"We just sank it," was the answer. _No. 129_ had dropped eight depth charges, one directly over the Austrian boat; in the water thrown up the officers had counted seven pieces of metal plates, and the ma.s.ses of oil and bubbles that presently arose completed the story of the destruction.

Meanwhile, the British cruisers had taken up their station at Durazzo and were finishing the work that made this place useless as a military headquarters.

Not a man in the whole American force was injured; in a brief time the excitement was all over, and the great ships, screened again by the wasps of chasers, started back to Brindisi. The impression made upon our Allies was well expressed in the congratulatory message sent to me in London by Commodore Kelly, who commanded the British cruisers in this action.

"Their conduct," he said, "was beyond praise. They all returned safely without casualties. They thoroughly enjoyed themselves."

And from the Italians came this message:

"Italian Naval General Staff expresses highest appreciation of useful and efficient work performed by United States chasers in protecting major vessels during action against Durazzo; also vivid admiration of their brilliant and clever operations which resulted in sinking two enemy submarines."

The war was now drawing to a close; a day before the Allied squadrons started for Durazzo Bulgaria surrendered; about two weeks after the attack Austria had given up the ghost. The subchasers were about this time just getting into their stride; the cessation of hostilities, however, ended their careers at the very moment when they had become most useful. A squadron of thirty-six under the command of Captain A. J.

Hepburn reached Queenstown in September, but though it had several interesting contacts with the enemy, and is credited with sending one German home badly damaged, the armistice was signed before it had really settled down to work. The final spectacular appearance was at Gibraltar, in the last four days of the war. The surrender of Austria had left the German submarines stranded in the Adriatic without a base; and they started home by way of the Mediterranean and Gibraltar. A squadron of eighteen chasers had just arrived at the Azores, on the way to reinforce the flotilla at Plymouth; seven of these were at once despatched to Gibraltar on the chance that they might bar the pa.s.sage of these U-boats. They reached this port at the storm season; yet they went out in the hardest gales and had several exciting contacts with the fleeing Germans. The records show that five submarines attempted to get through the straits; there is good evidence that two of these were sunk, one by the British patrol and one by our chasers.

FOOTNOTE:

[6] A "P" boat is a special type of anti-submarine craft smaller and slower than a destroyer and having a profile especially designed to resemble that of a submarine.

CHAPTER VII

THE LONDON FLAGSHIP

I

While our naval forces were thus playing their parts in several areas, the work of creating the central staff of a great naval organization was going forward in London. The headquarters for controlling extensive naval operations in many widely dispersed areas, like the headquarters of an army extending over a wide front, must necessarily be located far behind the scene of battle. Thus, a number of remodelled dwelling-houses in Grosvenor Gardens contained the mainspring for an elaborate mechanism which reached from London to Washington and from Queenstown to Corfu. On the day of the armistice the American naval forces in European waters comprised about 370 vessels of all cla.s.ses, more than 5,000 officers, regulars and reserves, and more than 75,000 men; we had established about forty-five bases and were represented in practically every field of naval operations. The widespread activities of our London headquarters on that eventful day presented a striking contrast to the humble beginnings of eighteen months before.

From April to August, 1917, the American navy had a very small staff organization in Europe. During these extremely critical four months the only American naval representatives in London, besides the regular Naval Attache and his aides, were my personal aide, Commander J. V. Babc.o.c.k, and myself; and our only office in those early days was a small room in the American Emba.s.sy. For a considerable part of this time we had no stenographers and no clerical a.s.sistance of our own, though of course the Naval Attache, Captain W. D. MacDougall, and his personnel gave us all the a.s.sistance in their power. Commander Babc.o.c.k had a small typewriter, which he was able to work with two fingers, and on this he laboriously pounded out the reports which first informed the Navy Department of the seriousness of the submarine situation. The fact that Commander Babc.o.c.k was my a.s.sociate during this critical period was a fortunate thing for me, and a still more fortunate thing for the United States. Commander Babc.o.c.k and I had been closely a.s.sociated for several years; in that early period, when we, in our two persons, represented the American naval forces at the seat of Allied naval activity, we not only worked together in that little room but we lived together. Our office was alternately this room in the American Emba.s.sy and our quarters in an hotel. I had already noted Commander Babc.o.c.k's abilities when he was on my staff in the Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla and when he was a student at the Naval War College; but our constant companionship throughout the war, especially during these first few strenuous months in London, gave me a still greater respect for his qualities. Many men have made vital contributions to our success in the war of whom the public scarcely ever hears even the name. A large part of the initiative and thinking which find expression in successful military action originates with officers of this type. They labour day after day and night after night, usually in subordinate positions, unselfishly doing work which is necessarily credited to other names than their own, daily lightening the burden of their chiefs, and constantly making suggestions which may control military operations or affect national policy.

