"Apparently the President is going to do this to avoid j.a.pan's declining to enter the League of Nations. It is a surrender of the principle of self-determination, a transfer of millions of Chinese from one foreign master to another. This is another of those secret arrangements which have riddled the 'Fourteen Points' and are wrecking a just peace.

"In my opinion it would be better to let j.a.pan stay out of the League than to abandon China and surrender our prestige in the Far East for 'a mess of pottage'--and a mess it is. I fear that it is too late to do anything to save the situation."

Mr. White, General Bliss, and I, at our meeting that morning before the plenary session, and later when we conferred as to what had taken place at the session, were unanimous in our opinions that China's rights should be sustained even if j.a.pan withdrew from the Peace Conference. We were all indignant at the idea of submitting to the j.a.panese demands and agreed that the President should be told of our att.i.tude, because we were unwilling to have it appear that we in any way approved of acceding to j.a.pan's claims or even of compromising them.

General Bliss volunteered to write the President a letter on the subject, a course which Mr. White and I heartily endorsed.

The next morning the General read the following letter to us and with our entire approval sent it to Mr. Wilson:

"_Hotel de Crillon, Paris_

"_April 29, 1919_

"MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

"Last Sat.u.r.day morning you told the American Delegation that you desired suggestions, although not at that moment, in regard to the pending matter of certain conflicting claims between j.a.pan and China centering about the alleged German rights. My princ.i.p.al interest in the matter is with sole reference to the question of the moral right or wrong involved. From this point of view I discussed the matter this morning with Mr. Lansing and Mr. White. They concurred with me and requested me to draft a hasty note to you on the subject.

"Since your conference with us last Sat.u.r.day, I have asked myself three or four Socratic questions the answers to which make me, personally, quite sure on which side the moral right lies.

"_First._ j.a.pan bases certain of her claims on the right acquired by conquest. I asked myself the following questions: Suppose j.a.pan had not succeeded in her efforts to force the capitulation of the Germans at Tsing-Tsau; suppose that the armistice of November 11th had found her still fighting the Germans at that place, just as the armistice found the English still fighting the Germans in South-East Africa. We would then oblige Germany to dispose of her claims in China by a clause in the Treaty of Peace. Would it occur to any one that, as a matter of right, we should force Germany to cede her claims to j.a.pan rather than to China? It seems to me that it would occur to every American that we would then have the opportunity that we have long desired to force Germany to correct, in favor of China, the great wrong which she began to do to the latter in 1898. What moral right has j.a.pan acquired by her conquest of Shantung a.s.sisted by the British? If Great Britain and j.a.pan secured no moral right to sovereignty over various savages inhabiting islands in the Pacific Ocean, but, on the other hand, we held that these peoples shall be governed by mandates under the League of Nations, what moral right has j.a.pan acquired to the suzerainty (which she would undoubtedly eventually have) over 30,000,000 Chinese in the sacred province of Shantung?

"_Second._ j.a.pan must base her claims either on the Convention with China or on the right of conquest, or on both. Let us consider her moral right under either of these points.

"_a)_ If the United States has not before this recognized the validity of the rights claimed by j.a.pan under her Convention with China, what has happened since the Armistice that would justify us in recognizing their validity now?

"_b)_ If Germany had possessed territory, in full sovereignty, on the east coast of Asia, a right to this territory, under international law, could have been obtained by conquest. But Germany possessed no such territory. What then was left for j.a.pan to acquire by conquest?

Apparently nothing but a lease extorted under compulsion from China by Germany. I understand that international lawyers hold that such a lease, or the rights acquired, justly or unjustly, under it, cannot be acquired by conquest.

"_Third._ Suppose Germany says to us, 'We will cede our lease and all rights under it, but we will cede them back to China.' Will we recognize the justice of j.a.pan's claims to such an extent that we will threaten Germany with further war unless she cedes these rights to j.a.pan rather than to China?

"Again, suppose that Germany, in her hopelessness of resistance to our demands, should sign without question a clause ceding these rights to j.a.pan, even though we know that this is so wrong that we would not fight in order to compel Germany to do it, what moral justification would we have in making Germany do this?

"_Fourth._ Stripped of all words that befog the issue, would we not, under the guise of making a treaty with Germany, really be making a treaty with j.a.pan by which we compel one of our Allies (China) to cede against her will these things to j.a.pan? Would not this action be really more unjustifiable than the one which you have refused to be a party to on the Dalmatian Coast? Because, in the latter case, the territory in dispute did not belong to one of the Allies, but to one of the Central Powers; the question in Dalmatia is as to which of two friendly powers we shall give territory taken from an enemy power; in China the question is, shall we take certain claimed rights from one friendly power in order to give them to another friendly power.

