When we say G.o.d, we seem to denote a substance; but it is a substance that is supersubstantial. When we say of Him, "He is just," we mention a quality, not an accidental quality--rather a substantial and, in fact, a supersubstantial quality.[20] For G.o.d is not one thing because He is, and another thing because He is just; with Him to be just and to be G.o.d are one and the same. So when we say, "He is great or the greatest," we seem to predicate quant.i.ty, but it is a quant.i.ty similar to this substance which we have declared to be supersubstantial; for with Him to be great and to be G.o.d are all one. Again, concerning His Form, we have already shown that He is Form, and truly One without Plurality. The categories we have mentioned are such that they give to the thing to which they are applied the character which they express; in created things they express divided being, in G.o.d, conjoined and united being-- in the following manner. When we name a substance, as man or G.o.d, it seems as though that of which the predication is made were substance itself, as man or G.o.d is substance. But there is a difference: since a man is not simply and entirely man, and in virtue of this he is not substance. For what man is he owes to other things which are not man.

But G.o.d is simply and entirely G.o.d, for He is nothing else than what He is, and therefore is, through simple existence, G.o.d. Again we apply just, a quality, as though it were that of which it is predicated; that is, if we say "a just man or just G.o.d," we a.s.sert that man or G.o.d is just. But there is a difference, for man is one thing, and a just man is another thing. But G.o.d is justice itself. So a man or G.o.d is said to be great, and it would appear that man is substantially great or that G.o.d is substantially great. But man is merely great; G.o.d is greatness.

The remaining categories are not predicable of G.o.d nor yet of created things.[21] For place is predicated of man or of G.o.d--a man is in the market-place; G.o.d is everywhere--but in neither case is the predicate identical with the object of predication. To say "A man is in the market" is quite a different thing from saying "he is white or long,"

or, so to speak, encompa.s.sed and determined by some property which enables him to be described in terms of his substance; this predicate of place simply declares how far his substance is given a particular setting amid other things.

It is otherwise, of course, with G.o.d. "He is everywhere" does not mean that He is in every place, for He cannot be in any place at all--but that every place is present to Him for Him to occupy, although He Himself can be received by no place, and therefore He cannot anywhere be in a place, since He is everywhere but in no place. It is the same with the category of time, as, "A man came yesterday; G.o.d is ever." Here again the predicate of "coming yesterday" denotes not something substantial, but something happening in terms of time. But the expression "G.o.d is ever" denotes a single Present, summing up His continual presence in all the past, in all the present--however that term be used--and in all the future. Philosophers say that "ever" may be applied to the life of the heavens and other immortal bodies. But as applied to G.o.d it has a different meaning. He is ever, because "ever" is with Him a term of present time, and there is this great difference between "now," which is our present, and the divine present. Our present connotes changing time and sempiternity; G.o.d's present, abiding, unmoved, and immoveable, connotes eternity. Add _semper_ to _eternity_ and you get the constant, incessant and thereby perpetual course of our present time, that is to say, sempiternity.[22]

It is just the same with the categories of condition and activity. For example, we say "A man runs, clothed," "G.o.d rules, possessing all things." Here again nothing substantial is a.s.serted of either subject; in fact all the categories we have hitherto named arise from what lies outside substance, and all of them, so to speak, refer to something other than substance. The difference between the categories is easily seen by an example. Thus, the terms "man" and "G.o.d" refer to the substance in virtue of which the subject is--man or G.o.d. The term "just"

refers to the quality in virtue of which the subject is something, viz.

just; the term "great" to the quant.i.ty in virtue of which He is something, viz. great. No other category save substance, quality, and quant.i.ty refer to the substance of the subject. If I say of one "he is in the market" or "everywhere," I am applying the category of place, which is not a category of the substance, like "just" in virtue of justice. So if I say, "he runs, He rules, he is now, He is ever," I make reference to activity or time--if indeed G.o.d's "ever" can be described as time--but not to a category of substance, like "great" in virtue of greatness.

Finally, we must not look for the categories of situation and pa.s.sivity in G.o.d, for they simply are not to be found in Him.

Have I now made clear the difference between the categories? Some denote the reality of a thing; others its accidental circ.u.mstances; the former declare that a thing is something; the latter say nothing about its being anything, but simply attach to it, so to speak, something external. Those categories which describe a thing in terms of its substance may be called substantial categories; when they apply to things as subjects they are called accidents. In reference to G.o.d, who is not a subject at all, it is only possible to employ the category of substance.

