The dead lay all about the streets and in the bombed dugouts. Lieut.

Rogers, O.C. No. 16 Platoon, was reputed to have killed eight himself.

Those Huns who escaped ran pell-mell singly or in groups up the hill and along the Hargicourt road, flinging away their packs, with which the slope was littered. Captain James, who had led the Company so gallantly and successfully, got them together and wheeled round to the east of the village in the chance of exploiting still further the result achieved. Through the clearing mist a battery could be dimly seen on the ridge 1,000 yards away limbering up and then disappearing over the crest, and it seemed possible to advance there, and thus command a view into Hargicourt. Unfortunately at this moment our barrage, by some unexplained mistake, fell upon the eastern exit of the village, causing several casualties. Part of the Company, therefore, made its way to its alloted position in the outpost line.

The remainder cleared up Ronssoy, and found all kinds of booty. Soup, coffee, bread and sausages were all ready in the dugouts and were consumed by the victors. A mail had just come in, and the letters lay about unopened. The equipment and packs were examined with keen interest. Everything was new and of the best material, for the Huns had just come from Russia, and had been hastily fitted out for the Western Front. In every pack, in addition to the usual articles, were a change of underclothing and three pairs of socks. One fortunate sergeant found a bottle of whisky in a dugout, which was quickly shared; it was not till afterwards that he discovered that it was not legitimate loot, but the property of the Brigade M.G. officer, who had appropriated the dugout and most incautiously left unguarded his treasure, which he had brought up with him in the attack. At the other end of the village a lively dispute was going on with the Oxfords, who were found carrying off the two machine guns captured when the outposts were rushed. The men were wonderfully excited and delighted at their achievement, and have always declared since that it was the best fight they have ever had in France.

The enemy's artillery had been active throughout the attack, but ineffective, as it was without direction. It had sh.e.l.led Brigade Headquarters and the ground in front of Templeux Wood, but had never overtaken the attack. Throughout the day 5.9-inch sh.e.l.ls were poured into Ronssoy, but did no damage whatever, as the men were either in the unlocated outpost line, or withdrawn well west of the village. A patrol of C Company managed during the day to get up to the ridge and look into Hargicourt, in front of which the enemy were visible, digging actively. Once or twice small patrols of Uhlans rode along the skyline, the first enemy cavalry that had yet been seen. No counter-attack of any description was attempted, and it was clear that the enemy rearguards, who were not in great strength, had been seriously inconvenienced by this surprise capture of their positions.

General Fanshawe, who, as usual, was not far behind, soon came up, and after going over the village said he had not seen a better day's work since he had been in France.

The casualties in officers were heavy, which is explained by their conspicuous gallantry in leading and directing their commands over the unfamiliar country. Four were killed or died of wounds; 2nd Lieuts.

Garside, Heppell, Hunt and Bostock; while Captain James and 2nd Lieut.

Rogers were wounded. Other ranks escaped very lightly with 9 killed and 39 wounded.

CHAPTER XVI

TOWARDS THE HINDENBURG LINE

April pursued its bitter way with snow and sleet. The first and triumphant stage of the Battle of Arras was fought on the 9th, when the enemy was thrust back 5 miles with the heaviest losses in prisoners and guns which he had yet suffered at the hands of the British. The repercussion of this violent fighting was felt all along the British line, and particularly to the southward, where the positions were still semi-fluid. The enemy's object was to delay as long as possible in his outposts before the Hindenburg Line, while the British endeavoured to push him rapidly upon his main positions, which would then be open to regular attack. Accordingly, small actions to seize local tactical features were epidemic throughout the 4th Army during this month. The Battalion at first rested from its labours in the village of Hamel, its former halting place in January, from 5th to 13th April, when it returned via Villers-Faucon to take over from the Oxfords. The line had by now been consolidated some 2,000 yards east of Ronssoy on the slopes of the hill, the crest of which was occupied by the German outposts, the key to whose position was the fortified farm of Guillemont. The Battalion was ordered to attack this point next evening in conjunction with a combined night movement by the whole Division. The weather was again vile, and wet snow fell incessantly. The night was pitch dark, and without firing lights it was impossible to see 5 yards. The attack was due to start at 11.30 p.m. It was to be carried out by two Companies, C and D. The pa.s.sword was 'Wilson,' which called to mind the entry of the United States into the war a few days previously. The Companies arrived punctually after a march of 2 miles from support, and began to form up for the a.s.sault.

While they were doing so, covering parties ahead reported that the enemy were advancing on the right flank. This was probably a patrol, but Captain James wisely pushed forward a platoon of D Company to secure his Company's advance. The enemy disappeared into the darkness, and immediately telephoned to their artillery, which promptly put a heavy and accurate barrage on our men who were formed up on open ground with no kind of cover. This caused 30 casualties, and as the men were so cold that they could hardly hold, much less fire, their rifles, it was decided not to proceed with the attack, and they were withdrawn to the trenches. A second attack, which was proposed for 1.30 a.m., was vetoed by the Brigade. General Fanshawe, when addressing the Battalion on the 22nd April, said that he was 'fully satisfied with the effort put forward, and that if it had been possible to reach the objective the Battalion would have done so.'

Guillemont Farm was taken by the 144th Brigade on 24th April. In this attack our Battalion cooperated after a few days' renewed rest at Hamel, where the immediate awards to officers and men for the fight at Ronssoy were made.

The attack, on the night of the 24th-25th resolved itself, as far as the Battalion went, into a demonstration. Apparently owing to the darkness of the night and the width of frontage allotted to the attacking Companies, touch was lost with the right Battalion of the 144th Brigade which was enveloping Guillemont Farm from the south. As our role was to protect the right flank, and as the attack on the left was disorganised by sh.e.l.l-fire, the operations came to a standstill. Dawn arrived before it was possible to sort out the attackers and to get a fresh Company into position. The two Companies engaged, A and B, lost only 1 killed and 9 wounded from machine gun fire. The net result of the attack was that Guillemont Farm was taken, but the Quennemont Spur to the south remained in the enemy's hand. The Battalion next day took over the whole of the front concerned from Companies of each of the four Battalions of the 144th Brigade. The relief was long and laborious, as all the Companies were mixed together and their exact limits uncertain. The enemy, expecting a renewal of the attack, showed great nervousness, and put down a counter-preparation three times during the night, but without doing much harm. This state of anxious expectancy continued during the remainder of the tour making life the more unpleasant, as the trenches were as yet improvised, and supplies had to be brought up over the open. Much patrolling was done to discover the exact position of the enemy's forward posts, while the snipers of D Company from their commanding position in Guillemont Farm claimed several victims. At sunset on the 29th the 7th Worcesters relieved us, and we went back into billets at Villers-Faucon. The long winter had ended, and spring arrived with a burst of sun and warmth. A fortnight's well-earned rest was now to follow, in which time could be given to refit and to a.s.similate the new drafts, which, however, were only sufficient to bring the total strength, from 600 to 700 men. It was remarked that although the general quality was good, out of the first contingent of 35, five wore trusses and three others possessed flat feet, varicose veins or hammer toes.

CHAPTER XVII

THE RENEWAL OF TRENCH WARFARE

The great attempts to break through in April had definitely failed from a variety of causes. The Russian Revolution had rendered impossible the blow in the East, for which British munitions had for the first time adequately armed the Russian Armies. The German retreat had partially disorganised the combined British and French plan. The failure of Nivelle's great blow at the Chemin des Dames on the 16th April with enormous losses, made the French Armies incapable of any offensive operation on a large scale for several months. Hence the Battle of Arras, which had begun so happily, degenerated towards the end of April into a series of furious struggles, each of which showed less promise of decisive importance than the last. The centre of gravity shifted to the north, where preparations on a vast scale were pushed forward for the main attack in Flanders, which opened on 31st July. Accordingly, the southern sector in which the Battalion remained, settled down into a normal period of what is called inactivity.

The Battalion spent the beginning of May in the ruins of the village of Doignt, now greatly improved since they pa.s.sed over the blasted roads on the 22nd March. Here the time pa.s.sed in the usual training and recreations, and a Challenge Cup, presented by the C.O., was competed for in inter-Platoon Football Matches. Here, too, an invaluable thresher installed at Peronne disinfected the blankets, which were in a filthy condition. On the 12th the Battalion, now under Major Aldworth's command, as the C.O. was Acting Brigadier, moved to Combles, and entered the 15th Corps area. The old Corps Commander rode up to the Brigade on the way and expressed his regret at leaving such a gallant and well-behaved Brigade. The old Somme battlefields were still entirely desolate, the ground was full of corruption and noxious fumes and littered with the debris of battle.

Far away, on the eastern horizon, a green strip appeared, showing the limits of the devastation. Next day the march was continued through the centre of the waste past Le Transloy to a capacious camp at Beulencourt on the Peronne road, 2 miles south of Bapaume. Next day the Battalion re-entered the line in front of Hermies, relieving the 9th Sherwoods, whose C.O., Colonel Thornton, came from our 1st Battalion. Until the end of June our lot was cast in this neighbourhood with normal periods of trench duty and relief. The line held by the Brigade stretched south from the great Bapaume-Cambrai road. It was from these trenches that the northern part of the surprise attack against Cambrai was launched on 20th November. The enemy was ensconced in his Hindenburg Line, which took advantage of every undulation in the bare tableland. The villages in our occupation, Hermies, Doignies and Beaumetz, had all shared in the systematic devastation of the spring. The foremost British line was still a matter of partially connected outposts, each Platoon forming as a rule a self-contained strong point, while inter-communication with other posts was always difficult and sometimes impossible by day.

The Battalion frontage was strung out to a width of about 2,300 yards, and on our arrival was protected only by discontinuous belts of wire, but before the first tour had been completed they had all been linked together. No Man's Land was wide and ill-defined, amounting sometimes to 1,000 yards, with such debateable features as ruined farms or clumps of trees situated in the midst, which required constant patrolling, but were found regularly unoccupied. The aspect of the country with its tangled growth of gra.s.s and weeds revived memories of Hebuterne two summers ago.

Thus six weeks were spent in comparative stagnation. Again the enemy's artillery were almost silent for days on end, though now and again violent bursts of 5.9-inch would be directed at the Support Companies.

The Battalion made no raids; the only one which was attempted against them was on a small scale, and was completely crushed by Sergeant Garrett, of Wokingham, whose good leadership of the post attacked earned him the Military Medal. We suffered no loss, and took one prisoner entangled in the wire. The total casualties for the period were no more than 15, but included Captain Down, who died of wounds on 22nd May. He had been with the Battalion since the spring of 1916, and was deeply regretted as a capable officer, who showed always the greatest consideration for his men. On 30th June the Battalion turned their backs on this quiet spot and marched by stages through Velu and Bihucourt northwards to Bailleulval, a village about 6 miles south-west of Arras, now 10 miles behind the line to which it had been in close proximity until that spring.

Here every sign suggested that the Battalion was soon to take part in an offensive. Drafts arrived in such numbers that the total strength was raised to 930, a higher figure than at any period since we first crossed to France. Training went on feverishly through the sultry days. The old system of trenches in front of the village were the scene of many practice attacks, nor did the musketry, bombing, and gas specialists neglect their opportunities. The Brigadier appeared, to give lectures and to inspect the capacity of each officer to use his compa.s.s. The Divisional General carried off all the senior officers for staff rides. Thus the three weeks were spent in most arduous preparation, which left no doubt that a severe ordeal was imminent. That a general offensive was intended in the north was no secret either to our Army or to the enemy, and was indeed the natural sequel to the Battle of Messines. All doubts were resolved when the Battalion entrained on 21st July at Mondicourt and moved north into Flanders. They pa.s.sed along the same route by which exactly two years before they had come down to Hebuterne, and the survivors of those days cheered as they pa.s.sed the well-remembered little towns of Marles and Lapugnoy. As the evening drew in the train wandered slowly through Lillers and Hazebrouck, vast centres of activity, finally drawing up at G.o.dewaersvelde at 10.45 p.m., whence a weary march ended at dawn at Houtkerque, which, curiously enough, was next door to our first resting place in Flanders,--Winnezeele. The entire move had occupied 20 hours; it is interesting to note that while the direct distance between the two points was 43 miles, the Battalion had traversed by road and rail at least 70.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES

The prolonged and terrible struggle which was now about to begin was the last attempt to break through in the west on the old plan. The immense collection of guns, ammunition, railway material, and every kind of transport aroused high hopes. It was believed that the bombardment prolonged throughout many days with an intensity far greater than before the Somme would overwhelm the German resistance, and open the way to the Flanders coast and to the submarine bases then at the most successful height of their activity. These expectations were disappointed. The German positions no longer consisted of continuous trench lines, which could be reduced to shapeless ma.s.ses of earth. An organisation of great depth had taken their place. Machine gun nests and pill-boxes scattered about were almost indistinguishable from the sea of mud in which they were placed, and defied accurate aerial reconnaissance. In this fortified zone the foremost lines were weakly held, and the British troops after taking them found the main resistance still before them, when their energies were almost exhausted by their painful journey through the mire. The artillery had done its work only too well in tearing the soil to pieces; but had none the less left intact many a pill-box which would only succ.u.mb to the direct hit of a 9.2-inch sh.e.l.l. The dice of success were thus loaded heavily against the attackers, and complete victory was rendered impossible by the incredible weather. The great storm which raged throughout the initial attack on July 31st was succeeded by almost unprecedented rain throughout August. The brief improvement of September relapsed into the deluges which made the last stages of the struggle for Pa.s.schendaele so heroic a feat of endurance. The last month of the Somme Battle had been terrible, but the whole of the events now to be described were fought under far worse conditions. No trenches or dugouts were available for sheltering the troops in the battle area, of whom only a small fraction could be accommodated in such pill-boxes as remained intact. The corduroy paths by which alone rations and stores could be brought up were ga.s.sed and sh.e.l.led night and day; one false step was to be engulfed sometimes beyond hope of recovery. The artillery were in little better case, their guns were placed almost wheel to wheel in the open, always sinking deeper into the mora.s.s, and unable to move away from the storm of sh.e.l.ls. The light railways on which they depended for a regular supply of sh.e.l.ls often sank themselves from lack of solid foundation. Far behind, junctions, dumps and rest camps were attacked by long-range fire and bombs, with a violent persistency quite unprecedented until the March days next year. The ordeal was bitterly hard, and the prize incompletely won, but the spirit of the British Armies rose supreme over all, and the German defence was taxed to the uttermost.

The 31st July brought the Battalion no excitements. Leaving camp soon after midnight they crossed the Belgian frontier and moved to St. Jan Ter Beezen, just west of Poperinghe. The flickers and rumble of the greatest bombardment yet known in war accompanied them through the night. The rain descended and the floods came for the next three days.

Again, as in the days of Loos and the Somme, the first expectations and the eager hopes were disappointed. Success had been only partial; the weather was impossible, operations were postponed. Next day the sodden men found themselves in dripping tents, just pitched, a stage nearer the line at Dambre Farm, in the low country west of Ypres. On the 5th the battlefield was reached. All through the afternoon at five minutes' interval the platoons moved up. Heavy sh.e.l.ls followed them all the way. At dusk the relief of the 188th Brigade in the reserve lines south of St. Julien was completed. Water stood everywhere, the trenches were blotted out, the pill-boxes themselves were flooded. The sh.e.l.ling was incessant, and no sleep was possible that night. On the night of the 6th-7th the 1st/4th Oxfords were relieved, and 24 hours were spent on either side of St. Julien through which runs the Steenbeck, foulest of streams. Next night, amidst violent thunder, the Battalion crawled back to Dambre Camp. The four days had cost them 11 killed and 31 wounded, which might well have been increased but for the steady discipline prevailing among all ranks.

Next week the attack, whose date was yet unknown, was sedulously practised in all its details. A large scale model of the ground was inspected by all officers and N.C.O.'s at Divisional Headquarters. On the 15th the time for action had arrived. The march to the battle was slow and deliberate. The men halted at midday at the camp of Reigersberg, ate and slept. Then ate again a last hot meal before setting out on their final journey through the darkness. All the Companies were in position by 3.30 a.m. on the 16th. Then followed a period of anxious inactivity, until at 4.45 the British barrage burst forth in its awful salute to the dawn. Men began to advance against the enemy on the whole front of 25 miles; the second act of the great struggle had begun.

The attack was, on the whole, a complete failure, though on the left the French made progress through the swamps towards Houthulst Forest, and the 23rd Division took Langemarck. In the centre, where our Division was engaged, progress was infinitesimal. The enemy troops, hidden in their deep and inconspicuous labyrinth of defence, were fresh and fought stoutly. Our attack was based on the support of tanks, which, owing to the condition of the ground, could not come into action. The forces alloted were far too weak to approach the ambitious objectives which had been a.s.signed to them: and were fortunate if they succeeded in winning a few hundred yards after a long and desperate struggle which left them crippled. Our Battalion had a hard and disspiriting task. a.s.signed as Reserve to the Brigade it had been intended to sweep through the a.s.saulting Battalions to the final objective. Actually their role was reduced to hanging about under violent sh.e.l.ling, almost stationary, turning now to right, now to left, to fill up gaps in the line, or to ward off threatened counter-attacks, always waiting for an order to advance which never came.

Although I have avoided criticism as far as possible in this narrative, I cannot refrain from saying, after a careful study of the doc.u.ments available, that the staff work of the 5th Army (General Gough) was thoroughly bad as far as our Division was concerned. Time after time units were set impossible tasks, with inadequate support from artillery and tanks, and with ludicrously small reserves. This opinion is thoroughly shared by others more competent to pa.s.s judgment than myself.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Map.]

The order of battle for the Brigade was as follows:--Starting from the line of the Steenbeek the three Battalions, covering a frontage of about 1,200 yards, were to take the fortified line of the Langemarck road from the crossroads at Winnipeg to those just west of Keerselare.

This accomplished, their a.s.sault was to take them beyond the Pink and Blue lines to an outpost position along the farms of Flora Hubner and Stroppe. The 5th Gloucesters on the right joined the Ulster Division, the Bucks Battalion was in the centre, and on the left the 4th Oxfords touched the 12th Division. It will thus be seen that the Brigade, unsupported, was expected to advance about a mile through the mud, everywhere ankle-deep, taking on its way three regularly-organised positions, to say nothing of the intermediate strong points with which the ground bristled. The enemy was at his strongest, well-prepared and expectant. The 7th Bavarian Regiment, which faced us, had just come into line; it was part of a good Division, the 5th Bavarian. His barrage descended only three minutes after our own had begun. It is not surprising that, as a result, no impression was made even on the line of the Langemarck road, except at one point round Springfield.

The fight swayed about round the pill-boxes, disused gun-pits and fortified farms which studded the countryside. Each one of these had to be taken separately; the pill-boxes in particular had to be rushed by bombers, who crept up and threw their bombs through the loopholes, which meanwhile were silenced by continuous machine-gun fire. One of these structures, entirely surrounded by water except for a narrow causeway, successfully defied all attempts at capture.

Meanwhile, our four Companies had varied experiences just behind this all-day battle. A Company on the right, advancing over the Steenbeek at zero, caught the full blast of the barrage. Captain Tripp (3rd East Surreys), who was in command, was immediately killed, and the only other officer, 2nd Lieut. Brooke, wounded. 2nd Lieut. Buck was then sent from Headquarters to take command. During the remainder of the day the Company, hara.s.sed continuously by sh.e.l.ls and rifle fire (for the enemy held positions within 300 yards of them), reduced in strength by almost a half, succeeded in maintaining touch with the Ulsters and the Gloucesters. Twice the enemy, pushing forward small parties, tried to find a gap, but was arrested at once. The line remained, curving in an arc east of St. Julien, about 200 yards beyond the starting point. B Company also experienced great difficulty in making their way through the barrage. Captain Norrish, who was in command, walked up and down looking for a gap. After a while he brought them through by the north-east corner of St. Julien. Thence, turning right-handed in small parties, they dug in behind A Company and the Gloucesters. For the remainder of the day they remained in support to the latter, who were vainly endeavouring to force their way forward to the Langemarck road. This Company seems to have lost about 40 men during the day. To C Company fell such small share of actual fighting as came the way of the Battalion. The Bucks, on moving forward, were held up by a large strong point at Hillock Farm, which resisted obstinately with machine guns. Two platoons of C Company, creeping up from the north-west, played their Lewis guns upon the loopholes. The farm was encircled and taken, 50 of the garrison were killed and the remainder captured. This was about 7 a.m. During the next three hours the Bucks thrust slowly forward, losing heavily all the way. By 10.30 they had gained a precarious footing in the Green line on a front of about 200 yards round Springfield. Their position was very dangerous, as both their flanks were in the air. The Oxfords, on their left, had been completely hung up, and were barely beyond our front line. Two platoons of C Company pushed up northwards into the gap at 11.30, but found only small parties of the enemy, who enfiladed them at close range from some disused gun-pits 200 yards west of the Poelcapelle road. These snipers caused constant casualties, and when Captain Holmes was. .h.i.t at noon all the officers had been put out of action. Under the leadership of Sergt.-Major Heath they cleared the gun-pits and extracted six prisoners, the only trophies of the day; there they remained until relief, losing at least 50 men. C.S.-M.

Heath obtained the M.C. D Company, contrary to their experience at Ronssoy, had the easiest time of the four. Held back on the western bank of the Steenbeek by the congestion at the bridges until 5.15 a.m., they crossed when the barrage, always lighter on our left, had greatly slackened and suffered only slight loss. They dug in near the eastern bank, and remained all day there in support of the Bucks. At noon one platoon moved forward to the right, and securing the Bucks'

right flank, kept in connection with the posts of A Company. The losses of this company were about 30 men. In all the casualties of the Battalion were 35 killed (including Captain Tripp), and 138 wounded and missing (including Captains Winslow and Holmes and 2nd Lieuts.

Brooke, Oldridge and Wood). This amounted to about a third of the fighting strength. The remainder of the Brigade suffered more heavily, especially the Bucks, who had clung for hours with splendid gallantry to the exposed and practically untenable position round Springfield.

The Battalion next day was relieved by Companies at dawn and dusk, and rea.s.sembled at Dambre Camp. The respite was short, for before many days the Division was called again to make a fresh attempt at the same spot. Although no general attack was found practicable until the 20th September, it was apparently deemed essential first to gain a footing on the low ridge of Gravenstal, which, though it rose only 60 feet above the Steenbeek Valley, dominated the country as far as Ypres, and gave the enemy eyes to see our preparations. The next attack was fixed for 27th August; this time it was the turn of the 143rd and 144th Brigades to attack, while we remained in Divisional Reserve. The front and the objectives were almost exactly the same. On the left was the 11th Division, on the right the 61st, our second line. It was the first time that these two had come together on the battlefield, and the occasion was not fortunate, for both were unable to make headway and lost severely. The plan of attack showed great lack of imagination, and shook general confidence in the staff of the 5th Army. The lessons of the 16th seemed to have been entirely thrown away. The same impossible advance was expected. The ground was far worse than before. The water lay knee-deep in the valley. As the men struggled forward they could be seen pulling one another out of the glutinous mud in which they had sunk to the waist. The tanks, promised as before, were unable to perform. Finally, the attack started at the singular hour of 1.55 p.m., which rendered concealment of all the final preparations impossible, and gave the German machine gunners deadly opportunities for dealing with the reserves who poured up in the afternoon along the crowded tracks. The Battalion arrived at its a.s.sembly place on the road running through St. Julien about 3.30 p.m., and, as before, waited on events. Towards dusk it became known that the Warwicks' attack had completely failed, while further north the 7th and 8th Worcesters succeeded after four hours' fighting in seizing the Green line from Springfield as far as the Keerselare cross roads. At 8 p.m. all hope of a further advance in the Warwick area had gone, and the Battalion was ordered to relieve the shattered Brigade, one Company taking the place of each Battalion. There was naturally much difficulty in taking over, and next morning it was discovered that three platoons of the 8th Warwicks, whose position was unknown to their C.O., were still lying unrelieved round Border Farm. Meanwhile, on the evening of the 27th, confused fighting still went on north of Springfield, where the 1st/4th Oxfords had been brought up to try by exploiting the success already gained to turn the Spot Farm-Winnipeg portion of the Green line. No further ground, however, was secured; the men were at the limits of their endurance, and by next morning it was clear that everything had combined to render a further attack impossible. The day was therefore, pa.s.sed quietly for the exhausted combatants; in front the stretcher-bearers bravely and indefatigably picked up the wounded, who had lain out all night in the liquid mud.

That night two companies of the 2nd/10th London relieved us. Thus half a Battalion held defensively the whole fighting front of a Brigade.

We returned again to Dambre Camp, which the enemy sh.e.l.led viciously with a naval gun. The Battalion may be considered fortunate in losing only 11 killed (including Captain Norrish, 10th Middles.e.x), and 51 wounded (including Captain Shaw, 4th Northants).

St. Jan Ter Beezen now reharboured the Battalion, which was built up again in strength by a succession of curious little drafts of 6 and 11. The usual training, increasing in intensity as the men recovered from the fatigue of battle, was carried on through a spell of close and thundery weather. The nights were more than once disturbed by a shower of bombs. On 16th September a train journey removed us far from the front to Audenfort, near Calais, to occupy the farms and barns of several scattered hamlets. The att.i.tude of the population, as sometimes happened in the back areas, was unfriendly. The reason, doubtless, is that the distance from the realities of war is apt to make the inhabitants less accommodating and the troops less well-disciplined. In this case, however, excellent relations were established in a few days. The training during the ensuing ten days was mainly confined to musketry, and A Company had the satisfaction of beating all the other companies of the Division in a field practice fired under the eyes of the G.O.C.

On the 27th September the Battalion returned to the same blighted region, now enveloped by dense autumn mists. The great attack of 20th September had rolled forward the tide of battle for more than a mile, and the British, now ensconced in the demolished farms on the east side of the Gravenstal Ridge, were preparing to carry out another stage of that painful and b.l.o.o.d.y progress. At dawn on 4th October the 143rd Brigade attacked through us, advancing some 1,500 yards. The Battalion spent the next three days in an uneasy reserve, changing their quarters every 24 hours, continuously soaked by the rain, which again fell pitilessly. On 7th October they regained the front line, pulling one another out of the trackless mire as they crawled up through the dripping night, plentifully sprinkled with gas on their way. Next night was even worse; the 7th Worcesters came up to relieve us under sh.e.l.l-fire; most of the guides we sent down to them were either killed or buried and the relief was long and arduous. The 144th Brigade attacked again on the 8th-9th October, under the worst possible conditions; our Battalion, in Divisional Reserve, was allotted to the Brigade, and lay out scattered by Companies until dusk on the 9th, ready to repel counter-attacks and to lend help as required, but was not actively engaged. The total casualties during this period amounted to 84, of whom 16 were killed. All who took part in these ten days' operations agree that the hardships suffered by the men exceeded everything yet endured on active service. The exhausted troops were taken back to Dambre Camp on the 9th by motor lorries.

This was their last experience of that tremendous and ill-conducted battle, in which they had been engaged with but slight intermission for 70 days.

