"The difference being independence and completeness (in the Supreme Spirit), and smallness and dependence (in the individual spirit)."

Or to propose another explanation of the text, _atma tat tvam asi_, That art thou, it may be divided, _atma tat tvam asi_. He alone is soul as possessing independence and other attributes, and thou art not-that (_atat_) as wanting those attributes; and thus the doctrine of unity is utterly expelled. Thus it has been said:--

"Or the division may be _Atat tvam_, and thus unity will be well got rid of."

According, therefore, to the Tattva-vada-rahasya, the words in the nine examples (in the Chhandogya Upanishad), He like a bird tied with a string, &c., teach unity with the view of giving an example of non-duality. Accordingly the Mahopanishad:--

"Like a bird and the string; like the juices of various trees;

"Like rivers and the sea; like fresh and salt water;

"Like a robber and the robbed; like a man and his energy;

"So are soul and the Lord diverse, for ever different.

"Nevertheless from subtilty (or imperceptibility) of form, the supreme Hari

"Is not seen by the dim-sighted to be other than the individual spirit, though he is its actuator;

"On knowing their diversity a man is emanc.i.p.ated: otherwise he is bound."

And again--

"Brahma, Siva, and the greatest of the G.o.ds decay with the decay of their bodies;

"Greater than these is Hari, undecaying, because his body is for the sustentation of Lakshmi.

"By reason of all his attributes, independence, power, knowledge, pleasure, and the rest,

"All they, all the deities, are in unlimited obedience to him."

And again:--

"Knowing Vish?u, full of all excellences, the soul, exempted from transmigration,

"Rejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless bliss.

"Vish?u is the refuge of liberated souls, and their supreme ruler.

"Obedient to him are they for ever; he is the Lord."

That by knowledge of one thing there is knowledge of all things may be evinced from its supremacy and causality, not from the falsity of all things. For knowledge of the false cannot be brought about by knowledge of real existence. As we see the current a.s.surance and expression that by knowing or not knowing its chief men a village is known or not known; and as when the father the cause is known, a man knows the son; (so by knowing the supreme and the cause, the inferior and the effect is known). Otherwise (on the doctrine of the Advaita-vadins that the world is false and illusory) the words _one_ and _lump_ in the text, By one lump of clay, fair sir, all that is made of clay is recognised, would be used to no purpose, for the text must be completed by supplying the words, By reason of clay recognised. For the text, Utterance with the voice, modification, name, clay (or other determinate object),--these alone are real, cannot be a.s.sumed to impart the falsity of things made; the reality of these being admitted, for what is meant is, that of which utterance with the voice is a modification, is unmodified, eternal; and a name such as clay, such speech is true. Otherwise it would result that the words _name_ and _alone_ would be otiose. There is no proof anywhere, then, that the world is unreal. Besides (we would ask) is the statement that the world is false itself true or false. If the statement is true, there is a violation of a real non-duality. If the statement is untrue, it follows that the world is true.

Perhaps it may be objected that this dilemma is a kind of fallacious reasoning, like the dilemma: Is transitoriness permanent or transitory? There is a difficulty in either case. As it is said by the author of the Nyaya-nirva?a: The proof of the permanence of the transitory, as being both permanent and transitory, is a paralogism.

And in the Tarkika-raksha--

"When a mode cannot be evinced to be either such and such, or not such and such,

"The denial of a subject characterised by such a mode is called Nitya-sama."

With the implied mention of this same technical expression it is stated in the Prabodha-siddhi: Equality of characteristic modes results from significancy. If it be said, This then is a valid rejoinder, we reply, This is a mere scaring of the uninstructed, for the source of fallacy has not been pointed out. This is twofold, general and particular: of these, the former is self-destructive, and the latter is of three kinds, defect of a requisite element, excess of an element not requisite, and residence in that which is not the subjicible subject. Of these (two forms of the fallacy), the general form is not suspected, no self-pervasion being observed in the dilemma in question (viz., Is the statement that the world is unreal itself true or false? &c.) So likewise the particular; for if a water-jar be said to be non-existent, the affirmation of its non-existence is equally applicable to the water-jar as that of its existence.

If you reply: We accept the unreality (or falsity) of the world, not its non-existence; this reply is about as wise as the procedure of the carter who will lose his head rather than pay a hundred pieces of money, but will at once give five score; for falsity and non-existence are synonymous. We dismiss further prolixity.

The meaning of the first aphorism, viz., Then hence the absolute is to be desired to be known, is as follows:--The word _then_ is allowed to purport auspiciousness, and to designate subsequency to the qualification (of the aspirant). The word _hence_ indicates a reason.

Accordingly it is stated in the Garu?a-pura?a:--

"All the aphorisms begin with the words Then and Hence regularly; what then is the reason of this?

"And what is the sense of those words, O sage? Why are those the most excellent?

"Tell me this, Brahma, that I may know it truly."

Thus addressed by Narada, the most excellent Brahma replied:--

"The word Then is used of subsequency and of competency, and in an auspicious sense,

"And the word Thence is employed to indicate the reason."

It is laid down that we must inst.i.tute inquiries about the absolute, because emanc.i.p.ation is not attained without the grace of Narayana, and his grace is not attained without knowledge. The absolute, about which the inquiry is to be inst.i.tuted, is described in the words (of the second aphorism): From which the genesis, and so forth, of this.

The meaning of the sentence is that the absolute is that from which result emanation, sustentation, and retractation; according to the words of the Skanda-pura?a--

"He is Hari the sole ruler, the spirit from whom are emanation, sustentation, retractation, necessity, knowledge, involution (in illusion), and bondage and liberation;"

and according to such Vedic texts, From which are these. The evidence adducible for this is described (in the third aphorism): Because it has its source from the system. That the absolute should be reached by way of inference is rejected by such texts as, He that knows not the Veda cogitates not that mighty one; Him described in the Upanishads.

Inference, moreover, is not by itself authoritative, as is said in the Kaurma-pura?a--

"Inference, unaccompanied by revelation, in no case

"Can definitely prove a matter, nor can any other form of evidence;

"Whatsoever other form of evidence, companioned by revelation and tradition,

"Acquires the rank of probation, about this there can be no hesitation."

What a Sastra (or system of sacred inst.i.tutes) is, has been stated in the Skanda-pura?a:--

"The Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sama-veda, the Atharva-veda, the Mahabharata, the Pancha-ratra, and the original Ramaya?a, are called Sastras.

"That also which is conformable to these is called Sastra.

"Any aggregate of composition other than this is a heterodoxy."

According, then, to the rule that the sense of the sacred inst.i.tutes is not to be taken from other sources than these, the Monist view, viz., that the purport of the texts of the Veda relates not to the duality learnt from those but to non-duality, is rejected: for as there is no proof of a G.o.d from inference, so there is no proof of the duality between G.o.d and other things from inference. Therefore there can be in these texts no mere explanation of such duality, and the texts must be understood to indicate the duality. Hence it is that it has said:--

"I ever laud Naraya?a, the one being to be known from genuine revelation, who transcends the perishable and the imperishable, without imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences."