[Footnote 362: This apologue is a widely spread piece of folk-lore. It is found in the Babylonian Talmud, _Sanhedrim_, fol. 91, _b_, and in the Gesta Romanorum.]

CHAPTER XV.

THE PATANJALI-DARSaNA.

We now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the opinions of such Munis as Patanjali and others, who originated the system of the Theistic Sa?khya philosophy. This school follows the so-called Yoga Sastra promulgated by Patanjali, and consisting of four chapters, which also bears the name of the "Sa?khya Pravachana," or detailed explanation of the Sa?khya.[363] In the first chapter thereof the venerable Patanjali, having in the opening aphorism, "Now is the exposition of Concentration" (_yoga_), avowed his commencement of the Yoga Sastra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of his subject, "Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle," and then he expounds at length the nature of Meditation (_samadhi_). In the second chapter, in the series of aphorisms commencing, "The practical part of Concentration is mortification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme," he expounds the practical part of _yoga_ proper to him whose mind is not yet thoroughly abstracted (iii. 9), viz., the five external subservients or means, "forbearance," and the rest. In the third chapter, in the series commencing "Attention is the fastening [of the mind] on some spot," he expounds the three internal subservients--attention, contemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name "subjugation" (_sa?yama_), and also the various superhuman powers which are their subordinate fruit. In the fourth chapter, in the series commencing, "Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells, mortification, and meditation," he expounds the highest end, Emanc.i.p.ation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called "perfections" (_siddhis_). This school accepts the old twenty-five principles [of the Sa?khya], "Nature," &c.; only adding the Supreme Being as the twenty-sixth--a Soul untouched by affliction, action, fruit, or stock of desert, who of His own will a.s.sumed a body in order to create, and originated all secular or Vaidic traditions,[364] and is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal of mundane existence.

"But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the [glossy] leaf of a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should need to accept any Supreme Being as gracious to it?" To this we reply, that the quality Goodness develops itself as the understanding, and it is this which is, as it were, burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this suffering quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the teachers have declared--

"It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the understanding and the substances belonging to Activity which torment,[365]

And it is through the modification of Darkness, as wrongly identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as suffering."

It has been also said by Patanjali,[366] "The power of the enjoyer, which is itself incapable of development or of transference, in an object which is developed and transferred experiences the modifications thereof."

Now the "power of the enjoyer" is the power of intelligence, and this is the soul; and in an object which is "developed" and "transferred," or reflected,--_i.e._, in the thinking principle or the understanding,--it experiences the modifications thereof, _i.e._, the power of intelligence, being reflected in the understanding, receives itself the shadow of the understanding, and imitates the modifications of it. Thus the soul, though in itself pure, sees according to the idea produced by the understanding; and, while thus seeing at second-hand, though really it is different from the understanding, it appears identical therewith. It is while the soul is thus suffering, that, by the practice of the eight subservient means, forbearance, religious observance, &c., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and for a long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme Being, at length there is produced an unclouded recognition of the distinction between the quality Goodness and the Soul; and the five "afflictions,"

ignorance, &c., are radically destroyed, and the various "stocks of desert," fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the undefiled soul abiding emanc.i.p.ated, perfect Emanc.i.p.ation is accomplished.

The words of the first aphorism, "Now is the exposition of concentration," establish the four preliminaries which lead to the intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice, viz., the object-matter, the end proposed, the connection [between the treatise and the object], and the person properly qualified to study it. The word "now" (_atha_) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning, [as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced]. "But," it may be objected, "there are several possible significations of this word _atha_; why, then, should you show an unwarranted partiality for this particular 'inceptive' meaning? The great Canon for nouns and their gender [the Amara Kosha Dictionary] gives many such meanings. '_Atha_ is used in the sense of an auspicious particle,--after,--now (inceptive),--what? (interrogatively),--and all (comprehensively).'

