Therefore as the Veda is thus proved to have not originated from any personal author, and as the minutest germ of suspicion against it is thus absolutely destroyed, we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated that it has a self-established authority in all matters relating to duty.

"Well"[283] [say our opponents], "let this question rest; but how about another well-known controversy? It is said--

"'The Sa?khyas hold that both authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness are self-proved; the followers of the Nyaya hold that both are proved by something else [as inference, &c.]; the Buddhists hold that the latter is self-proved and the former proved by something else; the teachers of the Veda maintain that authoritativeness is self-proved and non-authoritativeness proved by something else.' Now we ask, amidst all this discussion, how do the Mima?sakas accept as established their tenet that the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved? And what is the meaning of this so-called self-proved authoritativeness? Is it (_a._) that authoritativeness springs from itself? or (_b._) that it springs from the right knowledge in which it resides? or (_c._) that it springs from the instrumental causes [as the eye, &c.] which produced the right knowledge in which it resides? or (_d._) that it resides in a particular knowledge produced by the instrumental causes which produced the right knowledge?[284] or (_e._) that it resides in a particular knowledge produced by the instrumental causes _only_ which produced the right knowledge?

"(_a._) It cannot be the _first_, because wherever the relation of cause and effect is found there must be a difference, and therefore these two cannot reside in the same subject [_i.e._, authoritativeness cannot cause itself]. (_b._) It cannot be the _second_, because if knowledge, which is a quality, were the cause of authoritativeness, it would have to be a substance, as being an intimate cause.[285] (_c._) It cannot be the _third_, because 'authoritativeness' cannot properly be 'produced' at all,[286] whether we call it a general characteristic (_upadhi_) or a species (_jati_);[287] for if we call it an _upadhi_, it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any contradiction to a certain kind of knowledge which does not possess the nature of recollection;[288] and this cannot be produced, for we all allow that absolute non-existence is eternal; and still less can we speak of its being produced, if we regard it as a species. (_d._) Nor can it be the _fourth_, for wrong knowledge [as well as right knowledge] is a particular kind of knowledge, and the instrumental causes which produce the general are included in those which produce the particular,[289] just as the general idea 'seed,' as applied to 'tree,' is included in the particular seed of any special tree, as, _e.g._, the Dalbergia Sisu; otherwise we might suppose that the particular had no instrumental cause at all. Your definition would therefore extend too far [and include erroneous as well as true knowledge]; for non-authoritativeness, which Vedantists and most Mima?sakas allow to be produced by something external, must also be considered as residing in a particular knowledge [_i.e._, a wrong knowledge] produced [in part] by the instrumental causes which produced the right knowledge. (_e._) As for your _fifth_ view, we ask whether by being produced by the instrumental causes _only_ which produced right knowledge, you mean to include or exclude the absence of a 'defect'? It cannot be the former alternative; because the followers of the Nyaya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by something external [as inference, &c.], would at once grant that authoritativeness is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge combined with the absence of a 'defect.' Neither can it be the latter alternative; for, inasmuch as it is certain that the absence of a 'defect' is found combined with the various instrumental causes, this absence of a 'defect' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of right knowledge, since right knowledge will always accompany its presence, and be absent if it is absent,[290] and it will at the same time be not an unimportant condition.[291] If you object that non-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you whether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its "emergent non-existence" or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an effect, then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope binds you at both ends. This has also been said by Udayana [in his Kusumanjali, i. 10]--

"'As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause as well as an effect.'

"The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows:--Right knowledge depends on some cause[292] other than the common causes of knowledge, from the very fact that, while it is an effect, it is also knowledge, just as wrong knowledge does.[293] Authoritativeness is known through something external to itself [_e.g._, inference], because doubt arises in regard to it in an unfamiliar case, as we also see in non-authoritativeness.

"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is both produced and recognised by means of something external, the Mima?sa tenet that 'authoritativeness is self-proved' is like a gourd overripe and rotten."

This long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a vain attempt to strike the sky with his fist; for (_a._) we mean by our phrase "self-proved" that while right knowledge is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge, it is not produced by any other cause (as "defect," &c.) The following is our argument as drawn out in full:--Right knowledge is not produced by any other instrumental causes than those of knowledge, while, at the same time, it is produced by these, because it is not the site of wrongness of knowledge,--just like a jar.[294] Nor can Udayana's[295] argument be brought forward as establishing the dependence of authoritativeness on something external, for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the equally potent contradictory argument. "Right knowledge is not produced by any cause which is other than the causes of knowledge and is also other than 'defect,'[296] from the very fact of its being knowledge--like wrong knowledge." Again, since right knowledge can arise from the causes of knowledge _per se_, it would be a needless complexity to suppose that anything else is a cause, whether you call it a _gu?a_ or the absence of a "defect" (_dosha_).[297]

"But surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of wrong knowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence must be a cause of right knowledge?" We meet this, however, by maintaining that the absence of defect is only an indirect and remote cause, as it only acts negatively by preventing wrong knowledge. As it has been said--

"Therefore we reasonably conclude from the presence of _gu?as_ the absence of 'defects,'[298] from their absence the non-existence of the two kinds of non-authoritativeness,[299] and from this the general conclusion."[300]

(_b._) We maintain that the recognition of right knowledge is produced by the same causes only which make us perceive the first knowledge[301] [_sc._ the eye, mind, &c.] Nor can you object that this view is precluded, because it would imply that there could be no such thing as doubt; for we answer that doubt arises in cases where, although all the causes which produce knowledge are present, there is also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause, as a "defect,"

&c.