Commander Babc.o.c.k is a striking representative of this type. My personal obligations to him are incalculable; and I am indebted to him not only for his definite services, but for the sympathy, the encouragement, and the kindly and calculated pessimism which served so well to counterbalance my temperamental optimism.

Our relations were so close, working and living together as we did, that I find it difficult to speak of "Babby's" services with restraint. But there are particular accomplishments to his credit which should go down upon this popular record. I have described the first consultations with the British naval chiefs. These were the meetings which formed the basis of the reports recommending the conditions upon which the American navy should co-operate with the Allies. Commander Babc.o.c.k was constantly at my elbow during all these consultations, and was all the time independently conducting investigations in the several departments of the Admiralty. The original drafts of all my written and cabled communications to the department--reports which form a connected story of our partic.i.p.ation in the naval war during this period--were prepared by him.

Able as Commander Babc.o.c.k was, human endurance still had its limitations. A public-spirited American business man in London, Mr. R.

E. Gillmor, who had formerly been an officer in the navy, begged to be accepted as a volunteer; he brought two of his best stenographers, English girls, and personally paid their salaries for several weeks while they were devoting all their time to the American navy.

Subsequently he was enlisted in the naval reserves and performed very valuable services on the staff throughout nearly the entire period of the war--until ordered to America, where his technical knowledge was required in connection with certain important appliances with which he was familiar. His experience as a business man in London was of great value to our forces, and his time and energy were devoted to our service with a zeal and loyalty that endeared him to us all.

Soon afterward a number of Rhodes scholars and other young Americans then in Europe, G. B. Stockton, E. H. McCormick, T. B. Kittredge, P. F.

Good, R. M. D. Richardson, H. Millard, L. S. Stevens, and J. C.

Baillargeon, joined our forces as unpaid volunteers and gave us the benefit of their trained minds and European experience. Two of these, Kittredge and Stockton, both valuable workers, had been serving under Hoover in Belgium. They were all later enrolled as reserves and continued their work throughout the war. Lieutenant Stockton performed the arduous and important duties of chief business manager, or executive officer, of headquarters in a most efficient manner, and throughout the war Kittredge's previous historical training, European experience, and fine intellectual gifts made his services very valuable in the Intelligence Department.

Mr. Page, the American Amba.s.sador, aided and encouraged us in all possible ways. Immediately after my arrival in London he invited me to call upon him and his staff for any a.s.sistance they could render. In his enthusiastic and warm-hearted way, he said: "Everything we have is yours. I will turn the Emba.s.sy into the street if necessary"; and throughout the war he was a tower of strength to the cause. He gave us his time and the benefit of his great experience and personal prestige in establishing cordial relations with the various branches of the British Government--and all this with such an absence of diplomatic formality, such courteous and forceful efficiency, and such cordial sympathy and genuine kindness that he immediately excited not only our sincere admiration but also our personal affection.

During all this period events of the utmost importance were taking place; it was within these four months that the convoy system was adopted, that armed guards were placed on merchant ships, that the first American troops were escorted to France, and that our destroyers and other worships began arriving in European waters. In July it became apparent that the strain of doing the work of a dozen men, which had been continuous during the past four months, could no longer be supported by my aide, Commander Babc.o.c.k. When the destroyers and other ships arrived, we went through their lists; here and there we hit upon a man whom we regarded as qualified for responsible staff duty, and transferred him to the London headquarters. This proceeding was necessary if our essential administrative work was to be done. Among the reserves who were subsequently a.s.signed to our forces many excellent staff officers also were developed for handling the work of communications, cipher codes, and the like. When the Colonel House Commission came over in October, 1917, I explained our necessities to the "skippers" of the two cruisers that brought the party, who promptly gave us all the desks and office equipment they could spare and sent them to Grosvenor Gardens.

In August, however, additional ships and forces began to arrive from America, and it became necessary to have larger quarters than those available in the Emba.s.sy for handling the increasing administrative work. At one time the British Government contemplated building us a temporary structure near the Admiralty, but this was abandoned because there was a shortage of material. We therefore moved into an unoccupied dwelling near the American Emba.s.sy that seemed adapted to our needs. We rented this house furnished, just as it stood; a first glimpse of it, however, suggested refined domesticity rather than naval operations. We quickly cleared the building of rugs, tapestries, lace curtains, pictures, and expensive furniture, reduced the twenty-five rooms to their original bareness, and filled every corner with office equipment.

