Troublous Times in Canada - Part 13
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Part 13

The Under-Secretary of State for War:-

Sir,-With reference to the several reports which have been received from the General Officer Commanding in Canada relative to the Fenian movement in that Province, and to the measures taken by the colonists for repelling any Fenian attack, I am directed by the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief to request that you will acquaint the Secretary of State for War that His Royal Highness, having observed the alacrity, loyalty and zeal shown by the volunteers and militia forces of Canada in having come forward for the defence of the colony on the late trying occasion, in support of the troops, is very desirous of expressing to the force his full appreciation of their gallant and energetic behavior, and the very great gratification and satisfaction he has thereby experienced. And His Royal Highness trusts, therefore, that Lieut.-General Peel will see no objection to the necessary communication being made by him to the Colonial Office, with the view to His Royal Highness' sentiments, as above expressed, being made known through the proper channel to the volunteers and militia of Canada, lately employed against the Fenians.

I am, etc., W. F. FOSTER.

LORD MONCK'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION.

In acknowledgment of the service rendered by the United States Government in checking the invasion, Lord Monck, the Governor-General of Canada, sent the following despatch to Sir Frederick Bruce, the British Minister at Washington, for presentation to Secretary of State Seward:- OTTAWA, June 11th, 1866.

Sir,-I have learned from the public press the terms of the Proclamation which the President of the United States of America has promulgated against the hostile designs of the Fenians on the Province, the Government of which I have the honor to administer. I have also, by the same means, been made acquainted with the orders issued by the Attorney-General of the United States and other officers of the Administration of that country for the apprehension of the persons of Fenian conspirators and the stoppage and seizure of arms and other supplies intended to be used by them against Canada. As these proceedings of the Government of the United States have materially tended to defeat the hostile purposes of the Fenians against this Province, I shall feel much obliged if you will convey to the Secretary of State for the United States my acknowledgments of the course which has been adopted by that Government in reference to this matter.

I have, etc...

(Signed) MONCK.

LORD MONCK'S REPORT TO THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.

In presenting his report to the Right Hon. E. Cardwell, Secretary of State of the British Government, Lord Monck sent the following despatch, which was accompanied by the reports of the Lieutenant-General and other officers who were in command of troops during the campaign:-

OTTAWA. June 14th, 1866.

Sir,-I have the honor to transmit for your information, the reports to the Lieutenant-General commanding Her Majesty's forces of the several officers, relating to the proceedings connected with the late Fenian invasion at Fort Erie, Canada West. I think these doc.u.ments substantially corroborate the account which I gave you from telegraphic and other information in my despatches of the 1st, 4th and 8th instant.

From all the information I have received, I am now satisfied that a very large and comprehensive plan of attack had been arranged by the party which is popularly known as the Sweeny-Roberts section of the Fenian Brotherhood.

The plan of invasion, in addition to the attempt on the Niagara frontier-the only one which actually occurred-appears to have embraced attacks on the line of the Richelieu and Lake Champlain, and also on the frontier in the neighborhood of Prescott and Cornwall, where I have reason to think the princ.i.p.al demonstration was intended.

For the latter object, large bodies of men, sent by railroad from almost all parts of the United States, were a.s.sembled at a place called Malone, in the State of New York, and at Potsdam, also in the State of New York, and with a view to the former, St. Albans and its neighborhood in the State of Vermont was selected as the place of a.s.semblage.

Large supplies of arms, accoutrements and ammunition were also attempted to be forwarded by railroad to these points, but owing to the active intervention of the authorities of the United States-as soon as it became apparent that a breach of international law had been committed by these persons-a very large portion of these supplies never reached their destination.