"It would seem to be advisable to call particular attention to what the j.a.panese mean when they say that they will return Kiao-chow to China. They _do not_ offer to return the railway, the mines or the port, i.e., Tsingtau. The leased territory included a portion of land on the north-east side of the entrance of the Bay and another on the south-west and some islands. It is a small territory. The 50 Kilometer Zone was not included. That was a _limitation_ put upon the movement of German troops. They could not go beyond the boundary of the zone. Within this zone China enjoyed all rights of sovereignty and administration.

"j.a.pan's proposal to abandon the zone is somewhat of an impertinence, since she has violated it ever since she took possession. She kept troops all along the railway line until recently and insists on maintaining in the future a guard at Tsinan, 254 miles away. The zone would restrict her military movements, consequently she gives it up.

"The proposals she makes are (1) to open the whole bay. It is from 15 to 20 miles from the entrance to the northern sh.o.r.e of the bay. (2) To have a j.a.panese exclusive concession _at a-place_ to be designated by her, i.e., she can take just as much as she likes of the territory around the bay. It may be as large as the present leased territory, but more likely it will include only the best part of Tsingtau. What then does she give up? Nothing but such parts of the leased territory as are of no value.

"The operation then would amount chiefly to an exchange of two pieces of paper--one cancelling the lease for 78 years, the other granting a more valuable concession which would amount to a permanent t.i.tle to the port. Why take two years to go through this operation?

"If it be right for a policeman, who recovers your purse, to keep the contents and claim that he has fulfilled his duty in returning the empty purse, then j.a.pan's conduct may be tolerated.

"If it be right for j.a.pan to annex the territory of an Ally, then it cannot be wrong for Italy to retain Fiume taken from the enemy.

"If we support j.a.pan's claim, we abandon the democracy of China to the domination of the Prussianized militarism of j.a.pan.

"We shall be sowing dragons' teeth.

"It can't be right to do wrong even to make peace. Peace is desirable, but there are things dearer than peace, justice and freedom.

"Sincerely yours

"THE PRESIDENT

"T.H. BLISS"

I have not discussed certain modifications proposed by the j.a.panese delegates, since, as is clear from General Bliss's letter, they amounted to nothing and were merely a pretense of concession and without substantial value.

The day following the delivery of this letter to the President (April 30), by which he was fully advised of the att.i.tude of General Bliss, Mr.

White, and myself in regard to the j.a.panese claims, the Council of Four reached its final decision of the matter, in which necessarily Mr.

Wilson acquiesced. I learned of this decision the same evening. The memorandum which I made the next morning in regard to the matter is as follows:

"China has been abandoned to j.a.panese rapacity. A democratic territory has been given over to an autocratic government. The President has conceded to j.a.pan all that, if not more than, she ever hoped to obtain. This is the information contained in a memorandum handed by Ray Stannard Baker under the President's direction to the Chinese delegation last evening, a copy of which reached me through Mr. ---- [of the Chinese delegation].

"Mr. ---- also said that Mr. Baker stated that the President desired him to say that the President was very sorry that he had not been able to do more for China but that he had been compelled to accede to j.a.pan's demand 'in order _to save the League of Nations._'

"The memorandum was most depressing. Though I had antic.i.p.ated something of the sort three days ago [see note of April 28 previously quoted], I had unconsciously cherished a hope that the President would stand to his guns and champion China's cause. He has failed to do so. It is true that China is given the sh.e.l.l called 'sovereignty,'

but the economic control, the kernel, is turned over to j.a.pan.

"However logical may appear the argument that China's political integrity is preserved and will be maintained under the guaranty of the League of Nations, the fact is that j.a.pan will rule over millions of Chinese. Furthermore it is still a matter of conjecture how valuable the guaranty of the League will prove to be. It has, of course, never been tried, and j.a.pan's representation on the Council will possibly thwart any international action in regard to China.

"Frankly my policy would have been to say to the j.a.panese, 'If you do not give back to China what Germany stole from her, we don't want you in the League of Nations.' If the j.a.panese had taken offense and gone, I would have welcomed it, for we would have been well rid of a government with such imperial designs. But she would not have gone.

She would have submitted. She has attained a high place in world councils. Her astute statesmen would never have abandoned her present exalted position even for the sake of Kiao-Chau. The whole affair a.s.sumes a sordid and sinister character, in which the President, acting undoubtedly with the best of motives, became the cat's-paw.

"I have no doubt that the President fully believed that the League of Nations was in jeopardy and that to save it he was compelled to subordinate every other consideration. The result was that China was offered up as a sacrifice to propitiate the threatening Moloch of j.a.pan. When you get down to facts the threats were nothing but 'bluff.'

"I do not think that anything that has happened here has caused more severe or more outspoken criticism than this affair. I am heartsick over it, because I see how much good-will and regard the President is bound to lose. I can offer no adequate explanation to the critics.

There seems to be none."