In a few days the staff was installed in this five-story residence and the place was humming with the noise of typewriters. At first we regarded the leasing of this building as something of an extravagance; it seemed hardly likely that we should ever use it all! But in a few weeks we had taken the house adjoining, cut holes through the walls and put in doors; and this, too, was filled up in an incredibly short time, so rapidly did the administrative work grow. Ultimately we had to take over six of these private residences and make alterations which transformed them into one. From August our staff increased at a rapid rate until, on the day the armistice was signed, we had not far from 1,200 officers, enlisted men, and clerical force, working in our London establishment, the commissioned staff consisting of about 200 officers, of which sixty were regulars and the remainder reserves.

I find that many people are surprised that I had my headquarters in London. The historic conception of the commander-in-chief of a naval force located on the quarterdeck of his flagship still holds the popular imagination. But controlling the operations of extensive and widely dispersed forces in a campaign of this kind is quite a different proceeding from that of directing the naval campaigns of Nelson's time, just as making war on land has changed somewhat from the method in vogue with Napoleon. The opinion generally prevails that my princ.i.p.al task was to command in person certain naval forces afloat. The fact is that this was really no part of my job during the war. The game in which several great nations were engaged for four years was a game involving organized direction and co-operation. It is improbable that any one nation could have won the naval war; that was a task which demanded not only that we should all exert our fullest energies, but that, so far as it was humanly possible, we should exert them as a unit. It was the duty of the United States above all nations to manifest this spirit. We had entered the war late; we had entered it in a condition of unpreparedness; our naval forces, when compared to those which had been a.s.sembled by the Allies, were small; we had not been engaged for three years combating an enemy using new weapons and methods of naval warfare. It was not unlikely that we could make some original contributions to the Allied effort; indeed, we early did so; yet it was natural to suppose that the navies which had been combating the submarines so long understood that game better than did we, and it was our duty to a.s.sist them in this work, rather than to operate independently. Moreover, this question as to whether any particular one of our methods might be better or might be worse than Great Britain's was not the most important one. The point was that the British navy had developed its own methods of working and that it was a great "going concern." The crisis was so pressing that we simply did not have the time to create a separate force of our own; the most cursory examination of conditions convinced me that we could hope to accomplish something worth while only by playing the game as it was then being played, and that any attempt to lay down new rules would inevitably decrease the effectiveness of our co-operation, and perhaps result in losing the war. We can even admit, for the sake of the argument, that the Americans might have created a better organization than the British; but the question of improving on their methods, or of not improving on them, was a point that was not worth considering; long before we could have developed an efficient independent machine the war would have come to an end. It was thus our duty to take things as they were, to plunge immediately into the conflict, and to make every ship and every man tell in the most effective way and in the shortest possible time. Therefore I decided that our forces should become, for the purpose of this war, virtually a part of the Allied navies; to place at the disposal of the Allies our ships to reinforce the weak part of their lines; to ignore such secondary considerations as national pride, naval prestige, and personal ambitions; and to subordinate every other consideration to that of defeating the Hun. I have already described how in distributing our subchasers I practically placed them at the disposal of the Allied Council; and this represents the policy that was followed in all similar matters.

The naval high commands were located at Washington, London, Paris, and Rome. Necessarily London was the headquarters of the naval war. Events which had long preceded the European conflict had made this choice inevitable. The maritime development of four centuries had prepared London for the role which she was now called upon to play. From all over the world naval and maritime information flowed to this great capital as though in obedience to the law of gravity. Even in peace times London knew where every ship in the world was at any particular time. All other machinery for handling this great ma.s.s of detail was necessarily acc.u.mulated in this great city, and Lloyd's, the world headquarters for merchant shipping, had now become practically a part of the British Admiralty. In this war the matter of information and communications was supremely important. Every decision that was made and every order that was issued, even those that were the least consequential, rested upon complete information which was obtainable, in time to be useful, only in London. I could not have made my headquarters in Washington, or Paris, or Rome because these cities could not have furnished the military intelligence which was needed as a preliminary to every act. For the same reason I could not have efficiently controlled the operations of all our forces from Queenstown, or Brest, or Gibraltar; the staff controlling the whole had necessarily to be located in London, and the tactical commands at these other bases must be exercised by subordinates. The British placed all their sources of information and their communications at our disposal. They literally opened their doors and made us part of their organization. I sat daily in consultation with British naval chiefs, and our officers had access to all essential British information just as freely as did the British naval officers themselves. On the day of my arrival Admiral Jellicoe issued orders that the Americans should be shown anything which they wished to see. With all this information, the most complete and detailed in the world, constantly placed at our disposal, and a spirit of confidence and friendship always prevailing which has no parallel in history, it would have defeated the whole purpose of our partic.i.p.ation in the war had the American high command taken up its headquarters anywhere except in London.

