18

BREAKOUT BREAKOUT BUNGO STRAIT

APRIL 6, 1945

In the darkened s.p.a.ce of Yamato Yamato's upper radar compartment, Ens. Mitsuru Yoshida watched the slow, monotonous sweep of the radar. The room reeked of sweat, ozone, and cigarette smoke. Four off-duty sailors lay like bundles of laundry, asleep in a corner of the compartment. Four more were hunched over their direction finders, plotting bearings from what appeared to be radar emissions from two separate enemy submarines. When they directed Yamato Yamato's own radar to the bearings, they received confirmation: two weak but telltale returns.

The task force had pa.s.sed the midchannel point in the Bungo Strait. From here on they were in hostile waters. Vice Admiral Ito had redeployed his ships, putting them in the standard antisubmarine formation, destroyer screen in front, sonars pinging for enemy submarines. Yamato Yamato was in the center of the formation, the cruiser was in the center of the formation, the cruiser Yahagi Yahagi bringing up the rear, each ship keeping a 2,700-yard separation from the others. bringing up the rear, each ship keeping a 2,700-yard separation from the others.

Enemy submarines were out there. It was no surprise. The exit of the Bungo Strait into the Pacific Ocean was a favorite hunting ground for American submarines. Thousands of tons of j.a.panese shipping had gone down here, and so had a fair number of U.S. submarines. It was a deadly cat-and-mouse game, matching the speed and agility of the screening destroyers against the nerve and skill of the submarine crews. American submarine captains liked to maneuver on the surface at night, both to recharge their batteries and to use their best speed to reach a firing position. They depended on radar to warn them of oncoming threats and also to pick up approaching targets.

The Yamato Yamato could hardly be missed on anyone's radar. Yoshida could imagine the size of the blip made by a 72,000-ton battleship. A U.S. submarine captain would be ecstatic at picking up such a contact. could hardly be missed on anyone's radar. Yoshida could imagine the size of the blip made by a 72,000-ton battleship. A U.S. submarine captain would be ecstatic at picking up such a contact.

Apparently, one just had.

In the fore of the destroyer screen, Isokaze Isokaze went charging off in the direction of the nearest contact. After a hurried sweep, the destroyer lost the contact and came back to rejoin the formation. Minutes later, another contact. Again the destroyer went racing out toward the open sea. went charging off in the direction of the nearest contact. After a hurried sweep, the destroyer lost the contact and came back to rejoin the formation. Minutes later, another contact. Again the destroyer went racing out toward the open sea.

On the southern side of the formation the destroyer Asashimo Asashimo was doing the same thing, zigzagging over the blackened surface like a hound sniffing for rabbits. Each time the elusive contact would fade away. The game went on for nearly half an hour, thrusting and parrying, while the task force zigzagged and finally cleared the mouth of the Bungo Strait. was doing the same thing, zigzagging over the blackened surface like a hound sniffing for rabbits. Each time the elusive contact would fade away. The game went on for nearly half an hour, thrusting and parrying, while the task force zigzagged and finally cleared the mouth of the Bungo Strait.

Their best defenses were speed and geography. The submarines couldn't match the speed of the task force, now moving at 22 knots. As the task force turned south and hugged the long coastline of Kyushu, it presented the submarines with only one side from which to attack. The task force was relatively safe-at least until dawn.

It was d.a.m.ned frustrating. Lt. Cmdr. John Foote, skipper of USS Threadfin Threadfin, watched his target fade into the distance. His orders, which ran against the grain of any submarine commander, were not to attack until a contact report had been transmitted to Pearl Harbor. Pacific Fleet headquarters was expecting a breakout through the Bungo Strait by the battleship Yamato Yamato. It was critical that the movement of Yamato Yamato and her task force be reported and her task force be reported before before attempting an attack. attempting an attack.

Despite his frustration, Foote knew the reason for the order. Two U.S. subs had been lost in these waters in the past two months. If Threadfin Threadfin were sunk before making the contact report, were sunk before making the contact report, Yamato Yamato's breakout might go undetected.

