Early in June, 1907, there was another outbreak in San Francisco against the restaurant keepers, and telegrams from Tokyo told of the irritation this caused among the people in j.a.pan. At the Cabinet meeting I took the subject up again with considerable emphasis. I pointed out that these incidents were acc.u.mulating and were bristling with grave consequences; that j.a.pan had come into the front rank among nations and could not afford to permit us or any other nation to slap her, as it were, in the face, or to treat her even in small things as a nation of inferior race.

I brought up the subject of j.a.panese naturalization. As the law stood, a j.a.panese could not be naturalized, according to the rulings of one or two judges of the United States courts; but the subject had never been finally decided. A short time previous to this a j.a.panese seaman in Florida had filed a pet.i.tion for naturalization which was granted, and I referred the matter to the Attorney-General to see whether that would not afford an incident wherewith to test the law. But no action was taken.

At first the President did not seem to attach to the subject the importance that I did, but Secretary Root immediately spoke up that he agreed with my view of it, and as the discussion went along, the rest of the Cabinet, as well as the President, gradually came over to my view.

At the end the President remarked: "I am very glad you brought up that subject."

During the discussion I reviewed the whole legal aspect of the matter, and referred to the fact that the several decisions made had been based on Chinese precedents. I also touched on the ethnological aspect, that it was doubtful whether the j.a.panese could be cla.s.sed as Mongolians.

This phase appealed to Roosevelt, who seemed well informed in ethnological studies. I felt rather gratified with this thorough discussion of the subject. It had interested me for years, and I had been ruminating on it for several weeks.

At the last Cabinet meeting before the vacation season, each member referred to his plans for the summer. I had decided to combine business with pleasure by taking a trip along the Canadian border from Montreal to Vancouver to inspect the lighthouse and immigration services, then down the Pacific Coast and to Hawaii, where I might acquaint myself with regard to immigration as it affected the j.a.panese question. The President thought this would be a useful trip and urged me to take it.

In the administration of a department such as that of Commerce and Labor, it was important to familiarize one's self as much as possible with its outlying branches, to become personally acquainted with the various officers and the details of their work and surroundings, thereby to enable one better to do the administrative work than by remaining at one's desk.

After leaving Vancouver we stopped a few days each at Seattle, Portland, and San Francisco, where I conferred with the officials of the Department. From San Francisco we took a steamer to Hawaii, on board which we met George R. Carter, Governor of Hawaii, returning from a vacation in the United States, and Congressman and Mrs. Nicholas Longworth. It made a very pleasant party.

The authorities and the population gave us a rousing welcome, cannons saluted, and the militia was out to escort us. Only once before since the island became United States territory had a Cabinet official paid a visit, and that was two years before when Secretary of War Taft stopped there for a few days _en route_ to j.a.pan. We were comfortably installed in the Hotel Moana, in the suburb of Waikiki.

The islanders showered upon us bounteous hospitality in every conceivable form. We partic.i.p.ated in rounds of dinners and receptions.

Governor and Mrs. Carter entertained the Longworths and us in the official residence, the former palace of the Hawaiian rulers, in the throne room of which hung the portraits of those rulers from earliest times to the deposed Queen Liliuokalani. The reception was a brilliant occasion. The leading officials and the _elite_ of the population were there; the grounds were beautifully illuminated; and the Royal Hawaiian Band played the soft, plaintive music so typical of the mild temperament of the people and the luxuriant foliage of the island. My time was much taken up with official and semi-official duties. The island residents impressed me with the great need for better shipping facilities between the mainland and the islands. The coastwise shipping laws applying to them since annexation penalized the carrying of pa.s.sengers or freight in other than American bottoms. Foreign ships accepting either pa.s.sengers or freight to American ports on the coast were heavily fined. The result was, not only inconvenience to residents who for one reason or another needed to leave the islands, but the loss of much perishable freight, princ.i.p.ally fruit, which rotted on the wharves waiting for American ships. I promised them that I would do everything in my power to help them get the shipping facilities they needed.