As for your argument [O Naiyayika! given _supra_, in p. 198, lines 17-24], I ask, Is your own argument an authoritative proof by itself or not? If it is, it proves too much [for it would properly apply to itself and lead us to infer its own dependence on external proof, whereas you hold it to be independent of such]; and if it is not, we should have a case of _regressus in infinitum_, for it will want some other proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its turn will want some fresh proof, and so on for ever.

As for the argument urged by Udayana[302] in the Kusumanjali, when he tries to establish that immediate and vehement action does not depend on the agent's certainty as to the authoritativeness of the speech which sets him acting: "Action depends on wish, its vehemence on that of the wish,[303] wish on the knowledge that the thing wished for is a means to attain some wished-for end, and this is only ascertained by an inference based on some 'sign' which proves that the thing is closely connected with the wished-for end, and this inference depends on the things being in direct contact with the agent's senses; but throughout the whole series of antecedent steps the Mima?sa idea of the perception of authoritativeness is never once found as a cause of action." All this appears to us simple bl.u.s.ter, like that of the thief who ostentatiously throws open all his limbs before me, when I had actually found the gold under his armpit. It is only the knowledge that the thing is a means to attain the desired end, and this knowledge recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which causes the definite volition to arise at all; and in this we can distinctly trace the influence of that very perception of authoritativeness [whose existence he so vehemently pretended to deny]. If unhesitating action ever arose in any case from doubt, then, as it might always arise so in every given case, all ascertainment of authoritativeness would be useless; and as the very existence of what is unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor authoritativeness would have to be considered as dead and buried! But enough of this prolix controversy; since it has been said--

"Therefore the authoritativeness of a cognition, which (authoritativeness) presented itself as representing a real fact, may be overthrown by the perception of a 'defect,'

which perception is produced by some sign that proves the discrepancy between the cognition and the fact."[304]

Now with regard to the Veda, which is the self-proved and authoritative criterion in regard to duty, [we have the following divergency between the two great Mima?sa schools]:--The Veda is composed of three portions, respectively called "hymns" (_mantra_), "explanatory pa.s.sages" (_arthavada_), and "injunctions" (_vidhi_); and by "injunction" we mean such sentences as "Let him who desires heaven sacrifice with the jyotish?oma." Here _ta_, the affix of the third person singular, denotes an enjoining power, which is "coloured" [or rendered definite] by the meaning of the root, according to the opinion of the followers of Bha??a k.u.marila, who maintain that words signify[305] something definite by themselves [apart from the sentence]. The followers of Guru Prabhakara, on the contrary, hold that the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice, as they maintain that words only signify an action or something to be done.[306] Thus all has been made plain.

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 247: Madhava here calls it the _prachi Mima?sa_.]

[Footnote 248: Cf. _J. Nyayamalavist_, pp. 5-9.]

[Footnote 249: Thus it is said that he who desires to be a family priest should offer a black-necked animal to Agni, a parti-coloured one to Soma, and a black-necked one to Agni. Should this be a case for _tantra_ or not? By _tantra_ one offering to Agni would do for both; but as the offering to Soma comes between, they cannot be united, and thus it must be a case of _avapa_, _i.e._, offering the two separately (_J. Nyayamala_, xi. 1, 13).]

[Footnote 250: In p. 123, line 4, I read _vilaksha?a-d?ish?aphala_.]

[Footnote 251: In the former case it would be a _vidhi_, in the latter a _niyama_. Cf. the lines _vidhir atyantam aprapto niyama? pakshike sati, tatra chanyatra cha praptau parisa?khya vidhiyate_.]

[Footnote 252: The Mima?sa holds that the potential and similar affixes, which const.i.tute a _vidhi_, have a twofold power; by the one they express an active volition of the agent, corresponding to the root-meaning (_artha-bhavana_); by the other an enforcing power in the word (_sabda-bhavana_). Thus in _svargakamo yajeta_, the _eta_ implies "let him produce heaven by means of certain acts which together make up a sacrifice possessing a certain mystic influence;" next it implies an enforcing power residing in itself (as it is the word of the self-existent Veda and not of G.o.d) which sets the hearer upon this course of action.]

