As regards the financial methods of the Army in dealing with the colonists, the following extract from a memorandum of information issued by the Ft. Romie Colony, California, gives typical information.

1. Land: Twenty acres of land are sold to each colonist. The price of unimproved land at this date, 1904, is $100.00 per acre. This price, however, is liable to be increased at any time.[73]

2. Buildings: Houses, barns and other buildings are constructed by the colonists. Materials are furnished in quant.i.ties by the Army according to the size of the colonist's family, somewhat after the following schedule. For a family with one or two small children, a two-room house, about 1424 outside measurement, for which we appropriate not over $125.00. This is to include a small barn or shed for horses, cows, etc. For a family with three or four small children, a three-room house about 1824, costing with barn, etc., not over $175.00. For a larger family, perhaps a four or five-room house, limiting the appropriation for the same to $225.00. Colonists can suit themselves as to the style of the house, but must satisfy the manager that it can be erected within the limits of the appropriation named. The colonist can add to the size of the house as he gets on his financial feet.

3. Terms: On land breaking and other permanent land improvements, the colonists are given 20 years' time. The princ.i.p.al and interest are payable in installments each year.

4. Outfit: To colonists unable to purchase them, the Army furnishes the necessary implements and stock, consisting of the following: Team of horses, cow, hogs, chicken, seed, etc., secured by chattel mortgage. The interest on outfit and loans is fixed at 6 per cent. It is expected that the princ.i.p.al and interest will be repaid in installments each year. All outfits and loans are to be repaid within five years.[74]

We have briefly outlined the most prominent features of the Farm Colonies, but the final questions now arise, is the movement sound; what does it signify, and what development does the future hold for it? For one thing we must not be led astray by the statements of the Army. The continued existence of the colonies, in the face of great difficulties, through the term of eight or nine years they have been carried on, is not in itself an argument for the soundness of the movement. From ocean to ocean and throughout the world, the Army has advertised its success in colonizing enterprises, and hence it had a set purpose in maintaining and continuing its colonies, even though they should be failures from our point of view, and even though they should not fulfil the purpose originally intended by the Army itself. As has been remarked with regard to the industrial colonies, so here, we would emphasize the fact that the Army has no need to fear acknowledgement that the colonies have not been successful, because it has other credit upon which to depend for its reputation for usefulness. After looking at it from all sides, we come to the conclusion that the two experiments considered in these pages do not justify an extension of this work. This conclusion is based on several reasons:

1. Many of the successful colonists are not men who needed help the most, and many are not from the City at all.

2. The colonies have been, and are, an undue expense to the organization.

3. The same amount of energy and money would be more beneficial to the unemployed if used along other lines.

4. The principles advanced as essential by the originators of the movement were only partially carried out.[75]

Our first reason is based partly on personal investigation, and partly on the statements of the Army itself.[76] There are, as will be seen from examples given, certain places where families from the city without previous experience have made a success of the colonies, but these are greatly in the minority[77]. If, in the case of the California Colony at Fort Romie, when seventeen out of the original number of families taken from the city, left on account of the lack of water, the next group of settlers had again been chosen from the city, after water had been secured, a more conclusive experiment would have resulted, but instead, the second group were, "farmers by profession."[78] This looks as though the Army itself at that time doubted the ability of the city families to succeed on the land. At any rate, the fact that the majority of the families at the present time on the colonies are not from the city at all, shows that, as an experiment of removing the surplus population of the city to the country, the colonies are a failure. But further, when we take the minority, the families now in the colonies who came from the city, we find that, in most cases, they are not people who needed help the most, and those who have succeeded on the colonies, have succeeded because of elements in their character which would have led them to succeed in the long run anywhere, with favorable environment. In this case then, the only advantage in taking these people from the city was to leave more room there for somebody else, and this is not much of an advantage, since that "somebody else" is quite likely to come from the country to the city, and thus not be one of the city's submerged ones at all. Again, if, as we have just stated, men succeed in the country because of the same elements of character which would lead them to succeed anywhere, then the reason for their failing to succeed in the city would lie in an unfavorable environment, and to change their environment, it is not necessary to carry on a system of paternalistic colonies. This leads us to the question of a.s.sisted emigration, which we will discuss in connection with our third objection to the colonies.

As regards the second reason, that of undue expense, Mr. Haggard in 1905, found a loss to the Army of $50,000. While, since that time, in the case of the California Colony, there has been no further loss, yet in the case of the colony in Colorado, there has been much expenditure which should be added to the original loss. The Army states that it has been too liberal in its dealings with its colonists, but we note that, in spite of its liberality, there has been a constant tendency for the colonists to leave, hoping to do better elsewhere.[79] The Army might reply that this is no argument, and that the fact that they were able to leave with funds on hand was in itself a proof of liberality on the Army's part, but to prove the success of its experiment, it must show that those who have left have done better elsewhere, and not drifted back once more to the city. The Army might further state that in future a better selection of land might be made, and that other unfavorable things might be avoided, but we are dealing here with these two colonies and not future experiments. As regards such, there would always be unforeseen difficulties of every kind.[80]

Coming to the third reason for our conclusion, the reason that money might be expended in other ways with greater advantage to the unemployed, and with greater relief to the congestion of cities, we refer again to the recommendations of the Departmental Committee appointed by the English government to consider Commissioner Haggard's report.[81] In their report they recommend a system of emigration from the city to the English possessions, such as Canada, aided by the government, in preference to the system of colonization. With this we agree. A man once transported from the city and then thrown on his own resources in a favorable rural environment, will be more likely to succeed than a man who is taken out with a number of others to form a colony. The man left to his own resources will rise to the occasion, as so many have done in both Canada and the United States, who have migrated from city to country and made successful farmers and citizens, while, on the other hand, the man who feels dependent on an organization, which is responsible to the public for his success, and its own, will blame it for his own lack of efficiency. The Army itself claims a successful work done along the lines of emigration. In 1905, through the agency of the Army, 2,500 men were sent out from London to Canada. This number has since increased every year until in 1907 over 15,000 men were sent out. Many other emigration societies have been very successful in this work.[82] The emigrants sent out with some a.s.sistance, in many cases, gain new ambitions in life and make p.r.o.nounced successes on the new soil. As regards the cost, the following quotation may be submitted. "The cost of emigration to Canada from England does not amount to more than 10 a head, and some of the societies, especially those maintained by women, seem to be successful in securing repayment of at least a part of the money advanced. In other words, $300,000.00, which Mr. Rider Haggard a.s.sumes as a necessary sum for forming a colony of 1,500 families, would enable at least 6,000 families to go out as emigrants."[83] With regard to conditions in the large cities of the United States and other countries, we believe that the same arguments would apply, and that, in every case, a.s.sisted emigration will be found far more feasible and beneficial than any system of colonization. Again, for reasons already given, in addition to there being six thousand families aided by emigration, for the same sum as fifteen hundred families could be by colonization, the relief given would be far preferable. In other words, emigration has been proved successful, while colonization has not.

Coming back to the conclusions reached by Mr. Haggard on his recommendations to the English government: Mr. Haggard, after stating that the two experiments, outside of a slight failure of finance, seemed to him to be eminently successful, says that, given certain requisites,

"It will, I consider, be strange if success is not attained even in the case of poor persons taken from the cities, provided that they are suited in character, the victims of misfortune and circ.u.mstances rather than of vice, having had some acquaintance or connection with the land in their past life, and having also an earnest desire to raise themselves and their children in the world."

Now two of the "requisites" he mentions are, "that the land should be cheap as well as suitable" and "that markets also with accessibility and convenience of location should be borne in mind," two rather difficult requisites to be found together. Again, in the above quotation he lays down other provisos; among these being one that the people selected should have had some acquaintance or connection with the land in their past lives, a rather indefinite proviso in itself, but, from a list of poor men out of work or in irregular or casual employment in London and the other large cities in England in 1901 and 1906, compiled by Mr. Wilson Fox, we find that out of a total of 8,793 such men, ninety per cent were town born.[84] We also find in New York City in the spring of 1908, that out of a total of 185 dest.i.tute men, about eighty per cent were town born.[85] That then leaves ten per cent in the case of England and twenty per cent in the case of New York City from which to select or choose the ones needed for a colonizing enterprise.

