Another five minutes pa.s.sed, and most of our squadrons had now descended to refuel. In many cases our resources could not give them overhead protection. Then it appeared that the enemy were going home. The shifting of the discs on the table below showed a continuous eastward movement of German bombers and fighters. No new attack appeared. In another ten minutes the action was ended. We climbed again the stairways which led to the surface, and almost as we emerged the "All Clear" sounded.

"We are very glad, sir, you have seen this," said Park. "Of course, during the last twenty minutes we were so choked with information that we couldn't handle it. This shows you the limitation of our present resources. They have been strained far beyond their limits today." I asked whether any results had come to hand, and remarked that the attack appeared to have been repelled satisfactorily. Park replied that he was not satisfied that we had intercepted as many raiders as he had hoped we should. It was evident that the enemy had everywhere pierced our defences. Many scores of German bombers, with their fighter escort, had been reported over London. About a dozen had been brought down while I was below, but no picture of the results of the battle or of the damage or losses could be obtained.

It was 4.30 P.M P.M. before I got back to Chequers, and I immediately went to bed for my afternoon sleep. I must have been tired by the drama of Number 11 Group, for I did not wake till eight. When I rang, John Martin, my princ.i.p.al private secretary, came in with the evening budget of news from all over the world. It was repellent. This had gone wrong here; that had been delayed there; an unsatisfactory answer had been received from so-and-so; there had been bad sinkings in the Atlantic. "However," said Martin, as he finished this account, "all is redeemed by the air. We have shot down a hundred and eighty-three for a loss of under forty."

Although post-war information has shown that the enemy's losses on this day were only fifty-six, September 15 was the crux of the Battle of Britain. That same night our Bomber Command attacked in strength the shipping in the ports from Boulogne to Antwerp. At Antwerp particularly heavy losses were inflicted. On September 17, as we now know, the Fuehrer decided to postpone "Sea Lion" indefinitely. It was not till October 12 that the invasion was formally called off till the following spring. In July, 1941, it was postponed again by Hitler till the spring of 1942, "by which time the Russian campaign will be completed." This was a vain but an important imagining. On February 13, 1942, Admiral Raeder had his final interview on "Sea Lion" and got Hitler to agree to a complete "stand-down." Thus perished "Operation Sea Lion." And September 15 may stand as the date of its demise.

The German Naval Staff were in hearty accord with all the postponements; indeed, they instigated them. The Army leaders made no complaint. On the l7th I said in Parliament: The process of waiting keyed up to concert pitch day after day is apt in time to lose its charm of novelty. Sunday's action was the most brilliant and fruitful of any fought up to that date by the fighters of the Royal Air Force.... We may await the decision of this long air battle with sober but increasing confidence.

An impartial observer, Brigadier-General Strong, a.s.sistant Chief of the United States War Plans Division and Head of the American Military Mission which had been sent to London to observe the results of the Luftwaffe attacks, arrived back in New York on the 19th, and reported that the Luftwaffe "had made no serious inroad on the strength of the R.A.F., that the military damage done by air bombardment had been comparatively small, and that British claims of German aircraft losses were 'on the conservative side.' "

Yet the Battle of London was still to be fought out. Although invasion had been called off, it was not till September 27 that Goering gave up hope that his method of winning the war might succeed. In October, though London received its full share, the German effort was spread by day and night in frequent small-scale attacks on many places. Concentration of effort gave way to dispersion; the battle of attrition began. Attrition! But whose?

In cold blood, with the knowledge of the after-time, we may study the actual losses of the British and German Air Forces in what may well be deemed one of the decisive battles of the world. From the table our hopes and fears may be contrasted with what happened.

