In 1707, Kamtschatka was annexed to Russia, and two years later the first prisoners were sent to Siberia. They were prisoners of war and natives of conquered European provinces who objected to Muscovite rule. About 14,000 persons were sent the first year, but many died from the hardships suffered on the road.

Besides Siberia, Russia in Asia consists of:

I. The Caucasus. It was Peter the Great who, in 1722, invaded (p. 264) Dagestan and seized the greater part of this territory. We have seen how the mountaineers defended their liberty under Schamyl,[11] and it was left to his son Alexander to annex it and make it part of the Russian Empire. Including Trans Caucasia, it covers an area of 180,843 square miles,--or about that of Colorado and Utah, and contains a population of 8,350,000.

[Footnote 11: See p. 209]

II. The Kirghiz Steppe. This is a country of plains, unfit for agriculture and still inhabited by nomads who live in tents and wander with their flocks over the 755,793 square miles of territory. They are divided into three hordes or families, one of which surrendered to Anne Ivanovna in 1734. In 1869 the Kirghiz, together with the Cossacks of the Don, revolted, but in the autumn of 1870, order was restored.

For administrative purposes, it is divided into:

III. Transcaspia, which, as the name indicates, includes the region east of the Caspian Sea. It contains an area of 383,618 square miles with a population estimated at 352,000. Like the Kirghiz Steppe, it is unfit for agriculture, although it contains several oases. It was formed into a province by Alexander III. in 1881.

IV. Turkestan contains 409,414 square miles with a population of 3,341,000. The valleys of the Oxus and Jaxartes are very fertile, but the rest of the extensive province is almost a desert. The Oxus or Amu Daria once formed the boundary of the empires of Cyrus and Alexander.

It was conquered step by step, and after many struggles with the (p. 265) Turkomans and Kirghiz to whom it originally belonged.

V. The Khanates, so called because they once formed the territory of the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara. This province embraces 114,320 square miles with a population of 3,200,000. Both are recent acquisitions. It was the war with Khiva, in 1872, which first drew the attention of Europe to Russia's expansion in Central Asia. There had been some doubts as to the wisdom of permitting Russia to add more territory to her already enormous domain, but they had been allayed by a circular note to the powers, issued by Prince Gortchakof, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on November 21, 1864. He declared that Russia had been brought into contact with a number of half-savage tribes who proved a constant menace to the security of the Empire, and that the only means of maintaining order on the frontier, was to bring them under submission. This, he said, had been done by the United States, and was nothing but a measure necessary for self-defense.

This reasoning was self-evident, but in 1873 the press of Great Britain asked when and where this necessity would cease. Count Schouvalof was sent to London and in several interviews with Lord Granville, he stated distinctly and plainly that Russia had no intention to annex any more territory in Central Asia. He declared[12]

solemnly with regard to Khiva that "not only was it far from the intention of the emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that (p. 266) the conditions imposed should be such as would not in any way lead to the prolonged occupation of Khiva."

[Footnote 12: Parliamentary Papers, Central Asia.

1873.]

Notwithstanding this positive declaration, Khiva was annexed on the 10th of June, 1873. Four months afterwards, on the 10th of October, a treaty was signed by the Khan of Bokhara, giving to Russia free navigation on the Oxus, and other privileges. It has never been formally annexed, but is to all intents and purposes Russian territory.

XXIX--RUSSIAN METHODS. THE WAR WITH j.a.pAN. (p. 267)

At the time when the United States and the commercial powers of Europe were discussing the opening of j.a.pan, Russia resolved, if possible, to forestall them. In 1847, the czar appointed a young general, Nicholas Muravieff, as governor of Eastern Siberia. Shortly after entering upon his office he sent an officer named Vagarof, who had explored the Amoor River, back to it with four Cossacks to make an extensive report. The party left Strelka in the spring of 1848, but was never heard of again. Suspecting that they had been captured by the Chinese, a demand was made for their surrender on the plea that they were deserters, but the Chinese replied that they knew nothing of them.