Foote's problem was that Threadfin Threadfin had to remain on the surface while the report was transmitted. This time of night, the airwaves were jammed with military communications traffic. While the signalman tapped out the message, trying to break through the clutter of transmissions, a j.a.panese destroyer had been alerted to had to remain on the surface while the report was transmitted. This time of night, the airwaves were jammed with military communications traffic. While the signalman tapped out the message, trying to break through the clutter of transmissions, a j.a.panese destroyer had been alerted to Threadfin Threadfin's presence. Now the destroyer was racing like a greyhound in their direction. Foote had the diesel engines screaming at full power, thrashing across the surface at Threadfin Threadfin's maximum speed of 19.5 knots. It wasn't enough. Judging by the radar blip, the j.a.panese destroyer was making a good 30 knots.

Foote was playing it down to the wire. In the near blackness of the overcast night, the j.a.panese gun crews wouldn't be able to fire on him until they were very close, probably inside a mile. If they had radar-controlled guns, of course, they could start firing any minute now, but Foote was betting that they didn't.

The signalman continued keying his transmitter, trying to get through. Foote kept trying to urge a few more knots from his already straining engines. The destroyer kept coming.

At 2000, after nearly half an hour of trying, the signalman was successful. At almost the same time, the j.a.panese destroyer gave up the chase. Threadfin Threadfin was out of danger, at least for the moment. At 2020 came the acknowledgment that Pearl Harbor had received the report. But while was out of danger, at least for the moment. At 2020 came the acknowledgment that Pearl Harbor had received the report. But while Threadfin Threadfin had been occupied with transmitting the report, her shot at glory-sinking the world's biggest battleship-had slipped away. The fast-moving j.a.panese task force had pulled out of range and had been occupied with transmitting the report, her shot at glory-sinking the world's biggest battleship-had slipped away. The fast-moving j.a.panese task force had pulled out of range and Threadfin Threadfin would not be able to catch up. would not be able to catch up.

Another sub, USS Hackleback Hackleback, was on station 20 miles to the south. Her skipper, Lt. Cmdr. Frederick Janney, was watching the oncoming task force on his radar from 11 miles away. Judging from the size and disposition of the blips, there could be no doubt. It had to be Yamato Yamato and her entourage. Janney's radio transmission at 2030 to Pearl Harbor would be a confirmation of and her entourage. Janney's radio transmission at 2030 to Pearl Harbor would be a confirmation of Threadfin Threadfin's earlier report.

Before Hackleback Hackleback could set up a torpedo attack, she, too, drew the attention of the destroyer screen. The submarine was forced to turn her stern to the target and retreat from another onrushing destroyer. By the time the j.a.panese destroyer withdrew, could set up a torpedo attack, she, too, drew the attention of the destroyer screen. The submarine was forced to turn her stern to the target and retreat from another onrushing destroyer. By the time the j.a.panese destroyer withdrew, Hackleback Hackleback was also out of firing range. was also out of firing range.

As Yamato Yamato and her task group headed south, the news of their sortie was causing a hubbub in Pearl Harbor. The report was forwarded to Chester Nimitz's headquarters on Guam, to Fifth Fleet commander Raymond Spruance aboard and her task group headed south, the news of their sortie was causing a hubbub in Pearl Harbor. The report was forwarded to Chester Nimitz's headquarters on Guam, to Fifth Fleet commander Raymond Spruance aboard New Mexico New Mexico, and to Marc Mitscher on his flagship, the carrier Bunker Hill Bunker Hill.

The flashed reports from the American submarines were also received in the communications room of Yamato Yamato. Staring at the intercepted message, the intelligence officer was perplexed. It was not encoded. The report had been sent in plain language, for all the world to read.

Enemy task force headed south. Course 190 degrees, speed 25 knots...

To Mitsuru Yoshida, in the radar room in Yamato Yamato, it was an ominous sign. It meat that the Americans were tracking Yamato Yamato's every movement, and they didn't care whether the j.a.panese knew it.

Looking at the intercepted message, Yamato Yamato's navigation officer thought it was ironic. "I do believe we learn about our position faster from their side than from ours."

