The Democrats tended to uphold the President, the Republicans to condemn him. Although a majority of the committee on foreign relations exonerated Stevens, yet no opposition appeared to a declaration which pa.s.sed the Senate on May 31, 1894, maintaining that the United States ought not to intervene in Hawaiian affairs and that interference by any other government would be regarded as unfriendly to this country.

In the outcome, these events merely delayed annexation; they could not prevent it. In Hawaii the more influential and the propertied cla.s.ses supported the revolution and desired annexation. In the United States the desire for expansion was stimulated by the fear that some other nation might seize the prize. The military and naval situation in 1898 increased the demand for annexation, and in the summer of that year the acquisition was completed by means of a joint resolution of the two houses of Congress.[8] While negotiations were in progress j.a.pan protested that her interests in the Pacific were endangered. a.s.surances were given, however, that j.a.panese treaty rights would not be affected by the annexation and the protest was withdrawn. The United States was now "half-way across to Asia."

Most dangerous in its possibilities was the controversy with Great Britain over the boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela. British Guiana lies on the northern coast of South America, next to Venezuela and extends inland, with its western boundary roughly parallel to the valley of the Orinoco River. A long-standing disagreement had existed about the exact position of the line between the two countries--a disagreement which harked back to the claims of the Dutch, who had acquired Guiana in 1613 and had turned it over to the British in 1814.

In 1840 England commissioned a surveyor named Schomburgk to fix the boundary but his decision was objected to by the Venezuelans who claimed that he included a great area that rightfully belonged to them.

Gradually the British claims included more and more of the territory claimed by Venezuela, and the discovery of gold in the disputed region not only drew attention to the necessity of a settlement of the boundary but also attracted prospectors who began to occupy the land.

In 1876 Venezuela began negotiations for some means of deciding the dispute and came to the conclusion that arbitration was her only recourse. On the refusal of Great Britain to heed her protests, the Venezuelan government suspended diplomatic relations in 1887, although the United States attempted to prevent a rupture by suggesting the submission of the difference to an arbitral tribunal. This offer was not accepted by Great Britain, and repeated exertions on the part of both Venezuela and the United States at later times failed to produce better results. When Cleveland returned to the presidency in 1893 he again became interested in the Venezuelan matter and Secretary of State Gresham urged the attention of the British government to the desirability of arbitration.

President Cleveland was a man of great courage and had a very keen sense of justice. In his opinion a great nation was playing the bully with a small one, and the injustice stirred his feelings to the depths.

With the President's approval Secretary Olney, who had succeeded Gresham on the death of the latter, drew up an exposition of the Monroe doctrine which was communicated to Lord Salisbury. This despatch, which was dated July 20, 1895, brought matters to a climax. In brief the administration took the position that under the Monroe doctrine the United States adhered to the principle that no European nation might deprive an American state of the right and power of self-government.

This had been established American policy for seventy years. The Venezuelan boundary controversy was within the scope of the doctrine since Great Britain a.s.serted t.i.tle to disputed territory, substantially appropriating it, and refused to have her t.i.tle investigated. At the same time Secretary Olney disclaimed any intention of taking sides in the controversy until the merits of the case were authoritatively ascertained, although the general argument of the despatch seemed to place the United States on the side of Venezuela. Moreover, Secretary Olney adopted a swaggering and aggressive, not to say truculent tone.

He drew a contrast between monarchical Europe and self-governing America, particularly the United States, which "has furnished to the world the most conspicuous ... example ... of the excellence of free inst.i.tutions, whether from the standpoint of national greatness or of individual happiness." The United States, he a.s.serted, is "practically sovereign on this continent" because "wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable characteristics" of its dealings with others and because "its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation ... as against any or all other powers."

