The contention of Flood was that the mere repeal of the Act of George I.

was insufficient, and did not prevent its revival at any future period; that it really left the matter where it stood, and that it was therefore necessary to bring in a Bill for declaring the sole and exclusive right of the Irish Parliament to make laws in all cases whatsoever, internal and external, for the kingdom of Ireland. His desire was to trump Grattan's cards, and destroy his popularity, which in the following year he all but succeeded in doing, when a decision of Lord Mansfield in the Court of King's Bench enabled him to raise a cry that the independence of the Irish Courts of Judicature was in danger; and a further Act was forced on the British Government renouncing any claim to legislate and confirming the independence of the Irish Courts of Justice.(143) The contention of Grattan was that the relations between Great Britain and Ireland were to be ascertained from the record of the whole of the recent transactions, which were transactions between two independent nations having a common Sovereign; and this being so, he said it was no more possible for Great Britain to rea.s.sert her legislative supremacy over Ireland than it would be for her to do so over the American colonies, if the pending negotiations resulted, as they evidently were about to do, in a recognition of the independence of those colonies. Grattan, indeed, went so far as to say that the relations between Great Britain and Ireland were in future to be sought in the law of nations and not in the munic.i.p.al legislation of either country, which he said was no longer applicable. But both the Irish leaders agreed that in one way or another the legislative, financial, and judicial links between the two countries were to be severed, however much they differed as to the legal formulas which were to impress and carry out these ideas.(144)

The following propositions can, then, be based on the events of 1782:

(1) That the Irish leaders insisted on the freedom of Ireland from interference by the British Parliament both in internal and external affairs, or, as would now be said, both on Home and Imperial questions.

(2) That the British Ministers were ready to concede the former, and were not ready to yield the latter; but conceded both, owing to the circ.u.mstances of the time, and considered the concession final.

(3) That the British Ministers wished to obtain a contribution from Ireland for Imperial purposes, and the maintenance of a final appeal to an Imperial Court of Judicature.

(4) That the British Ministers do not appear to have proposed the representation of Ireland in the British Legislature.

In substance the plan proposed by Mr. Gladstone in 1886 was the plan which Grattan rejected in 1782. The objection to any such plan is the probability that if Ireland were to be asked, and were even to consent for the moment to make an appreciable contribution to the common expenses of the Empire, without being given through her representatives any share in the Parliamentary control of the funds so voted, and in the discussion of Imperial affairs-if, in other words, she was made a tribute-paying colony, instead of being treated as a member of a Federal system having an undiminished area of taxation for National purposes-a fresh and formidable grievance would arise in a few years, on the ground that taxation without representation was an intolerable thing, and contrary to the first principles of the Const.i.tution. It was with these considerations present to his mind that Mr. b.u.t.t, when leader of the Irish Home Rule Party, in order to get over the difficulty, had proposed that a Federal arrangement should be inst.i.tuted between Great Britain and Ireland-_i.e._, an arrangement under which Great Britain and Ireland should agree to vest certain powers in a purely Irish Legislature and certain others in the Imperial Parliament. The late Mr. Sharman Crawford, who like Mr. b.u.t.t was an Ulsterman and a Protestant, held similar views at an earlier epoch, and put them prominently forward during the period which elapsed between the imprisonment of O'Connell and the collapse of the first Tenant-right movement. With their opinion before us, it may be asked-why was no such plan proposed in 1782 by the English statesmen of the day? The answer is not far to seek.

The eighteenth century knew little or nothing about Federal Government.

The Const.i.tution of the United States, the parent of all the numerous later schemes of Federalism, was still in the limbo of the future; and it would be as idle to blame the Government of 1782 for not entering on a journey into the region of the unknown, especially at a moment of unexampled public difficulty, as it would be to blame the statesmen of the present day for not antic.i.p.ating the political discoveries of the next generation, whatever they may prove to be. It was owing no doubt to the idea of Federal Government being practically unknown to the men of 1782, and to the unwillingness of the English mind to strike out on a new and as yet untrodden path in the art of Government, that in all the discussions of that time there is little or no suggestion of inst.i.tuting a Federal link between Great Britain and Ireland. Some such suggestion was made during the negotiations on the Scotch Union, but it was decisively rejected by England, and only weakly urged by Scotland. The period was, in fact, one when Europe was still under the influence of a set of ideas which worked in an exactly opposite direction to the ideas of nationality and Federalism. The period was indeed drawing to a close; but the whole tendency of history had for two centuries previously been in the direction of large agglomerations of territory and centralization of government, quite irrespective of questions of nationality and race, and that tendency was still potent in 1782. The idea that the advantages of a national Government, extending over a large territory, might be combined with those of a decentralization of authority by a division of jurisdictions, was not one which the statesmen of the day in Europe had begun seriously to consider. Separation they understood, or an incorporate union: the possibility of an intermediate arrangement they ignored.