Meanwhile Muravieff had ordered the exploration of the sh.o.r.e of the Sea of Okhotsk and the mouth of the Amoor. These orders were promptly executed, and in 1850 Lieutenant Orloff entered the river from the sea. The following year Captain Nevilsko, who had come out in the _Baikal_, sent a boat up the river and laid the foundations of Nikolayefsk and Mariinsk, thereby securing a foothold on the Lower Amoor, knowing all the time that this was Chinese territory, and that Russia was at peace with China. The survey of the Sea of Okhotsk (p. 269) was not neglected. Port Imperial on the coast of Manchuria was discovered and occupied, and Urup, one of the Kurile Islands, was seized. When Commodore Perry arrived off the coast of j.a.pan, he was watched by Admiral Poutiatine in command of the _Pallas_, _Vostok_, _Olivutzu_ and _Menzikoff_. Aniwa Bay was seized the same year, and Russians landed on the west coast of what is known as Saghalien, but was known and owned by the j.a.panese under the name of Karafuto.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Village Scene]

The Crimean War gave Muravieff a pretext to violate farther the treaty with China. He claimed that the settlements on the Pacific, as well as the Russian ships, were in need of supplies, and that the ocean route was closed by the allied fleets. Was it Muravieff's duty to furnish those supplies? In that case, any reference to the ocean route was preposterous, because it is absurd to suppose that supplies would be sent from Eastern Siberia to the north Pacific coast by such a route; and if he had furnished them before by the overland route through Siberia, why, that road was open to him. What he needed was a pretext to secure the occupation of j.a.pan, or at least of some of its islands, before the other powers could know of it; and for that purpose, it was necessary to be in possession of the lower Amoor. Perry's energetic action thwarted him; but he could not know that. What he did know was that China was not in a condition to oppose him, and that the other powers need not know what he was doing.

He determined to send an expedition strong enough to insure respect, and lost no time in preparing it. Fifty barges, a steamer, and (p. 270) numerous rafts, a thousand Cossacks with cannon, the whole commanded by Muravieff himself, left Shilkinsk on the 24th of May, 1854.

Following the usual custom, the expedition was accompanied by scientific men to survey the river, prepare maps, explore the country, and examine its resources. At ten A.M., June 8, they arrived at Aigun where Muravieff was received by the Chinese authorities, who displayed about the same number of armed men, but such men and such arms!

Firelocks dating from the time of Kang-hi--1689,--convinced Muravieff that fifty Cossacks could put these braves to rout. Not caring to arouse Chinese hostility for fear that his schemes might attract attention, Muravieff did not resent it when the Chinese forbade him to enter the town; he continued on his journey, and on the 27th of June arrived at Mariinsk. After sending part of his force to Nikolayefsk, he went on to Port Imperial where he met Admiral Poutiatine. They discussed the situation, and Poutiatine left for j.a.pan on the _Diana_.

Muravieff hurried back as he had come, and prepared another expedition which he took down the river in 1855. In that year he sent three thousand Cossacks, and five hundred colonists down the Amoor, together with horses, cattle, provisions, and military stores. This activity could not escape the Chinese who dispatched four officials to Nikolayefsk to protest against the invasion of their territory. They arrived in July, and were entertained by Muravieff with a review of his forces; after this hint he simply dismissed them. At this time the settlements which stood in such urgent need of supplies, were (p. 271) Mariinsk, which consisted of two log cabins, Nikolayefsk numbered ten, and Castries Bay had "four badly built huts."[13]

[Footnote 13: Ravenstein, Russians on the Amoor.]

In a remarkably short time we hear of the indefatigable Muravieff at St. Petersburg urging the annexation of the Amoor. He was opposed by the czar's ministers, but succeeded in convincing the emperor that China could offer no resistance, and that the powers need not hear of it until it was too late. Thus he secured large supplies of men and money. In the beginning of 1857, he was back at his post, and on the 1st of June he dispatched Colonel Ushakof with six hundred men from Shilkinsk, and soon after followed him with a brigade of Cossack infantry and a regiment of cavalry, to garrison the forts which he constructed at strategic points.

Seizing the opportunity of China's distress caused by the war with England and France, Muravieff demanded the cession of the Amoor Valley. The Chinese were helpless. On the 28th of May, 1858, a treaty was signed at Aigun, giving to Russia the left bank of the Amoor down to the Ussuri, and both banks below that confluent, besides the right to navigate the Sungari and Ussuri rivers. Russia gave absolutely nothing in return. Meanwhile Count Poutiatine had been sent from St.