No doubt we were always oversanguine in our estimates of enemy scalps. In the upshot we got two to one of the German a.s.sailants, instead of three to one, as we believed and declared. But this was enough. The Royal Air Force, far from being destroyed, was triumphant. A strong flow of fresh pilots was provided. The aircraft factories, upon which not only our immediate need but our power to wage a long war depended, were mauled but not paralysed. The workers, skilled and unskilled, men and women alike, stood to their lathes and manned the workshops under fire, as if they were batteries in action which, indeed, they were. At the Ministry of Supply, Herbert Morrison spurred all in his wide sphere. "Go to it," he adjured, and to it they went. Skilful and ever-ready support was given to the air fighting by the Anti-Aircraft Command under General Pile. Their main contribution came later. The Observer Corps, devoted and tireless, were hourly at their posts. The carefully wrought organisation of Fighter Command, without which all might have been vain, proved equal to months of continuous strain. All played their part.

[image]

Further tables will be found in Appendix C Appendix C.

At the summit the stamina and valour of our fighter pilots remained unconquerable and supreme. Thus Britain was saved. Well might I say in the House of Commons, "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few."

[image]

2.

The Blitz

Successive Phases of the German Attack - Goering a.s.sumes Command of the Air Battle - His Attempt to Conquer London - Hitler's Boast - Fifty-Seven Nights' Bombardment (September 7 to November 3) - General Pile's Barrage - Some Personal Notes - Downing Street and the Annexe - Mr. Chamberlain's Fort.i.tude After His Major Operation - He Consents to Leave London - A Dinner at Number 10 - My Lucky Inspiration - The Bomb in the Treasury Courtyard - Burning Pall Mall - Destruction of the Carlton Club - Courage of the People - The Margate Restaurant and the War Damage Insurance Scheme - Rules for the Public Departments - The "Alert" and the "Alarm" - The "Banshee Howlings" - The Cabinet Advances Its Meal Times - Our Expectation that London Would be Reduced to Rubble - Haughty Mood of Parliament - I Persuade Them to Act with Prudence - Their Good Fortune.

THE G GERMAN AIR a.s.sAULT on Britain is a tale of divided counsels, conflicting purposes, and never fully accomplished plans. Three or four times in these months the enemy abandoned a method of attack which was causing us severe stress, and turned to something new. But all these stages overlapped one another, and cannot be readily distinguished by precise dates. Each one merged into the next. The early operations sought to engage our air forces in battle over the Channel and the south coast; next, the struggle was continued over our southern counties, princ.i.p.ally Kent and Suss.e.x, the enemy aiming to destroy our air-power organisation; then nearer to and over London; then London became the supreme target; and finally, when London triumphed, there was a renewed dispersion to the provincial cities and to the sole life-line by the Mersey and the Clyde. on Britain is a tale of divided counsels, conflicting purposes, and never fully accomplished plans. Three or four times in these months the enemy abandoned a method of attack which was causing us severe stress, and turned to something new. But all these stages overlapped one another, and cannot be readily distinguished by precise dates. Each one merged into the next. The early operations sought to engage our air forces in battle over the Channel and the south coast; next, the struggle was continued over our southern counties, princ.i.p.ally Kent and Suss.e.x, the enemy aiming to destroy our air-power organisation; then nearer to and over London; then London became the supreme target; and finally, when London triumphed, there was a renewed dispersion to the provincial cities and to the sole life-line by the Mersey and the Clyde.

We have seen how very hard they had run us in the attack on the south-coast airfields in the last week of August and the first week of September. But on September 7, Goering publicly a.s.sumed command of the air battle, and turned from daylight to night attack and from the fighter airfields of Kent and Suss.e.x to the vast built-up areas of London. Minor raids by daylight were frequent, indeed constant, and one great daylight attack was still to come; but in the main the whole character of the German offensive was altered. For fifty-seven nights the bombing of London was unceasing. This const.i.tuted an ordeal for the world's largest city, the results of which no one could measure beforehand. Never before was so wide an expanse of houses subjected to such bombardment or so many families required to face its problems and its terrors.

The sporadic raiding of London towards the end of August was promptly answered by us in a retaliatory attack on Berlin. Because of the distance we had to travel, this could only be on a very small scale compared with attacks on London from nearby French and Belgian airfields. The War Cabinet were much in the mood to hit back, to raise the stakes, and to defy the enemy. I was sure they were right, and believed that nothing impressed or disturbed Hitler so much as his realisation of British wrath and will-power. In his heart he was one of our admirers. He took, of course, full advantage of our reprisal on Berlin, and publicly announced the previously settled German policy of reducing London and other British cities to chaos and ruin. "If they attack our cities," he declared on September 4, "we will simply rub out theirs." He tried his best.