And yet an experiment in Federal Government is not to be approached with a light heart, and perhaps one thing only can be said about it with any certainty, that whatever success has attended it, wherever in fact it has worked smoothly, it has been when the powers reserved to the Federal or National Government have been those only which were strictly necessary, and in regard to which differences of opinion would presumably not arise amongst the States forming the Union.

It is the more important to bear these considerations in mind, because of the existence of a widely spread but erroneous idea in regard to the United States Const.i.tution, to the effect that the Federal Government has very numerous and extensive powers in internal affairs a.s.sured to it by the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. This Court, it is said, can intervene, under the terms of the Const.i.tution, to arrest the action of the State Governments, and therefore, once given a Federal Court, the success of the Federal experiment is a.s.sured.

But it is necessary to realize that it is only because the powers of the Federal Government are very strictly limited, and that the Federal Court is not overweighted with the a.s.sertion of rights, the exercise of which the public opinion of the States might not support, that its jurisdiction, when a.s.serted, is as a rule respected, while over the State Legislatures as such it has no power at all, by way of injunction or prohibition. Nor have cases been wanting from which the precarious character of its powers, and its occasional lack of any sufficient sanction to enforce its decrees, may be gathered, when it has happened that those decrees have not been in accord with the prevailing opinion of the State within which execution has had to be carried out. In 1812, when a state of war existed with Great Britain, the States of Ma.s.sachusetts and Connecticut refused obedience to the orders of the Federal Government for the concentration of the militias of all the Northern States on the frontier, giving as their reason that the Const.i.tution only empowered the Federal Government to call out the militia in the case of "insurrection or actual invasion," and that neither of these two eventualities had arisen. These doctrines met with general approval in the two States in question, and were endorsed by their Governors, their Legislatures, and their tribunals, nor were the Federal Courts able to enforce obedience to the commands of the Government at Washington. By a strict limitation of the powers of the National Government to what is absolutely necessary in order to secure the existence of the United States as a nation, the framers of the Const.i.tution of 1787 did as much as it was possible to do, in order to render their work permanent; but they were not able, as De Tocqueville pointed out, even before the war of Secession had come to confirm the foresight of his views, altogether to avoid the dangers which are the natural inheritance of all Federal forms of Government.

The possibility, then, of establishing a Federal connection of any kind between Great Britain and Ireland-that is to say, an arrangement under which certain powers would be vested in an Irish Legislature and Executive, and certain others in a Parliament and Executive common to both countries-depends entirely on whether it is believed not only that such a division of power can be successfully made upon paper-a feat which any const.i.tution-monger can accomplish-but also that public opinion in Ireland will not interpose hopeless obstacles to the a.s.sertion of the reserved rights and powers of the Imperial Legislature and Executive.

That under a Federal arrangement there would be any real possibility of frequent interference from London in Irish internal affairs is not probable, even were such interference legal. The attempt could only end in failure. Much has been said about the supremacy of the British or Imperial Parliament; and some of those who have used this expression apparently mean that every Act of the Irish Legislature and Executive is in some way or another to be reviewed by the British Parliament and Executive; or that in defiance of the plain teaching of history there is to be no responsible Irish Executive. The certain result of this would be to destroy the sense of responsibility in the Irish Legislature, to create endless differences of opinion between the two countries, and to make Great Britain the "whipping-boy" of Ireland, whenever Ireland had done anything foolish, and the British Parliament had not stepped in to prevent it. Reasonable men will continue to differ about the grant of Home Rule; but whatever is granted to Ireland in the way of legislative or executive right must be given fully and frankly, without looking backward. We must allow ourselves in this matter to listen to the voice of the statesmen of 1782. On the other hand, whatever is reserved must be clearly reserved, with ample guarantees for the arm of the Imperial Executive being long enough and strong enough to put down resistance. But that the power of the Imperial Parliament and Executive could, under any circ.u.mstances, be exerted frequently and in many matters, is a dangerous and impotent delusion. That power can only be maintained by carefully selecting and limiting the objects to which it is to relate; and by admitting Irish representatives to their full share-neither more nor less-of the control of Imperial questions in the Imperial Parliament, and securing adequate machinery for the execution of the decrees of the Imperial Government in Ireland when necessary. The arguments against any petty and irritating interference with the internal affairs of Ireland would be just as strong now as those which Lord Chatham used in 1774 against the proposed interference of the British House of Commons with the Absentee tax which the Irish Parliament was in that year supposed to be about to pa.s.s:

"The justice or policy of the tax," he said, "is not the question; and on these two, endless arguments may be maintained _pro_ and _con_. The simple question is, have the Commons of Ireland exceeded the powers lodged with them by the essential const.i.tution of Parliament? I answer, they have not, and the interference of the British Parliament would in this case be unjust, and the measure destructive of all fair correspondence between England and Ireland for ever."(145)

In what way would the British Parliament be more able to interfere in such a case than it was in 1774?