Petersburg to watch the allies and to profit by any blunder which they or the Chinese might make. Poutiatine stopped in j.a.pan, claiming that the Koreans had given him the privilege of establishing a coaling station at Port Hamilton, but knowing that Great Britain would certainly investigate his claim, he did not press it. He tried to seize the j.a.panese Island Tsushima in the southern entrance to the (p. 272) j.a.pan Sea, and midway between j.a.pan and Korea; but a polite and firm invitation from the British admiral to leave that island, and the admiral's insistence to remain until after he had left it, spoiled that little game. Poutiatine then proceeded to China where he proposed to help put down the Tai P'ing rebellion in return for the cession of Manchuria to Russia. This handsome offer was politely declined. Once again Muravieff hurried to St. Petersburg; upon his advice the newly acquired territory was officially annexed, and, by ukase of October 31, joined to the littoral of the Sea of Okhotsk and Kamtschatka under the name of Maritime Province of Eastern Siberia, with Nikolayevsk as capital. Muravieff remained in supreme command.

The tireless empire builder was again on the Pacific Coast in 1858. On May 21, he founded Blagovestchensk and, after descending the river, laid the foundation of Khabarofka, at the mouth of the Ussuri. In October he was back at Kiakhta, arranging for the postal service between St. Petersburg and the extreme east. On the 26th of August, he was created Count Amoorsky, or Count of the Amoor, a promotion which he had well earned. On the 31st of December, a remarkable ukase was published, beginning "Now that Russia has regained possession of this valuable region, etc." The entire territory of Eastern Siberia contained 740,922 square miles, a territory equal to that of all the Atlantic Coast States, together with Indiana, Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi. This did not include the Amoor Province, which was placed under the administration of (p. 273) a governor and eighteen officials, who received a combined annual salary of $18,873.60, of which the governor received $4680.

Muravieff was back at his post in 1859. Both he and Poutiatine tried to induce the j.a.panese to give up Karafuto (Saghalien), but without success. At this time there was again trouble between China and the allied British and French, and when in 1860, a British-French force marched on Peking, Russia had sent another empire builder, General Ignatieff, to watch if he could not secure something. He did; when the allies entered Peking, Ignatieff sought Prince Kung and told him that the "foreign devils" would surely seize the country unless some strong power compelled them to leave. Russia was willing to do this, because she had always been fond of China; and all she asked was a strip of outlying territory of no value to China. Prince Kung gladly signed away the whole east coast of Manchuria, six hundred miles long; and Ignatieff redeemed his promise by visiting Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, the British and French plenipotentiaries. After paying them some flattering compliments, he made the remark that the Peiho river would freeze in a few days, and if they did not get out at once, they would have to stay all winter in Peking. The two gentlemen finished their business in a hurry, packed up, and left, but not without thanking Ignatieff for his kindness and reporting the matter to their government, which did not hear of the Russian's diplomacy until a year later. This is how Russia extended her empire on the Pacific Coast.

For many years the efforts to secure the whole island of Karafuto (p. 274) continued and j.a.pan saw that war must follow unless a sacrifice was made. In 1875, j.a.pan surrendered the island, in return for the Kurile group, but the j.a.panese treasured in their hearts the loss and disgrace. It was this which caused the a.s.sault upon the present czar, when he was traveling in j.a.pan.

In 1894 the war between j.a.pan and China broke out, and when China, humbled, sued for peace, j.a.pan demanded the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula,--where Port Arthur is located,--besides making other conditions. When this became known, Russia, after securing the help of Germany and France, gave j.a.pan the "friendly advice," which was really a threat, not to take that peninsula. j.a.pan, single-handed, could not fight the three powers, and gave way; but every j.a.panese, high or low, young or old, was determined to pay off Russia. They bought or built war vessels everywhere and increased their army. Russia did not like this, and proposed that j.a.pan should take all the islands in the Pacific, the Philippines, Hawaii, Borneo, etc., and leave the continent of Asia to Russia. j.a.pan declined, and went on building ships. In the end of 1898, Russia announced that she had "leased" the very Liaotung Peninsula which she had prevented j.a.pan from taking.