Mr. Fox has also shown in his investigations:

1. That the countrymen who migrate to London are mainly the best youth of the villages.

2. That the incomers usually get the pick of the posts, especially outdoor trades.

3. Country immigrants do not to any considerable extent directly recruit the town unemployed who are, in the main, the sediment deposited at the bottom of the scale, as the physique and power of application of the town population tends to deteriorate.[86]

The conclusion is then, that it would be difficult to get the men according to Mr. Haggard's requirements, and difficult to get the land according to his requirements, and even if such were obtained, for reasons already stated there is no justification for a large colonizing enterprise in the two experiments described in this chapter.

Examples of Colonists taken from Ft. Amity by the author in January, 1908.

No. 1.

Elderly man. Widower. Had three grown-up children in the Colony at various times. Had one son a colonist with farm of his own. Was not a Salvationist. Came from Chicago where he was a tailor. Had a farm near the railroad depot which he considered valuable. Had two small houses.

Rented one. Raised alfalfa. Was sole agent for a coal company. Claimed he made $1,500.00 last year, mostly in the coal business. Said draining now being done on the Colony was very expensive. Considered the Colony a good thing.

No. 2.

Middle aged man. Married. One child. Had experience in the country before coming to the Colony. Had forty acres of Colony land which he had rented, and which he wished to sell at $106.00 per acre. Had mostly worked for the railroad in the station office. Wished to leave the Colony. Said he could not raise a vegetable garden owing to alkali and insect pests.

No. 3.

A new man. About thirty years old. One year out from Chicago, where he worked at different trades. Had wife and one child. Rented a house on the Colony and worked in one of the Colony stores. Had no money saved and saw no immediate chance of betterment. Liked the country better than the city, because his wife had better health.

No. 4.

Young married man. No children. Son of a Colonist and married to a daughter of a Colonist, whose father was sheriff of the County. Had good looking cottage and barns. Was doing well.

No. 5.

About fifty years old. Salvation Army officer. In the Colony six years.

Had son twenty-one, and together they worked a farm of sixty acres. He owned twenty and rented forty. His life was despaired of by the doctors, but he was enjoying good health at time of interview. Doing well financially.

No. 6.

About forty-five. Original Colonist. Married. Had four children. Came from Chicago, where he was a carpenter. Owned land in the Colony which he rented out. Ran a hardware store in the Colony and was partner in the Colony bank. Had property valued at $5,000.00. Had no capital when he came to the Colony.

No. 7.

About forty-eight years old. Original Colonist. Married and had nine children. Was railroad clerk in Chicago at $12.00 per week. Owned a corner lot on the town site where he ran a grocery store. Had property in Chicago worth $1,000.00 when he came to the Colony. Was worth $8,000.00 at time of interview.

No. 8.

A farmer, from surrounding country, induced by Colony management to invest in Colony land and tract as a "pace-setter" to the other colonists. Thus secured forty acres at $70.00 per acre. Had introduced the sheep industry. Bought up young lambs in Mexico, fattened them, and sold at a profit. Had been two years on the Colony. Made $5,000.00 net, per year. Had four thousand sheep.

No. 9.

Middle aged man. Married. Original colonist. Was expressman in Chicago, but previous to coming to the Colony had to leave family and go to work in the woods while the wife worked. Had taken out a government homestead outside of the Colony. Gave up his holdings on the Colony and was working as farm boss for a neighboring farmer while his wife ran a boarding house.

No. 10.

Scotchman. About fifty years old. Married. Had five children. In the Colony for six years. Arrived there with $25.00. Was carpenter in Chicago. Was worth $1,000.00 when interviewed. Was arranging to sell his holdings and go away, as he thought he could do better elsewhere.

No. 11.