That Great Britain, if she chooses, is strong enough to govern Ireland for a prolonged period against the wishes of the majority of the people of Ireland, is indeed true; and under a strong and consistent Administration, strict and even justice might no doubt produce quiet and a considerable degree of material prosperity, without the const.i.tutional question being touched. But the existence of outward calm and material prosperity has always been a favourite plea with the opponents of political reform. And it is the most subtle and dangerous of all possible pleas, so soothing in character, and making apparently so winning an appeal to plain common sense and to self-evident facts. "Now, after all this," says Lord Clarendon, when describing the period in which England was administered, judged, and legislated for by the Privy Council, "I must be so just as to say that during the whole time that these measures were exercised, and these new and extraordinary ways were run, this kingdom enjoyed the greatest calm and the fullest measure of felicity that any people in any age for so long a time together (for the above-mentioned eleven or twelve years) have been blessed with, to the wonder and envy of all the other parts of Christendom." But a few years after the happy period described in such glowing terms by the great historian the Civil War broke out.

If the necessity for a political change exists, sooner or later it forces its way to the front, notwithstanding outward calm. It has been so before, and there is no reason to doubt that it will be so again, because the claim made by Ireland depends on permanent facts which statesmen cannot alter notwithstanding occasional periods of material prosperity and outward calm. As the ultimate solution of existing difficulties it is indicated by the geography and by the history of the island; and these are the two conditions of every political problem, which it is difficult to surmount or evade. Time may indeed slowly soften the asperities produced by past errors and the crimes of bygone generations; but the geographical conditions of a problem remain fixed and unalterable, and in the long run will be found to be the permanent factor which governs the situation. Not by empty formulas, such as "governing Ireland according to Irish ideas,"

or, "extending all the liberties enjoyed by the subjects of Great Britain to those of the sister island," shall we advance one yard on our way, or indeed do aught but make it clear to friend and foe alike, that we are cultivating contradictory ideas without even being apparently aware that we are doing so. What we have to do is to resolve to take our stand on the few firm bits of fact which emerge like stepping-stones traversing a quaking bog; and then we may get over, and some day perhaps climb the distant hills which are on the other side. Otherwise we shall go on "filling our belly with the east wind" to the end of time; we shall fish all night and take nothing. These few firm bits of fact are those provided by history and geography. Open the map and look at the situation of Great Britain and of Ireland relatively to each other; observe how they lie near, yet apart; how they are separated by intervening seas, but seas so narrow as to be a bond quite as much as a bar; how they are inhabited by races speaking the same language but professing different religions; and bear in mind that these are the features of the picture which cannot be altered. This being so, let us next suppose that some stranger ignorant of all the trivial details of the Irish question, on his arrival amongst us, were asked to state what, in his opinion, with the above conditions placed before him, the inst.i.tutions of two such islands relatively to one another were likely to be, judging from his experience of other countries. Would he not probably reply that the wise statesmen of Great Britain, of whose fame he had heard in foreign lands, had doubtless long ago come to the conclusion that their separation for some purposes, and their union for others, was stamped on the map as the certain and inevitable condition of any satisfactory settlement of their mutual relations, and that, alike to their complete separation and to their complete union, there was one and the same answer: _Opposuit natura_.

But, further, let us suppose him in his turn to inquire what the experience of the past had been in this particular case; and whether the two countries at the present time were entirely united or entirely separate, or were linked by some intermediate arrangement adapted to their relative needs and springing out of them; and suppose that the answer was, as it would have to be, that after several centuries of aggravated strife, they had first tried entire legislative separation, and had then abandoned it for an absolute incorporate union. Would he in that case be astonished if he was informed that history had vindicated geography, and that under neither of these two relations had peace, goodwill, and amity, been the distinguishing characteristics of the relations of Great Britain and Ireland?

To such a traveller it might perhaps be explained as an unexampled portent, that although const.i.tutional liberty, limited only by the right of every Government to suppress crime and repress disorder, had been extended by the larger to the smaller country; that although an equal representation, a wide suffrage and vote by ballot had also been given, and no alien Church any longer vexed the conscientious scruples of the majority, and the land system of the country had also been reformed, yet so unreasonable were the minds of the Irish people that they refused to be contented, and were now asking for a modification of the fundamental articles of the existing incorporate union, and that a constant agitation in consequence prevailed.