j.a.pan understood, as the whole world did, that this "lease" meant possession. The j.a.panese statesmen did not protest, because there was but one protest that Russia would heed,--an appeal to arms. That was j.a.pan's method when, in 1899, Alexander Pavloff, the Russian minister in Korea, secured from that government a concession in the port of Masampo, opening into the entrance to the j.a.pan Sea. j.a.pan's (p. 275) demand was: Let Masampo go, or it means war. And Russia evacuated Masampo, while Pavloff was told that he might take a furlough. Then came 1900, the Boxer troubles and the international march upon Peking.

j.a.panese officers took note of the Russian troops, leaving the Russians to do the same with their soldiers. j.a.pan never ceased her preparations. In the latter part of 1901, Marquis Ito Hirob.u.mi visited the United States and crossed over to England, where he proposed an offensive-defensive alliance. British statesmen hesitated, when Ito told them in plain terms that if no such treaty was concluded, he was authorized to go on to Russia, and make the best terms he could for his country.

Meanwhile Pavloff had returned to Seoul, the capital of Korea, and by means best known to Russian diplomats, was trying to gain a foothold on the Peninsula. Under the pretext of a timber concession, the Russians constructed a fort on the Korean side of the Yalu river,--where it was afterwards discovered by newspaper correspondents. Russia had secured control of Manchuria with its 362,310 square miles and 11,250,000 population, and none of the powers dared protest. j.a.pan was ready. Could she allow the "peaceful"

absorption of Korea, as that of Manchuria had been accomplished? Safe in the offensive-defensive alliance with Great Britain, j.a.pan approached Russia in a dignified manner, to be put off with vague replies. After six months of patience, j.a.pan broke off diplomatic intercourse, and, as this is considered equal to a declaration of war, she struck and hit hard.

[Ill.u.s.tration: St. Petersburg] (p. 276)

x.x.x--RUSSIA LOSES HER PRESTIGE. (p. 277)

When, in February, 1904, the world was startled by the j.a.panese guns in the harbor of Chemulpo (Korea), one of Russia's well-known diplomats, speaking in defense of his country, said: "Ours has been a peaceful absorption." Another statesman, pleading for sympathy, remarked pathetically: "We were unprepared for war." The two advocates of Russia's cause spoke the truth, but they did not proclaim the whole truth.

Ever since Muravieff Amoorsky began the peaceful absorption of Manchuria by seizing the coastline of that province, Russia has extended her dominions using no other weapon than her prestige, that is, the dread inspired by her name, power, and resources. Repeated protests from Great Britain remained unheeded, because the czar's government was convinced that they would not be emphasized by a resort to arms. The semi-civilized tribes of Central Asia were unable, of course, to oppose the Russian advance; and China was justly afraid of defying the great northern power. Thus the peaceful absorption continued with such ease that the Russian tchinovnik ended in believing in their country's prestige. Herein lies the princ.i.p.al cause of the astounding history of the war with j.a.pan.

Although Russia repeatedly agreed to evacuate Manchuria, her (p. 278) actions in the construction of railways and other roads, the opening of mines, the enormous capital expended in creating a commercial emporium in Dalny, and her jealousy in excluding foreigners from that territory,--all this was ample evidence that nothing short of compulsion would cause her to withdraw. Besides, Alexander Pavloff, the Russian Minister in Korea, was anxious to emulate Count Ca.s.sini, his former chief at Peking. He was constantly plotting to secure a foothold in the Peninsula. In 1903, it was announced that a Russian company had obtained a timber concession on the Yalu River. A few months afterwards, some American newspaper correspondents with the j.a.panese army discovered the ruins of a Russian fort on that river, securely screened from indiscreet eyes, but in a fine position to control the pa.s.sage. That was the timber concession.