The first German aim had been the destruction of our air-power; the second was to break the spirit of the Londoner, or at least render uninhabitable the world's largest city. In these new purposes the enemy did not succeed. The victory of the Royal Air Force had been gained by the skill and daring of our pilots, by the excellence of our machines, and by their wonderful organisation. Other virtues not less splendid, not less indispensable to the life of Britain, were now to be displayed by millions of ordinary humble people, who proved to the world the strength of a community nursed in freedom.

From September 7 to November 3 an average of two hundred German bombers attacked London every night. The various preliminary raids which had been made upon our provincial cities in the previous three weeks had led to a considerable dispersion of our anti-aircraft artillery, and when London first became the main target there were but ninety-two guns in position. It was thought better to leave the air free for our night-fighters, working under Number 11 Group. Of these there were six squadrons of Blenheims and Defiants. Night-fighting was in its infancy, and very few casualties were inflicted on the enemy. Our batteries therefore remained silent for three nights in succession. Their own technique was at this time woefully imperfect. Nevertheless, in view of the weakness of our night-fighters and of their unsolved problems, it was decided that the anti-aircraft gunners should be given a free hand to fire at unseen targets, using any methods of control they liked. In forty-eight hours General Pile, commanding the Air Defence Artillery, had more than doubled the number of guns in the capital by withdrawals from the provincial cities. Our own aircraft were kept out of the way, and the batteries were given their chance.

For three nights Londoners had sat in their houses or inadequate shelters enduring what seemed to be an utterly unresisted attack. Suddenly, on September 10, the whole barrage opened, accompanied by a blaze of searchlights. This roaring cannonade did not do much harm to the enemy, but gave enormous satisfaction to the population. Everyone was cheered by the feeling that we were hitting back. From that time onward the batteries fired regularly, and of course practice, ingenuity, and grinding need steadily improved the shooting. A slowly increasing toll was taken of the German raiders. Upon occasions the batteries were silent and the night-fighters, whose methods were also progressing, came on the scene. The night raids were accompanied by more or less continuous daylight attacks by small groups or even single enemy planes, and the sirens often sounded at brief intervals throughout the whole twenty-four hours. To this curious existence the seven million inhabitants of London accustomed themselves.

In the hope that it may lighten the hard course of this narrative, I record a few personal notes about the "Blitz," well knowing how many thousands have far more exciting tales to tell.

When the bombardment first began, the idea was to treat it with disdain. In the West End everybody went about his business and pleasure and dined and slept as he usually did. The theatres were full, and the darkened streets were crowded with casual traffic. All this was perhaps a healthy reaction from the frightful squawk which the defeatist elements in Paris had put up on the occasion when they were first seriously raided in May. I remember dining in a small company when very lively and continuous raids were going on. The large windows of Stornoway House opened upon the Green Park, which flickered with the flashes of the guns and was occasionally lit by the glare of an exploding bomb. I felt that we were taking unnecessary risks. After dinner we went to the Imperial Chemicals Building overlooking the Embankment. From these high stone balconies there was a splendid view of the river. At least a dozen fires were burning on the south side, and while we were there, several heavy bombs fell, one near enough for my friends to pull me back behind a substantial stone pillar. This certainly confirmed my opinion that we should have to accept many restrictions upon the ordinary amenities of life.

The group of Government buildings around Whitehall were repeatedly hit. Downing Street consists of houses two hundred and fifty years old, shaky and lightly built by the profiteering contractor whose name they bear. At the time of the Munich alarm, shelters had been constructed for the occupants of Number 10 and Number 11, and the rooms on the garden level had had their ceilings propped up with a wooden under-ceiling and strong timbers. It was believed that this would support the ruins if the building was blown or shaken down; but of course neither these rooms nor the shelters were effective against a direct hit. During the last fortnight of September, preparations were made to transfer my Ministerial Headquarters to the more modern and solid Government offices looking over St. James's Park by Storey's Gate. These quarters we called "the Annexe." Below them were the War Room and a certain amount of bomb-proof sleeping accommodation. The bombs at this time were of course smaller than those of the later phases. Still, in the interval before the new apartments were ready, life at Downing Street was exciting. One might as well have been at a battalion headquarters in the line.