It is not easy to arrive at a trustworthy estimate of the number of men who actually arrived at their different points of rendezvous. It has been reported at times that there were at Potsdam, Malone, and the intervening country, as many as ten thousand men, and similar rumors have been from time to time circulated of the force at St. Albans and its neighborhood. From the best opinion I can form, however, I shall be inclined to think that the number of Fenians in the vicinity of St. Albans never exceeded two thousand men, and that three thousand would be a fair allowance for those a.s.sembled at Potsdam, Malone, and the surrounding counties. The men have been represented to me as having, many of them, served in the late Civil War in the United States-to have had a considerable amount of small arms of a good and efficient description. I have not heard of their possessing any artillery, and I am informed that they were deficient in the supplies of ammunition and totally dest.i.tute of all the other equipments of an organized force. They appear to have relied very much on a.s.sistance from the inhabitants of the Province, as the force which invaded Fort Erie brought with them-as I am told-a large quant.i.ty of spare arms to put in the hands of their sympathizers whom they expected to join them. I have in my former despatches noticed the measures which were adopted by the Provincial Government in order to place at the disposal of the Lieutenant-General commanding Her Majesty's forces, the Provincial resources available for defence, both by land and water. The reports of the officers of the army and volunteers, which I transmit, will acquaint you with the manner in which these means were used by the officers in command. I am happy to be able to bear my tribute to the energy and good faith exhibited by the American Government and its officials in checking all infractions of international obligations on the part of any portion of its citizens from the moment that it became evident that an invasion of the Province by the Fenians had actually taken place. The determination of the Government of the United States to stop the transportation of men and supplies to the places of a.s.sembly, rendered even the temporary success on the part of the Fenians impossible; while the large forces which the Lieutenant-General commanding was able to concentrate at each of the points threatened, had the effect of deterring from an attack the portion of the conspirators who had already arrived at their places of rendezvous. No invasion in force occurred except at Fort Erie. A slight incursion took place at a place called St. Armand, about thirteen miles from St. John's, on the borders of the County of Missisquoi, which ended in the capture of about sixteen prisoners, without any loss on our side.

The latest accounts I have received announced that the men who had congregated at the different points of a.s.sembly were being transmitted to their homes at the expense of the Government of the United States, most of the leaders having been arrested and held to bail to answer for their conduct.

Although I deplore the loss which the Volunteer Force suffered when engaged on the 2nd of June at Lime Ridge, amounting to six killed and thirty-one wounded. I think it is a matter for congratulation that a movement which might have been so formidable has collapsed with so small an amount of loss, either of life or property. I think it is also a source of satisfaction that such strong proofs have been afforded of the spirit which animates the Canadian people, of their loyalty to the throne, of their appreciation of the free inst.i.tutions under which they live, and of their readiness at all times to prove their sense of the value of these inst.i.tutions by incurring expense and personal risk in the defence of them. The period of the year at which the people have been called on to make these sacrifices of timely serving in the volunteer ranks has been the most inconvenient that could have been selected, yet I have never heard a murmur from any quarter at the necessity of suspending industrial occupation involving the risk of a whole year's production, while I have received information of a good deal of discontent on the part of those who were anxious to give their services, but whose presence in the ranks was not considered necessary.

I have to express my very high sense of the services performed by Lieutenant-General Sir J. Michel and the officers under his command in the able disposition of troops, both regulars and volunteers. The officers of the Royal Navy stationed at Quebec and Montreal deserve the highest credit for the rapidity with which they extemporized gunboats for the defence of the St. Lawrence and the Lakes. I have already spoken of the admirable spirit displayed by the Volunteer Force, both officers and men. I have every reason to believe that their conduct as regards discipline and order has ent.i.tled them to as much commendation as does their spirit of patriotism and self-reliance.

I desire particularly to bring before your notice the ability and energy exhibited by Colonel Macdougall, A.G.M., with a view to having his services specially mentioned to His Royal Highness, the Commander-in-Chief. This officer has not yet been one year in Canada, yet so admirable is the system of organization which he has established that he is able within a few hours to a.s.semble on any given point over a line of more than 1,000 miles, ma.s.ses of volunteers who at the time the order was given were scattered over the country pursuing their ordinary avocations. While I attribute full credit to the excellent spirit of the people for its share in this effect, I think the administrative ability which has given practical operation to this good feeling of the population ought to have its meed of praise and in the interests of the public service on some possible future emergency ought not to be left without official record.

There are prisoners in our hands to the number of about one hundred and fifty. (I have not yet received official returns of them), whose trial will be proceeded with at an early day.

I confidently expect within a few days to be able to dismiss to their homes the great majority of the Volunteers, and my firm conviction is, that this disturbance will produce beneficial effects by discrediting Fenian enterprises, exhibiting the futility of any attempt at invasion of the Province, and showing the absence of all disaffection amongst any portion of the people of Canada.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) MONCK.

The Right Honorable E. Cardwell.

WELLAND COUNTY HONORS THE BRAVE.