A delegation of j.a.panese editors, representing the four j.a.panese newspapers of Honolulu, called to ascertain my views regarding j.a.panese matters in the islands, what my policy was with regard to j.a.panese immigration, and whether I believed that the preponderance of j.a.panese people in Hawaii was inimical to the interests of the territory. I answered them:

An ideal condition for the future welfare of these islands would be that there should not be too great a preponderance of any one race, but that an equilibrium be maintained.

I would impress upon you, and upon each of the several races here, to have a care not to exploit these islands and their resources for the benefit of the country from which they come, but to act in the spirit of loyalty to the government under which they live; of loyalty to the interests of the islands which afford such happy and ideal homes for them and their children. I am gratified that the public school system has such a great influence upon the young, who grow up with the American ideals and respect for the liberty of the individual. I would like to see an increasing number of Americans from the mainland come and settle in these islands, if for no other reason than to guarantee for all time to come the continuance of the American spirit for the benefit and welfare of all peoples who have made and will make their homes here.

Unfortunately the time at my disposal did not permit my visiting the various islands. We did, however, see everything to be seen at Oahu, the island upon which Honolulu is situated. Rear-Admiral Very took us on the U.S.S. Iroquois to visit Pearl Harbor, the famous landlocked bay large enough to shelter the battle fleets of several nations. We also visited the Waialua pineapple plantation and cannery, where twenty thousand cans of the large, luscious fruit were put up daily. The processes of paring, coring, slicing, and canning were done by machinery with great speed, and we enjoyed tasting the fruit as much as any school children might.

In Honolulu I met Viscount Ishii, who was then j.a.panese under-Secretary of State. He has since been amba.s.sador at Washington and at this writing is amba.s.sador at Paris. We had frequent conferences and went over the whole j.a.panese question. He had fully informed himself upon all phases of the subject, as well as regarding the idiosyncrasies of the Pacific Coast States in opposing the immigration of j.a.panese laborers. Ishii's thorough understanding of the situation at that time did much to smooth ruffled feelings in j.a.pan. The Viscount returned to the States on the steamer with us.

As we sailed out of the harbor on the Asia, bedecked with Hawaiian flowers, the Royal Hawaiian Band played its farewell music. The last words we heard from the Hawaiian sh.o.r.e were "Aloha Nui," the Hawaiian farewell.

I had satisfied myself that, so far as concerned the carrying out of the President's Executive Order of March 14, 1907, the j.a.panese officials in both Hawaii and j.a.pan were doing everything in their power.

Hawaii at the time had a population of about 160,000, in round figures, of which about 80,000 were j.a.panese, 20,000 Chinese, and 25,000 native Hawaiians. Of the white element the biggest percentage were Portuguese, who numbered about 22,000, while all other Caucasians together, princ.i.p.ally American, British, and German, numbered 14,000. It therefore behooved our officials on the islands, in the Pacific ports, and along the Mexican border, to be especially watchful to carry out the regulations which the Department had formulated with regard to the admission of j.a.panese or Korean skilled and unskilled labor.

Soon after my return I had a conference with the President at Oyster Bay. The President informed me that Secretary Taft was about to leave for j.a.pan, to go from there to Russia by the Siberian Railroad. He said he had authorized him to see what could be done toward overcoming the difficulties in our relations, and what might be the effect in j.a.pan if we were to endeavor to pa.s.s a law giving naturalization to j.a.panese exclusive of the laboring cla.s.ses and the small traders who practically belonged to the same cla.s.s. This subject the President had urged in his last Message to Congress.

On October 25th I brought up in the Cabinet meeting, for the information of the President, statistics regarding j.a.panese immigration up to October 1, 1907, which showed that the immigration for the twelve months then ended was almost double that of the preceding twelve months, and also that there had been an appreciable increase since April 1, when the President's Executive Order went into effect, compared with the previous months. The statistics regarding the transit of j.a.panese between Mexico and Canada showed that something like six hundred and seventy registered from April to September, but only about one third that number actually made the transits. It was presumed, therefore, that the rest got off within United States territory.