In these months we held our evening Cabinets in the War Room in the Annexe bas.e.m.e.nt. To get there from Downing Street it was necessary to walk through the Foreign Office quadrangle and then clamber through the working parties who were pouring in the concrete to make the War Room and bas.e.m.e.nt offices safer. I did not realise what a trial this was to Mr. Chamberlain, with all the consequences of his major operation upon him. Nothing deterred him, and he was never more spick and span or cool and determined than at the last Cabinets which he attended.

One evening in late September, 1940, I looked out of the Downing Street front door and saw workmen piling sandbags in front of the low bas.e.m.e.nt windows of the Foreign Office opposite. I asked what they were doing. I was told that after his operation, Mr. Neville Chamberlain had to have special periodical treatment, and that it was embarra.s.sing to carry this out in the shelter of Number 11, where at least twenty people were gathered during the constant raids, so a small private place was being prepared over there for him. Every day he kept all his appointments, reserved, efficient, faultlessly attired. But here was the background. It was too much. I used my authority. I walked through the pa.s.sage between Number 10 and Number 11 and found Mrs. Chamberlain. I said: "He ought not to be here in this condition. You must take him away till he is well again. I will send all the telegrams to him each day." She went off to see her husband. In an hour she sent me word. "He will do what you wish. We are leaving tonight." I never saw him again. In less than two months he was no more. I am sure he wanted to die in harness. This was not to be.

Another evening (October 14) stands out in my mind. We were dining in the garden room of Number 10 when the usual night raid began. My companions were Archie Sinclair, Oliver Lyttelton, and Moore-Brabazon. The steel shutters had been closed. Several loud explosions occurred around us at no great distance, and presently a bomb fell, perhaps a hundred yards away, on the Horse Guards Parade, making a great deal of noise. Suddenly I had a providential impulse. The kitchen at Number 10 Downing Street is lofty and s.p.a.cious, and looks out onto one of the courts of the Treasury through a large plate-gla.s.s window about twenty-five feet high. The butler and parlour maid continued to serve the dinner with complete detachment, but I became acutely aware of this big window, behind which Mrs. Landemare, the cook, and Nellie, the kitchen maid, never turning a hair, were at work. I got up abruptly, went into the kitchen, told the butler to put the dinner on the hot plate in the dining-room, and ordered the cook and other servants into the shelter, such as it was. I had been seated again at table only about three minutes when a really very loud crash, close at hand, and a violent shock showed that the house had been struck. My detective came into the room and said much damage had been done. The kitchen, the pantry, and the offices on the Treasury side were shattered.

We went into the kitchen to view the scene. The devastation was complete. The bomb had fallen fifty yards away on the Treasury, and the blast had smitten the large, tidy kitchen, with all its bright saucepans and crockery, into a heap of black dust and rubble. The big plate-gla.s.s window had been hurled in fragments and splinters across the room, and would, of course, have cut its occupants, if there had been any, to pieces. But my fortunate inspiration, which I might so easily have neglected, had come in the nick of time. The underground Treasury shelter across the court had been blown to pieces by a direct hit, and the three civil servants who were doing Home Guard night-duty there were killed. All, however, were buried under tons of brick rubble, and we did not know who was missing.

As the raid continued and seemed to grow in intensity, we put on our tin hats and went out to view the scene from the top of the Annexe buildings. Before doing so, however, I could not resist taking Mrs. Landemare and the others from the shelter to see their kitchen. They were upset at the sight of the wreck, but princ.i.p.ally on account of the general untidiness!