Lord Salisbury did not reply to Secretary Olney for more than four months. He then a.s.serted that President Monroe's message of 1823 had laid down two propositions: that America was no longer to be looked upon as a field for European colonization; and that Europe must not attempt to extend its political system to America, or to control the political condition of any of the American communities. In Lord Salisbury's opinion Olney was a.s.serting that the Monroe doctrine conferred upon the United States the right to demand arbitration whenever a European power had a frontier difference with a South American community. He suggested that the Monroe doctrine was not a part of international law, that the boundary dispute had no relation to the dangers which President Monroe had feared and that the United States had no "apparent practical concern" with the controversy between Great Britain and Venezuela. He also raised some objections to arbitration as a method of settling disputes and a.s.serted the willingness of Great Britain to arbitrate her t.i.tle to part of the lands claimed. The remainder, he declared, could be thought of as Venezuelan only by extravagant claims based on the pretensions of Spanish officials in the last century. This area he expressly refused to submit to arbitration. The language of the Salisbury note was diplomatically correct, a fact which did not detract from the effect of the patronizing tone which characterized it.

President Cleveland doggedly proceeded with his demands. On December 17, (1895), he laid before Congress the correspondence with Lord Salisbury, together with a statement of his own position on the matter.

Disclaiming any preconceived conviction as to the merits of the dispute, he nevertheless deprecated the possibility that a European country, by extending its boundaries, might take possession of the territory of one of its neighbors. Inasmuch as Great Britain had refused to submit to arbitration, he believed it inc.u.mbent upon the United States to take measures to determine the true divisional line.

He suggested therefore that Congress empower the executive to appoint a commission to investigate and report. His closing words were so grave as to arouse the country to a realization of the dangerous pitch to which negotiations had mounted:

When such report is made and accepted it will in my opinion be the duty of the United States to resist ... the appropriation by Great Britain of any ... territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela. In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred, and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow. I am nevertheless firm in my conviction that while it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking peoples ... as being otherwise than friendly ... there is no calamity ... which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice.

Congress at once acceded to Cleveland's wishes and appropriated $100,000 for the proposed investigation. For a brief moment neither Great Britain nor America quite realized the meaning of the President's warlike utterance. In America it had generally been felt previously that his foreign policy was conciliatory rather than aggressive and, besides, the Venezuelan dispute had but little occupied popular attention. When it became evident that war was a definite possibility, public interest followed every step with anxiety. Newspaper sentiment divided. The press generally judged Cleveland's stand strong and "American." On the other hand, a few periodicals like the _Nation_ insinuated that the President was actuated by the desire to make political capital for a third term campaign and characterized his action as "criminally rash and insensate," "ignorant and reckless,"

"impudent and insulting." Influential citizens in both countries made energetic attempts to prevent anything that might make war inevitable.

The Prince of Wales and Lord Roseberry threw their influence on the side of conciliation. A.J. Balfour declared that a conflict with the United States would carry something of the "horror of civil war" and looked forward to the time when the country would "feel that they and we have a common duty to perform, a common office to fulfill among the nations of the world."

The President appointed a commission which set to work to obtain the information necessary for a judicial settlement of the boundary, and both Great Britain and Venezuela tactfully expressed a readiness to cooperate. Their labors, however, were brought to a close by a treaty between the two disputants providing for arbitration. A prominent feature of the treaty was an agreement that fifty years' control or settlement of an area should be sufficient to const.i.tute a t.i.tle, a provision which withdrew from consideration much of the territory to which Venezuela had laid claim. In October, 1899, the arbitration was concluded. The award did not meet the extreme claims of either party, but gave Great Britain the larger share of the disputed area, although a.s.signing the entire mouth of the Orinoco River to Venezuela.

Besides giving new life to the Monroe doctrine as an integral part of our foreign policy, the incident served to ill.u.s.trate the dangers of settling international disputes in haphazard fashion. In January, 1897, therefore, Secretary Olney and the British Amba.s.sador at Washington, Sir Julian Pauncefote, negotiated a general treaty for the settlement of disputes between the two countries by arbitration. Even with the example of the possible consequences of the Venezuelan controversy before it, however, the Senate failed to see the necessity for such an expedient, defeated the treaty by a narrow margin and left the greatest problem of international relations--the settlement of controversies on the basis of justice rather than force--to the care of a future generation.

On the whole, as has already been noted, the history of American diplomacy from 1877 to 1897 is scarcely more than an account of a series of unrelated incidents. Not only did the foreign policy of Blaine differ sharply from that of Cleveland, but there was no great question upon which public interest came to a focus, except temporarily over the Venezuelan matter, and no lesser problems that continued long enough to challenge attention to the fact that they remained unsolved.

There were visible, nevertheless, several important tendencies. Our att.i.tude toward Samoa and Hawaii indicated that the instinctive desire to annex territory had not disappeared with the rounding out of the continental possessions of the United States; American interest in arbitration as a method of settling disputes was expressed again and again; the place of the Monroe doctrine in American international policy was clearly shown; and the determination of the United States to be heard in all affairs that touched her interests was demonstrated without any possibility of doubt.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The most complete and reliable authority is J.B. Moore, _A Digest of International Law_ (8 vols. 1906), by one who was intimately connected with many of the incidents of which he wrote; the text of the treaties is in W.M. Malloy, _Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, etc., between the United States of America and other Powers_ (2 vols., 1910).

Valuable single volumes are: J.B. Moore, _American Diplomacy_ (1905); and C.B. Fish, _American Diplomacy_ (1915). W.F. Johnson, _America's Foreign Relations_ (2 vols., 1916), is interesting but somewhat marred by the author's tendency to take sides on controversial points; see also J.B. Henderson, _American Diplomatic Questions_ (1901). J.S.

Ba.s.sett, _Short History of the United States_ (1913), contains a brief and compact chapter.

Essential material on particular incidents is found in the following.

On j.a.pan, "Our War with One Gun" in _New England Magazine_, XXVIII, 662; J.M. Callahan, _American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East_ (1901); W.E. Griffis, _Townsend Harris_ (1896). On Samoa, J.W.

Foster, _American Diplomacy in the Orient_ (1903); R.L. Stevenson, _Eight Years of Trouble in Samoa_ (1892). On the seal fisheries, J.W.

Foster, _Diplomatic Memoirs_ (2 vols., 1909). On Hawaii, Cleveland's message in J.D. Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Presidents_, IX, 460. On Venezuela, Grover Cleveland, _Presidential Problems_, Chap. IV.

[1] The development of the United States as a commercial power was seen in the increased use of consuls as agents for procuring and publishing industrial and commercial information.

[2] Cf. Fish, _American Diplomacy_, 398.

[3] For later aspects of the controversy, see below, pp. 532-533.

[4] Cf. map p. 10.

[5] J.W. Foster, who was intimately connected with the case, suggests that the defects in the American argument were due partly to following briefs prepared by an agent of the Alaska Commercial Company in Washington. The agent was interested in getting everything possible for his company but his knowledge of the law in the case was slight. Cf.

Foster, _Memoirs_, II, 26 f.; Moore, _American Diplomacy_, 97-104.

[6] The attempts to protect the herds by government regulation failed to have any important results. An international arrangement was made in 1911, but the slaughter had proceeded so far that grave question arose whether any agreement would be effective short of absolute prohibition.

In 1912 Congress pa.s.sed a law forbidding any killing on the land for a term of five years; in 1917 when the restrictions were released the herds had greatly increased. In 1918 the seals numbered 530,480.

_American Year Book_, 1918, 503-4.

[7] Cf. _Political Science Review_, Aug., 1916, 481-499.

[8] Cf. below, p. 387 ff. Hawaii was brought into the Union as a territory in 1900.

CHAPTER XIV

THE RISE OF THE WAGE EARNER

In their handling of the labor problem, the governments of the states and the nation showed greater ignorance and less foresight than characterized their treatment of any of the other issues of the quarter century following the Civil War. Yet the building of the railroads and their consolidation into great systems, the development of manufacturing and its concentration into large concerns, and the growth of an army of wage earners brought about a problem of such size and complexity as to demand all the information and vision that the country could muster.

The phenomenal acc.u.mulation of wealth in the fields of mining, transportation and manufacturing which characterized the new industrial America formed the basis of a powerful propertied cla.s.s.

Some of the wealth was ama.s.sed by such unscrupulous methods as those which caused the popular demand for government regulation of the railroads and trusts. The prizes of success were big. The men who made their way to the top--men like Gould, Fisk, Vanderbilt, Rockefeller and Carnegie--were pioneers whose courage, foresight, and daring were combined with sufficient ruthlessness to enable them to triumph where others failed. A few of them, like Carnegie, had some slight conception of the meaning of the labor problem; most of them did not.