The services of the officers and men of the Welland Ca.n.a.l Field Battery and the Dunnville Naval Brigade-for their gallantry in the fight at Fort Erie-were recognized by the Munic.i.p.al Council of the County of Welland by the public presentation to each of them of a handsome silver medal, commemorative of the occasion. In addition, Capt. King and Capt. McCallum were each presented with handsome swords of honor by the County Council, as special marks of appreciation of their bravery by the people of the county. To each of the wounded a grant of 100 acres of the lands owned by the county in the Cranberry Marsh was given. In addition to the above honors the Corporation of the Village of Fort Erie presented Capt. King with a valuable sword as a testimonial of their recognition of his services at that place on the 2nd of June.

CHAPTER XVII.

A RETROSPECT OF EVENTS-A COMBINATION OF UNFORTUNATE CIRc.u.mSTANCES INVOLVE LEADING OFFICERS.

That the campaign on the Niagara frontier might have been conducted on lines which would have proved much more satisfactory for the success of the Canadian forces, is admitted. It seemed to be a combination of errors and omissions from the beginning, which furnished food for unfavorable criticism and condemnation by journalistic and arm-chair critics which created impressions on the public mind that exist even at the present day. Of course each critic would have done different-this plan or that plan "should have been" adopted, regardless of all military rules. The trite saying that "nothing succeeds like success" should be supplemented by adding, "and nothing more reprehensive than failure." In military operations success or defeat are in the scales, and the least little occurrence is liable to outbalance the other. No matter how carefully a commanding officer may lay his plans, or how minutely he may explain them to his staff and subordinates, if one does not do his part in promptly carrying out instructions at the proper moment, the whole machinery is thrown out of gear, and failure is the inevitable result.

In the first place, while Gen. Napier's plan of campaign was excellent in itself, there were several very important things omitted that were essential to its success. That of the greatest importance was the lack of proper provision being made for obtaining information of the exact position and movements of the enemy, such as a corps of competent scouts could have given. That omission is fatal to the success of any military movement. Again, those who were in command of columns on the 2nd of June do not seem to have had an intelligent idea of the country they were about to move over, and had to rely on whatever chance information they could obtain, much of which, in the excited state of the minds of the people, was unreliable. To condemn any particular officer for an unlooked-for disaster is a serious matter, unless such defeat is clearly the result of his own negligence, or some movement of which he had personal control. Therefore critics should always be careful to put the saddle of blame on the right horse.

As Col. Peac.o.c.ke had been a.s.signed to the immediate command of the troops operating on the Niagara frontier by Gen. Napier, it will be noted (as related in a former chapter) that he arrived at Chippawa on the evening of June 1st, with a considerable number of regular troops and a complete battery of field guns, manned by experienced gunners of the Royal Artillery. His reinforcements from Toronto and St. Catharines were closely following, and quickly available. That night he sent Capt. Akers across the country with definite orders to Lieut.-Col. Booker to move eastward to Ridgeway by rail at 5 o'clock the next morning, and effect a junction with his (Col. Peac.o.c.ke's) column at Stevensville at 10 o'clock. These instructions stated that Col. Peac.o.c.ke would leave Chippawa at 6 a.m., and in accordance with this programme Lieut.-Col. Booker proceeded to carry out his orders. On the other hand, it was nearly 8 o 'clock before Col. Peac.o.c.ke left Chippawa, which threw the whole programme out of joint by nearly two hours. Various excuses were made for the delay, but some of them were not very tenable. The regulars had had a good night's rest, and the volunteers (who were all on the ground at Chippawa before 4.30 a.m.) were eager and willing to proceed. Why he did not leave Chippawa by at least 6 o'clock (in the cool hours of the morning) is not sufficiently clear. A pilot engine was sent up the line of the Erie & Niagara Railway early in the morning, upon which were Lieut.-Col. John Hillyard Cameron and a detail of riflemen from the St. Catharines Battery of Artillery. They made a reconnaissance nearly as far as Black Creek, and returned with the report that they had not observed any signs of the enemy between Chippawa and that point. This was before Col. Peac.o.c.ke started on his march. Why could it not have been possible for him to have moved a portion of his advance up by train as far as Black Creek, was a question that was prevalent at the time. But Col. Peac.o.c.ke was not apparently taking any chances. He appears to have been overly cautious, and was disposed to adopt the old-time method of plodding along the beaten trail. Here again he made a mistake in taking "the longest way around" to reach Stevensville, while the intense heat and dust began to tell on his troops, which compelled him to halt at New Germany about 11 o'clock. Before reaching there he was informed of the disaster at Ridgeway by parties who had arrived from the battle-field. Why, then, did he not push on in search of the enemy, instead of remaining at New Germany until 5.30 p.m.? is another question. Excuses are easily framed and plausibly given in reports, but the country generally, and his soldiers particularly, have always thought that he might have managed to have got into a conflict with the enemy in some way. Col. Peac.o.c.ke was a very fine gentleman, and had the reputation of being a skilful military officer, but his extreme caution in this campaign spoiled all chances of any success in winning the renown that might have been his portion had he acted with snap and celerity of movement in battering the Fenian army before they left Canada. He had the opportunity, the men and the guns, but he let his golden chances slip by while he idly pa.s.sed away the time "resting" at Chippawa and New Germany.

