Commerce is slow in changing its channel. That between this country and the United States, is as yet but beginning; and this beginning has received some checks. The _Arret_ in question would be a considerable one, without the explanation I have the honor to ask. I am persuaded, that a continuation of the dispositions which have been hitherto manifested towards us, will insure effects, political and commercial, of value to both nations.

I have had too many proofs of the friendly interest your Excellency is pleased to take, in whatever may strengthen the bands and connect the views of the two countries, to doubt your patronage of the present application; or to pretermit any occasion of repeating a.s.surances of those sentiments of high respect and esteem with which I have the honor to be, your Excellency's most obedient, and most humble servant.

TO MONSIEUR L'ABBe DE MORELLET.

PARIS, Oct. 24, 1787

SIR,--I wish it were in my power to announce to the Count de Cambrai that the Treasury Board of the United States had enabled their banker here to answer the demands of the foreign officers. But it is not. As soon as I knew that there was a deficiency of money to pay the interest of this demand I informed the Treasury Board of it. They answered me they would supply the necessary fund as soon as it should be in their power; and I am persuaded they have not failed in inclination to do it.

Of this I had the honor to notify the Count de Cambrai the last year.

It is not unknown to you that the pursuit of our new machine of government which works the worst, is that which respects the raising money; and it is that which has occasioned the late attempts to amend our confederation. Foreseeing that our Treasury Board might not be able to remit money from America, I suggested to Congress the expediency of borrowing money in Holland to pay off the foreign officers. And in the month of July last, being a.s.sured they could command the money in Holland, I pressed a more particular proposition to this purpose. As I do not foresee any possible objection to the proposition I made them, I think myself sure of their acceding to it, and that I may receive news of it in the month of December. I may be disappointed as to the time of receiving their answer, because the course of their business is slow; but I do not apprehend it will be much r.e.t.a.r.ded, and still less that they will refuse it altogether. The moment I receive an answer, the Count de Cambrai may be a.s.sured it shall be communicated to him. In doing this I shall gratify not only my personal friendship for him, but also those sentiments of particular esteem and attachment with which I have the honor to be, dear Sir, your most obedient, and most humble servant.

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN JAY.

PARIS, Oct. 27, 1787.

SIR,--When I had the honor of addressing you on the 8th instant, the appearances of war were such, that no one would have been surprised to hear that hostilities were actually commenced at sea. The preparations were pushed with such vivacity on the part of England, that it was believed she had other objects in view than those she spoke out.

However, having protected by her countenance the establishment of the Stadtholder by the Prussian troops, and completely detached the Court of Berlin from that of Versailles, she made a proposition to the latter to disarm, which was agreed to. Mutual declarations for this purpose were signed last night at Versailles, of which I have now the honor to enclose you copies.

Commissaries are to be appointed on each side to see that the disarming takes place. The Count de Moustier having been detained at Brest a fortnight by contrary wind, and this continuing obstinately in the same point, admits a possibility that this letter may yet reach Brest before his departure. It pa.s.ses through the post office and will be opened and read of course. I shall have the honor of addressing you more fully a week hence by a private hand. I have now that of a.s.suring you of the sincerity of that esteem and respect with which I have the honor to be, Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant.

TO JOHN JAY.

PARIS, November 3, 1787.

SIR,--My last letters to you were of the 8th and 27th of October. In the former, I mentioned to you the declaration of this country, that they would interpose with force, if the Prussian troops entered Holland; the entry of those troops into Holland; the declaration of England, that if France did oppose force, they would consider it as an act of war; the naval armaments on both sides; the nomination of the Bailli de Suffrein as Generalissimo on the ocean; and the cold reception of Mr. Granville here, with his conciliatory propositions, as so many symptoms which seemed to indicate a certain and immediate rupture. It was indeed universally and hourly expected. But the King of Prussia, a little before these last events, got wind of the alliance on the carpet between France and the two empires; he awaked to the situation in which that would place him; he made some applications to the court of St. Petersburg, to divert the Empress from the proposed alliance, and supplicated the court of London not to abandon him. That court had also received a hint of the same project; both seemed to suspect, for the first time, that it would be possible for France to abandon the Turks, and that they were likely to get more than they had played for at Constantinople, for they had meant nothing more there, than to divert the Empress and Emperor from the affairs of the west, by employing them in the east, and at the same time, to embroil them with France as the patroness of the Turks. The court of London engaged not to abandon Prussia: but both of them relaxed a little the tone of their proceedings. The King of Prussia sent a Mr. Alvensleben here expressly to explain and soothe: the King of England, notwithstanding the cold reception of his propositions by Granville, renewed conferences here through Eden and the Duke of Dorset. The Minister, in the affection of his heart for peace, readily joined in conference, and a declaration and counter-declaration were cooked up at Versailles, and sent to London for approbation. They were approved, arrived here at one o'clock the 27th, were signed that night at Versailles, and on the next day, I had the honor of enclosing them to you, under cover to the Count de Moustier, whom I supposed still at Brest, dating my letter as of the 27th, by mistake for the 28th. Lest, however, these papers should not have got to Brest before the departure of the Count de Moustier, I now enclose you other copies. The English declaration states a notification of this court, in September, by Barthelemy, their Minister at London, "that they would send succours into Holland," as the first cause of England's arming; desires an explanation of the intentions of this court, as to the affairs of Holland, and proposes to disarm; on condition, however, that the King of France shall not retain any hostile views in any quarter, for what has been done in Holland. This last phrase was to secure Prussia, according to promise. The King of France acknowledges the notification by his Minister at London, promises he will do nothing in consequence of it, declares he has no intention to intermeddle with force in the affairs of Holland, and that he will entertain hostile views in no quarter, for what has been done there. He disavows having ever had any intention to interpose with force in the affairs of that republic. This disavowal begins the sentence, which acknowledges he had notified the contrary to the court of London, and it includes no apology to soothe the feelings which may be excited in the b.r.e.a.s.t.s of the Patriots of Holland, at hearing the King declare he never did intend to aid them with force, when promises to do this were the basis of those very attempts to better their const.i.tution, which have ended in its ruin, as well as their own.