The President seemed very much annoyed with this condition of things. I recalled to his mind that when the regulations under his Executive Order were originally presented by me, they contained a clause, along the lines of the Chinese regulation on the subject, to prevent the abuse of transit privileges, but that he and the Cabinet had decided it to be unwise to put in that clause. A few months thereafter, when we first suspected the abuse of transit privileges, I directed an accurate account to be taken of these transits, the result of which I now presented.

The first impulse of the President was to direct that all transit be denied, but I pointed out that that would raise considerable objection, as it would place the j.a.panese in a special cla.s.s in that respect. He insisted that something must be done. I suggested that the problem needed careful thought and I would take it up and prepare regulations similar to those for the Chinese. This I did, and the j.a.panese regulations differ only in that we do not require the photographing of the person to make the transit.

I did not propose to drop the matter of j.a.panese immigration and naturalization. Again and again I brought it up in Cabinet meetings. I believed the best way of adjusting the difficulties was to try to negotiate a treaty with j.a.pan permitting the naturalization of j.a.panese other than laboring cla.s.ses, and in return excluding all who came within the category of skilled or unskilled labor. The belief that such a treaty could be negotiated was confirmed by my talks with Ishii both at Honolulu and later when he visited Washington. The right to naturalization would be taken advantage of by only five or six thousand and would not, of course, be granted to the laborers then resident in the United States.

There were about seventy-three thousand j.a.panese in the United States, and it was fair to a.s.sume that two thirds of these were of the laboring cla.s.s. Of the remainder there was a small percentage of women and children, and then there were those born in America. j.a.panese eligible for citizenship would therefore not exceed ten or twelve thousand, and it was reasonable to a.s.sume that not more than half of them would be willing to throw off their native allegiance. My belief was that such an adjustment of the problem would leave no irritation behind it.

The President did not think such a treaty would be confirmed by the Senate, and to have it rejected would make matters worse. Secretary Metcalf thought the California members would not agree to such an arrangement. Notwithstanding these objections I was of the opinion that such force of argument could be found in favor of the arrangement that even representatives from California would not fail to see its advantage.

The whole question simmered along for a year or more, during which our understanding with j.a.pan in regard to the "Gentlemen's Agreement" and the regulations under it were put into concrete and final shape; that is, a letter was written by the j.a.panese amba.s.sador to our Secretary of State setting forth the understanding of j.a.pan, to which the Secretary replied accepting that understanding and setting forth the amicable relations existing between the two countries.

In late January, 1909, there was a recrudescence of anti-j.a.panese legislation in California. There were introduced in the State legislature three bills: (a) to exclude j.a.panese from ownership of land; (b) to segregate the j.a.panese in special districts of the city; (c) to prohibit j.a.panese from attending the public schools. With his usual good judgment the President telegraphed the Governor of California saying he was writing him and asking that he withhold any legislation affecting the j.a.panese until the receipt of that letter. For the time being this action had the desired effect.

The legislature of California was somewhat under the influence of agitators, like the j.a.panese and Korean Restriction League and some labor bodies. It was believed that the general sentiment of California was against such legislation, but either to avoid conflict, or from indifference or lack of public spirit, such sentiment did not make its influence felt. I had given out figures from month to month showing the number of immigrants from j.a.pan as compared with previous figures. I then made public statistics which showed that for the calendar year 1907 the number of immigrants was 12,400, whereas for the calendar year 1908, after the j.a.panese Government had taken the matter in hand in accordance with the "Gentlemen's Agreement," the number of immigrants was 4400.

Deducting the figure for the emigration from that 4400 left a total increase of j.a.panese population of only 185 for the year. The California agitators claimed my figures were erroneous, and that hordes of j.a.panese were surrept.i.tiously coming from the Canadian and Mexican borders. I gave out several interviews to the press to the effect that the figures were absolutely correct; that it was absurd to deny their correctness as I had proofs in my hands; and that if the Californians still doubted them a committee might call on me and I should gladly lay my proofs before them. I had sent a copy of these figures, certified by me, to the California authorities.