Linked to the industrial pioneer by community of interest was the holder of the war bonds of the federal government. These securities were purchased with depreciated paper currency but increased very greatly in value after the successful outcome of the struggle, and formed an investment whose value it is extremely difficult to estimate. The owners of the stocks and bonds of the railroads and manufacturing combinations further swelled the ranks of the propertied cla.s.s. Stability, continuous business and large earnings were the immediate considerations to this group. Anything which interfered was, naturally, a thing to be fought. Never before, unless in the South in slavery days, had a more powerful social cla.s.s existed in the United States. A large fraction of the group was composed of men who had risen from poverty to wealth in a short time. From one point of view such a man is a "self-made" man, industrious, frugal, able, energetic, bold. From another point of view he is a _parvenu_, narrow, overbearing, ostentatious, proud, conceited, uncultivated. The relatively small size of the propertied cla.s.s and an obvious community of interest tended to make its members reach a cla.s.s consciousness even during the Civil War. The success of the group in preventing all tariff reduction after 1865 was a striking example of the solidarity of its membership and its readiness for action.

Cla.s.s consciousness among the wage earners developed much more slowly, and in the nature of things was much less definite. Nevertheless the history of the industrial turmoil of the quarter century after the Civil War is the history of a cla.s.s groping for political, social and economic recognition.

At the close of the war the labor situation was confused and complicated. A million and a half of men in the North and South had to be readmitted to the ranks of industry. Approximately another million had died or been more or less disabled during the conflict. A stream of immigrants, already large and constantly increasing, was pouring into the North and seeking a means of livelihood. As has been seen, most of these settled in the manufacturing and mining sections of the northern and eastern states, helped to crowd the cities, and overflowed into the fertile, free lands of the mid-West. Nearly 800,000 of them reached the United States in one year, 1882. Most of them were men--an overwhelming portion of them men of working age, unskilled, frequently illiterate and hence compelled to seek employment in a relatively small number of occupations. Both the chances of unemployment and the danger of a lowered standard of living were increased by the immigrants.

The greater use of machinery during the progress of the war has already been alluded to, but some of its results demand further mention.[1] Most evident was the huge increase in the volume and value of the products of the factories. The labor of a single worker increased in effectiveness many times; in other words, the labor cost of a unit of production greatly diminished with the improvement of mechanical devices. The labor cost of making nails by hand in 1813 was seventy fold the cost of making them by machinery in 1899; loading ore by hand was seventy-three times as expensive in 1891 as machine loading was in 1896. Increased production encouraged greater consumption, enhanced compet.i.tion for markets, and opened the world to the products of American labor. Moreover, the introduction of machinery emphasized the importance of capital. When iron was rolled by hand, when cloth was produced by the use of the spinning wheel and hand-loom, when fields were tilled by inexpensive plow and hoe, relatively small amounts of capital were needed by the man who started in to work. Mechanical inventions revolutionized the situation. A costly power-loom enabled its owner to eliminate handworking compet.i.tors. If a workman could raise sufficient money or credit to purchase a supply of machines he could "set up in business," employ a number of "hands" and merely direct or manage the enterprise. Under such a system the employer must make enough profit to pay interest on his investment and to repair and replace his equipment. His attention was fixed on these elements of his industrial problem and the well-being of the laborer sank to a lower plane of importance. If the employer found the labor supply plentiful he had the upper hand in setting the wage-scale; the unorganized employee was almost completely at his mercy, because the employer could find another workman more easily than the workman could find another job. Meanwhile the workman knew the increased product which he was turning out, and became discontented because he did not see a corresponding increase in his remuneration.

From about 1830, when the rapid development of the use of mechanical appliances began, to the late eighties and early nineties when the new regime was meeting its sternest conflicts in the trust problem and the militant labor unions, the army of the wage earner was growing faster than the population. Between 1870 and 1890, for example, the population increased 63 per cent., while the number of laborers engaged in manufacturing increased nearly 130 per cent. By the latter year, 6,099,058 persons, about a tenth of the total population, were employed in transportation, mining and manufacturing.

It was noticeable, also, that the wage earners tended to concentrate.