[Footnote 253: These four "fruits of action" are obscure, and I do not remember to have seen them alluded to elsewhere. I was told in India that they were a thing's coming into being, growing, declining, and perishing. If so, they are the second, third, fifth, and sixth of the six _vikaras_ mentioned in Sa?kara's Vajrasuchi, 2, _i.e._, _asti_, _jayate_, _vardhate_, _vipari?amate_, _apakshiyate_, _nasyati_. I do not see how there could be any reference to the four kinds of _apurva_, sc. _phala_, _samudaya_, _utpatti_, and _a?ga_, described in Nyaya M. V. ii. 1, 2.]

[Footnote 254: The _nigamas_ are the Vedic quotations in Yaska's _nirukta_.]

[Footnote 255: See Nyaya-mala-vistara, i. 4, 19.]

[Footnote 256: The exact number is 915.]

[Footnote 257: This is to explain the last of the five members, the _sa?gati_.]

[Footnote 258: Cf. Asvalayana's G?ihya Sutras, i. 19, 1.]

[Footnote 259: The _anuvada_, of course, implies a previous _vidhi_, which it thus repeats and supplements, and so carries with it an equal authority. The _anuvada_ in the present case is the pa.s.sage which mentions that the Veda is to be read, as it enforces the previous _vidhi_ as to teaching.]

[Footnote 260: I read in p. 127, line 12, _anava-gamyamanasya_, and so the recension given in the Nyaya M. V. p. 14, _na budhyamanasya_.]

[Footnote 261: In the next two or three pages I have frequently borrowed from Dr. Muir's translation in his _Sanskrit Texts_, vol.

iii. p. 88.]

[Footnote 262: The soul may be traced back through successive transmigrations, but you never get back to its beginning.]

[Footnote 263: Madhava means that the author of this stanza, though unknown to many people, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his contemporaries, no doubt, knew who wrote it, and his descendants might perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the origin, but which, nevertheless, had a human author. The stanza in question is quoted in full in Bohtlingk's Indische Spruche, No. 5598, from the MS. anthology called the _Subhas.h.i.tar?ava_. For _muktaka_, see _Sah. Darp._, -- 558.]

[Footnote 264: The eternity of the Veda depends on this tenet of the Mima?sa that sound is eternal.]

[Footnote 265: Eternal things (as the atoms of earth, fire, water, and air, minds, time, s.p.a.ce, ether, and soul) have _visesha_, not _samanya_ or genus, and they are all imperceptible to the senses.

Genera are themselves eternal (though the individuals in which they reside are not), but they have not themselves genus. Both these arguments belong rather to the Nyaya-vaiseshika school than to the Nyaya.]

[Footnote 266: The Mima?saka allows that the _uchchara?a_ or utterance is non-eternal.]

[Footnote 267: The inference will be as follows: "The Vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, with a view to their manifestation, from the very fact of their having the nature of sentences, just like the compositions of Manu, &c."]

[Footnote 268: The argument will now run, "The Vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they possess authority, they still have the nature of sentences, like the composition of Manu, &c."]

[Footnote 269: In a.s.suming a material body, he would be subject to material limitations.]

[Footnote 270: The Jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman developments (_atisaya?_) in their saints.]

[Footnote 271: Jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air "manifest" the always existing sound.]

[Footnote 272: "What is meant by 'noise' (_nada_) is these 'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions,' occasioned by the vibrations of the air."--_Ballantyne_, _Mima?sa Aphorisms_, i. 17.]

[Footnote 273: The Nyaya holds that colour and sound are respectively special qualities of the elements light and ether; and as the organs of seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether, each will, of course, have its corresponding special quality.]

[Footnote 274: In p. 131, line 7, I read _pratyakshasiddhe?_.]

[Footnote 275: Cf. my note pp. 7, 8, (on the Charvaka-darsana) for the _upadhi_. The _upadhi_ or "condition" limits a too general middle term; it is defined as "that which always accompanies the major term, but does not always accompany the middle." Thus if the condition "produced from wet fuel" is added to "fire," the argument "the mountain has smoke because it has fire" is no longer a false one.

Here, in answer to the Nyaya argument in the text, our author objects that its middle term ("from the fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of sense") is too wide, _i.e._, it is sometimes found where the major term "non-eternal" is not found, as, _e.g._, in _sound_ itself, according to the Mima?sa doctrine. To obviate this he proposes to add the "condition," "not causing audition," as he will readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which, _while not causing audition_, are special qualities belonging to an organ of sense, as, _e.g._, colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition would make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the Purva Mima?sa and the Nyaya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of sound, as their points of view are so totally different.]

[Footnote 276: In the former case we have the _dhwa?sa_ of sound, in the latter its _pragabhava_.]

[Footnote 277: In p. 131, line 12, I read _samapauhi_ for _samapohi_, _i.e._, the pa.s.sive aorist of _sam_ + _apa_ + _uh_.]