It is not my purpose to attempt to detail the various movements of the army, to describe the battles which were fought, or to chronicle the victories and defeats which were achieved and sustained by the brave soldiers who fought under the flag of the Union. That duty belongs to the historian; mine simply to relate the experiences of my own men in the delicate, dangerous and laborious duties which devolved upon them.

Far less is it my desire to enter into a discussion upon the various subjects that have, since that fratricidal conflict, engrossed the attention of the student of history.

I trust, however, that I may be pardoned, if, for a time, I depart from the main narrative and devote a brief s.p.a.ce to the consideration of that much discussed subject, the campaign of the Peninsula. I make no pretension whatever to being a military scholar, nor in any sense a military man, but my connection with the government during the war, and partic.i.p.ation in the movements of the Army of the Potomac, together with my long and intimate acquaintance with its commander, General McClellan, may ent.i.tle me to a brief expression of my own views of that campaign. I may be pardoned, also, if I attempt to ascribe to their proper source, some of the causes which contributed largely to the disasters that attended it.

There can be no doubt of the fact, that the young commander-in-chief was subjected to the persecutions of the most malignant political intriguers, who feared that his growing popularity would result in political exaltation. Taking advantage of the fact, therefore, that General McClellan was an avowed Democrat, a scheming cabal was working to weaken his influence with the people by vague insinuations against his loyalty to the Union cause. To further that end, his plans, so carefully and intelligently matured, for the speedy crushing of the rebellion, were either totally disregarded by an unfriendly cabinet, or were so frequently thwarted, that to successfully carry them out was an utter impossibility.

As I have always been a faithful adherent of the maxim, "speak the truth, though the heavens fall," and believing it to be a doctrine, that if practically carried, will right all wrongs, uphold the innocent, administer censure where deserved, and praise where it is due, I have invariably attempted to form my judgment of my fellow-men upon their own intrinsic merits.

Whatever may have been his faults as a man, his mistakes as a General, he was throughout unflinchingly loyal to the cause of the North. With him it was but one sentiment, and one ambition--to whip the rebels into subjection--and manfully did he perform his duty toward the accomplishment of that object. Much of the censure which has been heaped upon him and his conduct as Commander of the Army of the Potomac, is due to a hasty and inconsiderate judgment of the man and his motives, or the result of direct prejudice and ill-will. In the eyes of his critics his great fault lay in what they considered his inexcusable delay in moving against the enemy in the Spring of 1862, after, as they supposed, he had ample time to prepare his army for the field.

From this point began the open and unfriendly criticisms which were designed to excite an impatient people, who did not, and could not, understand why active operations were not at once begun. This delay was adroitly used by scheming politicians to cast the shadow of disloyalty upon a man, who never for one moment entertained a disloyal thought, nor performed a single action which he did not believe would redound to the credit and honor of the Union troops, and of the Government which he served.

My acquaintance with General McClellan began before the war, and when he was the Vice-President of the Illinois Central Railroad. That corporation had, on frequent occasions, employed my services in various operations affecting their interests, and in this way I first met and became a.s.sociated with the General. From this date began my warm regard for the man, which, during the many years that have pa.s.sed, has known no diminution.

I knew the man so well, and my confidence in his integrity and patriotism was so thorough, that a doubt of his loyalty never entered my mind. Many of my old-line abolition friends went so far as to reproach me for my steadfast adherence to McClellan, and accused me of abandoning my principles. I, however, knew my own ground, and held it. I knew that the General was not an abolitionist, but that he was not a patriot I could not believe for a moment. I have always thought, and my opinion remains unchanged to this day, that had he been left free to carry out his plans in the Peninsula campaign, the Army of the Potomac would have escaped the disasters that befell it; Richmond would have been reduced, and occupied by the Federal troops; and victory instead of defeat would have crowned their heroic efforts from the river to the rebel seat of government.

"How do you account for General McClellan's 'masterly inactivity' during all these months that his army lay at Washington?" is asked. Ah, there is the mistake. It was anything but inactivity, and it is beginning to be pretty generally understood now what he was doing at that time.

More than one writer on the campaigns of the Civil War, has taken occasion to say that the splendid achievements of the Army of the Potomac at subsequent periods, and under other commanders, were mainly due to the careful drilling and the rigid discipline inculcated under McClellan. At the time he was called to the command of the army it was nothing better than a band of disorganized men, who had not recovered from the defeat of Bull Run, and whatever efficiency it attained, was accomplished by the indefatigable efforts of General McClellan and the officers under his command.