Now we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or comprehensiveness; but since there are four senses certainly suitable, _i.e._, 'after,' 'an auspicious particle,' 'reference to a previous topic,' and 'the inceptive now,' there is no reason for singling out the _last_." This objection, however, will not stand, for it cannot bear the following alternative. If you maintain the sense of "after," then do you hold that it implies following after anything whatever, or only after some definite cause as comprehended under the general definition of causation,[367] _i.e._, "previous existence [relatively to the effect]"? It cannot be the former, for, in accordance with the proverb that "No one stands for a single moment inactive," everybody must always do everything after previously doing something else; and since this is at once understood without any direct mention at all, there could be no use in employing the particle _atha_ to convey this meaning. Nor can it be the latter alternative; because, although we fully grant that the practice of concentration does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity, &c., yet these are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of exposition, and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance [which the presumed _cause_ should have]. "But why should we not hold that the word _atha_ implies that this very exposition is avowedly the predominant object, and does follow after previous tranquillity of mind, &c.?" We reply, that the aphorism uses the term "exposition"

(_a.n.u.sasana_), and this word, etymologically a.n.a.lysed, implies that by which the _yoga_ is explained, accompanied with definitions, divisions, and detailed means and results; and there is no rule that such an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind, &c., the rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is concerned, it must follow a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived knowledge, which should have quiet of mind, &c., as their precursors, in accordance with the words of Sruti: "Therefore having become tranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent, patient, full of faith and intent, let him see the soul in the soul."[368] Nor can the word _atha_ imply the necessary precedence, in the teacher, of a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; because, even granting that both these are present, they need not to be mentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in themselves to produce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student. Still [however we may settle these points] the question arises, Is the exposition of the _yoga_ ascertained to be a cause of final beat.i.tude or not? If it is, then it is still a desirable object, even if certain presupposed conditions should be absent; and if it is not, then it must be undesirable, whatever conditions may be present.[369] But it is clear that the exposition in question _is_ such a cause, since we have such a pa.s.sage of the Sruti as that [in the Ka?ha Upanishad, ii.

12]: "By the acquirement of _yoga_ or intense concentration on the Supreme Soul, the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and sorrow;" and again, such a pa.s.sage of the Sm?iti as that [in the Bhagavad Gita, ii. 53]: "The intellect unwavering in contemplation will then attain _yoga_." Hence we conclude that it is untenable to interpret _atha_ as implying that the exposition must follow "after" a previous inquiry on the part of the student, or "after" a previous course of ascetic training and use of elixirs, &c. [to render the body strong].

But in the case of the Vedanta Sutras, which open with the aphorism, "Now, therefore, there is the wish to know Brahman," Sa?kara acharya has declared that the inceptive meaning of _atha_ must be left out of the question, as the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken [at will]; and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean "after,"

_i.e._, that this desire must follow a previous course of tranquillity, &c., as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins the practice of tranquillity, self-control, indifference, endurance, contemplation, and faith, the object being to communicate the teaching to a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four so-called "means."[370]

"Well, then, let us grant that _atha_ cannot mean 'after;' but why should it not be simply an auspicious particle?" But this it cannot be, from the absence of any connection between the context and such auspicious meaning. Auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an unimpeached and desired good, and what is desired is so desired as being the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain; but this auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of _yoga_, since it is in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain.[371] Therefore it cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is that "the exposition of the _yoga_ is auspicious;" for auspiciousness cannot be either the primary meaning of _atha_ or its secondary meaning by metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself auspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like that of a drum. "But why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into the direct meaning of a sentence, so an effect [like this of auspiciousness] may also be included, since both are equally unexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned?"[372] We reply, that in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the meaning of one word and that of another; otherwise we should be guilty of breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set, that "verbal expectancy[373] can be fulfilled by _words_ alone."

"But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at the beginning of a Sastra, in order to lay the hosts of obstacles that would hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to begin, and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good, since it has been said by the wise, 'Those sastras become widely famous which have auspicious commencements, auspicious middles, and auspicious endings, and their students have long lives and are invincible in disputation'?[374] Now the word _atha_ implies 'auspiciousness,' since there is a Sm?iti which says,

"'The word _Om_ and the word _atha_,--these two in the ancient time,

"'Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth; therefore they are both auspicious.'

"Therefore let the word _atha_ stand here as signifying 'auspiciousness,' like the word '_v?iddhi_' used by Pa?ini in his opening sutra '_v?iddhir ad aich_.'"[375] This view, however, is untenable; since the very word _atha_, when heard, has an auspicious influence, even though it be employed to convey some other special signification, just as the hearing the sound of lutes, flutes, &c. [is auspicious for one starting on a journey]. If you still object, "How can the particle _atha_ have any other effect, if it is specially used here to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a new topic is commenced?" we reply that it certainly _can_ have such other additional effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for some other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a journey.[376] Nor does this contradict the sm?iti, since the sm?iti will still hold good, as the words "they are both auspicious" mean only that they produce an auspicious effect.