Might he not reply that he had heard it said by them of old time, that it was a mistake to be too much alarmed by the existence of political agitation; that absolute quiet is not a necessary sign of political health even in a const.i.tutional State; that what is called union within a political system may be a very equivocal expression; that the true union is a harmony, the result of which is that all parties, however opposed in appearance, co-operate towards the common good; that union may even exist in a State where the eye at first seems only to recognize a busy confusion; and that the contentment of the population with the inst.i.tutions under which they live is the only solid guarantee of their permanence.(146) Englishmen, he might add, in conclusion, had themselves been occupied for two centuries in proclaiming these and similar liberal sentiments from one end of Europe to the other, and the time had now perhaps arrived for applying them nearer home.

XI.-Grattan's Parliament. BY G. P. GOOCH

Grattan's Parliament was born of the American War of Independence and was slain by the French Revolution. Brief as was its life, it forms the most brilliant and interesting episode in Irish history. Never has the ancient and unconquerable spirit of nationality spoken in more eloquent accents than during the years when Grattan, loyal alike to the British connection and to Irish ideals, had won for his countrymen a measure of self-government. Representing only the Protestant minority, clogged with corruption, and containing its full share of selfish and reactionary influences, it was none the less the focus and the mouthpiece of national feeling. Fairly to judge the Grattan Parliament we must not only recall its limitations and errors but contrast its throbbing vitality with the servitude that preceded its foundation and the creeping paralysis which followed its dissolution.

A long sleep had succeeded the final expulsion of James II. from Ireland.

The penal code was perfected into a system accurately described by Burke as most perfectly fitted to degrade and brutalise the human spirit.

Catholic Ireland was voiceless and wholly lacking in political consciousness; and the silence of Protestants was only broken by a rare protest from Molyneux, Swift, or Lucas. If any doubt remained under Poynings' Laws as to the complete dependence on Great Britain, it was set at rest by the Declaratory Act pa.s.sed at Westminster in 1719. The Viceroys before Townshend only spent a few weeks in Dublin every second year for the biennial sessions of Parliament. The Lords Justices governed the country for its English masters by influence and corruption, and the Irish pension list provided grants too degrading to be charged on English revenues. A new era opened when Flood took his seat in 1759 and organised an Opposition, the programme of which included the limitation of parliaments, the revision of the pension list, the creation of a militia and the independence of the Irish Legislature. The first object was secured in 1768 by the Octennial Act; but at the height of his power and popularity he was captured by the Government, which naturally desired to disarm its most formidable foe. After an interval of independent support, the great orator accepted a salaried office and a seat in the Privy Council in 1775. In the same year Grattan entered Parliament at the age of twenty-nine, and quickly a.s.serted his t.i.tle to the leadership of the national party which Flood, in an evil moment for himself and his country, had abdicated.

The new leader was favoured by circ.u.mstances. While Flood clamoured for the suppression of the American revolt, the Presbyterians of the north loudly applauded the colonists, many thousands of whom had recently emigrated from Ulster. The community of interest was fully realised on both sides of the Atlantic; but Ireland asked for political and commercial autonomy, not for independence. With the demand there rapidly emerged the instrument of its realisation. Ireland was almost without troops when France declared war in 1778. When it became clear that the Government were unable to defend the island, the Protestant gentry came forward, and in a few weeks a disciplined and enthusiastic force of 40,000 men was under arms. Though organised for defence, the Volunteers, inspired by Charlemont and Grattan, determined to employ their strength in exacting concessions from the British Government. To use the words of Fox, the American war was the Irish harvest. The larger part of the damage inflicted on Irish commerce and manufactures by the legislation of the prominent partner was irreparable; but something might be saved from the wreck. The menacing aspect of the Volunteers and the panic-stricken despatches from Dublin Castle convinced the North Ministry that there was no alternative but to yield. Foreign and colonial trade was thrown open, the embargo on exports was removed, and Ireland was at last free to make use of her resources.

The easy overthrow of commercial restrictions encouraged Grattan to a bolder flight. In 1780 he moved his historic resolution "That no person on earth, save the King, Lords, and Commons of Ireland, has a right to make laws for Ireland." The motion was withdrawn after an impressive debate; but when the Volunteer Convention, which met shortly after, unanimously adopted the demand for self-government, the British Ministry surrendered.