[20] Gilbert de la Porree in his commentary on the _De Trin._ makes Boethius's meaning clear. "Quod igitur in illo substantiam nominamus, non est subiectionis ratione quod dicitur, sed ultra omnem quae accidentibus est subiecta substantiam est essentia, absque omnibus quae possunt accidere solitaria omnino." (Migne, _P.L._ lxiv. 1283). Cf. Aug.

_De Trin._ vii. 10.

[21] i.e. according to their substance.

[22] The doctrine is Augustine's, cf. _De Ciu. Dei_, xi. 6, xii. 16; but Boethius's use of _sempiternitas_, as well as his word-building, seem to be peculiar to himself. Claudia.n.u.s Mamertus, speaking of applying the categories to G.o.d, uses _sempiternitas_ as Boethius uses _aeternitas_.

Cf. _De Statu Animae_ i. 19. Apuleius seems to use both terms interchangeably, e.g. _Asclep._ 29-31. On Boethius's distinction between time and eternity see _Cons._ v. pr. 6, and Rand, _i er dem B. zugeschr.

Trakt. de fide_, pp. 425 ff, and Brandt in _Theol. Littzg._, 1902, p.

147.

V.

Age nunc de relatiuis speculemur pro quibus omne quod dictum est sumpsimus ad disputationem; maxime enim haec non uidentur secundum se facere praedicationem quae perspicue ex alieno aduentu constare perspiciuntur. Age enim, quoniam dominus ac seruus relatiua sunt, uideamus utrumne ita sit ut secundum se sit praedicatio an minime. Atqui si auferas seruum, abstuleris et dominum; at non etiam si auferas albedinem, abstuleris quoque alb.u.m, sed interest, quod albedo accidit albo, qua sublata perit nimirum alb.u.m. At in domino, si seruum auferas, perit uocabulum quo dominus uocabatur; sed non accidit seruus domino ut albedo albo, sed potestas quaedam qua seruus coercetur. Quae quoniam sublato deperit seruo, constat non eam per se domino accidere sed per seruorum quodam modo extrinsecus accessum.

Non igitur dici potest praedicationem relatiuam quidquam rei de qua dicitur secundum se uel addere uel minuere uel mutare. Quae tota non in eo quod est esse consist.i.t, sed in eo quod est in comparatione aliquo modo se habere, nec semper ad aliud sed aliquotiens ad idem. Age enim stet quisquam. Ei igitur si accedam dexter, erit ille sinister ad me comparatus, non quod ille ipse sinister sit, sed quod ego dexter accesserim. Rursus ego sinister accedo, item ille fit dexter, non quod ita sit per se dexter uelut albus ac longus, sed quod me accedente fit dexter atque id quod est a me et ex me est minime uero ex sese.

Quare quae secundum rei alicuius in eo quod ipsa est proprietatem non faciunt praedicationem, nihil alternare uel mutare queunt nullamque omnino uariare essentiam. Quocirca si pater ac filius ad aliquid dic.u.n.tur nihilque aliud ut dictum est differunt nisi sola relatione, relatio uero non praedicatur ad id de quo praedicatur quasi ipsa sit et secundum rem de qua dicitur, non faciet alteritatem rerum de qua dicitur, sed, si dici potest, quo quidem modo id quod uix intellegi potuit interpretatum est, personarum.

Omnino enim magna regulae est ueritas in rebus incorporalibus distantias effici differentiis non locis. Neque accessisse dici potest aliquid deo, ut pater fieret; non enim coepit esse umquam pater eo quod substantialis quidem ei est productio filii, relatiua uero praedicatio patris. Ac si meminimus omnium in prioribus de deo sententiarum, ita cogitemus processisse quidem ex deo patre filium deum et ex utrisque spiritum sanctum; hos, quoniam incorporales sint, minime locis distare. Quoniam uero pater deus et filius deus et spiritus sanctus deus, deus uero nullas habet differentias quibus differat ab deo, a nullo eorum differt. Differentiae uero ubi absunt, abest pluralitas; ubi abest pluralitas, adest unitas.

Nihil autem aliud gigni potuit ex deo nisi deus; et in rebus numerabilibus repet.i.tio unitatum non facit modis omnibus pluralitatem. Trium igitur idonee const.i.tuta est unitas.

V.

Let us now consider the category of relation, to which all the foregoing remarks have been preliminary; for qualities which obviously arise from the a.s.sociation of another term do not appear to predicate anything concerning the substance of a subject. For instance, master and slave[23] are relative terms; let us see whether either of them are predicates of substance. If you suppress the term slave,[24] you simultaneously suppress the term master. On the other hand, though you suppress the term whiteness, you do not suppress some white thing,[25]

though, of course, if the particular whiteness inhere as an accident in the thing, the thing disappears as soon as you suppress the accidental quality whiteness. But in the case of master, if you suppress the term slave, the term master disappears. But slave is not an accidental quality of master, as whiteness is of a white thing; it denotes the power which the master has over the slave. Now since the power goes when the slave is removed, it is plain that power is no accident to the substance of master, but is an advent.i.tious augmentation arising from the possession of slaves.