Russia's policy, therefore, was a serious menace to j.a.pan. But j.a.pan did not purpose to draw ridicule by unavailing protests. Feverishly the preparations for more emphatic action were continued; in the latter part of 1903, j.a.pan was ready. Safe from a possible European intervention by her treaty with Great Britain, j.a.pan reminded Russia of her promise to evacuate Manchuria on October 7, and requested an explanation for not keeping the pledge. Russia, with a blind faith in her prestige, replied that the affair did not concern j.a.pan but China, whereupon j.a.pan made a proposition concerning Manchuria and Korea which would be acceptable. With studied contempt replies from the czar were held back beyond the time permitted by international courtesy. (p. 279) Moreover their tenor was not only unsatisfactory, but was also calculated to exasperate the proud j.a.panese. When the final preparations were made, j.a.pan instructed her minister to St.

Petersburg, to demand his pa.s.sports,--an act equivalent to a declaration of war.

The tchinovnik doubted their senses. Russia maintained that a severance of diplomatic relations did not necessarily imply an appeal to the sword, when the news flashed over the wires that the Russian war vessels Varyag and Koreyetz had been blown up at Chemulpo to escape being captured. The world was still marveling at j.a.pan's audacity when it was informed that three other Russian war vessels had been disabled owing to a night torpedo attack under Admiral Togo.

Why was the Russian fleet, numerically superior to that of j.a.pan, divided? The answer is found in that fatal word: prestige. Pavloff in Korea had requested the presence of the two doomed ships, to keep the j.a.panese in awe. Admiral Stark lay under the guns of impregnable Port Arthur, trusting to the prestige, when the illusion vanished. There was still the Vladivostok squadron; it made an effort to induce Togo to leave Port Arthur by making a raid upon the north coast of j.a.pan, but in vain. Beyond sinking a few unarmed merchantmen, nothing of importance was accomplished.

The czar's choice to restore Russia's naval prestige, fell upon Admiral Makaroff. At about the same time, General Kuropatkin, the former Minister of War, was charged with punishing j.a.pan for her insolence. His departure for the Far East was theatrical. After many genuflexions before sacred eikons, he promised to restore Russia's (p. 280) prestige by dictating terms of peace in Tokyo.

Makaroff was less enthusiastic, and perhaps more in earnest. It is a.s.serted that he restored discipline in a sadly demoralized fleet. He was enticed out of Port Arthur's shelter by a small fleet of the enemy's cruisers sent out as a decoy. When he discovered Togo's ironclads he returned to port, but his flagship struck a mine at the entrance to Port Arthur and sunk. The Admiral, as well as his guest, the noted battle painter Verestchagin, perished.

With Togo blockading Port Arthur and Admiral Kaminura guarding Vladivostok, the j.a.panese secured the freedom of the sea, and began to pour troops into Korea. This was greeted with acclamation by the tchinovnik who, after their naval misfortunes, claimed that the situation would soon be reversed by the army. Some j.a.panese soldiers were landed openly at Chemulpo, but the bulk went ash.o.r.e in a well-concealed harbor south of the Yalu River. General Kuroki was in command.

Meanwhile Kuropatkin was in Manchuria busy organizing the army when not obstructed by Viceroy Alexieff. Such troops as he found were capable of rendering good service in hunting down Chinese brigands, but, as the sequel proved, the army had also been nurtured upon that most indigestible material, prestige. To the wonder of Europe,--and to a less degree of America,--Kuroki crossed the Yalu and sent the czar's dreaded soldiers flying before him. (May 1, 1904.)

Once more, and for the last time, did the Russian fleet at Port (p. 281) Arthur attempt a sortie. It failed, and its fate was sealed.

While the wreckage of Russia's once proud fleet lay concealed in Port Arthur's inner basin, the j.a.panese, after scouring the waters to clear them from mines, landed troops on the Liaotung Peninsula, claimed by j.a.pan after the war with China, but despoiled of it by Russia's peaceful absorption. In 1894, Port Arthur was taken in a day from the Chinese: the Russians defended the impregnable fortress for six months. "Our prestige demands that the enemy shall not capture Port Arthur," cried the tchinovnik, and Kuropatkin was ordered to General Stoessel's rescue. The attempt failed, and General Nogi could pursue the siege without being disturbed. (June 14-15, 1904.)

A stolid, ignorant, and densely superst.i.tious people was at war with a rejuvenated nation keenly alive to the power of education. That is the secret. Man for man, Russia would have won. But the resourcefulness of the little brown man more than offset the Russian's physical superiority. As the year 1905 dawned, the fall of Port Arthur was made known to the world.