The South, at the outbreak, was far better prepared for war than the North. For months preceding the election of Mr. Lincoln the people of the South were secretly preparing for a struggle. They had even then determined, if beaten by the ballot, to resort to the bayonet, and to decide upon the battle-field the questions which they failed to settle by fair discussion and honest legislation in the National Congress. The people of the North, on the contrary, being so long accustomed to submit to the expressed will of the majority, apprehended no danger. While they were keenly alive to the important nature of the issues presented in the campaign, they did not dream that the new party, if successful, would have a gigantic civil war on its hands as the result of its triumph in a contest peaceably decided by the silent yet all-powerful ballot. Resting in this fancied security from danger, the war was a surprise, for which they were but illy prepared.

I need not detail the situation of affairs when the news flashed over the wires that Fort Sumter was fired upon. Suffice it do say, that the South was up in arms, in full preparation almost, before the North could realize that war was at hand.

The first great battle of the war was fought, and the Union troops suffered a most humiliating defeat, falling back in disordered crowds upon Washington, and at this time General McClellan took command and brought order out of chaos.

The community did not seem to consider, or to understand, that it was necessary to spend so much time in drilling the troops and making elaborate preparations for the field. But the commanding officer was too good a general to imitate the impetuous actions of his predecessors, and to make an aggressive campaign with raw and undisciplined troops. It was in consequence of this, that months were spent in the patient and persistent task of properly organizing, drilling and equipping his men for the field, and in the spring of 1862, when the army did move, in the language of the General, it was one "from which much was to be expected."

Unfortunately, however, at the very outset, the General and the President had each matured a plan for the conduct of the war, and, in many respects, these were diametrically opposed to each other. At this point the question might be asked, whose plan should have been followed?

By the Const.i.tution, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of all the armies and the navy of the United States, and is, of course, _ex-officio_, the highest military authority in the land. "But if a President disclaims all knowledge of military affairs," as President Lincoln did, "it then becomes a question how far he should defer the conduct of a war to his appointed Commander-in-Chief, who is supposed to be chosen on account of his skill and sagacity in military matters, and upon his presumed fitness for the position."

In President Lincoln's hesitation between the advice of his Generals in the field, and the views urged by his Cabinet lay the foundation of many of the blunders and mistakes of the war, the trouble being, as one writer affirms, that "instead of one mind, there were many minds influencing the management of military affairs." As the result of this there was a lack of concert and action between the two heads of the military department, and at the critical period of the campaign, McDowell's forces were held at Washington when McClellan expected him to re-enforce the army of the Potomac.

Notwithstanding all that has been said and written upon this subject, I have no hesitation in expressing the opinion, that had not the President and his advisors, stood in such ungrounded fear for the safety of Washington, and had not withheld McDowell's forces at a time when their absence was a most serious blow to the plans of General McClellan, the close of the year would have seen the Rebellion crushed, and the war ended.

At the commencement of the campaign I had an interview with General McClellan, and he expressed the utmost confidence in his ability, provided his plans were fully supported and carried out, to gain the objective point of the war, and to accomplish the reduction of the rebel capital. My force of operatives had been diligently at work in procuring what information that was possible of attainment, of the numbers of the enemy, and with such success that in March I was able to report the approximate strength of the rebel army at 115,500 men, apportioned about as follows:

At Mana.s.sas, Centerville and vicinity, 80,000 " Brooks' Station, Dumfries, &c., 18,000 " Leesburg, 4,500 In the Shenandoah Valley, 13,000 ------- Total, 115,500

In gaining this important information, Timothy Webster, Pryce Lewis, John Scobell and a host of other efficient members of my force, some of whom have already been mentioned in these pages, deserve especial credit for their sleepless energy in prosecuting the work that had been a.s.signed to them.

On the 4th of April the forward movement was made, and the siege of Yorktown was begun. The result of this siege the student of history already knows, a simple detention of the Army of the Potomac, until the enemy could occupy and fortify Richmond. Here is where McClellan suffered from the detention of McDowell at Washington--he had prepared a plan with McDowell as one of its princ.i.p.al actors, and with that force withdrawn, the General's intentions were not only radically interfered with, but seriously deranged.

During this time the rebel army was being daily reinforced and strengthened, until, by June 26th, its numbers were swelled to nearly 200,000 effective men. McClellan, on the contrary, starting as he did, with a smaller army than he thought was necessary to cope with the enemy, found himself, when before their fortifications, after being deprived of McDowell's division, with an army of less than 90,000 effective troops.

Another element in this campaign must not be lost sight of. The Navy, whose co-operation and a.s.sistance had been promised and relied upon, was unable to aid him at all. Can it be wondered at, therefore, that his plans, however well laid, and whatever their merits, viewed from a military stand-point, or the stand-point of common sense, failed in their execution.