Nor can the particle _atha_ have here the meaning of "reference to a previous topic," since the previously mentioned faults will all equally apply here, as this meaning really involves that of "after" [which we have already discussed and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as this, as to whether this particular _atha_ means "the inceptive now" or "after,"

if another topic had been previously suggested, then "reference thereto"

would be a possible meaning; but in the present case [where no other topic has been previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning. Therefore, by exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for the _atha_ of the sutra, the remaining meaning of "the inceptive now." So, when it is said [in the Ta??ya Brahma?a, xvi. 8, 1; xvi. 10, 1], "Now this is the Jyotis," "Now this is the Visvajyotis,"[377] the particle _atha_ is accepted as signifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice, just as the _atha_ in the commencement of the Mahabhashya, "now comes the exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the Inst.i.tutes of Grammar. This has been declared by Vyasa in his Commentary on the Yoga Aphorisms, "the _atha_ in this opening aphorism indicates a commencement;"

and Vachaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss; therefore it may be considered as settled that the _atha_ here indicates a commencement and also signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view that this _atha_ implies a commencement, let the student be left in peace to strive after a successful understanding of the sastra through the attainment of the _yoga_, which is its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's explanation of its entire purport. But here some one may say, "Does not the sm?iti of Yajnavalkya say, 'Hira?yagarbha is the promulgator of the Yoga, and no other ancient sage?' how then is Patanjali the teacher thereof?" We reply that it was for this reason that the venerable Patanjali,[378] that ocean of compa.s.sion, considering how difficult it was to grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up and down in the Pura?as, &c., and wishing to collect together their essence, commenced his _a.n.u.sasana_,--the preposition _anu_ implying that it was a teaching which followed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of the system.

Since this _atha_ in the aphorism signifies "commencement," the full meaning of the sentence comes out as follows: "be it known that the inst.i.tute for the exposition of the _yoga_ is now commenced." In this inst.i.tute the "object-matter," as being that which is produced by it, is _yoga_ [or the "concentration of the mind"], with its means and its fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;" supreme absorption (_kaivalya_) is the highest "end" of the _yoga_ when it is produced.

The "connection" between the inst.i.tute and _yoga_ is that of the producer and the thing to be produced; the "connection" between _yoga_ and supreme absorption is that of the means and the end; and this is well known from Sruti and Sm?iti, as I have before shown. And it is established by the general context that those who aim at liberation are the duly qualified persons to hear this inst.i.tute. Nor need any one be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the opening aphorism of the Vedanta sutras, "Now, therefore, there is a wish to know Brahman;" and lest here, too, we should seek to establish by the general context that all persons who aim at liberation are duly qualified students of the Vedanta. For the word _atha_, as there used, signifies "succession" [or "after"]; and it is a settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a regular channel to duly qualified students, and consequently the question cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by the context. Hence it has been said, "When Sruti comes [as the determining authority] 'the subject-matter' and the rest have no place."[379] The full meaning of this is as follows: Where a thing is not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the "subject-matter" and the rest can establish the true meaning, not otherwise; but wherever we can attain the meaning by a direct text, there the other modes of interpretation are irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text of the Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the "subject-matter" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the authority which would establish this contrary conclusion is [by the very nature of "_sruti_"] already precluded from having any force; and in the latter it is useless. This is all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3, 14]; "A definite text, a 'sign,' the 'sentence,' the 'subject-matter,'

the 'relative position,' or 'the t.i.tle,'--when any of these come into collision, the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is more remote"[380] [and therefore less obvious]. It has been thus summed up--

"A text always precludes the rest; the 't.i.tle' is always precluded by any of the preceding modes;

"But whether any intervening one is precluded, or itself precludes, depends on circ.u.mstances."