It cannot therefore be affirmed that a category of relation increases, decreases, or alters in any way the substance of the thing to which it is applied. The category of relation, then, has nothing to do with the essence of the subject; it simply denotes a condition of relativity, and that not necessarily to something else, but sometimes to the subject itself. For suppose a man standing. If I go up to him on my right and stand beside him, he will be left, in relation to me, not because he is left in himself, but because I have come up to him on my right. Again, if I come up to him on my left, he becomes right in relation to me, not because he is right in himself, as he may be white or long, but because he is right in virtue of my approach. What he is depends entirely on me, and not in the least on the essence of his being.

Accordingly those predicates which do not denote the essential nature of a thing cannot alter, change, or disturb its nature in any way.

Wherefore if Father and Son are predicates of relation, and, as we have said, have no other difference but that of relation, and if relation is not a.s.serted of its subject as though it were the subject itself and its substantial quality, it will effect no real difference in its subject, but, in a phrase which aims at interpreting what we can hardly understand, a difference of persons. For it is a canon of absolute truth that distinctions in incorporeal things are established by differences and not by spatial separation. It cannot be said that G.o.d became Father by the addition to His substance of some accident; for he never began to be Father, since the begetting of the Son belongs to His very substance; however, the predicate father, as such, is relative. And if we bear in mind all the propositions made concerning G.o.d in the previous discussion, we shall admit that G.o.d the Son proceeded from G.o.d the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both, and that They cannot possibly be spatially different, since They are incorporeal. But since the Father is G.o.d, the Son is G.o.d, and the Holy Spirit is G.o.d, and since there are in G.o.d no points of difference distinguishing Him from G.o.d, He differs from none of the Others. But where there are no differences there is no plurality; where is no plurality there is Unity. Again, nothing but G.o.d can be begotten of G.o.d, and lastly, in concrete enumerations the repet.i.tion of units does not produce plurality. Thus the Unity of the Three is suitably established.

[23] _Dominus_ and _seruus_ are similarly used as ill.u.s.tration, _In Cat._ (Migne, _P.L._ lxiv. 217).

[24] i.e. which is external to the master.

[25] i.e. which is external to the whitened thing.

VI.

Sed quoniam nulla relatio ad se ipsum referri potest, idcirco quod ea secundum se ipsum est praedicatio quae relatione caret, facta quidem est trinitatis numerositas in eo quod est praedicatio relationis, seruata uero unitas in eo quod est indifferentia uel substantiae uel operationis uel omnino eius quae secundum se dicitur praedicationis. Ita igitur substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem; atque ideo sola singillatim proferuntur atque separatim quae relationis sunt. Nam idem pater qui filius non est nec idem uterque qui spiritus sanctus. Idem tamen deus est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, idem iustus idem bonus idem magnus idem omnia quae secundum se poterunt praedicari. Sane sciendum est non semper talem esse relatiuam praedicationem, ut semper ad differens praedicetur, ut est seruus ad dominum; differunt enim. Nam omne aequale aequali aequale est et simile simili simile est et idem ei quod est idem idem est; et similis est relatio in trinitate patris ad filium et utriusque ad spiritum sanctum ut eius quod est idem ad id quod est idem. Quod si id in cunctis aliis rebus non potest inueniri, facit hoc cognata caducis rebus alteritas. Nos uero nulla imaginatione diduci sed simplici intellectu erigi et ut quidque intellegi potest ita aggredi etiam intellectu oportet.

Sed de proposita quaestione satis dictum est. Nunc uestri normam iudicii exspectat subtilitas quaestionis; quae utrum recte decursa sit an minime, uestrae statuet p.r.o.nuntiationis auctoritas. Quod si sententiae fidei fundamentis sponte firmissimae opitulante gratia diuina idonea argumentorum adiumenta praest.i.timus, illuc perfecti operis laet.i.tia remeabit unde uenit effectus. Quod si ultra se humanitas nequiuit ascendere, quantum inbecillitas subtrahit uota supplebunt.

VI.

But since no relation can be affirmed of one subject alone, since a predication referring to one substance is a predication without relation, the manifoldness of the Trinity is secured through the category of relation, and the Unity is maintained through the fact that there is no difference of substance, or operation, or generally of any substantial predicate. So then, the category of substance preserves the Unity, that of relation brings about the Trinity. Hence only terms belonging to relation may be applied singly to Each. For the Father is not the same as the Son, nor is either of Them the same as the Holy Spirit. Yet Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each the same G.o.d, the same in justice, in goodness, in greatness, and in everything that can be predicated of substance. One must not forget that predicates of relativity do not always involve relation to something other than the subject, as slave involves master, where the two terms are different.