In April, 1782, the declaration of legislative independence was brought forward by Grattan in one of his n.o.blest orations. "I found Ireland on her knees. She is now a nation. In that character I hail her, and, bowing in her august presence, I say, _Esto perpetua_!" A new and happier era seemed at last to be opening in the fortunes of Ireland and in her relations with Great Britain. "I am convinced," wrote Burke to Charlemont in words of gold, "that no reluctant tie can be a strong one, and that a natural, cheerful alliance will be a far more secure link of connection than any principle of subordination borne with grudging and discontent." Grattan was fully satisfied with the repeal of the Declaratory Act of 1719; but when the demand arose for an express renunciation of the authority of the British Parliament, the Coalition Ministry of Fox and North pa.s.sed an Act unconditionally recognising the right of the Irish people to be bound only by laws enacted by the King and the Irish Parliament.

The Grattan Parliament appeared to enter on its career with a fair capital of good will. Irishmen began to feel that they had a country; and though autonomy had been wrested in an hour of weakness by a show of force, there was no trace of resentment in the debates at St. Stephen's which accompanied the renunciation of power. The new const.i.tution seemed to enable Ireland to work out her own salvation without let or hindrance. But the powers which appeared so ample were in reality strictly limited. In the first place, while the Irish Legislature became in theory the peer of the British Legislature, the Irish Executive-the Lord-Lieutenant and the Chief Secretary-continued to be appointed by and responsible to the British Ministry. Secondly, Irish Bills did not become law till they were sanctioned by the King and sealed by the Great Seal on the advice of British Ministers. Finally, a majority of the Irish Parliament rested not on the free choice of the people or even of the Protestant population, but on the owners of nomination boroughs, most of whom were bound to the Executive by the possession or prospect of t.i.tles, pensions or sinecures.

Government by patronage survived the Renunciation Act, and reduced the authority of the Grattan Parliament to a shadow. The power of withholding supplies was an empty privilege; for the greater part of the income of the country came from the hereditary revenue, which was independent of Parliament.

The difficulties inherent in the novel situation were speedily revealed.

It was Grattan's fervent wish that the Volunteers, their emanc.i.p.ating task accomplished, should dissolve and leave the parliament to carry out its work. Flood, on the other hand, who had rejoined the ranks of the Opposition, had less confidence in the sincerity of the British Government, and desired to retain the weapon that had proved so effective, at any rate till a Reform Bill had placed the Legislature in a position to withstand the insidious a.s.saults of the Executive. Parliamentary reform was the natural corollary of the Renunciation Act. Flood laid his proposals before the Volunteer Convention, and, armed with its approval, carried them to College Green. His object was to emanc.i.p.ate parliament from the control of placemen and pensioners and to break the power of the borough-owners by the extension of the franchise. The fault of the measure was that, contrary to the wishes of Grattan, it perpetuated the exclusion of Catholics from political rights. The Executive opposed the Bill on the ground that it emanated from Praetorian bands, though the Volunteers themselves were held in check by British troops. The whole open and secret influence of the Government was exerted, and the proposals were defeated.

Reform was the condition of genuine autonomy. Without it the Legislature was clay in the hands of the potter. Though a share of the blame falls to the members who saw their influence endangered, the main responsibility for its defeat lies with the agents of the British Government. Having granted legislative equality, England took care to secure that the Grattan Parliament should possess the shadow but not the substance of power.

The next disappointment arose in the sphere not of politics but of commerce. It was the wish both of Pitt, the disciple of Adam Smith, and of Grattan that commercial intercourse between the two countries should be facilitated. But the offer to open the English market was accompanied by a proposal that Ireland should make a definite contribution to Imperial expenditure. She already maintained an army of 15,000 men, a fifth of whom were at the disposal of the British Government while the rest could be employed outside Ireland with the consent of the Dublin Parliament. But Pitt, convinced that free trade with England would stimulate Irish prosperity, felt justified in demanding a share of the increased revenue for the Imperial navy. Grattan disliked the suggestion of anything which could be represented as a tribute, and would have preferred voluntary grants; but he waived his objection, and Pitt's scheme, in the form of resolutions, was approved by the Irish Parliament. At this stage the jealousy of the British commercial cla.s.ses flamed out, and the scheme, on emerging from the debates at Westminster, was found to have been radically altered. As in its final form it curtailed the independence of the Irish Parliament, Grattan strongly opposed it. A scheme which failed to satisfy England and had lost its friends in Ireland was not worth further effort.

Pitt had done his best, but had been overborne by the commercial interests. When the Irish Parliament later declared its readiness to discuss a commercial treaty, it met with no response.