I have a.n.a.lyzed these declarations, because, being somewhat wrapped up in their expressions, their full import might escape, on a transient reading; and it is necessary it should not escape. It conveys to us the important lesson, that no circ.u.mstances of morality, honor, interest, or engagement, are sufficient to authorize a secure reliance on any nation, at all times, and in all positions. A moment of difficulty, or a moment of error, may render forever useless the most friendly dispositions in the King, in the major part of his ministers, and the whole of his nation. The present pacification is considered by most as only a short truce. They calculate on the spirit of the nation, and not on the agued hand which guides its movements. It is certain, that from this moment the whole system of Europe changes. Instead of counting together England, Austria, and Russia, as heretofore, against France, Spain, Holland, Prussia, and Turkey, the division will probably be, England, Holland, and Prussia, against France, Austria, Russia, and perhaps Spain. This last power is not sure, because the dispositions of its heir apparent are not sure. But whether the present be truce or peace, it will allow time to mature the conditions of the alliance between France and the two empires, always supposed to be on the carpet. It is thought to be obstructed by the avidity of the Emperor, who would swallow a good part of Turkey, Silesia, Bavaria, and the rights of the Germanic body. To the two or three first articles, France might consent, receiving in gratification a well-rounded portion of the Austrian Netherlands, with the islands of Candia, Cyprus, Rhodes, and perhaps lower Egypt. But all this is in embryo, uncertainty known, and counterworked by the machinations of the courts of London and Berlin.

The following solution of the British armaments is supposed in a letter of the 25th ultimo, from Colonel Blachden of Connecticut, now at Dunkirk, to the Marquis de La Fayette. I will cite it in his own words:--"A gentleman who left London two days ago, and came to this place to-day, informs me that it is now generally supposed that Mr.

Pitt's great secret, which has puzzled the whole nation so long, and to accomplish which design the whole force of the nation is armed, is to make a vigorous effort for the recovery of America. When I recollect the delay they have made in delivering the forts in America, and that little more than a year ago, one of the British ministry wrote to the King a letter, in which were these remarkable words, 'if your Majesty pleases, America may yet be yours;' add to this, if it were possible for the present ministry in England to effect such a matter, they would secure their places and their power for a long time, and should they fail in the end, they would be certain of holding them during the attempt, which it is in their power to prolong as much as they please, and, at all events, they would boast of having endeavored the recovery of what a former ministry had abandoned--it is possible." A similar surmise has come in a letter from a person in Rotterdam to one at this place. I am satisfied that the King of England believes the ma.s.s of our people to be tired of their independence, and desirous of returning under his government; and that the same opinion prevails in the ministry and nation. They have hired their news writers to repeat this lie in their gazettes so long, that they have become the dupes of it themselves. But there is no occasion to recur to this, in order to account for their arming. A more rational purpose avowed, that purpose executed, and when executed, a solemn agreement to disarm, seem to leave no doubt that the re-establishment of the Stadtholder was their object. Yet it is possible, that having found that this court will not make war in this moment for any ally, new views may arise, and they may think the moment favorable for executing any purposes they may have, in our quarter. Add to this, that reason is of no aid in calculating their movements. We are, therefore, never safe till our magazines are filled with arms. The present season of truce or peace, should, in my opinion, be improved without a moment's respite, to effect this essential object, and no means be omitted, by which money may be obtained for the purpose. I say this, however, with due deference to the opinion of Congress, who are better judges of the necessity and practicability of the measure.

I mentioned to you, in a former letter, the application I had made to the Dutch amba.s.sadors and Prussian envoy, for the protection of Mr.

Dumas. The latter soon after received an a.s.surance, that he was put under the protection of the States of Holland; and the Dutch Amba.s.sador called on me a few days ago, to inform me, by instruction from his const.i.tuents, "that the States General had received a written application from Mr. Adams, praying their protection of Dumas; that they had instructed their _greffier_, f.a.gel, to a.s.sure Mr. Adams, by letter, that he was under the protection of the States of Holland; but to inform him, at the same time, that Mr. Dumas' conduct, out of the line of his office, had been so extraordinary, that they would expect _de l'honnetete_ de Mr. Adams, that he would charge some other person with the affairs of the United States, during his absence."

Your letter of September the 8th, has been duly received. I shall pay due attention to the instructions relative to the medals, and give any aid I can in the case of Boss' vessel. As yet, however, my endeavors to find Monsieur Pauly, _avocat au conseil d'etat, rue Coquilliere_, have been ineffectual. There is no such person living in that street. I found a Monsieur Pauly, _avocat au parlement_, in another part of the town; he opened the letter, but said it could not mean him. I shall advertise in the public papers. If that fails, there will be no other chance of finding him. Mr. Warnum will do well, therefore, to send some other description by which the person may be found. Indeed, some friend of the party interested should be engaged to follow up this business, as it will require constant attention, and probably a much larger sum of money than that named in the bill enclosed in Mr. Warnum's letter.

I have the honor to enclose you a letter from O'Bryan to me, containing information from Algiers, and one from Mr. Montgomery, at Alicant. The purpose of sending you this last, is to show you how much the difficulties of ransom are increased since the Spanish negotiations.

The Russian captives have cost about eight thousand livres apiece, on an average. I certainly have no idea that we should give any such sum; and, therefore, if it should be the sense of Congress to give such a price, I would be glad to know it by instruction. My idea is, that we should not ransom, but on the footing of the nation which pays least, that it may be as little worth their while to go in pursuit of us, as any nation. This is cruelty to the individuals now in captivity, but kindness to the hundreds that would soon be so, were we to make it worth the while of those pirates to go cut of the Straits in quest of us. As soon as money is provided, I shall put this business into train.

I have taken measures to damp at Algiers all expectations of our proposing to ransom, at any price. I feel the distress which this must occasion to our countrymen there, and their connections; but the object of it is their ultimate good, by bringing down their holders to such a price as we ought to pay, instead of letting them remain in such expectations as cannot be gratified. The gazettes of France and Leyden accompany this.

I have the honor to be, with sentiments of the most perfect esteem and respect, Sir, your most obedient humble servant.

[_The annexed are translations of the declaration and counter-declaration, referred to in the preceding letter._]

DECLARATION.

The events which have taken place in the republic of the United provinces, appearing no longer to leave any subject of discussion, and still less of dispute, between the two courts, the undersigned are authorized to ask, if it be the intention of his most Christian Majesty to act in pursuance of the notification given, on the 16th of last month, by the Minister Plenipotentiary of his most Christian Majesty, which announcing his purpose of aiding Holland, has occasioned maritime armaments on the part of his Majesty, which armaments have become reciprocal.

If the court of Versailles is disposed to explain itself on this subject, and on the conduct adopted towards the republic, in a manner conformably to the desire evinced by each party, to preserve a good understanding between the two courts, it being also understood, at the same time, that no hostile view is entertained in any quarter, in consequence of the past; his Majesty, always eager to manifest his concurrence in the friendly sentiments of his most Christian Majesty, agrees forthwith that the armaments, and, in general, all preparations for war, shall be mutually discontinued, and that the marines of the two nations shall be placed on the footing of a peace establishment, such as existed on the first of January of the present year.

Signed. { DORSET.

{ WM. EDEN.

At Versailles, the 27th of October, 1787.

COUNTER-DECLARATION.

It neither being, nor ever having been, the intention of his Majesty to interpose by force in the affairs of the republic of the United provinces, the communication made to the court of London by M.

Barthelemy, having had no other object than to announce to that court an intention, the motives of which no longer exist, _especially since the King of Prussia has made known his resolution_, his Majesty makes no difficulty in declaring, that he has no wish to act in pursuance of the communication aforesaid, and that he entertains no hostile view in any quarter, relative to what has pa.s.sed in Holland.

Consequently, his Majesty, desiring to concur in the sentiments of his Britannic Majesty, for the preservation of a good understanding between the two courts, consents with pleasure to the proposition of his Britannic Majesty, that the armaments, and, in general, all preparations for war, shall be mutually discontinued, and that the marines of the two nations shall be replaced upon the footing of the peace establishment, as it existed on the first day of January of the present year.