For equals are equal, like are like, identicals are identical, each with other, and the relation of Father to Son, and of both to Holy Spirit is a relation of identicals. A relation of this kind is not to be found in created things, but that is because of the difference which we know attaches to transient objects. We must not in speaking of G.o.d let imagination lead us astray; we must let the Faculty of pure Knowledge lift us up and teach us to know all things as far as they may be known.[26]

I have now finished the investigation which I proposed. The exactness of my reasoning awaits the standard of your judgment; your authority will p.r.o.nounce whether I have seen a straight path to the goal. If, G.o.d helping me, I have furnished some support in argument to an article which stands by itself on the firm foundation of Faith, I shall render joyous praise for the finished work to Him from whom the invitation comes. But if human nature has failed to reach beyond its limits, whatever is lost through my infirmity must be made good by my intention.

[26] Cf. _Cons._ v. pr. 4 and 5, especially in pr. 5 the pa.s.sage "quare in illius summae intellegentiae ac.u.men si possumus erigamur."

ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII V.C. ET INL. EXCONS. ORD. PATRICII

AD IOHANNEM DIACONVM

VTRVM PATER ET FILIVS ET SPIRITVS SANCTVS DE DIVINITATE SVBSTANTIALITER PRAEDICENTVR

Quaero an pater et filius ac spiritus sanctus de diuinitate substantialiter praedicentur an alio quolibet modo; uiamque indaginis hinc arbitror esse sumendam, unde rerum omnium manifestum constat exordium, id est ab ipsis catholicae fidei fundamentis. Si igitur interrogem, an qui dicitur pater substantia sit, respondetur esse substantia. Quod si quaeram, an filius substantia sit, idem dicitur. Spiritum quoque sanctum substantiam esse nemo dubitauerit. Sed c.u.m rursus colligo patrem filium spiritum sanctum, non plures sed una occurrit esse substantia. Vna igitur substantia trium nec separari ullo modo aut disiungi potest nec uelut partibus in unum coniuncta est, sed est una simpliciter. Quaec.u.mque igitur de diuina substantia praedicantur, ea tribus oportet esse communia; idque signi erit quae sint quae de diuinitatis substantia praedicentur, quod quaec.u.mque hoc modo dic.u.n.tur, de singulis in unum collectis tribus singulariter praedicabuntur.

Hoc modo si dicimus: "Pater deus est, filius deus est, spiritus sanctus deus est," pater filius ac spiritus sanctus unus deus. Si igitur eorum una deitas una substantia est, licet dei nomen de diuinitate substantialiter praedicari.

Ita pater ueritas est, filius ueritas est, spiritus sanctus ueritas est; pater filius et spiritus sanctus non tres ueritates sed una ueritas est. Si igitur una in his substantia una est ueritas, necesse est ueritatem substantialiter praedicari. De bonitate de incommutabilitate de iust.i.tia de omnipotentia ac de ceteris omnibus quae tam de singulis quam de omnibus singulariter praedicamus manifestum est substantialiter dici. Vnde apparet ea quae c.u.m in singulis separatim dici conuenit nec tamen in omnibus dici queunt, non substantialiter praedicari sed alio modo; qui uero iste sit, posterius quaeram. Nam qui pater est, hoc uocabulum non transmitt.i.t ad filium neque ad spiritum sanctum. Quo fit ut non sit substantiale nomen hoc inditum; nam si substantiale esset, ut deus ut ueritas ut iust.i.tia ut ipsa quoque substantia, de ceteris diceretur.

Item filius solus hoc recipit nomen neque c.u.m aliis iungit sicut in deo, sicut in ueritate, sicut in ceteris quae superius dixi. Spiritus quoque non est idem qui pater ac filius. Ex his igitur intellegimus patrem ac filium ac spiritum sanctum non de ipsa diuinitate substantialiter dici sed alio quodam modo; si enim substantialiter praedicaretur, et de singulis et de omnibus singulariter diceretur. Haec uero ad aliquid dici manifestum est; nam et pater alicuius pater est et filius alicuius filius est, spiritus alicuius spiritus. Quo fit, ut ne trinitas quidem substantialiter de deo praedicetur; non enim pater trinitas (qui enim pater est, filius ac spiritus sanctus non est) nec trinitas filius nec trinitas spiritus sanctus secundum eundem modum, sed trinitas quidem in personarum pluralitate consist.i.t, unitas uero in substantiae simplicitate.