By dawn on April 7, Yamato Yamato was transiting Osumi Strait, the narrow and shoal-filled pa.s.sage between southern Kyushu and the northernmost island of the Ryukyu archipelago. Admiral Ito was still hoping to deceive the Americans about was transiting Osumi Strait, the narrow and shoal-filled pa.s.sage between southern Kyushu and the northernmost island of the Ryukyu archipelago. Admiral Ito was still hoping to deceive the Americans about Yamato Yamato's objective. On a tracking map, it would appear that Yamato Yamato was hugging the coast of Kyushu, making her way to the port of Sasebo on the northwestern tip of the island. Of course, the presence of such an escorting force-eight destroyers and a heavy cruiser-would be setting off alarms in every American intelligence office. was hugging the coast of Kyushu, making her way to the port of Sasebo on the northwestern tip of the island. Of course, the presence of such an escorting force-eight destroyers and a heavy cruiser-would be setting off alarms in every American intelligence office.

Ito's only advantage that morning, he decided, was the weather. Intermittent rain showers were peppering the decks of the task force. Dark clouds scudded low over the tossing sea. The whitecaps provided ideal camouflage for the gray warships of the task force. Ito liked the forecast even better. The barometer was still falling, and the route to Okinawa was covered with squall lines and patches of heavy rain.

Since leaving the mouth of the Bungo Strait, there had been no more submarine contacts. Still, Ito knew the Americans were watching. All he had to do was gaze overhead. Enemy reconnaissance planes-fighters, long-range bombers, even lumbering Martin PBM flying boats-were flitting in and out of the clouds. Occasionally Yamato Yamato's antiaircraft batteries would open up, but the gunfire was mostly a gesture of defiance. The planes were staying carefully out of range. They weren't there to fight, just to watch.

While they were still close to the Kyushu sh.o.r.eline, Ito ordered the two remaining floatplanes on Yamato Yamato to be catapulted and returned to land. to be catapulted and returned to land. Yamato Yamato normally carried a complement of seven "Pete" and "Jake" floatplanes. They were used for over-the-horizon reconnaissance and spotting to help direct normally carried a complement of seven "Pete" and "Jake" floatplanes. They were used for over-the-horizon reconnaissance and spotting to help direct Yamato Yamato's big guns.

The two pilots, looking incongruous on Yamato Yamato's bridge in their flight suits and leather helmets, dutifully asked permission to remain aboard the ship. The executive officer, Captain Nomura, waved them away. The floatplanes would be of no use in the coming battle, nor would the pilots, who would just get in the way. In any case, they should be spared for a future airborne mission.

Each of the floatplanes was hoisted to one of the two immense catapults. Minutes later, one after the other, they hurtled down the catapult track and wobbled into the sky. After a cursory search for submarines in the path of the task force, they turned north and vanished in the murk.

Ito ordered another course correction, heading the task force back to the east. He planned to continue the deception into the morning by returning to a westerly course, letting the American spotter planes report the zigzagging to their headquarters. At the right moment he would abruptly wheel to the south and race at flank speed toward Okinawa. Sometime after nightfall he would be closing with the American fleet, bombarding the enemy sh.o.r.e positions, spreading havoc with the U.S. invasion force.

Yamato's task force would have no air cover. That much had been decided even before the order for Ten-Go was written. Whatever airpower the j.a.panese Imperial Navy still possessed had already been allocated to the kikusui kikusui operation, the ma.s.sed operation, the ma.s.sed tokko tokko attacks on the U.S. fleet. attacks on the U.S. fleet.

The previous day, April 6, had been the first day of the first kikusui kikusui. The planners of Ten-Go, including Ugaki, Toyoda, and Ohnishi, were gambling that the American carrier-based warplanes would be too busy countering the waves of tokko tokko raiders to mount a serious air attack on raiders to mount a serious air attack on Yamato Yamato.

It was a pipe dream, Admiral Ito knew. Yamato Yamato's fate was in the hands of the G.o.ds.

One of the screening destroyers, Asashimo Asashimo, was having trouble. With the task force still steaming on the diversionary northwestward course, Asashimo Asashimo was drifting slowly behind, unable to keep station. From the bridge of was drifting slowly behind, unable to keep station. From the bridge of Yamato Yamato, Ens. Mitsuru Yoshida read the signal flags hoisted on the destroyer: "Engine trouble." A few minutes later came another message: "Repairs will take five hours."

