"Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition on account of the [supposed] non-invariable concomitance of the major term."

If you maintain that there are many sound counter-arguments, such as "If the Supreme Being were a maker, He would be possessed of a body,"

&c., we reply, that all such reasoning is equally inconsistent, whether we allow that Supreme Being's existence to be established or not.[241]

As has been said by Udayana acharya [in the Kusumanjali, iii. 5]--

"If Sruti, &c., have any authority, your negative argument fails from being precluded; if they are fallacious, our old objection of a 'baseless inference' returns stronger than ever."

Nor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction to our argument, since it would be overthrown by either alternative of G.o.d's being known or unknown.[242]

"Well, let all this be granted; but the activity of G.o.d in creating the world, what end did it have in view? His own advantage or some other being's? If it was for the former end, was it in order to attain something desired, or to avoid something not desired? It could not be the first, because this would be quite incongruous in a being who possesses every possible desire gratified; and for the same reason too it could not be the second. If it was for the latter end [the advantage of another] it would be equally incongruous; for who would call that being "wise" who busied himself in acting for another? If you replied that His activity was justified by compa.s.sion, any one would at once retort that this feeling of compa.s.sion should have rather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and not checkered with misery, since this militates against His compa.s.sion; for we define compa.s.sion as the disinterested wish to avoid causing another pain. Hence we conclude that it is not befitting for G.o.d to create the world." This has been said by Bha??acharya--

"Not even a fool acts without some object in view;

"Suppose that G.o.d did not create the world, what end would be left undone by Him?"--

We reply, O thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be pleased for a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes, and to consider the following suggestions. His action in creation is indeed solely caused by compa.s.sion; but the idea of a creation which shall consist only of happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be created. Nor need you object that this would interfere with G.o.d's own independence [as He would thus seem to depend on others' actions], since there is the well-known saying, "One's own body does not hinder one;" nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims;[243] and for this there is authority in such pa.s.sages of the Veda as that (in the Svetasvatara Upanishad, iii. 2), "There is one Rudra only; he admits[244] not of a second," &c. "But then how will you remedy your deadly sickness of reasoning in a circle? [for you have to prove the Veda by the authority of G.o.d, and then again you have to prove G.o.d's existence by the Veda"]. We reply, that we defy you to point out any reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do you suspect this "reciprocal dependence of each," which you call "reasoning in a circle," in regard to their being produced or in regard to their being known?[245] It cannot be the former, for though the production of the Veda is dependent on G.o.d, still as G.o.d Himself is eternal, there is no possibility of _His_ being produced; nor can it be in regard to their being known, for even if our knowledge of G.o.d were dependent on the Veda, the Veda might be learned from some other source; nor, again, can it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda, for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any _yogin_ endowed with the transcendent faculties (_tivra_,[246] &c.)

Therefore, when G.o.d has been rendered propitious by the performance of duties which produce His favour, the desired end, Liberation, is obtained; thus everything is clear.

E. B. C.

NOTE ON PAGES 172, 173.

We have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or _hetvabhasas_ of the modern Hindu logic (cf. _Siddhantamukt._, -- 71, _Tarkasa?gr._, 55-67), viz., _anaikanta_, _viruddha_, _asiddha_, _kalatyayopadish?a_ or _badhita_, and _pratipaks.h.i.ta_ or _sat-pratipaksha_. The four first of these generally correspond to the _savyabhichara_ or "erratic,"

_viruddha_ or "contradictory," _sadhyasama_ or "unproved," and _at.i.takala_ or "mistimed," _i.e._, "precluded," as given in the list of fallacies of the older logic in p. 164; but _pratipaks.h.i.ta_ corresponds imperfectly to _prakara?asama_. The _prakara?asama_ or "uncertain" reason is properly that reason which is equally available for both sides, as, _e.g._, the argument, "Sound is eternal because it is audible," which could be met by the equally plausible argument, "Sound is non-eternal because it is audible;" or, according to other authorities, it is that reason which itself raises the same difficulties as the original question, as, _e.g._, "sound is non-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it;" here this alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old question, "Is sound eternal?" But the _pratipaks.h.i.ta_ reason is one which is counter-balanced by an equally valid reason, as "Sound is eternal because it is audible," and "Sound is non-eternal because it is a product."