Capt. Akers was another officer whose action in consenting with the ideas of Lieut.-Col. Dennis to change the plans of their commanding officer is inexplicable. Why these two officers should have dared to a.s.sume such responsibility is beyond all comprehension. A soldier's first duty is obedience to orders, and as these had been definitely issued by Col. Peac.o.c.ke, it was manifestly not their business to change them, but to see that they were rigidly carried out. For that purpose Capt. Akers had been specially despatched from Chippawa to Port Colborne; but in less than half an hour after his arrival he was busily engaged with Lieut.-Col. Dennis and Lieut.-Col. Booker in concocting a new plan of campaign. After deciding on what they intended to do, they condescendingly notified Col. Peac.o.c.ke of the change in his own plans, and without, waiting for a reply they started off for Fort Erie on the steamer "W. T. Robb" to put them in execution. Such a.s.sumption was certainly astounding, and no doubt Col. Peac.o.c.ke had a choleric fit when he was apprised of it. This was another mistake, which contributed largely to the defeat of Col. Peac.o.c.ke's purposes, and left a cloud on the military prestige of both Lieut.-Col. Dennis and Capt. Akers. As Lieut.-Col. Booker had also been persuaded to join in the new plan, he was making his arrangements to do so when he received an imperative order by telegraph from Col. Peac.o.c.ke to adhere to his original instructions.

As Lieut.-Col. Dennis and Capt. Akers sailed away in high hope from Port Colborne, they probably built the fairy air castles which were doomed to totter and fall before night. It did not seem to occur to them that Col. Peac.o.c.ke's sanction to, and co-operation in, their change of plan would be necessary to ensure success. Therefore their disappointment must have been great when they found that Lieut.-Col. Booker failed to arrive at Fort Erie at 7 o'clock, as provided in their new arrangement. At this hour Lieut.-Col. Booker was leaving Ridgeway (in pursuance of his latest orders) on his march for Stevensville, and soon after had the misfortune to strike the enemy in force. And thereby hangs another tale of a grave mistake, which brought considerable censure to that officer. The story of the battle is told elsewhere, and need not be repeated.

In the light of official reports and the testimony of officers and men who were engaged in the battle of Lime Ridge, the disaster which occurred to Lieut.-Col. Booker's column (almost in the moment of victory) can be attributed wholly to a fatal order being given at the most critical time in the progress of the fight. Lieut.-Col. Booker had up to that eventful moment displayed singular sagacity and wisdom in the handling of his troops, and had correctly followed the usual military rules which would be applicable to the occasion. But somebody appears to have originated the report that the enemy were about to make a cavalry charge, and at this crisis, when the troops were ordered to "Form square," the demon of disaster suddenly appeared. It was the proper order to have given had there really been a cavalry force advancing, but as the alarm originated in the imagination of others, for which there was no valid reason, the movement proved a mistake which turned the tide of battle and caused the dire disaster for which Lieut.-Col. Booker was, and is to this day, most unjustly blamed. A little reflection on the part of his critics might have tended to tone down their asperity and given him some credit for what he did do, both before and after the unfortunate order was given. But some person had to take the blame, and Lieut.-Col. Hooker was made the victim of circ.u.mstances. Here was a volunteer Colonel (who had never previously commanded a brigade) suddenly placed in command of the whole column because he happened to be the senior officer present, and ordered to advance across the path of the enemy to make a junction with Col. Peac.o.c.ke's forces at Stevensville. His orders were to leave Port Colborne at a certain hour, which he did-exactly on time. He was handicapped in many ways, yet he did his duty and carried out the orders he received to the letter. He had neither cavalry, artillery or scouts with his column, so that his position was not a very enviable one. Had Capt. Akers remained with Col. Booker instead of going off on an excursion with Lieut.-Col. Dennis on the tug "Robb," his presence might have made some difference in the fortunes of the battle at Lime Ridge. Lieut.-Col. Booker had no staff officer to a.s.sist him, and in this position Capt. Akers might have been of some service, and won more glory than he did in the campaign. As to Lieut.-Col. Booker's conduct on the field at Lime Ridge (which was so unfavorably commented upon by the public press and carping critics who accepted the mult.i.tude of erroneous rumors that were prevalent during that period of excitement), it may lie stated that the whole affair was fully investigated by a Military Court of Inquiry, composed of three competent officers of high and honorable standing, who took the sworn testimony of a large number of officers and men who were engaged in the battle. As the whole evidence, and a full report of the proceedings of the Court, are published as an appendix to this book, it will prove very interesting to the reader, and serve to give an intelligent idea of the events narrated, from which you can draw your own conclusions as to whether Lieut.-Col. Booker was unjustly censured or not.