It was bad news. Without the collective support of its task force, a lone destroyer in the waters south of Kyushu was as good as dead. If a submarine didn't pick it off, a flight of American warplanes would find it.

Aboard Yamato Yamato, Admiral Ito considered the situation. Asashimo Asashimo's problem seemed to be a damaged reduction gear in her power plant. Ito decided to give them time to repair the problem. The task force would reverse course, go back to gather up Asashimo Asashimo, then steam at high speed for Okinawa. If Asashimo Asashimo could maintain station, she would share in the glory of the coming battle. If not, she was on her own. could maintain station, she would share in the glory of the coming battle. If not, she was on her own.

A buzz of excitement crackled in the flag plot compartment in buzz of excitement crackled in the flag plot compartment in New Mexico New Mexico. Unlike similar s.p.a.ces on other ships, the air on Raymond Spruance's bridge was not clouded with cigarette smoke. Spruance, a tobacco hater, had banned smoking in his flag s.p.a.ces.

Spruance was studying the newly received reports about the j.a.panese task force. Seldom had his staff seen their boss's cold, gimlet eyes flash like this. The last of j.a.pan's great battleships was coming out to fight.

Spruance was a black-shoe admiral-a surface sailor who had cut his teeth on battleships. In the Navy of 1945, he was something of an oddity-a nonaviator whose command now included the greatest naval air force ever deployed. But Spruance also commanded a task force of battleships and cruisers whose only duty until now had been the bombardment of enemy sh.o.r.e positions on Okinawa.

The last major engagement of surface forces had been the October 1944 night battle at Surigao Strait when a j.a.panese fleet of two battleships, one cruiser, and four destroyers, commanded by Adm. Shoji Nishimura, charged blindly into the waiting guns of the U.S. Seventh Fleet battleships. Nishimura himself went down with his flagship Yamashiro Yamashiro. For the Americans, it had been a sweet revenge. Five of the Seventh Fleet's six old battleships had been salvaged from the wreckage of Pearl Harbor.

Now, nearly six months later, the normally cool and a.n.a.lytical Raymond Spruance was hearing the siren song of a last epic sea battle. He signaled Rear Adm. Mort Deyo, who commanded Task Force 54, to prepare his battle line to meet the Yamato Yamato task force. Spruance's own flagship, task force. Spruance's own flagship, New Mexico New Mexico, was one of Deyo's six battleships. It meant that Spruance himself was going to observe the great battle from a front-row seat.

In addition to his aging battleships, Deyo's task force included seven cruisers and thirty-one destroyers-enough firepower to counter anything the j.a.panese task force could mount. The prize of sinking the world's greatest dreadnought could go to the battleship admirals.

Maybe. On the eastern side of Okinawa, in his own flag plot aboard the carrier Bunker Hill Bunker Hill, another admiral was eyeing the same prize.

19

RACE FOR GLORY RACE FOR GLORY USS BUNKER HILL BUNKER HILL

175 MILES EAST OF OKINAWA

APRIL 6, 1945

One of his code names was "Bald Eagle," and it fit him perfectly. The commander of Task Force 58, Vice Adm. Marc "Pete" Mitscher, had the gaunt, wizened face of a bird of prey. His eyes, according to one of his staffers, "could give an order with a glance."

Mitscher looked older than his fifty-eight years. His lifestyle was typical of his generation of flag officers, including Halsey and McCain, who disdained exercise and smoked a pack and a half of cigarettes a day. During flight operations Mitscher spent his time in a four-foot-high, specially built swivel chair on the flag bridge. The chair was invariably aimed aft, giving rise to speculation among his sailors that the old man was more interested in where he'd been than where he was going. The truth was that Mitscher didn't like the wind in his face.

The chair was just one of Mitscher's foibles. Another was the long-billed baseball cap, his standard shipboard headgear. The "Mitscher cap" was so imitated that in 1946 the Navy authorized it as a work uniform accessory.