CHAPTER XIX

LAST DAYS IN FRANCE AND THE JOURNEY TO ITALY

On 15th October the Battalion left the Flemish swamps for good, and, returning south by rail, eventually settled for the remainder of the month in the huts at Villars-au-Bois, north-west of Arras. Here they rested in pleasant country behind the 2nd Canadian Division, one of whose regiments, the 27th, they replaced in reserve. The former were a splendid body of men, and very friendly. Their Quartermaster excited general admiration, being a man of over 60 years of age, two of whose sons were serving in the same Battalion as Second-in-Command and Adjutant. As usual, after active operations adequate drafts arrived of both officers and men; the former came mainly from the 3rd Wilts, the latter from the M.T., who, though practically ignorant of infantry work, soon developed in a very satisfactory way. From 2nd-10th November we occupied the sector in front of Vimy Ridge, the scene of the great Canadian victories in April, looking across to the devastated mining town of Lens. The Canadians had done all that was possible to improve the trenches, which the counter-bombardment of either side had levelled, and they were generally good except on the left, where all the soil had been shot away. The dugouts, as generally in ground captured from the Huns, were excellent; there was little fighting activity, and no more than three casualties were suffered. On the 8th the Battalion received the thanks of the 31st Division for their a.s.sistance in a daylight raid carried out by the latter on our right. Smoke-clouds were emitted from our trenches, while the skilful manipulation of life-sized dummies successfully produced the illusion of lines of men issuing from their trenches, who drew on their wooden bodies the desired effect of heavy enemy fire. On November 14th Savy and Villars Brulin received the Battalion. These little villages, some 12 miles from the firing line near the source of the Scarpe, were, though we knew it not, to be the last billets of the Battalion in France. Every autumn the enemy had replied to our offensive in France with a furious blow elsewhere. As in 1915 he had crushed Serbia, in 1916 occupied two-thirds of Roumania, so this year he fell upon the Italians at Caporetto on the 25th October. This enormous disaster, which cost the Italians 250,000 prisoners and a third of their artillery, brought the Austro-Germans by the beginning of November to the banks of the Piave, and it was decided that British and French forces should be dispatched to Italy to defend Venice and to give the Italian Army a breathing s.p.a.ce for reorganisation. Therefore, when we were resting on the 21st, and speculating on the possibility of taking part in the Cambrai Battle so dramatically begun the day before, orders arrived for entrainment next afternoon with nine days' rations.

The journey was made in two trains, under the command of Colonel Clarke and Major Aldworth respectively, which made for Italy by different routes, after leaving Troyes. Colonel Clarke's train reached Dijon on the second evening; Lyons early the next morning; throughout that day the exquisite and fruitful Rhone Valley pa.s.sed before the delighted eyes of the men. The journey was slow, and when Avignon was reached at 2 a.m. on the 25th, the train was already twelve hours late. Still further time was then lost owing to an accident at Toulon, which station was only entered at dusk after a triumphant progress through crowds of excited southerners, who gathered along the line cheering and waving. Most of the famous places of the French Riviera were pa.s.sed in darkness, but at 8.10 on the 26th the frontier was pa.s.sed at Ventimille. The journey continued along the lovely Italian coast until Savona was reached at nightfall. The Italians showed little disposition to welcome their deliverers, and the unpopularity of the war in these districts was patent. Next dawn found the train at Pavia, whence it proceeded along the Po to Cremona, where a 16-hour halt enabled the men to stretch their legs. With band playing they marched through the streets, and succeeded in arousing the enthusiasm of the inhabitants. The local commandante, Cav.

Vittorio, a very courteous gentleman, took the salute as the two Companies re-entered the station. The extreme congestion of the Italian railways now upset all timetables completely. Mantua was not reached until 1 a.m. on the 29th, but finally the two Companies detrained at Saletto; and in the afternoon billeting orders arrived, and the evening found them lodged in a private house, a theatre and a monastery at Noventa. The billets were shared with a detachment of the Italian Veterinary Corps, the miserable condition of whose horses and mules bore witness to the rigours of the recent retreat. An 8-mile march next day over roads slippery with frost ended in a most elegant billet, a gorgeous chateau, which belonged to a Colonel Cabely, killed near Gorizia. Part of its magnificence, however, consisted in marble floors, a cold bed for men wrapped up in only one blanket.

Major Aldworth's train travelled more rapidly; by midnight on the 24th it had crossed the Mont Cenis and was running through Italian territory. Early next morning everyone was peering out of the windows at the great snow mountains through which the train descended to the Piedmontese Plain. The bells of the village churches were ringing everywhere on this Sunday morning as the train moved towards Turin, which was reached at noon on the 25th November. This city provided a rousing welcome; ladies handed out chocolate, cigarettes and little silk flags from the platform; the train steamed out into the open country between vociferating crowds. The journey henceforth was slow and circuitous, the direction being first north-east to Milan, which was pa.s.sed during the night of 26th-27th November; then south to Pavia, and from there along the Po through Mantua to Nogaro, where the men were comfortably installed in billets by 9 p.m. on 27th November. Both journeys were as comfortable as could be expected in the exceptional circ.u.mstances. The men were able to get a hot drink at least twice a day, which was often supplemented by the energy of Red Cross ladies on the platforms, particularly in France.