I expect that actual change in our legal system will come initially from litigation rather than legislation, as litigation often precipitates such transformations. In a precursor of what is to come, attorney Martine Rothblatt, a partner in Mahon, Patusky, Rothblatt & Fisher, filed a mock motion on September 16, 2003, to prevent a corporation from disconnecting a conscious computer. The motion was argued in a mock trial in the biocyberethics session at the International Bar a.s.sociation conference.10 We can measure certain correlates of subjective experience (for example, certain patterns of objectively measurable neurological activity with objectively verifiable reports of certain subjective experiences, such as hearing a sound). But we cannot penetrate to the core of subjective experience through objective measurement. As I mentioned in chapter 1, we are dealing with the difference between third-person "objective" experience, which is the basis of science, and first-person "subjective" experience, which is a synonym for consciousness.

Consider that we are unable to truly experience the subjective experiences of others. The experience-beaming technology of 2029 will enable the brain of one person to experience only the sensory sensory experiences (and potentially some of the neurological correlates of emotions and other aspects of experience) of another person. But that will still not convey the same experiences (and potentially some of the neurological correlates of emotions and other aspects of experience) of another person. But that will still not convey the same internal internal experience as that undergone by the person beaming the experience, because his or her brain is different. Every day we hear reports about the experiences of others, and we may even feel empathy in response to the behavior that results from their internal states. But because we're exposed to only the experience as that undergone by the person beaming the experience, because his or her brain is different. Every day we hear reports about the experiences of others, and we may even feel empathy in response to the behavior that results from their internal states. But because we're exposed to only the behavior behavior of others, we can only of others, we can only imagine imagine their subjective experiences. Because it is possible to construct a perfectly consistent, scientific worldview that omits the existence of consciousness, some observers come to the conclusion that it's just an illusion. their subjective experiences. Because it is possible to construct a perfectly consistent, scientific worldview that omits the existence of consciousness, some observers come to the conclusion that it's just an illusion.

Jaron Lanier, the virtual-reality pioneer, takes issue (in the third of his six objections to what he calls "cybernetic totalism" in his treatise "One Half a Manifesto") with those who maintain "that subjective experience either doesn't exist, or is unimportant because it is some sort of ambient or peripheral effect."11 As I pointed out, there is no device or system we can postulate that could definitively detect subjectivity (conscious experience) a.s.sociated with an ent.i.ty. Any such purported device would have philosophical a.s.sumptions built into it. Although I disagree with much of Lanier's treatise (see the "Criticism from Software" section in chapter 9), I concur with him on this issue and can even imagine (and empathize with!) his feelings of frustration at the dictums of "cybernetic totalists" such as myself (not that I accept this characterization). As I pointed out, there is no device or system we can postulate that could definitively detect subjectivity (conscious experience) a.s.sociated with an ent.i.ty. Any such purported device would have philosophical a.s.sumptions built into it. Although I disagree with much of Lanier's treatise (see the "Criticism from Software" section in chapter 9), I concur with him on this issue and can even imagine (and empathize with!) his feelings of frustration at the dictums of "cybernetic totalists" such as myself (not that I accept this characterization).12 Like Lanier I even accept the subjective experience of those who maintain that there is no such thing as subjective experience. Like Lanier I even accept the subjective experience of those who maintain that there is no such thing as subjective experience.

Precisely because we cannot resolve issues of consciousness entirely through objective measurement and a.n.a.lysis (science), a critical role exists for philosophy. Consciousness is the most important ontological question. After all, if we truly imagine a world in which there is no subjective experience (a world in which there is swirling stuff but no conscious ent.i.ty to experience it), that world may as well not exist. In some philosophical traditions, both Eastern (certain schools of Buddhist thought, for example), and Western (specifically, observer-based interpretations of quantum mechanics), that is exactly how such a world is regarded.

RAY: We can debate what sorts of ent.i.ties are or can be conscious. We can argue about whether consciousness is an emergent property or caused by some specific mechanism, biological or otherwise. But there's another mystery a.s.sociated with consciousness, perhaps the most important one. We can debate what sorts of ent.i.ties are or can be conscious. We can argue about whether consciousness is an emergent property or caused by some specific mechanism, biological or otherwise. But there's another mystery a.s.sociated with consciousness, perhaps the most important one.

MOLLY 2004: Okay, I'm all ears. Okay, I'm all ears.

