it, and chose the time for it. We know now that the war has revealed how thoroughly the German preparations had been made beforehand: with an organization and forethought which is wonderful, and would have been admirable had it been devoted to a praiseworthy purpose. Not one of the other nations now fighting against Germany is prepared in the same way.

Now, we wish to have three things: Firstly, to secure our own liberty as independent States, who will live and let live on equal terms; secondly, the establishment somehow of a Germany not dominated by a military caste; a nation who will look at liberty and politics from the same point of view as we do, and who will deal with us on equal terms and in good faith; thirdly, reparation for the cruel wrongs done to Belgium; to get that is a matter of honour and justice and right.

The statements made by Wolff's Bureau in Europe deny that Germany is yet ready for peace. If she is ready for peace, then I think that her amba.s.sador in Washington ought not to beat about the bush. He ought to make it clear to President Wilson that he is authorized to speak on behalf of his Government; and state to the President that Germany does wish to make peace. In that case, President Wilson could approach all the others who are engaged in this war and bring them into consultation with one another and with him. But at present we have no indication that Germany wishes to have peace, and no indication that she would agree to any terms that would give reparation to Belgium and security to the rest of Europe that the peace would be durable.

Yours very truly E. GREY

The history of those negotiations is presented somewhat at length because my friend of many years, the late Amba.s.sador Page, in his recently published letters also expressed the feeling that I had been used as a dupe to throw the blame for continuing the war upon Great Britain, though he expressed great confidence in me and friendship for me. I may say I was not unmindful of this contingency; but I felt that if the negotiations did not result as we hoped, they would serve to expose the insincerity of the German Government with regard to its peace professions. And this is precisely what happened, as the answer of the German Chancellor, received by the State Department on September 22d, confirms:

The Imperial Chancellor is much obliged for America's offer.

Germany did not want war, it was forced upon her. Even after we shall have defeated France we shall still have to face England and Russia. England, France, and Russia have signed a convention to make peace solely in mutual agreement with each other. England, that is, Mr. Asquith, the London Times, and English diplomatic officers, have on various occasions ... [sic] that England is determined to conduct the war to the utmost and that she expects success from it lasting a long time. It is therefore up to the United States to get our enemies to make peace proposals. Germany can only accept the peace which promises to be a real and lasting peace and will protect her against any new attacks from her enemies. If we accepted America's offer of mediation now our enemies would interpret it as a sign of weakness and the German people would not understand it. For the nation which has been willing to make such sacrifices has a right to demand that there shall be guarantees of rest and security.

Secretary Bryan, in his instruction to Amba.s.sador Page on September 8th, had antic.i.p.ated Germany's refusal to accept mediation. The instruction concluded:

We do not know, of course, what reply the German Emperor will make, but this war is so horrible from every aspect that no one can afford to take the responsibility for continuing it implacably. The British and French amba.s.sadors fear that Germany will not accept any reasonable terms, but even a failure to agree will not rob an attempt at mediation of all its advantages because the different nations would be able to explain to the world their att.i.tude, the reasons for continuing the war, the end to be hoped for and the terms upon which peace is possible. This would locate the responsibility for the continuance of the war and help to mould public opinion. Will notify you as soon as answer is received from Bernstorff.

On September 29th all the British papers served by the Central News War Service carried a cable from New York detailing the negotiations, which ended:

It is believed by those concerned that an important step has been taken to pave the way for mediation, when the opportune moment arrives. In other words, the bolt on the door of mediation has been thrown back so that it will be possible for the door to be opened without either side being forced to take the initiative. Time will doubtless show that the initiative so fortuitously taken by Mr.

Straus will prove of real service in the interests of ultimate peace negotiations, and any endeavors to deprecate those services as having been made in Germany's interests are not only contrary to all the facts, but are most unfortunate.

_Note_: The censor does not object to the publication of the foregoing details, but insists that publication should be accompanied by a footnote pointing out that since these occurrences took place the German Government have disavowed their amba.s.sador.

Had Germany's oft-reiterated peace professions been sincere, she would have accepted this offer for mediation. By her refusal the falsity of her professions was exposed not only in Great Britain and in our own country, but in all the neutral countries; and the _expose_ served as added proof to all peace-loving and neutrally-minded persons that the responsibility for the war and its continuance rested upon the German Government.