Happily our relations with j.a.pan are now more peaceful than they have been for some time, and to a large degree this has been accomplished by the Four Power Treaty negotiated at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in December, 1921. The various vexatious instances that I have referred to were stimulated by German officers stationed in the Far East and fostered by the sensational press in both j.a.pan and our own country. By this means these happenings were exaggerated far beyond their significance. The Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance of 1911 came into being because of the aggression of Germany and Russia in the Far East. After the World War, of course, this condition no longer obtained, and as the _raison d'etre_ of the alliance had therefore vanished, there was a justified feeling in America that the continuance of the treaty was a menace to our country. This fact was not unrecognized in Great Britain itself. As Mr. Balfour stated at the Washington Conference, it was necessary to "annul, merge, destroy, as it were, this ancient and outward and unnecessary agreement, and replace it by something new, something effective, which should embrace all the powers concerned in the vast area of the Pacific." By the Four Power Treaty the Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance was automatically discontinued, and Great Britain, the United States, France, and j.a.pan became a.s.sociated in friendly partnership as guardians of the peace in the Far East.

So far as concerns the relationship between our country and j.a.pan, the transcendent importance of this treaty has been to supersede and overshadow all these minor matters that before were continually menacing our good relations. By the reservations prepared by the American delegates, and accepted by the other powers, it is provided that the treaty "shall not be taken to embrace questions which according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective powers." Verily this treaty stands out as one of the great achievements of the Washington Conference.

To return to immigration problems during my inc.u.mbency as Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor, a minor though nevertheless annoying matter needing adjustment was the regulation with regard to the head tax. After the pa.s.sage of the Immigration Law of 1903 a head tax of two dollars was levied upon all alien pa.s.sengers, including even officials of foreign governments. In 1905 Attorney-General Moody had given an opinion to the effect that the tax applied to all alien pa.s.sengers, whether officers of foreign governments or not. I thought this contrary to the law of nations and to well-established diplomatic usages recognized throughout the world.

As the subject also came within the province of another department, namely, the Department of State, I naturally brought it up at a Cabinet meeting. The President recommended that I issue orders in accordance with my suggestion, and Secretary Root agreed that it was an outrage to levy such a tax upon the representatives of foreign governments.

Informally I took the matter up with Attorney-General Bonaparte, but as the decision against this immunity had been made by his Department he felt himself bound by the decision of his predecessor. He suggested that I issue the order on my own responsibility, but I decided for the time being not to do so. At a later Cabinet meeting I again brought up the matter, this time reading the order as I proposed it. The President and Secretary Root, also Secretary Taft, agreed that it should be issued, and this I did.

At the same time I discussed a provision of the Immigration Act of 1906 requiring masters of all vessels bringing in aliens, without exception, to fill out a blank or manifest giving the age, s.e.x, calling, nationality, race, of each alien, and whether able to read or write, and whether anarchist or not. These blanks then had to be signed by the aliens. I prepared two circulars, one ordering the discontinuance of the head tax and the other discontinuing the filling out of these blanks so far as concerned diplomatic or consular officials and other persons duly accredited from foreign governments to the United States, in service or in transit.

At dinner at the British amba.s.sador's home some weeks thereafter Lady Bryce mentioned having to sign a blank asking whether she believed in the practice of polygamy. Of course, she brought it up in a humorous way, but it was apparent that she had felt humiliated at such questioning. I told her I fully appreciated her feelings and was happy to be able to say that that stupid practice had been discontinued.

The subject of naturalization had occupied my attention for years past.

Under the law then existing, as well as under older laws, a person could be naturalized not only in the United States courts, but in any State court having a seal. And the naturalization laws prior to the Act of 1906 were most carelessly administered. In the larger cities of many of the States naturalization applications were hurried through in bunches at the direction of some political boss. In that way many persons were naturalized who would have been found, had time been taken to sift the applications, not ent.i.tled to citizenship. The effects of so careless a method I saw in Turkey, and in my dispatches to the State Department I repeatedly pointed out the evil.