Incidentally, there was an atmosphere in the London Admiralty which made a strong appeal to anyone who is interested in naval history. Everything about the place is reminiscent of great naval achievements. The room in which our councils met was the same old Admiralty Board room that had been used for centuries. In accordance with the spirit of British conservatism, this room is almost exactly the same now, even in its furnishings, as it was in Nelson's time. The same old wood carvings hang over the same old fireplace; the table at which we sat is the identical one at which Nelson must have sat many times, and the very silver inkstand which Nelson used was used by his successors in this war. The portrait of this great naval chieftain looked down upon us during our deliberations. Above the fireplace is painted a huge compa.s.s, and about the centre of this swings an arrow. This was a part of the Admiralty equipment of a hundred years ago, though it has no usefulness now except a sentimental one. In old days this arrow was geared to a weather vane on the roof of the Admiralty, and it constantly showed to the chiefs a.s.sembled in the council room the direction of the wind--a matter of great importance in the days of sailing ships.

All general orders and plans concerning the naval operations of British and American forces came from the Admiralty, and here officers of my staff were constantly at work. The commanders-in-chief at the various bases commanded the combined British and American ships based on those ports only in the sense that they carried out the general instructions and policies which were formulated in London. These orders, so far as they affected American forces, could be issued to the commanders-in-chief only after American headquarters in London had vised them. Thus the American staff held the ultimate command over all the American forces which were based in British waters. The same was true of those at Brest, Gibraltar, and other stations. The commanders-in-chief executed them, and were responsible for the manner in which the forces were used in combating the enemy. The operations of which I was the commander extended over an immense area. The Plymouth and Queenstown forces represented only a part of the ultimate American naval strength in European waters and not the most important part; before the war ended, Brest, as I shall show, developed into a greater naval base than any of those which we maintained in the British Isles. Convoys were not only coming across the Atlantic but they were constantly arriving from the Mediterranean and from the South Sea, and it was the duty of headquarters in London, and not the duty of local commanders, to route these precious argosies, except in special cases, just before they reached their port of destination. Not infrequently, as previously described, it was necessary to change destinations, or to slow down convoys, or to make any number of decisions based on new information; naturally only the centre of information, the Admiralty convoy room, could serve as a clearing house for such operations. The point is that it was necessary for me to exercise the chief command of American forces through subordinates. My position in this respect was precisely the same as that of Generals Haig and Pershing; I had to maintain a great headquarters in the rear, and to depend upon subordinates for the actual execution of orders.

The American headquarters in London comprised many separate departments, each one of which was directly responsible to me as the Force Commander, through the Chief of Staff; they included such indispensable branches as the office of the Chief of Staff, Captain N. C. Twining, Chief of Staff; a.s.sistant Chief of Staff, Captain W. R. s.e.xton; Intelligence Department, Commander J. V. Babc.o.c.k, who also acted as Aide; Convoy Operations Section, Captain Byron A. Long; Anti-submarine Section, Captain R. H.

Leigh; Aviation Section, Captain H. I. Cone, and afterward, Lieutenant-Commander W. A. Edwards; Personnel Section, Commander H. R.

Stark; Communication Section, Lieutenant-Commander E. G. Blakeslee; Material Section, Captain E. C. Tobey (S.C.); Repair Section, Captain S.

F. Smith (C.C.), and afterward, L. B. McBride (C.C.); Ordnance Section, Commander G. L. Schuyler, and afterward, Commander T. A. Thomson; Medical Section, Captain F. L. Pleadwell (M.C.), and afterward, Commander Edgar Thompson (M.C.); Legal Section, Commander W. H. McGrann; and the Scientific Section, Professor H. A. b.u.mstead, Ph.D.