Pitt was bitterly disappointed by his failure, and lost a good deal of his interest in Ireland. He adopted the view of successive Lords-Lieutenant that genuine parliamentary reform was incompatible with the supremacy of the Executive. "There can, I think, be little doubt," p.r.o.nounces Lecky, "that the prospect of a legislative union was already in his mind, and it was probably the real key to much of his subsequent policy." Dr. Holland Rose quotes a significant letter of Pitt to the Viceroy, Lord Westmorland, in the autumn of 1792. "The idea of the present fermentation gradually bringing both parties to think of an Union with this country has long been in my mind. I hardly dare flatter myself with the hope of its taking place; but I believe it, though itself not easy to be accomplished, to be the only solution for other and greater difficulties." Thus the Grattan Parliament never had a fair chance. The dual system could only be worked by mutual good will, and if one of the partners withheld her aid, the experiment was doomed. Pitt was not yet openly hostile; but he allowed his agents in Dublin to shape their own course. He recognised that the root of Irish crime was to be found in the t.i.the system, and suggested in 1786 that t.i.thes should be commuted; yet when Grattan brought forward proposals with this object he allowed the Executive to defeat them.

Pitt's growing dislike of the system of 1782 was reinforced by the action of the Irish Parliament in the Regency crisis. When the King became insane in 1788, the Whigs contended that their patron, the Prince of Wales, should automatically exercise the power of the Crown, while Pitt retorted that it was for Parliament to appoint him Regent, and to define his powers. The Irish Parliament sided with the Whigs, Grattan and the Nationalists on the const.i.tutional ground that Pitt's proposed safeguards were unnecessary in Ireland, the camp-followers in view of the probable change in the source of patronage. The controversy terminated with the King's restoration to health; but the Prime Minister never forgot nor forgave the encouragement rendered to his enemies at the crisis of his fate.

Pitt had attempted nothing for Ireland since the failure of his commercial proposals; but the ferment created by the seductive doctrines of the French Revolution determined him to conciliate the Catholics, to whom he had always been friendly and whom he agreed with Burke in regarding as naturally conservative. On being informed of his wishes in 1791 the Irish Government did its utmost to dissuade him, and succeeded in whittling down the concessions till they were scarcely worth granting. Though Flood and Charlemont were immovably opposed to the extension of any kind of political rights to Catholics, and though Grattan always explicitly reserved Protestant ascendency, there was a large body of opinion prepared for a fairly liberal policy; and the new organisation of United Irishmen, founded in 1791 by Wolfe Tone, rested on the recognition of a common effective citizenship. In view of these circ.u.mstances, Pitt for the first and last time determined to overrule his agents. The Relief Bill of 1793 enfranchised Catholics on the same terms as Protestants, admitted them to juries, to the magistracy, and to commissions in the Army and Navy, allowed them to receive degrees in Dublin University and to carry arms.

This generous measure, which the Executive hated but dared not oppose, pa.s.sed without difficulty. Though the main merit belongs to Pitt, the acceptance of such far-reaching concessions by a Protestant body is a proof that, left to itself, it was not unwilling to concede substantial instalments of justice to the Catholic majority. Recent attempts to minimise the importance of the Act, on the ground that the franchise without eligibility to Parliament was worthless, misjudge the situation.

The measure was hailed by Catholic opinion as a decisive breach with the intolerant traditions of a century; and its easy pa.s.sage to the Statute-book suggests how different might have been the record and the fate of the Grattan Parliament had Pitt throughout encouraged its more generous intuitions and compelled his agents to support the policy which he knew to be right.

The union of the Portland Whigs with Pitt in 1794 seemed to bring further reforms within sight. Grattan travelled to London to discuss the situation, and met Fitzwilliam, who was designed for the Viceroyalty.

Fitzwilliam was known to favour Parliamentary Reform and Catholic Emanc.i.p.ation, and the liveliest hopes and fears were entertained of a decisive change of system. On learning from Dublin that there was already open talk of the dismissal of the Chancellor and other members of the Ascendency party, Pitt was deeply annoyed. It would be best, he declared, that Fitzwilliam should not go to Ireland; and, in any case, he must understand that no idea of a new system could be entertained, and that no supporters of the Government should be displaced. Shortly before his departure Pitt and Grenville met Portland, Spencer, Windham and Fitzwilliam to determine the policy to be pursued. No notes were made of the conversation, and the Viceroy left England on January 4th, 1795, without written instructions, though well aware of Pitt's general views and wishes. Three days after landing he dismissed Beresford, the head of the Revenue and an inveterate enemy of Catholic claims, who possessed enormous borough influence and was often described as the King of Ireland.