Another officer who was roundly condemned by the officers and men under his command, and by the public generally, for his singular conduct during the engagement at Fort Erie, was Lieut.-Col. J. S. Dennis, who was in command of the expedition on the steamer "W. T. Robb." Grave charges were filed against this officer, which resulted in a Court of Inquiry being appointed to investigate the case. As the charges made and the finding of the Court will be found in the latter portion of the appendix of this book, the writer will not discuss them here. Suffice it to say that the officers and men of the force which he landed on the dock at Port Erie on the 2nd of June, and placed in great jeopardy and peril, were not at all satisfied with the opinion of the Court, which they considered in the nature of a "white-wash" for Lieut.-Col. Dennis (and a thin coat at that), as the President of the Court dissented from the finding of his two colleagues on two charges, but was over-ruled by them.

CHAPTER XVIII.

DANGERS WHICH EXISTED PREVIOUS TO CONFEDERATION OF THE PROVINCES-PROPOSALS OF ANNEXATION TO THE UNITED STATES-LESSONS LEARNED BY THE FENIAN RAID.

Forty-four years have elapsed since the perilous events recorded in the preceding pages occurred. A new generation has come and grown into middle life, while the second generation is now budding forth into manhood and womanhood. How many of these are conversant with the history of their own country? Beyond a very vague knowledge of what has been taught to them in a superficial manner in our schools and colleges, and the fragmentary reminiscences that may have been recounted to them by their sires and grandsires who pa.s.sed through these troublous times, it is doubtful whether even one-tenth of our present population have any idea of just how near Canada came to being absorbed by the United States in that critical period.

At that time Canada was in a peculiar position, which may be described as "a house divided within itself," as there was no cohesion among the scattered Provinces, each regulating its own affairs, with the exception of Canada East and Canada West (now Quebec and Ontario) who were governed by the same Parliament. The situation was certainly a dark and serious one. We had subtle traitors at home and scheming enemies abroad who labored a.s.siduously to bring about annexation, but the stern spirit of loyalty to the British Crown which pervaded the hearts of the people as a whole, and the wise statesmanship of that n.o.ble group of patriots whose names will go ringing down through the corridors of time in the existence of our nation as "The Fathers of Confederation," saved the situation, and made Canada what it is to-day, a heritage of which our sons and daughters may well feel proud.

It was during the year 1866 that the apostles of Confederation were busy educating the people of the different Provinces in the creed of that very desirable proposition. While they met serious opposition in some portions of what is now our grand Dominion, yet in others the proposal was received favorably, while one or two of the Provinces expressed an antipathy to the movement. But just at this time two important events occurred which had a material bearing on the question, and had an effect in bringing about the Union. The first was the sudden abrogation by the United States of the Reciprocity Treaty which for some years had existed between the Canadian Provinces and that country, and the second the Fenian Raid. Each of these events sent a thrill through the Canadian people which fired their hearts and settled the project of Confederation. The necessity of united action in defence, and co-operation in other matters for the benefit of the whole, was heartily admitted, and forthwith the Provinces joined hands and hearts in bringing about its early consummation. The full meaning of the motto, "United we Stand-Divided we Fall," was realized by the majority, and the necessary legislation was carried through the several Provincial Parliaments that year, which received Imperial sanction, and resulted in the birth of the Dominion of Canada on July 1st, 1867.