RAY: Well, even if we a.s.sume that all humans who seem to be conscious in fact are, why is my consciousness a.s.sociated with this particular person, me? Why am I conscious of this particular person who read Tom Swift Jr. books as a child, got involved with inventions, writes books about the future, and so on? Every morning that I wake up, I have the experiences of this specific person. Why wasn't I Alanis Morissette or someone else? Well, even if we a.s.sume that all humans who seem to be conscious in fact are, why is my consciousness a.s.sociated with this particular person, me? Why am I conscious of this particular person who read Tom Swift Jr. books as a child, got involved with inventions, writes books about the future, and so on? Every morning that I wake up, I have the experiences of this specific person. Why wasn't I Alanis Morissette or someone else?

SIGMUND FREUD: Hmm, so you'd like to be Alanis Morissette? Hmm, so you'd like to be Alanis Morissette?

RAY: That's an interesting proposition, but that's not my point. That's an interesting proposition, but that's not my point.

MOLLY 2004: What is your point? I don't understand. What is your point? I don't understand.

RAY: Why am I conscious of the experiences and decisions of this particular person? Why am I conscious of the experiences and decisions of this particular person?

MOLLY 2004: Because, silly, that's who you are. Because, silly, that's who you are.

SIGMUND: It seems that there's something about yourself that you don't like. Tell me more about that. It seems that there's something about yourself that you don't like. Tell me more about that.

MOLLY 2004: Earlier, Ray didn't like being human altogether. Earlier, Ray didn't like being human altogether.

RAY: I didn't say I don't like being human. I said I didn't like the limitations, problems, and high level of maintenance of my version 1.0 body. But this is all beside the point that I'm trying to make here. I didn't say I don't like being human. I said I didn't like the limitations, problems, and high level of maintenance of my version 1.0 body. But this is all beside the point that I'm trying to make here.

CHARLES DARWIN: You wonder why you're you? That's a tautology, there's not much to wonder about. You wonder why you're you? That's a tautology, there's not much to wonder about.

RAY: Like many attempts to express the really "hard" problems of consciousness, this is sounding meaningless. But if you ask me what I really wonder about, it is this: why am I continually aware of this particular person's experiences and feelings? As for other people's consciousness, I accept it, but I don't experience other people's experiences, not directly anyway. Like many attempts to express the really "hard" problems of consciousness, this is sounding meaningless. But if you ask me what I really wonder about, it is this: why am I continually aware of this particular person's experiences and feelings? As for other people's consciousness, I accept it, but I don't experience other people's experiences, not directly anyway.

SIGMUND: Okay, I'm getting a clearer picture now. You don't experience other people's experiences? Have you ever talked to someone about empathy? Okay, I'm getting a clearer picture now. You don't experience other people's experiences? Have you ever talked to someone about empathy?

RAY: Look, I'm talking about consciousness now in a very personal way. Look, I'm talking about consciousness now in a very personal way.

SIGMUND: That's good, keep going. That's good, keep going.

RAY: Actually, this is a good example of what typically happens when people try to have a dialogue about consciousness. The discussion inevitably veers off into something else, like psychology or behavior or intelligence or neurology. But the mystery of why I am this particular person is what I really wonder about. Actually, this is a good example of what typically happens when people try to have a dialogue about consciousness. The discussion inevitably veers off into something else, like psychology or behavior or intelligence or neurology. But the mystery of why I am this particular person is what I really wonder about.

CHARLES: You know you do create who you are. You know you do create who you are.

RAY: Yes, that's true. Just as our brains create our thoughts, our thoughts in turn create our brains. Yes, that's true. Just as our brains create our thoughts, our thoughts in turn create our brains.

CHARLES: So you've made yourself, and that's why you are who you are, so to speak. So you've made yourself, and that's why you are who you are, so to speak.

MOLLY 2104: We experience that very directly in 2104. Being nonbiological, I'm able to change who I am quite readily. As we discussed earlier, if I'm in the mood, I can combine my thought patterns with someone else's and create a merged ident.i.ty. It's a profound experience. We experience that very directly in 2104. Being nonbiological, I'm able to change who I am quite readily. As we discussed earlier, if I'm in the mood, I can combine my thought patterns with someone else's and create a merged ident.i.ty. It's a profound experience.

MOLLY 2004: Well, Miss Molly of the future, we do that back in the primitive days of 2004 also. We call it falling in love. Well, Miss Molly of the future, we do that back in the primitive days of 2004 also. We call it falling in love.

Who Am I? What Am I?