Largely growing out of my presentation of the subject, Mr. Gaillard Hunt, chief of the pa.s.sport division of the State Department, had taken it up in his thorough manner and made a report to President McKinley, upon which the President appointed a commission to study the subject.

The commission was renewed by President Roosevelt. Its report, known as House Doc.u.ment 326, 59th Congress, 2d Session, and ent.i.tled "Citizenship of the United States, Expatriation, and Protection Abroad," was the basis of the Act of 1906. This act went far in preventing fraudulent naturalization as well as in withdrawing protection from those who were using United States citizenship not with the intention of becoming part of the new country in which they had chosen to reside, but as a means to escape their duties as subjects of the country of their origin upon returning there to live, as had happened so often in Turkey.

For the proper carrying out of this law additional examiners were needed, and also about eleven additional a.s.sistant district attorneys. I therefore arranged with Attorney-General Bonaparte to appear with him before the Appropriations Committee of the House to explain the necessity of an appropriation to cover the enlargement of the corps for the enforcement and administration of the new law. During my experience abroad much of the time of our diplomatic representatives was taken up with questions relating to the protection of our citizens, and often this protection was invoked by persons who should never have been naturalized.

The exclusion and deportation of criminals and anarchists was another phase of the immigration service to which I had given considerable study. I found the law provided for arrest and deportation of criminal aliens only up to three years of the time of their landing, and that there was gross misconception regarding the scope of the law. There was no cooperation between our immigration officials and the local police departments for the detection of such persons. The police departments of most of our cities were disposed to a.s.sume that by virtue of the immigration law the whole subject was under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government; and on the other hand our officials did not confer with munic.i.p.al officials to make use of the immigration law. It is one thing to provide for the exclusion of criminals and anarchists, but it is quite another to discover, on entry, whether a person belongs to either cla.s.s. They are usually neither illiterate nor lacking in cunning and deception, but within three years they may be detected, as "birds of a feather flock together."

I decided to issue a circular to all commissioners of immigration and immigration inspectors, with a view to bringing about cooperation with the local officials. I took the subject up in the Cabinet and the President approved. It so happened that while this circular was being prepared, an Italian immigrant, recently arrived, killed a Catholic priest in Denver while the latter was officiating at a ma.s.s in his church, and a day or two thereafter another recently arrived immigrant, a Russian, attacked the chief of police of Chicago and his family with a dagger. Both of these men would have come under the deportation provisions of the immigration law had the police been aware of these provisions, as in both instances they had been suspected, by their affiliations and their talk, of being anarchists, as that term is defined in the Immigration Act of February 20, 1907. Under the local criminal laws this suspicion was not enough to justify arrest.

Appearing as it did immediately after these two incidents my circular had much publicity and brought about the deportation of a number of undesirables upon evidence supplied by the police and detective officers.

In a Department which covered so many and such varied subjects, the conflict between human and property interests was often apparent. I recall a remark by the President, as we were speaking about this, that whenever within my jurisdiction there occurred this conflict he was sure I would lean on the human side, and I could always count on his support.

A striking example of this conflict grew out of an order I issued for the inspection of excursion and ferry boats at least three times a year instead of once. The summer before I took office the boiler of the General Sloc.u.m, a large excursion boat on the Long Island Sound, blew up and caused the death of over a hundred women and children. As spring approached and the excursion season drew near, I made up my mind that I should make all possible provision to prevent the recurrence of any such disaster.

I accompanied the supervising inspector-general, George Uhler, to witness the inspection of some pa.s.senger boats plying between Washington and Norfolk, to get personal knowledge of the details of inspection. I carefully studied a report made to me by Mr. Murray, the a.s.sistant secretary of my Department, who had been a member of the board of inquiry into the Sloc.u.m disaster and later the Valencia wreck. I called a meeting of the board of supervising inspectors of steamboats and impressed upon them the importance of great care in inspection. I urged that no man be retained in the inspection service who was not thoroughly competent and efficient, since they had to deal with the protection of human life.