Therefore [after all this long discussion] it may be now considered as settled that, since it has an "object," as well as the other preliminaries, the study of the Sastra, which teaches the Yoga, is to be commenced like that of the Vedanta, which discusses the nature of Brahman. "But," it may be objected, "it is the Yoga which was said to be the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced, not the Sastra." We grant that the Yoga is the princ.i.p.al object, as that which is to be produced; but since it is produced by the Sastra, especially directed thereto, this Sastra is the means for its production, and, as a general rule, the agent's activity is directly concerned with the means rather than with the end. Just as the operations of Devadatta the woodcutter, _i.e._, his lifting his arm up and down, &c., relate rather to the instrument, _i.e._, the axe, than to the object, _i.e._, the tree, so here the speaker, Patanjali, in his immediate action of speaking, means the Yoga-Sastra as his primary object, while he intends the Yoga itself in his ultimate action of "denotation." In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is that the commencing the Yogasastra is that which primarily claims our attention; while the "yoga," or the restraint of the modifications of the mind, is what is to be expounded in this Sastra. "But as we read in the lists of roots that the root _yuj_ is used in the sense of 'joining,' should not the word _yoga_, its derivative, mean 'conjunction,' and not 'restraint'? And indeed this has been said by Yajnavalkya:[381]--

'The conjunction of the individual and the supreme souls is called _yoga_.'"

This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility of any such action,[382] &c., in either as would produce this conjunction of the two souls. [Nor, again, is such an explanation needed in order to remove the opposition of other philosophical schools]; for the notion of the conjunction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines of the Vaiseshika and Nyaya schools [and therefore they would still oppose our theory]. And even if we accepted the explanation in accordance with the Mima?sa [or Vedanta], our Yogasastra would be rendered nugatory by this concession [and the very ground cut from under our feet]; because the ident.i.ty of the individual and supreme souls being in that school something already accomplished, it could not be regarded as something to be produced by our Sastra. And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are used in many different senses, the root _yuj_ may very well be used here in the sense of "contemplation."[383] Thus it has been said--

"Particles, prepositions, and roots--these three are all held to be of manifold meaning; instances found in reading are their evidence."

Therefore some authors expressly give _yuj_ in this sense, and insert in their lists "_yuj_ in the sense of _samadhi_." Nor does this contradict Yajnavalkya's declaration, as the word _yoga_, used by him, may bear this meaning; and he has himself said--

"_Samadhi_ is the state of ident.i.ty of the individual and supreme souls; this abiding absolutely in Brahman is the _samadhi_ of the individual soul."

It has been also said by the venerable Vyasa [in his Commentary on the Yoga-sutras, i. 1], "_Yoga is samadhi_."

An objection however, may be here raised that "the term _samadhi_ is used by Patanjali [in ii. 29] in the sense of one of the eight ancillary parts[384] of the eightfold concentration (or _yoga_); and the whole cannot be thus itself a part as well as a whole, since the princ.i.p.al and the ancillary must be completely different from each other, as all their attendant circ.u.mstances must be different, just as we see in the _darsapur?amasa_ sacrifices and their ancillary rites the _prayajas_, and therefore _samadhi_ cannot be the meaning of _yoga_." We however reply that this objection is incorrect; for although the term _samadhi_ is used for etymological reasons[385] to express the ancillary part which is really defined [in iii. 3] as "the contemplation which a.s.sumes the form of the object, and is apparently devoid of any nature of its own;" still the further use of this term to describe the princ.i.p.al state is justified by the author's wish to declare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as the inferior ultimately merges into the superior]. Nor can you hold that etymology alone can decide where a word can be used; because if so, as the word _go_, "a bull," is derived by all grammarians from the root _gam_, "to go," we ought never to use the phrase "a standing bull" [as the two words would be contradictory], and the man Devadatta, when going, would properly be called _go_, "a bull;" and, moreover, the Sutra, i.

2, distinctly gives us a definite justification for employing the word in this sense when it declares that "concentration (_yoga_) is the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle." [The second or princ.i.p.al sense of _samadhi_ will therefore be quite distinct from the first or inferior.]