Archie and I went up to the cupola of the Annexe building. The night was clear and there was a wide view of London. It seemed that the greater part of Pall Mall was in flames. At least five fierce fires were burning there, and others in St. James's Street and Piccadilly. Farther back over the river in the opposite direction there were many conflagrations. But Pall Mall was the vivid flame-picture. Gradually the attack died down, and presently the "All Clear" sounded, leaving only the blazing fires. We went downstairs to my new apartments on the first floor of the Annexe and there found Captain David Margesson, the Chief Whip, who was accustomed to live at the Carlton Club. He told us the club had been blown to bits, and indeed we had thought, by the situation of the fires, that it must have been hit. He was in the club with about two hundred and fifty members and staff. It had been struck by a heavy bomb. The whole of the facade and the ma.s.sive coping on the Pall Mall side had fallen into the street, obliterating his motor-car, which was parked near the front door. The smoking-room had been full of members, and the whole ceiling had come down upon them. When I looked at the ruins next day, it seemed incredible that most of them should not have been killed. However, by what seemed a miracle, they had all crawled out of the dust, smoke, and rubble, and though many were injured not a single life was lost. When in due course these facts came to the notice of the Cabinet, our Labour colleagues facetiously remarked, "The Devil looks after his own." Mr. Quintin Hogg had carried his father, a former Lord Chancellor, on his shoulders from the wreck, as Aeneas had borne Pater Anchises from the ruins of Troy. Margesson had nowhere to sleep, and we found him blankets and a bed in the bas.e.m.e.nt of the Annexe. Altogether it was a lurid evening, and considering the damage to buildings it was remarkable that there were not more than five hundred people killed and about a couple of thousand injured.

One day after luncheon the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Kingsley Wood, came to see me on business at Number 10, and we heard a very heavy explosion take place across the river in South London. I took him to see what had happened. The bomb had fallen in Peckham. It was a very big one probably a land-mine. It had completely destroyed or gutted twenty or thirty small three-story houses and cleared a considerable open s.p.a.ce in this very poor district. Already little pathetic Union Jacks had been stuck up amid the ruins. When my car was recognised, the people came running from all quarters, and a crowd of more than a thousand was soon gathered. All these folk were in a high state of enthusiasm. They crowded round us, cheering and manifesting every sign of lively affection, wanting to touch and stroke my clothes. One would have thought I had brought them some fine substantial benefit which would improve their lot in life. I was completely undermined, and wept. Ismay, who was with me, records that he heard an old woman say, "You see, he really cares. He's crying." They were tears not of sorrow but of wonder and admiration. "But see, look here," they said, and drew me to the centre of the ruins. There was an enormous crater, perhaps forty yards across and twenty feet deep. c.o.c.ked up at an angle on the very edge was an Anderson shelter, and we were greeted at its twisted doorway by a youngish man, his wife and three children, quite unharmed but obviously sh.e.l.l-jarred. They had been there at the moment of the explosion. They could give no account of their experiences. But there they were, and proud of it. Their neighbours regarded them as enviable curiosities. When we got back into the car, a harsher mood swept over this haggard crowd. "Give it 'em back," they cried, and "Let them them have it too." I undertook forthwith to see that their wishes were carried out; and this promise was certainly kept. The debt was repaid tenfold, twentyfold, in the frightful routine bombardment of German cities, which grew in intensity as our air power developed, as the bombs became far heavier and the explosives more powerful. Certainly the enemy got it all back in good measure, pressed down and running over. Alas for poor humanity! have it too." I undertook forthwith to see that their wishes were carried out; and this promise was certainly kept. The debt was repaid tenfold, twentyfold, in the frightful routine bombardment of German cities, which grew in intensity as our air power developed, as the bombs became far heavier and the explosives more powerful. Certainly the enemy got it all back in good measure, pressed down and running over. Alas for poor humanity!