The laborers engaged in manufacturing were to be found, for the most part, in the Northeast, and especially in such leading industrial cities as New York, Chicago and Philadelphia. Furthermore, the development of the factory system and the consolidation of many small companies into a few great ones tended to localize the labor problem still further--in a relatively small number of plants. The concentration of industry in great factories where large numbers of workers labored side by side ended the paternal care which the old-time employer had expended upon his employees. With the introduction of machinery, the danger of accidents due to the ignorance or carelessness of fellow workmen increased. The use of mechanical appliances also gave opportunity for the employment of women and children, and thus raised the question whether any restrictions ought to be placed upon the employment of these cla.s.ses of people. The construction of factories, their ventilation, sanitary appliances, and safe-guards for health and comfort became subjects of importance.

With the example of consolidation before them that was presented by the railroads and the corporations, it was inevitable that the wage earners should organize for their protection and advancement. Labor organizations of wage earners have existed in the United States since 1827, and between that time and 1840 came a considerable awakening among the laboring cla.s.ses which was part of a general humanitarian movement throughout the country. Robert Owen, an English industrial idealist, had visited this country about 1825 and provided the initiative for a short-lived communistic settlement at New Harmony, Indiana. Similar enterprises were established at other points; the most famous of these was that at Brook Farm in Ma.s.sachusetts, which enlisted the interest and support of many of the literary people of New England. The expanding humanitarian and idealistic movement was cut short by the Civil War, but the development of industrialism went on uninfluenced by the spirit of social progress which might have permeated it. After reconstruction was over, a new generation had to become impressed with the evils which needed correction and to set itself to the task which civil strife had thrust aside.

The need of a responsible organization of wage earners was indicated by the career of the Molly Maguires. The Molly Maguires const.i.tuted an inner circle of Irish Catholics who controlled the activities of the branches of the Ancient Order of Hibernians in the hard-coal counties of eastern Pennsylvania. During the war and immediately after it the group gained a little power in local politics, and also undertook to punish mine owners, bosses and superintendents who offended members of the Order. Intimidation became common, and even murder was resorted to until the region was fairly terrorized. It seemed impossible to combat the Mollies because their activities were shrouded in secrecy.

Usually, for example, when a murder was to be committed, a member would be brought in from an outside district in order that he might not be recognized if discovered, and he would be aided in escaping after the crime. Finally the president of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad procured a Pinkerton detective named James McParlan who went into the region and remained for two years. During this time he posed as a fugitive from justice and as a counterfeiter, became a member of the Order, a confidant of the Molly Maguires, and collected evidence.

Armed with the knowledge acquired by McParlan, the officials were able to arrest and convict twenty-four criminals, of whom ten were executed, and the career of the Mollies came to an end.

The activities of the Molly Maguires were symptomatic of what might occur throughout the ranks of labor during the confused period of adjustment after the war, and yet they were temporary and local in their effect on the development of the labor movement. The history of the great labor controversies after the war properly begins with the Knights of Labor, an a.s.sociation which originated in Philadelphia in 1869 as the result of the efforts of a garment cutter named Uriah S.

Stephens.[2] In the beginning, the affairs of the Knights were veiled in dense secrecy; even the name of the society was never mentioned but was indicated by five stars--*****. As the number of members increased, however, all manner of disquieting and untruthful rumors spread concerning its purposes, so that the element of secrecy was done away with in 1881 and a declaration of principles was made public. The fundamental purpose of the Knights was the formation of an order which should include all branches of the wage earners and which should aim to improve their economic, moral, social and intellectual condition.

Emphasis was placed, that is to say, on the welfare of the laboring cla.s.ses as a whole, rather than upon that of any particular trade or craft. The organization was centralized and the interests of the group were developed on a national scale. The growth of the a.s.sociation was extremely rapid at times, reaching a climax in the middle eighties when about 700,000 members, both men and women, made it a power in industrial disputes. Some of the members taken in at this time were extremists--European anarchists, for example--who urged a violent policy and got almost if not quite out of control of the officers during 1886. In the late eighties the membership dwindled rapidly, owing to the failure of strikes inst.i.tuted by the order, and its place and influence were largely taken by the American Federation of Labor.