While the campaign for Confederation was in progress, and its stalwart advocates were using their best endeavors throughout the country to bring the project to fruition, considerable opposition was manifested by a certain section who favored annexation to the United States. These men were backed up by American influences, and went so far as to secure the a.s.sistance of several prominent United States Congressmen to draft a proposal whereby the Provinces of Canada might become annexed and made certain States of the Union. The subject was discussed seriously by a large section of the American press, while statesmen and others who were eager to acquire our territory lost no opportunity to present their views in that respect.

While the annexation pot was boiling, and the Fenians were still threatening another raid, the question was brought before the American people in a tangible form. On the 2nd of July, 1866, the following bill was reported to the United States Congress by Representative Banks, and recommitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. As viewed in the light of the present day, its provisions contain very interesting reading:-

A Bill for the admission of the States of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Canada East and Canada West, and for the organization of the Territories of Selkirk, Saskatchewan and Columbia.

SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, of America in Congress a.s.sembled, That the President of the United States is hereby authorized and directed, whenever notice shall be deposited in the Department of State, that the Governments of Great Britain and the Provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, Canada, British Columbia, and Vancouver's Island, have accepted the proposition hereinafter made by the United States, to publish by proclamation that, from the date thereof, the States of Nova-Scotia, New Brunswick, Canada East and Canada West, and the Territories of Selkirk, Saskatchewan, and Columbia, with limits and rights as by this Act defined, are const.i.tuted and admitted as States and Territories of the United States of America.

SEC. 2. Be it further enacted, etc., That the following articles are hereby proposed, and from the date of the proclamation of the President of the United States shall take effect, as irrevocable conditions of the admission of the States of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Canada East and Canada West, and the future States of Selkirk, Saskatchewan and Columbia, to wit:

Article I. All public lands not sold or granted; ca.n.a.ls, public harbours, lighthouses and piers; river and lake improvements; railways, mortgages and other debts due by railway companies to the Provinces; custom houses and post offices shall vest in the United States; but all other public works and property shall belong to the State Governments respectively, hereby const.i.tuted, together with all sums due from purchasers or lessees of lands, mines, or minerals at the time of the union.

Article II. In consideration of public lands, works, and property vested as aforesaid in the United States, the United States will a.s.sume and discharge the funded debt and contingent liabilities of the late Provinces at rates of interest not exceeding five per centum, to the amount of $85,700,000, apportioned as follows: To Canada West, $36,500,000; to Canada East, $29,000,000; to Nova Scotia, $8,000,000; to New Brunswick, $7,000,000; to Newfoundland, $3,200,000; and to Prince Edward Island, $2,000,000; and in further consideration of the transfer by said Provinces to the United States of the power to levy import and export duties, the United States will make an annual grant of $1,646,000 in aid of local expenditures, to be apportioned as follows: To Canada West, $700,000; to Canada East, $550,000; to Nova Scotia. $165,000; to Newfoundland, $65,000; to Prince Edward Island, $40,000.

Article III. For all purposes of State organization and representation in the Congress of the United States. Newfoundland shall be a part of Canada East, and Prince Edward Island shall be a part of Nova Scotia, except that each shall always be a separate representative district, and ent.i.tled to elect at least one member of the House of Representatives, and except also that the munic.i.p.al authorities of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island shall receive the indemnities agreed to be paid by the United States in Article II.

Article IV. Territorial divisions are established as follows: (1) New Brunswick, with its present limits; (2) Nova Scotia, with the addition of Prince Edward Island; (3) Canada East, with the addition of Newfoundland and all territory east of longitude 80 deg, and south of Hudson Straits; (4) Canada West, with the addition of territory south of Hudson's Bay, and between longitude 80 and 90 deg.; (5) Selkirk Territory, bounded east by longitude 90 deg., south by the late boundary of the United States, west by longitude 105 deg., and north by the Arctic Circle; (6) Saskatchewan Territory, bounded east by longitude 105 deg., south by lat.i.tude 49 deg., west by the Rocky Mountains, and north by lat.i.tude 70 deg.; (7) Columbia Territory, including Vancouver's Island and Queen Charlotte's Island, and bounded east and north by the Rocky Mountains, south by lat.i.tude 40 deg., and west by the Pacific Ocean and Russian America. But Congress reserves the right of changing the limits and subdividing the areas of the western territories at discretion.

Article V. Until the next decennial revision, representation in the House of Representatives shall be as follows: Canada West, 12 members; Canada East, including Newfoundland, 11 members; New Brunswick, 2 members; Nova Scotia, including Prince Edward Island, 4 members.