Another time I visited Margate. An air raid came upon us, and I was conducted into their big tunnel, where quite large numbers of people lived permanently. When we came out, after a quarter of an hour, we looked at the still-smoking damage. A small restaurant had been hit. n.o.body had been hurt, but the place had been reduced into a litter of crockery, utensils, and splintered furniture. The proprietor, his wife, and the cooks and waitresses were in tears. Where was their home? Where was their livelihood? Here is a privilege of power. I formed an immediate resolve. On the way back in my train I dictated a letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer laying down the principle that all damage from the fire of the enemy must be a charge upon the State and compensation be paid in full and at once. Thus the burden would not fall alone on those whose homes or business premises were hit, but would be borne evenly on the shoulders of the nation. Kingsley Wood was naturally a little worried by the indefinite character of this obligation. But I pressed hard, and an insurance scheme was devised in a fortnight which afterwards played a substantial part in our affairs. In explaining this to Parliament on September 5 I said: It is very painful to me to see, as I have seen in my journeys about the country, a small British house or business smashed by the enemy's fire, and to see that without feeling a.s.sured that we are doing our best to spread the burden so that we all stand in together. Damage by enemy action stands on a different footing from any other kind of loss or damage, because the nation undertakes the task of defending the lives and property of its subjects and taxpayers against a.s.saults from outside. Unless public opinion and the judgment of the House were prepared to separate damage resulting from the fire of the enemy from all other forms of war loss, and unless the House was prepared to draw the distinction very sharply between war damage by bomb and sh.e.l.l and the other forms of loss which are incurred, we could not attempt to deal with this matter; otherwise we should be opening up a field to which there would be no bounds. If, however, we were able to embark upon such a project as would give complete insurance, at any rate up to a certain minimum figure, for everyone against war damage by sh.e.l.l or bomb, I think it would be a very solid mark of the confidence which after some experience we are justified in feeling about the way in which we are going to come through this war.

The Treasury went through various emotions about this insurance scheme. First, they thought it was going to be their ruin; but when after May, 1941, the air raids ceased for over three years, they began to make a great deal of money, and considered the plan provident and statesmanlike. However, later on in the war, when the "doodle-bugs" and rockets began, the account swung the other way, and eight hundred and thirty millions have in fact already been paid out. I am very glad it is so.

Our outlook at this time was that London, except for its strong modern buildings, would be gradually and soon reduced to a rubble-heap. I was deeply anxious about the life of the people of London, the greater part of whom stayed, slept, and took a chance where they were. The brick and concrete shelters were multiplying rapidly. The Tubes offered accommodation for a good many. There were several large shelters, some of which held as many as seven thousand people, who camped there in confidence night after night, little knowing what the effect of a direct hit would have been upon them. I asked that brick traverses should be built in these as fast as possible. About the Tubes there was an argument which was ultimately resolved by a compromise.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges, Home Secretary and Minister of Transport.

21.IX.40.

1. When I asked at the Cabinet the other day why the Tubes could not be used to some extent, even at the expense of transport facilities, as air-raid shelters, I was a.s.sured that this was most undesirable, and that the whole matter had been reviewed before that conclusion was reached. I now see that the Aldwych Tube is to be used as a shelter. Pray let me have more information about this, and what has happened to supersede the former decisive arguments.2. I still remain in favour of a widespread utilisation of the Tubes, by which I mean not only the stations but the railway lines, and I should like a short report on one sheet of paper showing the numbers that could be accommodated on various sections and the structural changes that would be required to fit these sections for their new use. Is it true, for instance, that 750,000 people could be accommodated in the Aldwych section alone? We may well have to balance the relative demands of transport and shelter.3. I am awaiting the report of the Home Secretary on the forward policy of (1) Making more shelters.(2) Strengthening existing bas.e.m.e.nts.(3) Making empty bas.e.m.e.nts and premises available.(4) Most important. a.s.signing fixed places by tickets to a large proportion of the people, thus keeping them where we want them, and avoiding crowding.

In this new phase of warfare it became important to extract the optimum of work, not only from the factories, but even more from the departments in London which were under frequent bombardment during both the day and night. At first, whenever the sirens gave the alarm, all the occupants of a score of Ministries were promptly collected and led down to the bas.e.m.e.nts, for what these were worth. Pride even was being taken in the efficiency and thoroughness with which this evolution was performed. In many cases it was only half a dozen aeroplanes which approached sometimes only one. Often they did not arrive. A petty raid might bring to a standstill for over an hour the whole executive and administrative machine in London.