Fitzwilliam afterwards stated that he told Pitt the step might be necessary and that he had acquiesced by his silence. Pitt rejoined that he had no recollection of the incident. In any case a man of such importance should not have been removed without communicating with the Home Government. A few days later the Viceroy informed Portland, the Home Secretary, of the unanimity of Catholics and the readiness of Protestants for a measure of emanc.i.p.ation. Despite pressing and repeated communications, Portland delayed his reply and finally urged him not to commit himself. Next day Pitt wrote censuring the removal of Beresford, but without mentioning the Catholic question. Fitzwilliam replied that Pitt must choose between him and Beresford, and informed Portland that he would not risk a rebellion by deferring the measure. A week later Portland wrote in peremptory terms that Grattan's Bill, which enjoyed the Viceroy's support, must go no further, and on the following day Fitzwilliam was recalled.

The Viceroyalty had lasted six weeks; but Fitzwilliam is remembered while the phantom rulers who preceded and followed him are forgotten. The episode has a narrower and a wider aspect. That his dismissals were in contravention of the understanding on which his appointment rested was admitted by his personal and political friends in the Cabinet. But though the Viceroy was guilty of disloyalty to his instructions, a strong case can be made out for his policy. He knew that the prevailing system was thoroughly vicious, and he realised that if a policy of conciliation and reform was to be undertaken it could not be effectively carried out by men who were opposed to it. As Pitt had explicitly vetoed a change of system, it would have been wiser to have refused the post. The aims of the two men were fundamentally different. Though in favour of admitting Catholics to Parliament, Pitt thought it safer to defer emanc.i.p.ation till a Union was accomplished, and therefore determined to preserve Government patronage and control for future emergencies. Fitzwilliam desired to govern Ireland in accordance with Irish ideas, in the spirit of the Const.i.tution of 1782 and with the help of men who were loyal to it. In his recent work, "The End of the Irish Parliament," Mr. Fisher, who finds nothing to admire in the Grattan Parliament and little in its founder, suggests that the Fitzwilliam crisis was a storm in a tea-cup, and that the main issue involved was the subst.i.tution of the Ponsonbys for the Beresfords as the dispensers of patronage. But Irish tradition is in this case a safe guide as to the character and importance of the incident. Ireland instinctively felt, as India was to feel nearly a century later in regard to Ripon, that Fitzwilliam was a friend. The news of his recall was received with delight in Ascendency circles, and elsewhere with consternation. It was taken as a definite rejection of the Catholic claims, and increasing numbers despaired of achieving any real reform by peaceful means. It revealed in a flash that the autonomy of Ireland was a sham. From this point the rebellion of 1798 and the Union were in sight.

The new Viceroy, Camden, was an anaemic personality, and with the establishment of Maynooth the tale of reforms came to an end. The uncrowned king of Ireland and the brain of Dublin Castle was Fitzgibbon, who as Attorney-General stood by Pitt in the Regency crisis and had been rewarded by the Chancellorship and the earldom of Clare. In his discriminating study of Clare, the late Litton Falkiner has advanced all that can be said for the ablest and most ruthless of the opponents of the Grattan Parliament, pointing out that he remained on friendly terms with the Opposition till 1789. Wholly dest.i.tute of national feeling, Clare openly scoffed at the Catholic Relief Act of 1793, which the Government was compelled to support. It was from him that emanated in 1795 the fatal suggestion that the King could not a.s.sent to the repeal of laws affecting Irish Catholics without violating his Coronation oath. "In forcefulness and narrowness, in bravery and bigotry," writes Dr. Holland Rose with entire truth, "he was a fit spokesman of the British garrison, which was resolved to hold every outwork of the citadel." With Pitt's glance fixed on Union and Clare in virtual command of the machine, there was no place for Grattan in his own Parliament. He disapproved the revolutionary republicanism of the United Irishmen and the ascendency principles of Dublin Castle, and refused to encourage the one by attacking the other.

After a final attempt in 1797 to procure the admission of Catholics to Parliament and to introduce household franchise, he retired into private life, his Letter to the Citizens of Dublin firing a parting shot at the Government.

The rebellion of 1798 and the French invasions form no integral part of the history of the Grattan Parliament; but they none the less sealed its doom. In his speech on the Union, Clare frankly confessed that he had been working for the Union since 1793, and he began to urge the policy on Pitt in the same year. Pitt, who had long regarded a Union followed by Catholic Emanc.i.p.ation as the ultimate solution of the Irish problem, was now convinced that further delay was dangerous. In the early part of the eighteenth century the idea of Union was by no means unpopular; but the American war had shaken Ireland from her slumbers, and the debates on the Commercial Propositions and the Regency showed that the Grattan Parliament was jealous of the slightest infringement of the settlement of 1782. But the matter was not to be settled by argument, and no dissolution was allowed. The high-minded Cornwallis, who had succeeded Camden, groaned over his hateful task. "My occupation is most unpleasant, negotiating and jobbing with the most corrupt people under heaven. How I long to kick those whom my public duty obliges me to court! I despise and hate myself every hour for engaging in such dirty work, and am supported only by the reflection that without an Union the British Empire must be dissolved."

