[47:2] It does not follow, however, that at least the majority of the members of the Norwegian government tried to come to an agreement.

[48:1] A very sensible and intelligent article written by Mr FRITZ HANSEN, member of the last Union Committee, may especially be brought to notice.

[48:2] N:o 10.

[49:1] N:o 10.

[50:1] This is proved by the motion on the Union question brought forward in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Parliament. See N:o 14.

[50:2] N:o 11.

[51:1] NANSEN does not even mention the doc.u.ment in his book.

[51:2] N:o 12.

[52:1] This last alternative was considered to imply proposals for a compromise, which had now and then been hinted at, namely, that a Chancellor of the Union should direct all matters concerning Union policy, but each of the Kingdoms should have its own Minister for Foreign affairs, chiefly with Consular affairs under their especial direction.

The proposal was said to have been brought forward in the first place at the meeting of the last Union Committee by one of the Norwegian radical representatives.

[52:2] N:o 13 and 14.

[52:3] NANSEN (page 87) rouses suspicion in every possible way against this Swedish offer. He implies that the new offer, made immediately after the breaking off of the negotiations, which, of course, was caused by Swedish perfidy, was not likely to inspire confidence, and especially as it did not include the same guarantees we had before. It must nevertheless be observed that this treaty contained far _greater_ guarantees, partly on account of the unanimous decision of the Diet, partly on the grounds that the Crown Prince's programme was far easier to carry out than the programme of the Communique, which implied that the Consular question would solve itself. NANSEN also mentions that the last Union Committee worked on a similar basis without being able to come to a decision, as the Swedish proposals were not acceptable to any section of the Norwegian Commissioners. To this it must be observed that this Swedish offer was more conciliatory towards the Norwegian wishes, than the Norwegian majority's proposal had been in the last Union Committee.

Why therefore could it not be accepted by the Norwegians?

[53:1] N:o 15.

[53:2] N:o 16.

[54:1] N:o 17.

[55:1] Page 14.

[56:1] NANSEN (pag. 93).

[58:1] NANSEN page 93.

[58:2] There is no protocol of this Cabinet meeting, only a complete report, communicated to the government of Christiania by the delegates of the Cabinet.

Compare with N:o 19.

[58:3] N:o 18.

[58:4] Compare N:o 27.

[59:1] N:os 18, 19 and 21.

[59:2] On the Norwegian side they attach great praise to themselves for having given the King a few day's grace in order to form a new Ministry.

The Norwegian Cabinet also blame the King (Compare with N:o 21) for not having made use of this truce, and plainly imply hereby, that the King in fact abdicated of his own accord. The King replied to this by alluding to the Cabinets open threats (Compare with N:o 19) that the man who, after being warned by the King, dared to approach the King as adviser, from that moment lost his national rights; in other words, however the King might act, the Revolution would come. The King is therefore reproached for not endeavouring to form a new Ministry, after he had been threatened with the revolution if the attempt had shown any sign of success. How truly Norwegian!

[60:1] N:o 21.

[60:2] N:o 22.

[60:3] The terms of this communication are almost word for word the same as in the address to the King.

[60:4] N:o 23.

[60:5] N:o 24.

[60:6] N:o 25.

[60:7] One reeds, for exemple, NANSENS arguments in real exaggerated Norwegian logic. (page 94).

[61:1] Compare N:o 1 -- 112 and N:o 2 -- 12.

[61:2] The kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible and inalienable realm, united with Sweden under one King.

[61:3] N:o 26.

[62:1] N:o 27.

[62:2] N:o 28. They are careful not to confute the King's defence of the legality of his action.

[63:1] Compare, with N:os 15 and 16.

VII.

[Sidenote: _The question of the Justification of the Norwegian Revolution._]

Revolutions are not to be condemned under all conditions. History--even the history of Sweden--records many revolutions, which are said to have been a vital necessity. But a revolution can only be morally defended on the grounds of its having been _the extreme means of protecting most important interests_.

[Sidenote: _The Swedish oppression._]

In these days there have been numerous comparisons made between Norway's breaking out of the Union, and Sweden's struggle for freedom from Denmark in the middle ages. Sweden's way of using its power has been stamped as an intolerable _oppression_. It can scarcely be necessary to give a more powerful confutation to these very idle fancies, than simply to refer to the fact that Norway's struggle for freedom has had for its object the enormously important cause--their own consuls!

[Sidenote: _Sweden's loyalty in conducting the Foreign policy of the Union._]

The dominating position of Sweden within the Union has consisted simply in its administration of Foreign affairs of the Union; _in everything else Norway has had an independent right of decision in full equality with that of Sweden_. An Norway cannot complain that Sweden has conducted the administration of Foreign policy in a manner that has been injurious to the interests of Norway. This was emphatically conceded during the hottest days of the Stadtholder conflict in 1861. It is remarkable that in the present day, when the want to prove an ant.i.thesis in Norway, they can never produce anything but the episode from the beginning of the Union--the well known Bodo affair in 1819-1821--an episode concerning which _Norwegian_ investigations of recent date, have served to place Swedish Foreign administration in a far better light than what Norwegian tradition had done. The advantage given to Norway by the Swedish administration of Foreign affairs, is the inestimable gift of a 90 years'

uninterrupted peace, which has given the people of Norway an opportunity of peacefully devoting themselves to the labour of material and spiritual development. Sweden has furthermore especially tried to insure interests so far that, in the direction of Foreign affairs, Norwegian a.s.sistance has been employed as far as the regulations in the organisation of the same would permit. It has already been mentioned that Norwegian counsels have used their influence in the council for Foreign affairs, that Norwegian influence on The Consular system has, for a long time, been as near as possible equal to that of Sweden. It may also be added, that Norwegians have always been appointed to posts in connection with those offices under the Foreign Office. In the Foreign Office itself Norwegians have always held office: even as Under Secretary of State-- the next in rank to the Minister for Foreign affairs--a Norwegian has lately been in office. the posts at the Emba.s.sies at Foreign Courts, even the most important, have to a great extent been held by Norwegians. Of those Consuls sent abroad, by far the greater number are Norwegians.

Norway has herself given the best proof that the Swedish administration of Foreign affairs has been conscientiously carried out to the interests of Norway, by, time after time, refusing the Swedish offers to give Norway greater influence in the settlement of Foreign affairs, offers, which even if they did not accede to all Norway's demands, would, if realised, have given Norway a far better position than it had previously held.

[Sidenote: _Has Norway been denied its prerogative._]

But it has been said on the Norwegian side--and this has been brought forward as the main point--Norway has been denied her prerogative, as a free and independent Kingdom. If by that, they mean that Norway has been denied equality in the Union, it is _not true_.

Sweden's only condition, that Norway, as they say, should enjoy her prerogative, has been, that this prerogative in its application should be subordinate to the demands stipulated by the Union, demands which Sweden on her side was quite prepared to submit to. That a right should be maintained under the consciousness that it has its limits in necessary obligatory respects, has been almost lost sight of by Norway. The chief impetus of the Revolution has been a reckless desire on the part of the Norwegians to be absolutly their own masters, that and nothing else.