I therefore proposed the stage "Alert," operative on the siren warning, as distinct from the "Alarm," which should be enforced only when the spotters on the roof, or "Jim Crows," as they came to be called, reported "Imminent danger," which meant that the enemy were actually overhead or very near. Schemes were worked out accordingly. In order to enforce rigorous compliance, while we lived under these repeated daylight attacks, I called for a weekly return of the number of hours spent by the staff of each department in the shelters.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges and General Ismay.

17.IX.40.

Please report by tomorrow night the number of hours on September 16 that the princ.i.p.al offices in London were in their dug-outs and out of action through air alarm.2. General Ismay should find out how the Air Ministry and Fighter Command view the idea that no red warning should be given when only two or three aircraft are approaching London.

Prime Minister to Sir Horace Wilson and Sir Edward Bridges 19.IX.40.

Let me have a further return [of time lost in Government Departments owing to air-raid warnings] for the 17th and 18th, and henceforward daily, from all Ministries, including the Service Departments. These returns will be circulated to heads of all Departments at the same time as they are sent to me. Thus it will be possible to see who are doing best. If all returns are not received on any day from some Departments, those that are should nevertheless be circulated.

This put everybody on their mettle. Eight of these returns were actually furnished. It was amusing to see that the fighting Departments were for some time in the worst position. Offended and spurred by this implied reproach, they very quickly took their proper place. The loss of hours in all Departments was reduced to a fraction. Presently our fighters made daylight attack too costly to the enemy, and this phase pa.s.sed away. In spite of the almost continuous alerts and alarms which were sounded, hardly a single Government Department was. .h.i.t during daylight when it was full of people, nor any loss of life sustained. But how much time might have been wasted in the functioning of the war machine if the civil and military staffs had shown any weakness, or been guided up the wrong alley!

As early as September 1, before the heavy night attacks began, I had addressed the Home Secretary and others.

Air-raid Warnings and Precautions1. The present system of air-raid warnings was designed to cope with occasional large ma.s.s raids on definite targets, not with waves coming over several times a day, and still less with sporadic bombers roaming about at nights. We cannot allow large parts of the country to be immobilised for hours every day and to be distracted every night. The enemy must not be permitted to prejudice our war effort by stopping work in the factories which he has been unable to destroy.2. There should be inst.i.tuted, therefore, a new system of warnings:The Alert The Alarm The All ClearThe Alert should not interrupt the normal life of the area. People not engaged on national work could, if they desired, take refuge or put their children in a place of safety. But in general they should learn, and they do learn, to adapt themselves to their dangers and take only such precautions as are compatible with their duties and imposed by their temperament.3. The air-raid services should be run on an increased nucleus staff, and not all be called out every time as on a present red warning. The lookout system should be developed in all factories where war work is proceeding, and should be put into effect when the Alert is given; the lookouts would have full authority to give local factory or office alarms. The signal for the Alert might be given during the day by the hoisting of a display of yellow flags by a sufficient number of specially charged air-raid wardens. At night flickering yellow (or perhaps red) lamps could be employed. The use of electric street lighting should be studied, and the possibility of sounding special signals on the telephone.4. The Alarm is a direct order to "Take cover" and for the full manning of all A.R.P. positions. This will very likely synchronise with, or precede by only a brief interval, the actual attack. The routine in each case must be subject to local conditions.The signal for the Alarm would be the siren. It would probably be unnecessary to supplement this by light or telephone signals.5. The All Clear could be sounded as at present. It would end the Alarm period. If the Alert continued, the flags would remain hoisted; if the enemy had definitely turned back, the Alert flags and lights would be removed.The use of the Alert and Alarm signals might vary in different parts of the country. In areas subject to frequent attack, such as East Kent, South and Southeast London, Southeast Anglia, Birmingham, Derby, Liverpool, Bristol, and some other places, the Alert would be a commonplace. The Alarm would denote actual attack. This would also apply to the Whitehall district. In other parts of the country a somewhat less sparing use of the Alarm might be justified in order to keep the air-raid services from deteriorating.6. In Government offices in London no one should be forced to take cover until actual firing has begun and the siren ordering the Alarm under the new conditions has been sounded. No one is to stop work merely because London is under Alert conditions.

