A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR YATES.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, February 3, 1864.

GOVERNOR YATES, Springfield, Ill.:

The United States Government lot in Springfield can be used for a soldiers' home, with the understanding that the Government does not incur any expense in the case.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR MURPHY.

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1864.

GOVERNOR J. MURPHY:

My order to General Steele about an election was made in ignorance of the action your convention had taken or would take. A subsequent letter directs General Steele to aid you on your own plan, and not to thwart or hinder you. Show this to him.

A. LINCOLN.

THE STORY OF THE EMANc.i.p.aTION PROCLAMATION

TOLD BY THE PRESIDENT, TO THE ARTIST F. B. CARPENTER,

FEBRUARY 6, 1864.

"It had got to be," said Mr. Lincoln, "midsummer, 1862. Things had gone on from bad to worse, until I felt that we had reached the end of our rope on the plan of operations we had been pursuing; that we had about played our last card, and must change our tactics, or lose the game. I now determined upon the adoption of the emanc.i.p.ation policy; and without consultation with, or the knowledge of, the Cabinet, I prepared the original draft of the proclamation, and, after much anxious thought, called a Cabinet meeting upon the subject. This was the last of July or the first part of the month of August, 1862. [The exact date was July 22, 1862.]... All were present excepting Mr. Blair, the Postmaster-General, who was absent at the opening of the discussion, but came in subsequently. I said to the Cabinet that I had resolved upon this step, and had not called them together to ask their advice, but to lay the subject-matter of a proclamation before them, suggestions as to which would be in order after they had heard it read. Mr. Lovejoy was in error when he informed you that it excited no comment excepting on the part of Secretary Seward. Various suggestions were offered. Secretary Chase wished the language stronger in reference to the arming of the blacks.

"Mr. Blair, after he came in, deprecated the policy on the ground that it would cost the administration the fall elections. Nothing, however, was offered that I had not already fully antic.i.p.ated and settled in my mind, until Secretary Seward spoke. He said in substance, 'Mr. President, I approve of the proclamation, but I question the expediency of its issue at this juncture. The depression of the public mind, consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that I fear the effect of so important a step. It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government, a cry for help; the government stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the government.' His idea," said the President, "was that it would be considered our last shriek on the retreat." [This was his precise expression.] 'Now,'

continued Mr. Seward, 'while I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, that you postpone its issue until you can give it to the country supported by military success, instead of issuing it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest disasters of the war.' Mr. Lincoln continued "The wisdom of the view of the Secretary of State struck me with very great force. It was an aspect of the case that, in all my thought upon the subject, I had entirely overlooked. The result was that I put the draft of the proclamation aside, as you do your sketch for a picture, waiting for a victory.

"From time to time I added or changed a line, touching it up here and there, anxiously watching the process of events. Well, the next news we had was of Pope's disaster at Bull Run. Things looked darker than ever.

Finally came the week of the battle of Antietam. I determined to wait no longer. The news came, I think, on Wednesday, that the advantage was on our side. I was then staying at the Soldiers' Home [three miles out of Washington]. Here I finished writing the second draft of the preliminary proclamation; came up on Sat.u.r.day; called the Cabinet together to hear it, and it was published on the following Monday."

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL SEDGWICK.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, February 11, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL SEDGWICK, Army of Potomac:

Unless there be some strong reason to the contrary, please send General Kilpatrick to us here, for two or three days.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO HORACE MAYNARD.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, February 13, 1864.

HON. HORACE MAYNARD, Nashville, Tenn.:

Your letter of [the] second received. Of course Governor Johnson will proceed with reorganization as the exigencies of the case appear to him to require. I do not apprehend he will think it necessary to deviate from my views to any ruinous extent. On one hasty reading I see no such deviation in his program, which you send.

A. LINCOLN.

TO W. M. FISHBACK.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, February 17, 1864.

WILLIAM M. FISHBACK, Little Rock, Arkansas:

When I fixed a plan for an election in Arkansas I did it in ignorance that your convention was doing the same work. Since I learned the latter fact I have been constantly trying to yield my plan to them. I have sent two letters to General Steele, and three or four despatches to you and others, saying that he, General Steele, must be master, but that it will probably be best for him to merely help the convention on its own plan. Some single mind must be master, else there will be no agreement in anything, and General Steele, commanding the military and being on the ground, is the best man to be that master. Even now citizens are telegraphing me to postpone the election to a later day than either that fixed by the convention or by me. This discord must be silenced.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL STEELE.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, February 17, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL STEELE, Little Rock, Arkansas:

The day fixed by the convention for the election is probably the best, but you on the ground, and in consultation with gentlemen there, are to decide. I should have fixed no day for an election, presented no plan for reconstruction, had I known the convention was doing the same things. It is probably best that you merely a.s.sist the convention on their own plan, as to election day and all other matters I have already written and telegraphed this half a dozen times.