"But surely if _yoga_ is held to be the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of knowledge, their suppression, or in other words their 'destruction,' would also abide in the soul, since it is a principle in logic that the antecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as the counter-ent.i.ty to these negations;[386] and consequently in accordance with the maxim, 'This newly produced character will affect the subject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the soul itself would be destroyed." This, however, we do not allow; because we maintain that these various modifications which are to be hindered,[387] such as "right notion," "misconception," "fancy,"

"sleep," and "memory" (i. 6), are attributes of the internal organ (_chitta_), since the power of pure intelligence, which is unchangeable, cannot become the site of this discriminative perception. Nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul[388] has not been proved, since there is an argument to establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from the fact that it always knows, while that which is not always knowing is not unchangeable, as the internal organ, &c. And so again, if this soul were susceptible of change, then, as this change would be occasional, we could not predicate its always knowing these modifications. But the true view is, that while the intelligent soul always remains as the presiding witness, there is another essentially pure substance[389] which abides always the same; and as it is this which is affected by any given object, so it is this perceptible substance which is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces an impression;[390] and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own proper independence, and it is maintained to be the always knowing, and no suspicion of change alights upon it. That object by which the understanding becomes affected is known; that object by which it is not affected is not known; for the understanding is called "susceptible of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is susceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of influence of the object which resembles the magnet,--this influence or want of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of knowledge. "But inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which spring from egoism are all-pervading, are they not always connected with all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should be a knowledge everywhere and always of all things?" We reply that even although we grant that they are all-pervading, it is only where a given understanding has certain modifications in a given body, and certain objects are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge of these objects only, and none other, is produced to that understanding; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute, we hold that objects are just like magnets, and affect the understanding just as these do iron,--coming in contact with it through the channels of the senses. Therefore, the "modifications" belong to the understanding, not to the soul; and so says the Sruti, "Desire, volition, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of firmness,--all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage Panchasikha declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul, "The power that enjoys is unchangeable;" and so Patanjali also (iv. 18), "The modifications of the understanding are always known,--this arises from the unchangeableness of the Ruling Soul." The following is the argument drawn out formally to establish the changeableness of the understanding. The understanding is susceptible of change because its various objects are now known and now not known, just like the organ of hearing and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is notoriously threefold, _i.e._, a change of "property," of "aspect,"[391] and of "condition." When the subject, the understanding, perceives the colour "blue," &c., there is a change of "property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a bracelet, a diadem, or an armlet; there is a change of "aspect" when the property becomes present, past, or future; and there is a change of "condition"

when there is a manifestation or non-manifestation[392] of the perception, as of blue, &c.; or, in the case of gold, the [relative]

newness or oldness [at two different moments] would be its change of condition. These three kinds of change must be traced out by the reader for himself in different other cases. And thus we conclude that there is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that, since "right notion"

and the other modifications are attributes of the understanding, their "suppression" will also have its site in the same organ.

[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have said above.] "But if we accept your definition that '_yoga_ is the suppression of the modifications of the _chitta_,' this will apply also to 'sound sleep,' since there too we may find the suppression [or suspension] of the modifications found in _kshipta_, _vikshipta_, _mu?ha_,[393] &c.; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible for the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states called _kshipta_, &c., remain at all, and because they only hinder the attainment of the _summum bonum_. Let us examine this more closely.

For the understanding is called _kshipta_, 'restless,' when it is restless [with an excess of the quality _rajas_], as being tossed about amidst various objects which engage it. It is called _mu?ha_, 'blinded,' when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is sunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the quality _tamas_].

It is called _vikshipta_, 'unrestless,' when it is different from the first state[394] [as filled with the quality _sattva_]." We must here, however, note a distinction; for, in accordance with the line of the Bhagavad Gita (vi. 34), 'The mind, O K?ish?a, is fickle, turbulent, violent, and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects; but restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced in it by sickness, &c., or other consequences of former actions; as it is said [in the Yoga Sutras, i. 30], 'Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness, laziness, addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure to attain some stage, and instability,--these distractions of the mind are called "obstacles".' Here 'sickness' means fever, &c., caused by the want of equilibrium between the three humours; 'languor' is the mind's want of activity; 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces two opposite alternatives; 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the means for producing meditation; 'laziness' is a want of exertion from heaviness of body, speech, or mind; 'addiction to objects' is an attachment to objects of sense; 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken notion of one thing for another; 'failure to attain some stage' is the failing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract meditation; 'instability' is the mind's failure to continue there, even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached. Therefore we maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be laid down as the definition of _yoga_.