Marc Mitscher was, above all else, a naval aviator. Unlike Halsey, McCain, and chief of naval operations Ernest King, who, at an advanced age and rank, had all undergone flight training in order to wear wings and then command aviation units, Mitscher was the real thing. He had been designated naval aviator number 33 back in 1916. While aviation was still an unwanted stepchild of the Navy, Mitscher was catapulting off battleships, flying ungainly patrol planes, and winning the Navy Cross for his role as pilot of NC-1, one of a group of four Navy Curtiss flying boats to attempt the first transatlantic flight. Mitscher's plane was forced down in heavy seas near the Azores, but another of the flying boats, NC-4, became the first airplane to make it across the Atlantic.

Mitscher served in a succession of aeronautical staff and carrier-based a.s.signments, and in 1941 became the first skipper of the newly built USS Hornet Hornet. It was from the deck of the Hornet Hornet, under Mitscher's command, that Lt. Col. Jimmy Doolittle and his sixteen B-25 bombers launched on the first strike against j.a.pan on April 18, 1942.

As commander of the Fast Carrier Task Force at the Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944, Mitscher won fame-and the everlasting grat.i.tude of his pilots. When the planes of a strike were forced to return to the carriers after nightfall, Mitscher broke with standard operating procedure and ordered the flight deck lights and ships' searchlights turned on, exposing his carriers to j.a.panese subs and airplanes. The gamble paid off. Mitscher recovered most of his planes and pilots, and his precious carriers survived.

Like most senior brown-shoe commanders, Mitscher had spent a career battling the black shoes, especially the battleship admirals who had steered the navy's thinking for most of the current century. One of those was Raymond Spruance, and another was Chester Nimitz, both of whom were now Mitscher's bosses.

A decree had come down the previous year from the chief of naval operation, Ernest King, that carrier task force commanders would henceforth have surface officers a.s.signed as chiefs of staff. The idea was that the mix of cultures would give the commander better coordination with his screening ships. Mitscher was a.s.signed a highly decorated destroyer squadron commander, forty-three-year-old Capt. Arleigh Burke, as his chief of staff.

Mitscher had not been happy. Having a nonaviator so closely involved with the command of his carrier task force offended him, especially when it was one like Burke, who was already a celebrity for his exploits as a hard-charging destroyer division commander. He had earned a nickname, "Thirty-one-Knot" Burke, for being a fast mover not only in a destroyer but in all things that involved guns and ordnance.

Burke, for his part, was just as unhappy. Without warning he'd been yanked from his Destroyer Squadron 23 at the Bismarck Archipelago and exiled to the most foreign of environments, the flag s.p.a.ces of a 27,000-ton aircraft carrier. The two men were like dogs in a kennel, each warily sizing up the other.

It took a few weeks, but the crotchety Mitscher was eventually won over by Thirty-one-Knot Burke's obvious brilliance. By the time Task Force 58 arrived off Okinawa, the Bald Eagle and his black-shoe chief of staff had bonded into a formidable team.

Now Mitscher was seeing an opportunity he couldn't resist. Studying the sighting reports of the j.a.panese task force, he felt a stirring of the old battleship-versus-aircraft-carrier rivalry. Though the great battles of the Pacific had mostly been fought by the carriers, the matter of whether airpower alone could prevail over a surface force had not been proven beyond all doubt.

It had been Mitscher who sent carrier-based planes after Yamato Yamato and her sister ship and her sister ship Musashi Musashi at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Yamato Yamato had escaped, and although had escaped, and although Musashi Musashi eventually went down, the actual cause of her sinking was not certain. No one had ruled out the possibility that the coup de grace was delivered by a submarine. Here was a chance to end the debate forever. eventually went down, the actual cause of her sinking was not certain. No one had ruled out the possibility that the coup de grace was delivered by a submarine. Here was a chance to end the debate forever.

But there was a problem. Mitscher's immediate superior, Admiral Spruance, had just transmitted an all-fleet order to allow the enemy task force to proceed southward, where it would be engaged by Admiral Deyo's surface task force. In the meantime, Mitscher's orders were "to concentrate the offensive effort of Task Force 58 in combat air patrols to meet enemy air attacks."

The battleships were going to get the Yamato Yamato.