I was fortunate in all of my departmental chiefs. The Chief of Staff, Captain N. C. Twining, would certainly have been a marked man in any navy; he had a genius for detail, a tireless energy, and a mastery of all the problems that constantly arose. I used to wonder when Captain Twining ever found an opportunity to sleep; he seemed to be working every hour of the day and night; yet, so far as was observable, he never wearied of his task, and never slackened in his devotion to the Allied cause. As soon as a matter came up that called for definite decision, Captain Twining would a.s.semble from the several departments all data and information which were available concerning the question at issue, spend a few hours studying this information, and then give his judgment--an opinion which was invariably sound and which was adopted in the vast majority of cases; in fact, in all cases except those in which questions of policy or extraneous considerations dictated a different or modified decision. Captain Twining is a man of really fine intellect combined with a remarkable capacity for getting things done; without his constant presence at my elbow, my work would have been much heavier and much less successful than it was. He is an officer of such exceptional ability, such matured experience, and such forceful character as to a.s.sure him a brilliant career in whatever duty he may be called upon to perform. I can never be sufficiently grateful to him for his loyalty and devotion and for his indispensable contribution to the efficiency of the forces I had the honour to command.

In accordance with my habitual practice, I applied the system of placing responsibility upon my carefully selected heads of departments, giving them commensurate authority, and holding them to account for results.

Because the task was such a great one, this was the only possible way in which the operations of the force could have been successfully conducted. I say, successfully conducted, because in a "business" of this kind, "good enough" and "to-morrow" may mean disaster; that is, it is a case of keeping both information and operations up to the minute.

If the personnel and equipment of the staff are not completely capable of this, it is more than a partial failure, and the result is an ever-present danger. There were men in this great war who "went to pieces" simply because they tried to do everything themselves. This administrative vice of attempting to control every detail, even insignificant ones, to which military men seem particularly addicted, it had always been my policy to avoid. Business at Grosvenor Gardens developed to such an extent that about a thousand messages were every day received in our office or sent from it; and of these 60 per cent.

were in code. Obviously it was impossible for the Force Commander to keep constantly at his finger ends all these details. All department heads, therefore, were selected because they were officers who could be depended upon to handle these matters and make decisions independently; they were all strong men, and it is to their combined efforts that the success of our operations was due. You would have to search a long time among the navies of the world before you could find an abler convoy officer than Captain Byron A. Long; an abler naval constructor than Captain L. B. McBride; an abler man to have charge of the finances of our naval forces, the purchase of supplies and all kinds of material than Captain (S.C.) Eugene C. Tobey; abler aviation officers than Captain H. I. Cone and Lieutenant-Commander W. A. Edwards; an abler chief of operations than Captain R. H. Leigh, or an abler intelligence officer than Commander J. V. Babc.o.c.k. These men, and others of the fourteen department heads, acted as a kind of cabinet. Many of them handled matters which, though wholly essential to the success of the forces, were quite outside of my personal knowledge or experience, and consequently they had to be men in whose ability to guide me in such matters I could place complete confidence. As an example of this I may cite one of the duties of Captain Tobey. Nearly all of the very considerable financial transactions he was entrusted with were "Greek"

to me, but he had only to show me the right place on the numerous doc.u.ments, and I signed my name in absolute confidence that the interests of the Government were secure.

All cables, reports, and other communications were referred each day to the department which they concerned. The head of each department studied them, attended to the great majority on his own responsibility, and selected the few that needed more careful attention. A meeting of the Chief of Staff and all department heads was held each day, at which these few selected matters were discussed in council and decisions made.

The final results of these deliberations were the only matters that were referred to me. This system of subdividing responsibility and authority not only promoted efficiency but it left the Force Commander time to attend to vitally important questions of general policy, to keep in personal touch with the high command of the Allied navies, to attend the Allied naval councils, and, in general, to keep his finger constantly on the pulse of the whole war situation. Officers of our own and other navies who were always coming in from the outlying stations, and who could immediately be placed in touch with the one man who could answer all their questions and give immediate decisions, testified to the efficient condition in which the American headquarters was maintained.

One of our departments was so novel, and performed such valuable service, that I must describe it in some detail. We took over into our London organization an idea that is advantageously used in many American industrial establishments, and had a Planning Section, the first, I think, which had ever been adopted by any navy. I detached from all other duties five officers: Captain F. H. Schofield, Captain D. W. Knox, Captain H. E. Yarnell (who exchanged places afterward with Captain L.

McNamee of the Plans Section of the Navy Department), and Colonel R. H.