We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as regards the three conditions of the mind called _kshipta_, _mu?ha_, and _vikshipta_, which [as being connected with the three qualities] are all to be avoided as faulty states, the suppression of the modifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided [and so cannot be called _yoga_], this does not apply to the other two conditions called _ekagra_ and _niruddha_, which are to be pursued and attained; and therefore the suppression of the modifications in these two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered as _yoga_. Now by _ekagra_ we mean that state when the mind, entirely filled with the _sattva_ quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and by _niruddha_ we mean that state when all its developments are stopped, and only their latent impressions [or potentialities] remain.

Now this _samadhi_, "meditation" [in the highest sense], is twofold: "that in which there is distinct recognition" (_sa?prajnata_), and "that in which distinct recognition is lost" (_asa?prajnata_) [Yoga S., i. 17, 18].[395] The former is defined as that meditation where the thought is intent on its own object, and all the "modifications," such as "right notion," &c., so far as they depend on external things, are suppressed, or, according to the etymology of the term, it is where the intellect[396]

is thoroughly recognised (_samyak prajnayate_) as distinct from Nature. It has a fourfold division, as _savitarka_, _savichara_, _sananda_, and _sasmita_. Now this "meditation" is a kind of "pondering" (_bhavana_), which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is thus to be pondered is of two kinds, being either iswara or the twenty-five principles. And these principles also are of two kinds--senseless and not senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect, egoism, &c., are senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul. Now among these objects which are to be pondered, when, having taken as the object the gross elements, as earth, &c., pondering is pursued in the form of an investigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent,[397] or in the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the idea which is to be produced [cf. i. 42]; then the meditation is called "argumentative"

(_savitarka_). When, having taken as its object something subtile, as the five subtile elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in relation to s.p.a.ce, time, &c., then the meditation is called "deliberative"

(_savichara_). When the mind, commingled with some "pa.s.sion" and "darkness," is pondered, then the meditation is called "beatific"

(_sananda_), because "goodness" is then predominant, which consists in the manifestation of joy.[398] When pondering is pursued, having as its object the pure element of "goodness," unaffected by even a little of "pa.s.sion"

or "darkness," then that meditation is called "egoistical" (_sasmita_), because here personal existence[399] only remains, since the intellectual faculty becomes now predominant, and the quality of "goodness" has become quite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to higher things].

But the "meditation, where distinct recognition is lost," consists in the suppression of all "modifications" whatever.

"But" [it may be asked] "was not 'concentration' defined as the suppression of all the modifications? How, then, can the 'meditation where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all, since we still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the quality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality of goodness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable, because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the "modifications" of the thinking power, as especially stopping the operation of the "afflictions," the "actions," the "fructifications,"

and the "stock of deserts."[400]

The "afflictions" (_klesa_) are well known as five, viz., ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. But here a question is at once raised, In what sense is the word _avidya_, "ignorance," used here? Is it to be considered as an _avyayibhava_ compound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word "above-board"?[401] or is it a _tatpurusha_ [or _karmadharaya_]

compound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word "town-clerk"? or is it a _bahuvrihi_ compound, where both portions are dependent on something external to the compound, as "blue-eyed"? It cannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound were predominant, then we should have the negation the emphatic part in _avidya_ (_i.e._, it would be an instance of what is called the express negation, or _prasajya-pratishedha_);[402] and consequently, as _avidya_ would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable to produce positive results, as the "afflictions," &c., and the very form of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the second; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence it may be characterised by (_a_ + _vidya_), opposes the "afflictions," &c., and cannot therefore be their source. Nor can it be the third; for then,--in accordance with the words of the author of the V?itti,[403]

"there is a _bahuvrihi_ compound which is formed with some word meaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with the optional elision of this subsequent word"[404]--we must explain this supposed _bahuvrihi_ compound _avidya_ as follows: "That _buddhi_ is to be characterised as _avidya_ (_sc._ an adjective), of which there is not a _vidya_ existing." But this explanation is untenable; for such an _avidya_ could not become the source of the "afflictions;"[405] and yet, on the other hand, it ought to be their source,[406] even though it were a.s.sociated with the suppression of all the "modifications,"[407] and were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and the quality of goodness [which is found in the _sasmita_ meditation].