Or maybe not. Like a team of sharp-eyed contract lawyers, Mitscher, Burke, and Cmdr. James Flatley, the fighter pilot who served as Mitscher's operations officer, pored over Spruance's order. It was a situation as old as warfare itself, officers trying to find the tiniest amount of slack in their orders.

Mitscher had served under Spruance long enough to know his style. Spruance believed in allowing his commanders discretion to act on opportunity, and Mitscher believed that he was looking at just such an opportunity. In any case, Spruance's order had not specifically forbidden forbidden Mitscher to go after the enemy task force. It was as much slack as Mitscher needed. Mitscher to go after the enemy task force. It was as much slack as Mitscher needed.

The problem, in Mitscher's mind, wasn't in complying with Spruance's order to maintain combat air patrols. With twenty-four carriers and air groups in his task force, he could provide plenty of combat air patrol coverage and and still deploy a knockout blow against the enemy fleet. The trick was in knowing where the enemy fleet was headed and what their objective was. still deploy a knockout blow against the enemy fleet. The trick was in knowing where the enemy fleet was headed and what their objective was.

Then came another order from Spruance. Deyo was to form his two battleship divisions, two cruiser divisions, and twenty destroyers into line of battle and head north. In his flag plot, Mitscher read his copy of the dispatch, then sent his own order to each of his carrier task groups. They were to steam northwestward, shortening the distance between them and the next day's likely position of the j.a.panese force. If Spruance had any objection, he would have to countermand Mitscher's order.

The race to get Yamato Yamato was on. was on.

By now both Mitscher and Flatley were bleary-eyed after the arduous day. Each left to hit his bunk, leaving Burke to ruminate about the j.a.panese task force. Long ago Burke had learned how to ration his rest periods, catnapping during lulls in the action, seeming never to run out of alertness.

Alone in flag plot, Burke sucked on his pipe and thought about the j.a.panese task force. Spread out before him were charts of the seas off southern j.a.pan and the Ryukyus. In his mind, he tried to insert himself into the j.a.panese commander's position. Where would he he go? In which direction? After what objective? go? In which direction? After what objective?

The more he pondered the situation, the clearer it became to him. The j.a.panese commander intended to attack the amphibious force off the western sh.o.r.e of Okinawa. He wouldn't telegraph his intention by proceeding on a direct course, which would bring them into range of the carrier task force on the east side of Okinawa. He would ease westward, perhaps northward, feinting in the direction of Sasebo on the far coast of Kyushu, staying out of range of the carrier-based warplanes.

Burke was sure of it. Sometime the next morning, the j.a.panese commander would make his charge toward Okinawa.

In his flag bridge aboard Yamato Yamato, Ito ordered the task force into a turn to the southwest. They were at the spot where he had planned to pick up the lagging Asashimo Asashimo and reintegrate her into the force. But and reintegrate her into the force. But Asashimo Asashimo still couldn't keep up. She hadn't sorted out the reduction gear problem that had caused her to fall behind. still couldn't keep up. She hadn't sorted out the reduction gear problem that had caused her to fall behind.

There was no time to wait. Ito gave the order to abandon the destroyer and proceed with only nine ships. As the fleet charged through the squally seas at a speed of 22 knots, the hapless destroyer disappeared from view.

There was only one prudent choice for Asashimo Asashimo's captain, Lt. Cmdr. Yoshiro Sugihara: to reverse course and return to Kyushu. The destroyer was no longer under the protective umbrella of the task force's air defense guns.

But this was not a day for prudence. Sugihara had no intention of missing what was surely the last stand of the Imperial j.a.panese Navy. Asashimo Asashimo continued limping behind the task force, following the wake of the continued limping behind the task force, following the wake of the Yamato Yamato.

In the early hours of April 7, Mitscher became sick. Though the admiral's physician didn't have a diagnosis, he came to flag plot to inform Burke that Mitscher would have to stay in bed. The gaunt, heavy-smoking admiral was already in frail condition, and the doctor was worried that he might become incapacitated.