Why are you you?-THE IMPLIED QUESTION IN THE ACRONYM YRUU (YOUNG RELIGIOUS UNITARIAN UNIVERSALISTS), AN ORGANIZATION I WAS ACTIVE IN WHEN I WAS GROWING UP IN THE EARLY 1960S (IT WAS THEN CALLED LRY, LIBERAL RELIGIOUS YOUTH).

What you are looking for is who is looking.-SAINT FRANCIS OF a.s.sISI I'm not aware of too many thingsI know what I know if you know what I mean.Philosophy is the talk on a cereal box.Religion is the smile on a dog....Philosophy is a walk on the slippery rocks.Religion is a light in the fog....What I am is what I am.Are you what you are or what?-EDIE BRICKELL, "WHAT I AM"

Freedom of will is the ability to do gladly that which I must do.-CARL JUNG The chance of the quantum theoretician is not the ethical freedom of the Augustinian.-NORBERT WEINER13 I should prefer to an ordinary death, being immersed with a few friends in a cask of Madeira, until that time, then to be recalled to life by the solar warmth of my dear country! But in all probability, we live in a century too little advanced, and too near the infancy of science, to see such an art brought in our time to its perfection.-BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, 1773

A related but distinct question has to do with our own ident.i.ties. We talked earlier about the potential to upload the patterns of an individual mind-knowledge, skills, personality, memories-to another substrate. Although the new ent.i.ty would act just like me, the question remains: is it really me me?

Some of the scenarios for radical life extension involve reengineering and rebuilding the systems and subsystems that our bodies and brains comprise. In taking part in this reconstruction, do I lose my self along the way? Again, this issue will transform itself from a centuries-old philosophical dialogue to a pressing practical matter in the next several decades.

So who am I? Since I am constantly changing, am I just a pattern? What if someone copies that pattern? Am I the original and/or the copy? Perhaps I am this stuff here-that is, the both ordered and chaotic collection of molecules that make up my body and brain.

But there's a problem with this position. The specific set of particles that my body and brain comprise are in fact completely different from the atoms and molecules that I comprised only a short while ago. We know that most of our cells are turned over in a matter of weeks, and even our neurons, which persist as distinct cells for a relatively long time, nonetheless change all of their const.i.tuent molecules within a month.14 The half-life of a microtubule (a protein filament that provides the structure of a neuron) is about ten minutes. The actin filaments in dendrites are replaced about every forty seconds. The proteins that power the synapses are replaced about every hour. NMDA receptors in synapses stick around for a relatively long five days. The half-life of a microtubule (a protein filament that provides the structure of a neuron) is about ten minutes. The actin filaments in dendrites are replaced about every forty seconds. The proteins that power the synapses are replaced about every hour. NMDA receptors in synapses stick around for a relatively long five days.

So I am a completely different set of stuff than I was a month ago, and all that persists is the pattern of organization of that stuff. The pattern changes also, but slowly and in a continuum. I am rather like the pattern that water makes in a stream as it rushes past the rocks in its path. The actual molecules of water change every millisecond, but the pattern persists for hours or even years.

Perhaps, therefore, we should say I am a pattern of matter and energy that persists over time. But there is a problem with this definition, as well, since we will ultimately be able to upload this pattern to replicate my body and brain to a sufficiently high degree of accuracy that the copy is indistinguishable from the original. (That is, the copy could pa.s.s a "Ray Kurzweil" Turing test.) The copy, therefore, will share my pattern. One might counter that we may not get every detail correct, but as time goes on our attempts to create a neural and body replica will increase in resolution and accuracy at the same exponential pace that governs all information-based technologies. We will ultimately be able to capture and re-create my pattern of salient neural and physical details to any desired degree of accuracy.

Although the copy shares my pattern, it would be hard to say that the copy is me because I would-or could-still be here. You could even scan and copy me while I was sleeping. If you come to me in the morning and say, "Good news, Ray, we've successfully reinstantiated you into a more durable substrate, so we won't be needing your old body and brain anymore," I may beg to differ.

If you do the thought experiment, it's clear that the copy may look and act just like me, but it's nonetheless not not me. I may not even know that he was created. Although he would have all my memories and recall having been me, from the point in time of his creation Ray 2 would have his own unique experiences, and his reality would begin to diverge from mine. me. I may not even know that he was created. Although he would have all my memories and recall having been me, from the point in time of his creation Ray 2 would have his own unique experiences, and his reality would begin to diverge from mine.