It is manifest, from the foregoing recital of events leading up to the decision in regard to the Shantung Question and the apparent reasons for the President's agreement to support the j.a.panese claims, that we radically differed as to the decision which was embodied in Articles 156, 157, and 158 of the Treaty of Versailles (see Appendix VI, p. 318).

I do not think that we held different opinions as to the justice of the Chinese position, though probably the soundness of the legal argument in favor of the extinguishment of the German rights appealed more strongly to me than it did to Mr. Wilson. Our chief differences were, first, that it was more important to insure the acceptance of the Covenant of the League of Nations than to do strict justice to China; second, that the j.a.panese withdrawal from the Conference would prevent the formation of the League; and, third, that j.a.pan would have withdrawn if her claims had been denied. As to these differences our opposite views remained unchanged after the Treaty of Versailles was signed.

When I was summoned before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on August 6, 1919, I told the Committee that, in my opinion, the j.a.panese signatures would have been affixed to the Treaty containing the Covenant even though Shantung had not been delivered over to j.a.pan, and that the only reason that I had yielded was because it was my duty to follow the decision of the President of the United States.

About two weeks later, August 19, the President had a conference at the White House with the same Committee. In answer to questions regarding the Shantung Settlement, Mr. Wilson said concerning my statement that his judgment was different from mine, that in his judgment the signatures could not have been obtained if he had not given Shantung to j.a.pan, and that he had been notified that the j.a.panese delegates had been instructed not to sign the Treaty unless the cession of the German rights in Shantung to j.a.pan was included.

Presumably the opinion which Mr. Wilson held in the summer of 1919 he continues to hold, and for my part my views and feelings remain the same now as they were then, with possibly the difference that the indignation and shame that I felt at the time in being in any way a partic.i.p.ant in robbing China of her just rights have increased rather than lessened.

So intense was the bitterness among the American Commissioners over the flagrant wrong being perpetrated that, when the decision of the Council of Four was known, some of them considered whether or not they ought to resign or give notice that they would not sign the Treaty if the articles concerning Shantung appeared. The presence at Versailles of the German plenipotentiaries, the uncertainty of the return of the Italian delegates then in Rome, and the murmurs of dissatisfaction among the delegates of the lesser nations made the international situation precarious. To have added to the serious conditions and to have possibly precipitated a crisis by openly rebelling against the President was to a.s.sume a responsibility which no Commissioner was willing to take. With the greatest reluctance the American Commissioners submitted to the decision of the Council of Four; and, when the Chinese delegates refused to sign the Treaty after they had been denied the right to sign it with reservations to the Shantung articles, the American Commissioners, who had so strongly opposed the settlement, silently approved their conduct as the only patriotic and statesmanlike course to take. So far as China was concerned the Shantung Question remained open, and the Chinese Government very properly refused, after the Treaty of Versailles was signed, to enter into any negotiations with j.a.pan looking toward its settlement upon the basis of the treaty provisions.

There was one exception to the President's usual practice which is especially noticeable in connection with the Shantung controversy, and that was the greater partic.i.p.ation which he permitted the members of the American Commission in negotiating with both the j.a.panese and the Chinese. It is true he did not disclose his intentions to the Commissioners, but he did express a wish for their advice and he directed me to confer with the j.a.panese and obtain their views. Just why he adopted this course, for him unusual, I do not know unless he felt that so far as the equity of China's claim was concerned we were all in agreement, and if there was to be a departure from strict justice he desired to have his colleagues suggest a way to do so. It is possible, too, that he felt the question was in large measure a legal one, and decided that the illegality of transferring the German rights to j.a.pan could be more successfully presented to the j.a.panese delegates by a lawyer. In any event, in this particular case he adopted a course more in accord with established custom and practice than he did in any other of the many perplexing and difficult problems which he was called upon to solve during the Paris negotiations, excepting of course the subjects submitted to commissions of the Conference. As has been shown, Mr.

Wilson did not follow the advice of the three Commissioners given him in General Bliss's letter, but that does not detract from the noteworthiness of the fact that in the case of Shantung he sought advice from his Commissioners.

This ends the account of the Shantung Settlement and the negotiations which led up to it. The consequences were those which were bound to follow so indefensible a decision as the one that was reached. Public opinion in the United States was almost unanimous in condemning it and in denouncing those responsible for so evident a departure from legal justice and the principles of international morality. No plea of expediency or of necessity excused such a flagrant denial of undoubted right. The popular recognition that a great wrong had been done to a nation weak because of political discord and an insufficient military establishment, in order to win favor with a nation strong because of its military power and national unity, had much to do with increasing the hostility to the Treaty and preventing its acceptance by the Senate of the United States. The whole affair furnishes another example of the results of secret diplomacy, for the arguments which prevailed with the President were those to which he listened when he sat in secret council with M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George.