One writer, in speaking of the treatment of General McClellan, has well said: "A general of high spirit and sensitive soul might have found in the government's action the occasion for sending in his resignation; but General McClellan continued in command, accepted the situation, and endeavored to make the best of it."

And still another has said, although inclined to be partial and unfair, in his account of the battles of Antietam and Fredericksburg:

"His capacity and energy as an organizer are universally recognized. He was an excellent strategist, and, in many respects, an excellent soldier. He did not use his own troops with sufficient promptness and vigor to achieve great and decisive results, but he was oftener successful than unsuccessful with them; and he so conducted affairs that they never suffered heavily without inflicting heavy loss upon their adversaries. It may appear a strange statement to follow the other matter which this volume contains, but it is none the less true, that there are strong grounds for believing that he was the best commander the Army of the Potomac ever had." Concluding a comparison, that redounds much to the credit of General McClellan, both as a soldier and a patriot, the same writer says:

"A growing familiarity with his history as a soldier, increases the disposition to regard him with respect and grat.i.tude, and to believe, while recognizing the limitations of his nature, that his failure to accomplish more was partly his misfortune, and not altogether his fault."

General McClellan knew much better than some of his self-appointed critics the numbers and strength of the enemy. He knew from the reports of the secret service that the general estimate of the rebel army at, and around Richmond, was far below their real numbers.

My shrewd and daring operatives, men and women trained for the work, moved in and out among the Rebel troops at all times and places. From actual observation they gathered the location, character and strength of their fortifications, and from actual count the estimates were made of the numerical strength of the opposing army.

Suffice it to say, that I knew of my own knowledge, and General McClellan knew from the reports I laid before him, the fearful odds against which he had to contend in the bravely fought but disastrous campaign of the Peninsula.[C]

FOOTNOTES:

[C] See detailed statement in Appendix.

CHAPTER x.x.xII.

_Webster's Expedition.--His Gallantry.--A Stormy Pa.s.sage.--A Mysterious Package.--Treason Discovered and Punished._

It was Christmas morning, in Washington, and the bells were ringing merrily throughout the city. The sun was just peeping over the hills, and lighting up the winter landscape with a beauty and brilliancy that would defy the skill of an artist. Washington was alive with soldiers.

Throughout the city the military was the predominating element, and for miles around the country was dotted with the white tents that marked the encampments of the country's defenders. Thousands of muskets gleamed in the morning light, as with the rattle of the drum or the shrill blast of the bugle, the _reveille_ awoke the hills and valleys from the death-like silence and slumber of the night.

The Union army was encamped around the capital, and General McClellan was in command. For months the process of drilling and disciplining the volunteer troops had been going on under his watchful eye and masterful hand, and the "Army of the Potomac" was rapidly approaching a degree of efficiency that was eminently calculated to make them formidable adversaries to their reckless and determined enemies.

This morning, at my headquarters on I street, Timothy Webster was engaged in completing his arrangements for another extended journey into Rebeldom. By this time he had succeeded in thoroughly ingratiating himself into the favor of the rebel authorities, and at the War Department in Richmond he was regarded as a trusted emissary of the Confederate government.

Upon the trips which he had previously made he had carried numerous letters from Northern residents to their secessionist relatives in the South, and then, upon returning, he had delivered communications from Southern people to individuals north of the line. Of course these letters and communications, before being delivered to the parties to whom they were addressed, were first submitted to the inspection of trusted employees of my office, and anything which tended to convey information of the movements and intentions of the Southern leaders was carefully noted, and the Federal authorities duly notified. By this means a double purpose was served. Webster not only won the entire confidence of the Southern authorities, but he was very frequently the bearer of important dispatches, whose contents were often valuable to the Northern leaders.

After finishing his preparations, Webster came into my room, where Mr.

Bangs and I were seated, and announcing his readiness to start, inquired if I had any further orders for him.

"I am ready now, Major," said he, cheerily, "have you any further commands?"

"No, Webster," said I, "I believe everything has been carefully arranged, and I have no commands to give except for you to take good care of yourself."

"I'll try to do that," he replied with a laugh, and then, tapping his breast lightly, where his letters were sewed into the lining of his waistcoat, "I will take care of my mail too."

With a warm clasp of the hand, and a hearty good-bye, Webster went out into the bright sunlight and frosty air of a winter's morning, and was soon lost to view.

Procuring a conveyance, Webster left Washington, pa.s.sing the guards without difficulty, and made his way toward Leonardstown, in Maryland.

This journey was accomplished without event or accident, and early on the following morning, he drove up before the hotel, and was warmly greeted by John Moore, the landlord of the hostelry at that place.

This Moore was a strong secessionist at heart, although openly professing to be a Union man, and regarding Webster as a Southern emissary his greeting was always cordial, and his hospitality unstinted.