I had to give way about the sirens, or "Banshee howlings," as I described them to Parliament.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary and others concerned.

14.IX.40.

I promised the House that new regulations about air-raid warnings, sirens, whistles, Jim Crow, etc., should be considered within the past week. However, the intensification of raiding has made it inexpedient to abolish the sirens at this moment. I shall be glad, however, to have a short statement prepared of what is the practice which has in fact developed during the last week.

One felt keenly for all the poor people, most of them in their little homes, with nothing over their heads.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary.

3.IX.40.

In spite of the shortage of materials, a great effort should be made to help people to drain their Anderson shelters, which reflect so much credit on your name, and to make floors for them against the winter rain. Bricks on edge placed loosely together without mortar, covered with a piece of linoleum, would be quite good, but there must be a drain and a sump. I am prepared to help you in a comprehensive scheme to tackle this. Instruction can be given on the broadcast, and of course the Regional Commissioners and local authorities should be used. Let me have a plan.

Prime Minister to General Ismay and Private Office.

11.IX.40.

Please call for reports on whether any serious effects are being produced by the air attack on (1) food supplies and distribution;(2) numbers of homeless, and provision therefor;(3) exhaustion of Fire Brigade personnel;(4) sewage in London area;(5) gas and electricity;(6) water supplies in London area.(7) General Ismay to find out what is the practical effect of the bombing on Woolwich production. See also my report from the Minister of Supply.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges.

12.IX.40.

Will you kindly convey to the Cabinet and Ministers the suggestion which I make that our hours should be somewhat advanced. Luncheon should be at one o'clock, and Cabinet times moved forward by half an hour. In principle it will be convenient if we aim at an earlier dinner-hour, say, 7.15 P.M P.M. Darkness falls earlier, and for the next few weeks severe bombing may be expected once the protection of the fighter aircraft is withdrawn. It would be a good thing if staffs and servants could be under shelter as early as possible, and Ministers are requested to arrange to work in places of reasonable security during the night raids, and especially to find places for sleeping where they will not be disturbed by anything but a direct hit.I propose to ask Parliament when it meets at the usual time on Tuesday to meet in these occasional sittings at 11 A.M. A.M. and separate at 4 or 5 and separate at 4 or 5 P.M P.M. This will allow Members to reach their homes, and I hope their shelters, by daylight. We must adapt ourselves to these conditions, which will probably be accentuated. Indeed, it is likely we shall have to move our office hours forward by another half-hour as the days shorten.

Parliament also required guidance about the conduct of its work in these dangerous days. Members felt that it was their duty to set an example. This was right, but it might have been pushed too far; I had to reason with the Commons to make them observe ordinary prudence and conform to the peculiar conditions of the time. I convinced them in secret session of the need to take necessary and well-considered precautions. They agreed that their days and hours of sitting should not be advertised, and to suspend their debates when the Jim Crow reported to the Speaker "Imminent danger." Then they all trooped down dutifully to the crowded, ineffectual shelters that had been provided. It will always add to the renown of the British Parliament that its Members continued to sit and discharge their duties through all this period. The Commons are very touchy in such matters, and it would have been easy to misjudge their mood. When one Chamber was damaged, they moved to another, and I did my utmost to persuade them to follow wise advice with good grace. Their migrations will be recorded in due course. In short, everyone behaved with sense and dignity. It was also lucky that when the Chamber was blown to pieces a few months later, it was by night and not by day, when empty and not full. With our mastery of the daylight raids there came considerable relief in personal convenience. But during the first few months I was never free from anxiety about the safety of the Members. After all, a free sovereign Parliament, fairly chosen by universal suffrage, able to turn out the Government any day, but proud to uphold it in the darkest days, was one of the points which were in dispute with the enemy. Parliament won.