Dunlap (of the Marines), who was succeeded by Colonel L. McC. Little, when ordered to command a regiment of Marines in France. These men made it their business to advise the Commander-in-Chief on any questions that might arise. All were graduates of the Naval War College at Newport, and they applied to the consideration of war problems the lessons which they had learned at that inst.i.tution. The business of the Planning Section was to make studies of particular problems, to prepare plans for future operations, and also to criticize fully the organization and methods which were already in existence. The fact that these men had no administrative duties and that they could therefore devote all their time to surveying our operations, discovering mistakes, and suggesting better ways of doing things, as well as the fact that they were themselves scholarly students of naval warfare, made their labours exceedingly valuable. I gave them the utmost freedom in finding fault with the existing regime; there was no department and no office, from that of the Commander-in-Chief down, upon whose activities they were not at liberty to submit the fullest and the frankest reports. If anything could be done in a better way, we certainly wanted to know it. Whenever any specific problem of importance came up, it was always submitted to these men for a report. The value of such a report depended upon the completeness and accuracy of the information available, and it was the business of the Intelligence Department of the staff to supply this. If the desired information was not in their files, or the files of the Allied admiralties, or was not up to date, it was their duty to obtain it at once. The point is that the Planning Section had no other duties beyond rendering a decision, based upon a careful a.n.a.lysis of the facts bearing upon the case, which they submitted in writing. There was no phase of the naval warfare upon which the officers of the Planning Section did not give us reports. One of their favourite methods was to place themselves in the position of the Germans and to decide how, if they were directing German naval operations, they would frustrate the tactics of the Allies. Their records contain detailed descriptions of how merchant ships could be sunk by submarines, and these methods, our officers believed, represented a great improvement over those used by the Germans. Indeed, I think that many of these reports, had they fallen into the hands of the Germans, would have been found by them exceedingly useful. There was a general impression, in our own navy as well as in the British, that most of the German submarine commanders handled their boats unskilfully and obtained inadequate results. All these doc.u.ments were given to the responsible men in our forces, as well as to the British, and had a considerable influence upon operations. The British also established a Planning Section, which worked harmoniously with our own.

A subject upon which our Planning Section liked to speculate was the possible sortie of the German fleet. The possibility of a great naval engagement filled the minds of most naval officers; and, after we had sent five of our battleships to reinforce Admiral Beatty's fleet, this topic became even more interesting to American naval men. Would the Germans ever come out? What had they to gain or to lose by such an undertaking? What were their chances of victory? Where would the engagement be fought, and what part would the several elements of modern naval warfare play in it: mines, submarines, battle-cruisers, airplanes, dirigibles, and destroyers? These were among the questions with which the Planning Section busied itself, and this problem, like many others, they approached from the German standpoint. They placed themselves in the position of the German High Command, and peered into the Grand Fleet looking for a weakness, which, had they been Germans, they might turn to account in a general engagement. The only weak spot our Planning Section could find was one which reflected the greatest credit upon the British forces. The British commander, Admiral Sir David Beatty, was a particularly dashing and heroic fighter; could not these splendid qualities really be turned to the advantage of the Germans?

That Admiral Beatty would fight at the first opportunity, and that he would run all justifiable risks, if a chance presented of defeating the German fleet, was as well known to the Germans as to ourselves. The British Admiral, it was also known, did not entertain much respect for mines and torpedoes. All navies possessed what was known as a "torpedo flag." This was an emblem which was to be displayed in case torpedoes were sighted, for the purpose of warning the ships to change course or, if necessary, to desist from an attack. It was generally reported that Admiral Beatty had ordered all these torpedo flags to be destroyed; in case he once started in pursuit of the German fleet, he proposed to take his chances, dive straight through a school of approaching torpedoes, or even to rush full speed over a mine-field, making no efforts to avoid these hidden dangers. That he would probably lose some ships the Admiral well knew, but he figured--and probably correctly--that he would certainly have enough vessels left to annihilate the enemy. Still, in the judgment of our Planning Section, Admiral Beatty's a.s.sumed att.i.tude toward "torpedo flags" gave the Germans their only possible chance of seriously injuring the Grand Fleet. They drew up a plan of attack on the Scapa Flow forces based upon this a.s.sumption. Imagining themselves directors of the German navy, they constructed large numbers of torpedo boats, submarines, and mine-fields and stationed them in a particularly advantageous position; they then proposed to send the German fleet in the direction of Scapa Flow, draw the Grand Fleet to the attack, and then lead it in the direction of the torpedoes and mines. Probably such a scheme would never have succeeded; but it represented, in the opinion of our Planning group, Germany's only chance of crippling the Grand Fleet and winning the war. In other words, had my staff found itself in Germany's position, that is the strategy which it would probably have used. I gave this report unofficially to the British Admiralty simply because I thought it might afford British officers reading that would possibly be entertaining. It is an evidence of the co-operation that existed between the two forces, and of the British disposition to accept suggestions, that this doc.u.ment was immediately sent to Admiral Beatty.