This is a real issue with regard to cryonics (the process of preserving by freezing a person who has just died, with a view toward "reanimating" him later when the technology exists to reverse the damage from the early stages of the dying process, the cryonic-preservation process, and the disease or condition that killed him in the first place). a.s.suming a "preserved" person is ultimately reanimated, many of the proposed methods imply that the reanimated person will essentially be "rebuilt" with new materials and even entirely new neuromorphically equivalent systems. The reanimated person will, therefore, effectively be "Ray 2" (that is, someone else).

Now let's pursue this train of thought a bit further, and you will see where the dilemma arises. If we copy me and then destroy the original, that's the end of me, because as we concluded above the copy is not me. Since the copy will do a convincing job of impersonating me, no one may know the difference, but it's nonetheless the end of me.

Consider replacing a tiny portion of my brain with its neuromorphic equivalent.

Okay, I'm still here: the operation was successful (incidentally, nan.o.bots will eventually do this without surgery). We know people like this already, such as those with cochlear implants, implants for Parkinson's disease, and others. Now replace another portion of my brain: okay, I'm still here ... and again....At the end of the process, I'm still myself. There never was an "old Ray" and a "new Ray," I'm the same as I was before. No one ever missed me, including me.

The gradual replacement of Ray results in Ray, so consciousness and ident.i.ty appear to have been preserved. However, in the case of gradual replacement there is no simultaneous old me and new me. At the end of the process you have the equivalent of the new me (that is, Ray 2) and no old me (Ray 1). So gradual replacement also means the end of me. We might therefore wonder: at what point did my body and brain become someone else?

On yet another hand (we're running out of philosophical hands here), as I pointed out at the beginning of this question, I am in fact being continually replaced as part of a normal biological process. (And, by the way, that process is not particularly gradual but rather rapid.) As we concluded, all that persists is my spatial and temporal pattern of matter and energy. But the thought experiment above shows that gradual replacement means the end of me even if my pattern is preserved. So am I constantly being replaced by someone else who just seems a lot like the me of a few moments earlier?

So, again, who am I? It's the ultimate ontological question, and we often refer to it as the issue of consciousness. I have consciously (pun intended) phrased the issue entirely in the first person because that is its nature. It is not a third-person question. So my question is not "who are you?" although you may wish to ask this question yourself.

When people speak of consciousness they often slip into considerations of behavioral and neurological correlates of consciousness (for example, whether or not an ent.i.ty can be self-reflective). But these are third-person (objective) issues and do not represent what David Chalmers calls the "hard question" of consciousness: how can matter (the brain) lead to something as apparently immaterial as consciousness?15 The question of whether or not an ent.i.ty is conscious is apparent only to itself. The difference between neurological correlates of consciousness (such as intelligent behavior) and the ontological reality of consciousness is the difference between objective and subjective reality. That's why we can't propose an objective consciousness detector without philosophical a.s.sumptions built into it.

I do believe that we humans will come to accept that nonbiological ent.i.ties are conscious, because ultimately the nonbiological ent.i.ties will have all the subtle cues that humans currently possess and that we a.s.sociate with emotional and other subjective experiences. Still, while we will be able to verify the subtle cues, we will have no direct access to the implied consciousness.

I will acknowledge that many of you do seem conscious to me, but I should not be too quick to accept this impression. Perhaps I am really living in a simulation, and you are all part of it.

Or, perhaps it's only my memories of you that exist, and these actual experiences never took place.

Or maybe I am only now experiencing the sensation of recalling apparent memories, but neither the experience nor the memories really exist. Well, you see the problem.

Despite these dilemmas my personal philosophy remains based on patternism-I am princ.i.p.ally a pattern that persists in time. I am an evolving pattern, and I can influence the course of the evolution of my pattern. Knowledge is a pattern, as distinguished from mere information, and losing knowledge is a profound loss. Thus, losing a person is the ultimate loss.

MOLLY 2004: As far as I'm concerned, who I am is pretty straightforward-it's basically this brain and body, which at least this month is in pretty good shape, thank you. As far as I'm concerned, who I am is pretty straightforward-it's basically this brain and body, which at least this month is in pretty good shape, thank you.

RAY: Are you including the food in your digestive tract, in its various stages of decomposition along the way? Are you including the food in your digestive tract, in its various stages of decomposition along the way?

MOLLY 2004: Okay, you can exclude that. Some of it will become me, but it hasn't been enrolled yet in the "part of Molly" club. Okay, you can exclude that. Some of it will become me, but it hasn't been enrolled yet in the "part of Molly" club.

RAY: Well, 90 percent of the cells in your body don't have your DNA. Well, 90 percent of the cells in your body don't have your DNA.