There was no national opposition to the measure. The Catholics were won by the promises of Emanc.i.p.ation, though they were not informed that the King had already declared his objections to it insuperable. The main fight was waged by the Ulster Protestants from whom had sprung the Volunteers. When the Irish Parliament met for the last time in January, 1800, a majority had been secured by Cornwallis, Castlereagh, and Clare. Grattan had sought re-election and returned to utter an eloquent protest against the destruction of the body that for ever bears his name. He predicted that the Union would be one of Parliaments, not of peoples. To destroy the Parliament was to destroy an organ of national intelligence, a source and symbol of national life. "The thing it is proposed to buy is what cannot be sold-liberty." He reiterated his conviction that nature was on the side of autonomy. "Ireland hears the ocean protesting against separation, but she hears the sea likewise protesting against Union." The warnings of the most spotless of Irish patriots were of no avail. The Grattan Parliament was swallowed up. In his touching words, he watched by its cradle and followed its hea.r.s.e.

There is a good deal to be said for the a.s.sertion that after the rebellion of 1798 the continuance of the experiment of 1782 was a source of danger to Great Britain in her life and death struggle with France. But there is no ground for the contention that the const.i.tution itself was intrinsically unworkable. Its congenital weakness was that the Executive was responsible not to the Irish but to the British Parliament. Friction between the Legislature and the Executive was thus inevitable; but with tact and goodwill even this anomaly need not have stopped the working of the machine. What would have happened had the British Ministry unselfishly co-operated with Grattan and the moderate Nationalists to secure urgent political and economic reforms we can but conjecture. But we know only too well the effect of withholding such co-operation. There is scarcely a trace in the voluminous correspondence of the Viceroys, except perhaps the Duke of Rutland, of any consideration for the good of the country over which they ruled. Their mandate was to watch the interest of England. When Cornwallis proposed in 1798 that Castlereagh should become Chief Secretary, the King objected that the post ought to be held by a Briton; but his scruples were allayed by the Viceroy's a.s.surance that his candidate was "so very unlike an Irishman" that the appointment would be perfectly safe. There is no ground whatever for the notion that the Parliament was a wholly corrupt and reactionary body. That Grattan was not prepared to endanger the Protestant Ascendency is true but irrelevant; for he was ready to champion such measures of Parliamentary Reform and Catholic Emanc.i.p.ation as would have transformed Parliament into a tolerable mirror of Irish opinion. There can be little doubt that if the Executive had lent its aid, such measures could have been carried as easily as the Relief Bill of 1793.

In his thoughtful and eloquent volume, "The Framework of Home Rule," Mr.

Erskine Childers gently chides Home Rulers for wasting vain regrets on the Grattan Parliament, in which he loses interest after the rejection of Flood's Reform Bill of 1783. No instructed Home Ruler would dream of setting that celebrated body on a pedestal. We know too well that, in the words of Litton Falkiner, it was a parliament of landlords, of placemen, and of Protestants. It was fundamentally conservative and aristocratic. It was ever ready to pa.s.s Coercion Acts. It was no more a council of disinterested patriots than the sister a.s.sembly at Westminster. On the other hand a large and influential section of its members was eager to purge it of its baser elements. "With every inducement to religious bigotry, it carried the policy of toleration in many respects further than the Parliament of England. With many inducements to disloyalty, it was steadily faithful to the connection. Nor should it be forgotten that it was on the whole a vigilant and intelligent guardian of the material interests of the country."(147) Though cabin'd, cribbed, confined, it was at least in some degree an organ of public opinion and a symbol of nationality, as the Third Duma, tame though it be, has stood for the principle of representation in autocratic Russia. The duty of British statesmen was to mend it, not to end it. If Grattan's Parliament was a failure, the Union was a greater failure. For the one experiment recognised, however imperfectly, the separateness of Ireland, while the other started from its denial. To use the jargon of the Ascendency party, Ireland was "loyal" before the Union and "disloyal" after it. The clear moral of those chequered years for latter-day statesmen is that a responsible Executive is of more importance than a co-equal legislature, and that having granted autonomy the British Parliament and British Ministers must strive to render it a success. Pitt's Union was not partnership but subjection. The only true Union between countries so different is to be found in loyal comradeship. Against such a relationship history cannot bear witness, for it has never been tried.