In America many of us continued to hope that some way might be found to bring the representatives of the warring nations into a conference, thereby removing misunderstanding and misconception and paving the way for an early peace. On December 31st the New York representative of the Central News of London asked several Americans to write New Year's messages to the warring nations of Europe, to be cabled to all the chief newspapers of the continent. Messages were given by Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, Andrew Carnegie, Bishop David Greer, and myself, and they were all substantially of the same tenor, as a pa.s.sage from each will show:

_Bishop Greer_: It is the earnest hope and prayer of all Christian people in America that the awful and deplorable war now raging may soon reach an end which will insure lasting peace and one satisfactory in character to all the nations involved.

_Andrew Carnegie_: I am convinced that the next effort of lovers of peace should be to concentrate the world over in demanding that this unparalleled slaughter of man by man shall be the last war waged by civilized nations for the settlement of international disputes. War dethroned--Peace enthroned.

_President Butler_: May it be in America's fortunate lot to bind up the wounds of the war and to set the feet of her sister nations once more in the paths of peace, international good-will and constructive statesmanship.

I said: For the past five months each of the nations has been seeking victory in the trenches of death; but it has not been found there. Only through wise counsels can the victory of permanent peace be obtained. President Wilson and His Holiness the Pope have offered their offices to open the door of mediation. Will not the Kaiser and King George give the mandate so that the door may be opened and this delusion be dispelled, thereby earning the blessings of a bleeding and suffering world?

These statements are cited as evidence of how slowly we in America came to realize the ruthless designs for conquest which the German militarists had prepared and fostered for forty years, not only strategically, but even in shaping the psychology of the child in school and the man in the street to conform to their design.

For a year or more events marched on, tragically, like a malignant disease. On February 2, 1917, I lunched with Roosevelt at the Hotel Langdon, on Fifth Avenue and Fifty-Sixth Street, where Roosevelt was in the habit of stopping when in New York. The German Government two days before had announced her submarine blockade of the British, French, and Dutch coasts, and our own entrance into the war seemed likely.

We were discussing the crisis, and Roosevelt said he did not think we should be involved; the President would probably find some way out and arrange to have Germany's pledge, not to destroy merchant ships of neutrals or belligerents without warning, whittled down so as to apply only to ships flying the American flag. He told us that he had engaged pa.s.sage on one of the United Fruit Company steamers to Jamaica for Mrs.

Roosevelt and himself. Mrs. Roosevelt needed a change, and they would start in a few days. Regarding the war, he could do nothing more. He had done all he could. He had made an offer to the Secretary of War to raise a division, and had a whole card catalogue of names of men who had volunteered to serve in it.

His relations with the President were far from friendly. He had violently criticized him in articles contributed to the "Metropolitan Magazine" and in several public addresses had urged preparedness and compulsory military training. I asked him, in view of the German blockade, what he would do if he were President. He said he would promptly a.s.semble our fleet, put marines on the interned German ships, and show Germany that we were in dead earnest; that unless she recalled her decision to sink merchant ships without observing the rules of modern warfare we should take immediate steps to protect our rights.

"If we continue to back down we will become Chinafied, without any rights that other nations will respect," said Roosevelt emphatically.

In such critical times, personal differences might be laid aside, I suggested, and I wanted him to write the President and let him have the benefit of his views. I went further: I suggested that I could write the President about it. But in Roosevelt's opinion, Wilson would conclude that Roosevelt had himself urged me to do this because of my close a.s.sociation with Roosevelt.

My own relations with the President were always agreeable, I might even say most friendly. He had written me sometime before, that he would consider it a favor if I would keep him informed of developments that came under my observation regarding important matters. It occurred to me that on the eve of war it would be a fine thing if he consulted with his two surviving predecessors, as Monroe had done in consulting with Jefferson and Madison before issuing the doctrine which bears his name.

In the crisis we were facing such a step would allay partisan differences and serve to solidify the Nation. With these ideas in mind I sent the President the following telegram:

Every patriotic American should support you in this great crisis in the history of our country. May I suggest the course followed by Monroe under a crisis involving many of the same principles, to confer with the two surviving ex-Presidents, whose advice, I feel sure, will be most helpful and serve to patriotically solidify the country behind you?