MOLLY 2004: Is that so? Just whose DNA is it, then? Is that so? Just whose DNA is it, then?

RAY: Biological humans have about ten trillion cells with their own DNA, but there are about one hundred trillion microorganisms in the digestive tract, basically bacteria. Biological humans have about ten trillion cells with their own DNA, but there are about one hundred trillion microorganisms in the digestive tract, basically bacteria.

MOLLY 2004: Doesn't sound very appealing. Are they entirely necessary? Doesn't sound very appealing. Are they entirely necessary?

RAY: They're actually part of the society of cells that makes Molly alive and thriving. You couldn't survive without healthy gut bacteria. a.s.suming your intestinal flora are in good balance, they're necessary for your well-being. They're actually part of the society of cells that makes Molly alive and thriving. You couldn't survive without healthy gut bacteria. a.s.suming your intestinal flora are in good balance, they're necessary for your well-being.

MOLLY 2004: Okay, but I wouldn't count them as me. There are lots of things that my well-being depends on. Like my house and my car, but I still don't count them as part of me. Okay, but I wouldn't count them as me. There are lots of things that my well-being depends on. Like my house and my car, but I still don't count them as part of me.

RAY: Very well, it's reasonable to leave out the entire contents of the GI tract, bacteria and all. That's actually how the body sees it. Even though it's physically inside the body, the body considers the tract to be external and carefully screens what it absorbs into the bloodstream. Very well, it's reasonable to leave out the entire contents of the GI tract, bacteria and all. That's actually how the body sees it. Even though it's physically inside the body, the body considers the tract to be external and carefully screens what it absorbs into the bloodstream.

MOLLY 2004: As I think more about who I am, I kind of like Jaron Lanier's "circle of empathy." As I think more about who I am, I kind of like Jaron Lanier's "circle of empathy."

RAY: Tell me more. Tell me more.

MOLLY 2004: Basically, the circle of reality that I consider to be "me" is not clear-cut. It's not simply my body. I have limited identification with, say, my toes and, after our last discussion, even less with the contents of my large intestine. Basically, the circle of reality that I consider to be "me" is not clear-cut. It's not simply my body. I have limited identification with, say, my toes and, after our last discussion, even less with the contents of my large intestine.

RAY: That's reasonable, and even with regard to our brains we are aware of only a tiny portion of what goes on in there. That's reasonable, and even with regard to our brains we are aware of only a tiny portion of what goes on in there.

MOLLY 2004: It's true that there are parts of my brain that seem to be somebody else, or at least somewhere else. Often, thoughts and dreams that intrude on my awareness seem to have come from some foreign place. They're obviously coming from my brain, but it doesn't seem that way. It's true that there are parts of my brain that seem to be somebody else, or at least somewhere else. Often, thoughts and dreams that intrude on my awareness seem to have come from some foreign place. They're obviously coming from my brain, but it doesn't seem that way.

RAY: Conversely, loved ones who are physically separate may be so close as to seem to be part of ourselves. Conversely, loved ones who are physically separate may be so close as to seem to be part of ourselves.

MOLLY 2004: The boundary of myself is seeming less and less clear. The boundary of myself is seeming less and less clear.

RAY: Well, just wait until we're predominantly nonbiological. Then we'll be able to merge our thoughts and thinking at will, so finding boundaries will be even more difficult. Well, just wait until we're predominantly nonbiological. Then we'll be able to merge our thoughts and thinking at will, so finding boundaries will be even more difficult.

MOLLY 2004: That actually sounds kind of appealing. You know, some Buddhist philosophies emphasize the extent to which there is inherently no boundary at all between us. That actually sounds kind of appealing. You know, some Buddhist philosophies emphasize the extent to which there is inherently no boundary at all between us.

RAY: Sounds like they're talking about the Singularity. Sounds like they're talking about the Singularity.

The Singularity as Transcendence

Modernity sees humanity as having ascended from what is inferior to it-life begins in slime and ends in intelligence-whereas traditional cultures see it as descended from its superiors. As the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins puts the matter: "We are the only people who a.s.sume that we have ascended from apes. Everybody else takes it for granted that they are descended from G.o.ds."-HUSTON SMITH16 Some philosophers hold that philosophy is what you do to a problem until it's clear enough to solve it by doing science. Others hold that if a philosophical problem succ.u.mbs to empirical methods, that shows it wasn't really philosophical to begin with.-JERRY A. FODOR17

The Singularity denotes an event that will take place in the material world, the inevitable next step in the evolutionary process that started with biological evolution and has extended through human-directed technological evolution. However, it is precisely in the world of matter and energy that we encounter transcendence, a princ.i.p.al connotation of what people refer to as spirituality. Let's consider the nature of spirituality in the physical world.