With Mitscher indisposed, the black-shoe chief of staff, Burke, became the de facto task force commander, with fighter pilot Cmdr. Jimmy Flatley as his air warfare expert. They ordered eight h.e.l.lcat fighters launched at dawn to comb a fan-shaped 90-degree sector from northeast to northwest. A division of four Marine Corsairs was stationed at 60-mile intervals to relay the message back to the task force flagship.

At 0830, a h.e.l.lcat pilot from Ess.e.x Ess.e.x spotted the j.a.panese task force through the broken cloud deck. The ships were steaming on a northwest course of 300 degrees. spotted the j.a.panese task force through the broken cloud deck. The ships were steaming on a northwest course of 300 degrees.

Northwest course? Receiving this information, Admiral Spruance ordered Deyo to go after the j.a.panese task force. Now he was worried that they might be slipping northward toward Sasebo. If so, they'd soon be out of range of both battleships and warplanes. Receiving this information, Admiral Spruance ordered Deyo to go after the j.a.panese task force. Now he was worried that they might be slipping northward toward Sasebo. If so, they'd soon be out of range of both battleships and warplanes.

Aboard Bunker Hill Bunker Hill, Burke reached a different conclusion. It was a head fake, he believed. The Yamato Yamato task force was making a zigzag turn, feinting northwestward. Sticking to his hunch, he deployed another sixteen-plane search group to a point task force was making a zigzag turn, feinting northwestward. Sticking to his hunch, he deployed another sixteen-plane search group to a point south south of the reported position. If he was right, the j.a.panese force would soon make a hard turn to port and be picked up by the search group. of the reported position. If he was right, the j.a.panese force would soon make a hard turn to port and be picked up by the search group.

And they did. Another Ess.e.x Ess.e.x h.e.l.lcat radioed that the task force was now heading southwesterly, on a course of 240 degrees. Burke's hunch was right: the j.a.panese commander was making the course changes to confuse the trackers. h.e.l.lcat radioed that the task force was now heading southwesterly, on a course of 240 degrees. Burke's hunch was right: the j.a.panese commander was making the course changes to confuse the trackers.

Burke sent the order to each of the carrier task groups: prepare their bombers, fighters, and torpedo planes for action.

Later that morning, Mitscher returned to the flag plot. Looking gaunter and more birdlike than ever, he settled himself into his chair and resumed command. "He looked like h.e.l.l," Burke recalled. Later he surmised that Mitscher had suffered a small heart attack during the night.

The success of the attack would depend on the search planes keeping track of the j.a.panese task force and directing the warplanes toward it. The strike planes would be at the extreme end of their range, some nearly 300 miles from their carriers. They would have only minutes to locate the enemy and make the attack. Mitscher had no intention of running his airplanes out of gas before they made it home. He'd already had that experience the previous June in the Philippine Sea when nearly a hundred of his warplanes, returning from a maximum-range strike, were forced down in the ocean.

Another problem was communications. At this distance the planes would be out of contact with the task force command. Mitscher ordered more fighters to be stationed between the carriers and the estimated j.a.panese position to relay reports.

At 1000, the strike took off. The first to go were the planes from Belleau Wood, Hornet, Bennington Belleau Wood, Hornet, Bennington, and San Jacinto San Jacinto. They were quickly followed by the warplanes from Bunker Hill, Ess.e.x, Bataan, Cabot Bunker Hill, Ess.e.x, Bataan, Cabot, and Hanc.o.c.k Hanc.o.c.k-283 airplanes of every type in the inventory, including Corsairs, h.e.l.lcats, Avengers, h.e.l.ldivers, and even a few plodding Wildcat fighters.

Fifteen minutes later, Hanc.o.c.k Hanc.o.c.k's fifty-three-plane group took off. At 1045, 106 warplanes from Intrepid, Langley Intrepid, Langley, and Yorktown Yorktown-the carriers farthest from the target-headed off in search of the enemy task force.

From his swivel chair on Bunker Hill Bunker Hill's bridge, Mitscher watched the warplanes depart, then he settled back to await the results. Either the j.a.panese would be where Burke had estimated, or they wouldn't be.

Not everyone in flag plot shared Burke's conviction. A Royal Navy observer, Cmdr. Charlie Owen, asked Burke if he actually knew knew where where Yamato Yamato was going to be in two hours. was going to be in two hours.