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 205: Cf. Nyaya Sutras, i. 29.]

[Footnote 206: In p. 112, line 16, of the Calcutta edition, I read _doshanimitta-tattva_ for _doshanimittakatva_ (compare Nyaya Sut. iv.

68).]

[Footnote 207: Without this last clause the definition might include the objects (_vishaya_), as these are, of course, connected with right knowledge.]

[Footnote 208: isvara is a cause of right knowledge (_prama?a_) according to the definition, because he is _pramaya asraya?_.]

[Footnote 209: On this compare Siddhanta-Muktavali, p. 115.]

[Footnote 210: On these compare my note to Colebrooke's Essays, vol.

i. p. 315.]

[Footnote 211: "Our coming to the conclusion that there can be no smoke in the hill if there be no fire, while we _see_ the smoke, is the confutation of there being no fire in the hill" (_Ballantyne_).

Or, in other words, "the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke (_vyapaka_) if it has the absence-of-fire (the false _vyapya_").]

[Footnote 212: Action (_prav?itti_) follows after the ascertainment of the truth by _nyaya_.]

[Footnote 213: Cp. Vatsyayana's Comment., p. 6. The Calcutta edition reads _prakirt.i.ta_ for _pariks.h.i.ta_.]

[Footnote 214: The printed text omits the third fault, "a stupid indifference, _moha_," which is however referred to presently.]

[Footnote 215: In p. 116, line 3, I would read _tannirvartakam_ for _tannivartakam_.]

[Footnote 216: This refers to the couplet so often quoted in Hindu authors, "Logic, the three Vedas, trade and agriculture, and the eternal doctrine of polity,--these four sciences are the causes of the stability of the world" (cf. Manu, vii. 43). It occurs in Kamandaki's _Nitisara_, ii. 2, and seems to be referred to in Vatsyayana's Com. p.

3, from which Madhava is here borrowing.]

[Footnote 217: Compare the English proverb, "As soon as the cat can lick her ear."]

[Footnote 218: Literally the "bell-road," _i.e._, "the chief road through a village, or that by which elephants, &c., decorated with tinkling ornaments, proceed."--_Wilson's Dict._]

[Footnote 219: The cognition is produced in the first moment, remains during the second, and ceases in the third.]

[Footnote 220: See Nyaya Sut. i. 2.]

[Footnote 221: As otherwise why should we require liberation at all?

Or rather the author probably a.s.sumes that other Naiyayikas have sufficiently established this point against its opponents, cf. p. 167, line 11.]

[Footnote 222: See _supra_, pp. 24-32.]

[Footnote 223: All is momentary, all is pain, all is _sui generis_, all is unreal.]

[Footnote 224: In the form of the various _klesas_ or "afflictions."]

[Footnote 225: _avara?a_, cf. pp. 55, 58.]

[Footnote 226: But the Nyaya holds that the attributes of the soul, as happiness, desire, aversion, &c., are perceived by the internal sense, mind (Bhasha P. -- 83).]

[Footnote 227: The reading _murtapratibandhat_ is difficult, but I believe that _pratibandha_ means here _vyapti_, as it does in Sankhya Sutras, i. 100.]

[Footnote 228: The true _summum bonum_ must be _niratisaya_,--incapable of being added to.]

[Footnote 229: _Yogyanupalabdhi_ is when an object is not seen, and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, as the eye, light, &c.]

[Footnote 230: Alluding to the Vedic phrase, "_gravana? plavanti_,"

see Uttara Naishadha, xvii. 37. The phrase _asmana? plavanti_ occurs in Sha?v. Br. 5, 12.]

[Footnote 231: Or perhaps "capable of being surpa.s.sed."]

[Footnote 232: Since the Supreme Being is a single instance.]

[Footnote 233: Since the Veda, if non-eternal, must [to be authoritative] have been created by G.o.d, and yet it is brought forward to reveal the existence of G.o.d.]

[Footnote 234: The Nyaya holds presumption to be included under inference, and comparison is declared to be the ascertaining the relation of a name to the thing named.]

[Footnote 235: Since ether is connected by contact with the parts of everything, as _e.g._, a jar.]