Where shall I start? How about with water? It's simple enough, but consider the diverse and beautiful ways it manifests itself: the endlessly varying patterns as it cascades past rocks in a stream, then surges chaotically down a waterfall (all viewable from my office window, incidentally); the billowing patterns of clouds in the sky; the arrangement of snow on a mountain; the satisfying design of a single snowflake. Or consider Einstein's description of the entangled order and disorder in a gla.s.s of water (that is, his thesis on Brownian motion).

Or elsewhere in the biological world, consider the intricate dance of spirals of DNA during mitosis. How about the loveliness of a tree as it bends in the wind and its leaves churn in a tangled dance? Or the bustling world we see in a microscope? There's transcendence everywhere.

A comment on the word "transcendence" is in order here. "To transcend" means "to go beyond," but this need not compel us to adopt an ornate dualist view that regards transcendent levels of reality (such as the spiritual level) to be not of this world. We can "go beyond" the "ordinary" powers of the material world through the power of patterns. Although I have been called a materialist, I regard myself as a "patternist," It's through the emergent powers of the pattern that we transcend. Since the material stuff of which we are made turns over quickly, it is the transcendent power of our patterns that persists.

The power of patterns to endure goes beyond explicitly self-replicating systems, such as organisms and self-replicating technology. It is the persistence and power of patterns that support life and intelligence. The pattern is far more important than the material stuff that const.i.tutes it.

Random strokes on a canvas are just paint. But when arranged in just the right way, they transcend the material stuff and become art. Random notes are just sounds. Sequenced in an "inspired" way, we have music. A pile of components is just an inventory. Ordered in an innovative manner, and perhaps with the addition of some software (another pattern), we have the "magic" (transcendence) of technology.

Although some regard what is referred to as "spiritual" as the true meaning of transcendence, transcendence refers to all levels of reality: the creations of the natural world, including ourselves, as well as our own creations in the form of art, culture, technology, and emotional and spiritual expression. Evolution concerns patterns, and it is specifically the depth and order of patterns that grow in an evolutionary process. As a consummation of the evolution in our midst, the Singularity will deepen all of these manifestations of transcendence.

Another connotation of the word "spiritual" is "containing spirit," which is to say being conscious. Consciousness-the seat of "personalness"-is regarded as what is real in many philosophical and religious traditions. A common Buddhist ontology considers subjective-conscious-experience as the ultimate reality, rather than physical or objective phenomena, which are considered maya (illusion).

The arguments I make in this book with regard to consciousness are for the purpose of ill.u.s.trating this vexing and paradoxical (and, therefore, profound) nature of consciousness: how one set of a.s.sumptions (that is, that a copy of my mind file either shares or does not share my consciousness) leads ultimately to an opposite view, and vice versa.

We do a.s.sume that humans are conscious, at least when they appear to be. At the other end of the spectrum we a.s.sume that simple machines are not. In the cosmological sense the contemporary universe acts more like a simple machine than a conscious being. But as we discussed in the previous chapter, the matter and energy in our vicinity will become infused with the intelligence, knowledge, creativity, beauty, and emotional intelligence (the ability to love, for example) of our human-machine civilization. Our civilization will then expand outward, turning all the dumb matter and energy we encounter into sublimely intelligent-transcendent-matter and energy. So in a sense, we can say that the Singularity will ultimately infuse the universe with spirit.

Evolution moves toward greater complexity, greater elegance, greater knowledge, greater intelligence, greater beauty, greater creativity, and greater levels of subtle attributes such as love. In every monotheistic tradition G.o.d is likewise described as all of these qualities, only without any limitation: infinite knowledge, infinite intelligence, infinite beauty, infinite creativity, infinite love, and so on. Of course, even the accelerating growth of evolution never achieves an infinite level, but as it explodes exponentially it certainly moves rapidly in that direction. So evolution moves inexorably toward this conception of G.o.d, although never quite reaching this ideal. We can regard, therefore, the freeing of our thinking from the severe limitations of its biological form to be an essentially spiritual undertaking.

MOLLY 2004: So, do you believe in G.o.d? So, do you believe in G.o.d?

RAY: Well, it's a three-letter word-and a powerful meme. Well, it's a three-letter word-and a powerful meme.