II

The fact that I was able ultimately to create such an organization and leave the administration of its individual departments so largely to their respective heads was especially fortunate because it gave me time for what was perhaps the most important of my duties. This was my attendance at the meetings of the Allied Naval Council, not to mention daily conferences with various officials of the Allies. This naval council was the great headquarters for combined Allied operations against the enemy on the sea. It was not officially const.i.tuted by the Allied governments until November 29, 1917, but it had actually been in continuous operation since the beginning of the war, the heads of the Allied admiralties having met frequently in conference. At these meetings every phase of the situation was discussed, and the methods finally adopted represented the mature judgment of the Allied naval chiefs who partic.i.p.ated in them. Without this council, and without the co-operation for which it stood, our efforts would have been so dispersed and would have so overlapped that their efficiency would have been greatly decreased. This international naval conference not only had to decide questions of naval strategy, but it also had to concern itself with a mult.i.tude of practical matters which have little interest for the public, but which are exceedingly important in war. In this struggle coal, oil, and other materials played a part almost as important as ships and men; these materials, like ships and men, were limited in quant.i.ty; and it was necessary to apportion them as deliberately and as economically as the seemingly more important munitions of warfare. The Germans were constantly changing their tactics; sometimes they would make their concentrations in a certain area; while at other times their strength would appear in another field far distant from the first. These changes made it necessary that we should in each case readjust our forces to counteract the enemy's tactics. It was a vital necessity that these readjustments should be made immediately when the enemy's changes of tactics became known. It is evident that the element necessary to success was that the earliest and most complete possible information should be followed by prompt decision and action; and it is manifest that these requirements could have been satisfied only by a council which was fully informed and which was on the spot momentarily ready to act. The Allied Naval Council responded to all these requirements. One of my first duties, after my arrival, was to attend one of these councils in Paris; and immediately afterward the meetings became much more frequent.

Not only were the proceedings interesting because of the vast importance of the issues which were discussed, but because they brought me into intimate contact with some of the ablest minds in the European navies.

Over the first London councils Admiral Jellicoe presided. I have already given my first impressions of this admirable sailor; subsequent events only increased my respect for his character and abilities. An English woman once described Admiral Jellicoe as "a great gentleman"; it is a description upon which I can hardly improve. The First Lord, Sir Eric Geddes, though he was by profession an engineer and had been transferred from the business of building roads and a.s.suring the communications behind the armies in France to become the civilian head of the British navy, acquired, in an astonishingly short time, a mastery of the details of naval administration. Sir Eric is a type of man that we like to think of as American; perhaps the fact that he had received his business training in this country, and had served an apprenticeship on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, strengthened this impression. The habitues of the National Sporting Club in London--of whom I was one--used to look reproachfully at the giant figure of the First Lord; in their opinion he had sadly missed his calling. His mighty frame, his hard and supple muscles, his power of vigorous and rapid movement, his keen eye and his quick wit--these qualities, in the opinion of those best qualified to judge, would have made this stupendous Briton one of the greatest heavyweight prize-fighters in the annals of pugilism. With a little training I am sure that Sir Eric would even now make a creditable showing in the professional ring. However, the paths of this business man and statesman lay in other fields. After returning from America he had had a brilliant business career in England; he represented the type which we call "self-made men"; that is, he fought his way to the top without the aid of influential friends. His elevation to the Admiralty, in succession to Sir Edward Carson, was something new in British public life, for Sir Eric had never dabbled in politics, and, until the war started, he was practically unknown in political circles. But this crisis in British affairs made it necessary for the Ministry to "draft"

the most capable executives in the nation, irrespective of political considerations; and Sir Eric, therefore, quite naturally found himself at the head of the navy. In a short time he had acquired a knowledge of the naval situation which enabled him to preside over an international naval council with a very complete grasp of all the problems which were presented. I have heard the great naval specialists who attended say that, had they not known the real fact, they would hardly have suspected that Sir Eric was not a naval man. We admired not only his ability to direct the course of discussion, and even to take an important part in it, but also his skill at summing up the results of the whole proceeding in a few terse and masterly phrases. In fine, the First Lord was a man after Roosevelt's heart--big, athletic, energetic, with a genius for reaching the kernel of a question and of getting things done.