Signed. MONTMORIN.

At Versailles, the 27th of October, 1787.

TO JOHN JAY.

(Private.) PARIS, November 3, 1787.

DEAR SIR,--I shall take the liberty of confiding sometimes to a private letter such details of the small history of the court or cabinet, as may be worthy of being known, and yet not proper to be publicly communicated. I doubt whether the administration is yet in a permanent form. The Count de Montmorin and Baron de Breteuil are, I believe, firm enough in their places. It was doubted whether they would wait for the Count de La Luzerne, if the war had taken place; but at present, I suppose they will. I wish it also, because M. de Hector, his only compet.i.tor, has on some occasions shown little value for the connection with us. Lambert, the Comptroller General, is thought to be very insecure. I should be sorry also to lose him. I have worked several days with him, the Marquis de La Fayette, and Monsieur du Pont, (father of the young gentleman gone to America with the Count de Moustier) to reduce into one _Arret_, whatever concerned our commerce. I have found him a man of great judgment and application, possessing good general principles on subjects of commerce, and friendly dispositions towards us. He pa.s.sed the _Arret_ in a very favorable form, but it has been opposed in the Council, and will, I fear, suffer some alteration in the article of whale oil. That of tobacco, which was put into a separate instrument, experiences difficulties also, which do not come from him.

M. du Pont has rendered us essential service on these occasions. I wish his son could be so well noticed, as to make a favorable report to his father; he would, I think, be gratified by it, and his good dispositions be strengthened, and rendered further useful to us.

Whether I shall be able to send you these regulations by the present packet, will depend on their getting through the Council in time. The Archbishop continues well with his patroness. Her object is, a close connection with her brother. I suppose he convinces her, that peace will furnish the best occasion of cementing that connection.

It may not be uninstructive, to give you the origin and nature of his influence with the Queen. When the Duke de Choiseul proposed the marriage of the Dauphin with this lady, he thought it proper to send a person to Vienna, to perfect her in the language. He asked his friend, the Archbishop of Thoulouse, to recommend to him a proper person. He recommended a certain Abbe. The Abbe, from his first arrival at Vienna, either tutored by his patron, or prompted by grat.i.tude, impressed on the Queen's mind, the exalted talents and merit of the Archbishop, and continually represented him as the only man fit to be placed at the helm of affairs. On his return to Paris, being retained near the person of the Queen, he kept him constantly in her view. The Archbishop was named of the a.s.sembly des Notables, had occasion enough there to prove his talents, and Count de Vergennes, his great enemy, dying opportunely, the Queen got him into place. He uses the Abbe even yet, for instilling all his notions into her mind. That he has imposing talents and patriotic dispositions, I think is certain. Good judges think him a theorist only, little acquainted with the details of business, and spoiling all his plans by a bungled execution. He may perhaps undergo a severe trial. His best actions are exciting against him a host of enemies, particularly the reduction of the pensions, and reforms in other branches of economy. Some think the other ministers are willing he should stay in, till he has effected this odious, yet necessary work, and that they will then make him the scape-goat of the transaction. The declarations too, which I send you in my public letter, if they should become public, will probably raise an universal cry. It will all fall on him, because Montmorin and Breteuil say, without reserve, that the sacrifice of the Dutch has been against their advice. He will, perhaps, not permit these declarations to appear in this country. They are absolutely unknown; they were communicated to me by the Duke of Dorset, and I believe no other copy has been given here.

They Till be published doubtless in England, as a proof of their triumph, and may thence make their way into this country. If the Premier can stem a few months, he may remain long in office, and will never make war if he can help it. If he should be removed, the peace will probably be short. He is solely chargeable with the loss of Holland. True, they could not have raised money by taxes, to supply the necessities of war; but could they do it were their finances ever so well arranged? No nation makes war now-a-days, but by the aid of loans; and it is probable, that in a war for the liberties of Holland, all the treasures of that country would have been at their service. They have now lost the cow which furnishes the milk of war. She will be on the side of their enemies, whenever a rupture shall take place; and no arrangement of their finances can countervail this circ.u.mstance.

I have no doubt, you permit access to the letters of your foreign ministers, by persons only of the most perfect trust. It is in the European system, to bribe the clerks high, in order to obtain copies of interesting papers. I am sure you are equally attentive to the conveyance of your letters to us, as you know that all are opened that pa.s.s through any post-office of Europe. Your letters which come by the packet, if put into the mail at New York, or into the post-office at Havre, wear proofs that they have been opened. The pa.s.senger to whom they are confided, should be cautioned always to keep them in his own hands, till he can deliver them personally in Paris.

I have the honor to be, with very sincere esteem and respect, dear Sir, your most obedient, and most humble servant.