When it came to facility of exposition, however, we Anglo-Saxons made a poor showing in comparison with most French naval officers and in particular with Admirals Lacaze and de Bon. Both these gentlemen represented the Gallic type in its finest aspects. After spending a few moments with Rear-Admiral Lacaze, it was easy to understand the real affection which all French naval officers felt for him. He is a small, slight man, with a grey, pointed beard, and he possesses that earnestness of spirit, that courtesy of manner, and that sympathy and charm which we regard as the finest attributes of the cultured Frenchman. Admiral Lacaze has also a genuine French facility of speech and that precision of statement which is so characteristic of the French intellect. A slight acquaintance would make one believe that Admiral Lacaze would be a model husband and father, perhaps grandfather; it was with surprise, however, that I learned that he was a bachelor, but I am sure that he is that kind of bachelor who is an uncle to all of the children of his acquaintance. As Minister of Marine he was the presiding officer of the council when it met in Paris.

In Vice-Admiral de Bon, chief of the French naval staff, Admiral Lacaze had a worthy colleague; he was really a man of heroic mould, and he certainly looked the part. His white hair and his white beard, cut square, gave at first glance an impression of age; yet his clear, pink skin, not ruffled by a trace of wrinkle, his erect figure, his bright blue eyes, the vigour of his conversation and the energy of his movements, betokened rather perpetual youth. Compared with the naval forces of Great Britain, the French navy was of inconsiderable size, but in Admiral de Bon it made a contribution to Allied naval strength which was worth many dreadnoughts. The reputation of this man has scarcely reached this side of the Atlantic; yet it was the general opinion of practically all naval men that his was the keenest mind at the Allied Naval Council. It was certainly the most persuasive in argument, and the one that had most influence in determining our conclusions. Not that there was anything about this great French sailor that was arrogant or offensively self-a.s.sertive. On the contrary, his manner was all compact of charm and courtesy. He was about the most persuasive person I have ever met. Whenever an important matter arose, there was some influence that made us turn instinctively to Admiral de Bon for enlightenment; and, when he rose to talk, the council hung upon his every word. For the man was a consummate orator. Those who understood French even slightly had little difficulty in following the Admiral, for he spoke his delightful language with a precision, a neatness of phrase, and a clearness of enunciation which made every syllable intelligible. So perfect did these speeches seem that one would have suspected that Admiral de Bon had composed them at his leisure, but this was not the case; the man apparently had only to open his mouth, and his speech spontaneously flowed forth; he never hesitated for a word. And his words were not only eloquent, but, as I have said, they were full of substance. The charm which he manifested on these public occasions he carried likewise into his domestic life. Whenever the council met in Paris the Admiral's delightful wife and daughters entertained us at luncheon--an experience which caused many of us to regret that it did not always meet in that city.

The other two members of this interesting group were Rear-Admiral Funakoshi, representing the j.a.panese navy, and Vice-Admiral di Revel, representing the Italian. The j.a.panese was also naval attache at London, and the popularity which he had acquired in this post he also won in the larger field. In some respects, he was not like the conventional notion of a j.a.panese; physically he did not fulfil the accepted role, for he was tall and heavily built; nor was there anything about him that was "inscrutable"; the fact was that he was exceedingly frank and open, and apparently loved nothing so much as a good joke. The remark of a London newspaper that Admiral di Revel, the Italian, "unlike Admiral Sims, looks every inch the sailor," caused Admiral Funakoshi much amus.e.m.e.nt; he could not resist the temptation to chaff me about it. We all became so well acquainted that, in our lighter moments, we did not mind having a little fun at one another's expense; and in these pa.s.sages the j.a.panese representative did not always make the poorest showing. The Italian, di Revel, was a source of continual delight. Someone remarked that he was in reality an Irishman who had escaped into Italy; and this facetious characterization was really not inapt. His shock of red hair, his reddish beard, and his short, stocky figure almost persuaded one that County Cork was his native soil. He delivered his opinions with an insistence which indicated that he entertained little doubt about their soundness; he was not particularly patient if they were called in question; yet he was so courteous, so energetic, and so entertaining that he was a general favourite. That his Government appreciated his services is shown by the fact that it made di Revel a full admiral, a rank which is rarely bestowed in Italy.

Such, then, were the men who directed the mighty forces that defeated the German submarines. The work at the councils was arduous, yet the opportunity of a.s.sociating with such men in such a task is one that comes to few naval officers. They all worked with the most indomitable spirit; not one of them ever for a moment showed the slightest discouragement over a situation which was at times disquieting, to say the least; not one faltered in the determination to force the issue to the only logical end. History has given few examples of alliances that worked harmoniously. The Allied Naval Council did its full share in making harmonious the Allied effort against the submarine.