No sufficient evidence has ever been produced to convince a judicial mind that Adams and Clay had come to any understanding in regard to this matter either before Clay announced publicly that he should support Adams, or afterward. But men generally do not have judicial minds. "Diffused distrust and indiscriminate suspicion" mark the att.i.tude of the vulgar mind toward personages in high station.

Politicians know only too well that this is one of the most potent forces which can be called into play, and they know only too well how to take advantage of it. Conscious as both Adams and Clay doubtless were of their own rect.i.tude, they did not sufficiently appreciate the p.r.o.neness of the ma.s.ses to believe in the corruption of their superiors. Neither did they correctly appreciate the ungenerous and uncandid spirit of the leaders among their opponents in clinging to this charge, and reiterating it, after they had failed to substantiate it by any credible evidence. They certainly did not comprehend that they had given their opponents a shibboleth which would lead them to certain victory.

{144} [Sidenote: Clay's nomination to the secretaryship of State in the Senate.]

The opposition began at once their attack in the Senate under the issue of Clay's appointment. Fifteen of the forty-one Senators present voted against it. Among the fifteen was Jackson, who, upon his way, a few days later, from Washington to his home in Tennessee, repeated and re-enlivened the charge of "bargain and corruption." It is more than probable that Jackson believed in it himself. He was so convinced of his own honesty that he believed every one who differed with him to be dishonest. This is a trait of character frequently met with, and it is a most dangerous force with which to deal. The "Old Hero" possessed it in an extraordinary degree.

[Sidenote: The composition of the new Anti-administration party.]

Despite the fact that there were no material differences in political principles, and the further fact that Adams retained Monroe's cabinet so far as he could, appointing new members only to positions made vacant therein by his own and Calhoun's promotion to the presidency and the vice-presidency, and by Crawford's refusal to accept the Treasury for another term, it was now perfectly evident that Jackson, Calhoun, and Crawford, with their followers, were determined upon an organized opposition to the Adams-Clay Administration, no matter what principles and policies that Administration should follow; that Jackson would, on account of his popularity with the ma.s.ses, be put forward as the head of the new party; and that the cry of "bargain and corruption" between the President and the chief officer of his Administration, for robbing the "Old Hero" of his rights and the people of their choice, was to be their watchword in the conflict.

{145}

CHAPTER VII.

THE DIVISION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

Personal Differences, and Party Division--Military Confederation of the Spanish-American States--Invitation to the United States to send Representatives to the Congress at Panama--The Acceptance of the Invitation--Opposition in the Senate to the sending of Representatives to Panama--Popular Sympathy in the United States for the South-American States--The President's Nominations Confirmed--The Haytian Question at the Congress--Cuba and Porto Rico--Real Nature of the Opposition to the Panama Mission--The Failure of the Panama Congress--Adams on Internal Improvements in his Message of December 6th, 1825--Van Buren's Resolution against Internal Improvements--The Practices of the Adams Administration in respect to Internal Improvements--The Chief Practical Difficulty in the way of a National System of Internal Improvements--The Tariff of 1824 a Failure--The Tariff Bill of 1827--Development of the Industrial Ant.i.thesis between the North and the South--Hostility to the Measure in South Carolina--The Tariff of 1828--The Character of the Bill as Reflected in the a.n.a.lysis of the Vote Upon It--The Tariff of 1828 not a Complete Party Measure--The Presidential Campaign of 1828 still Dominated by Personal Considerations--Election of Jackson--Advent of the Parvenus--Foreign Affairs under Jackson's Administration--The Democratic Party and its Divisions.

[Sidenote: Personal differences, and party division.]

In the absence of any well defined differences in political opinions, and in the state of determined {146} personal hostility between the leaders developed by the election of 1824, the fact that Adams and Clay took broad national views, placed a liberal construction upon the Const.i.tution, and insisted upon the employment of all the powers vested by it in the general Government to the highest point of their usefulness in the promotion of the general welfare, had the natural effect of forcing the opposition upon the opposite grounds, and, therefore, tended to make a particularistic party, the so-called "States' rights" party, out of the Jackson-Calhoun-Crawford faction.

One of the most patent indications of the correctness of the proposition that the opposition in principle between the National Republican party and the Democratic party, as the Administrationists and the Anti-administrationists were soon termed, took its rise largely in the personal hostility of the leaders, is to be found in the history of the chief question of the foreign relations with which the Adams Administration had to deal in the years 1825 and 1826.

[Sidenote: Spanish-American interpretations of "the Monroe Doctrine."]

The Spanish Americans had taken the cautious utterances of President Monroe, in his December message of 1823, for much more than he meant them. They thought, or professed to think, that the Government had pledged itself to meet any intervention of the Allied Powers of Europe in American affairs by any resistance necessary to defeat it. They were also acquainted with the fact that both Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay were more p.r.o.nounced than President Monroe in favor of going to the support of the new republics of South and Middle America. Naturally then, when these two men came to the head of the Government, on March 4th, 1825, the Spanish Americans felt encouraged to expect some {147} substantial aid from the United States in the further course of their struggle with Spain and her possible allies.

[Sidenote: Military Confederation of the Spanish-American states.]

Already in the summer of 1822 the Republic of Colombia had initiated the plan of a Confederation of the Spanish-American states. By a treaty with Peru, bearing date of July 12th, 1823, by another with Chili of the same date, by another with the United Provinces of Central America, of April 12th, 1825, and by another with Mexico, of September 20th, 1825, the Republic of Colombia had established a military confederation between these five states, and had pledged them to send plenipotentiaries to a "general a.s.sembly of American states ... with the charge of cementing, in the most solid and stable manner, the intimate relations which ought to exist between all and every one of them." According to this agreement the a.s.sembly of plenipotentiaries was to serve as a council in conflicts, as a rallying-point in common dangers, as a faithful interpreter of treaties between their respective states, and as an umpire and conciliator in the disputes and differences which might arise between their respective states.

[Sidenote: Invitation to the United States to send representatives to the congress at Panama.]

During the spring of the year 1825 the Ministers of Colombia and Mexico sought Mr. Clay, and communicated to him the desires of their respective governments to have the United States send representatives to this proposed congress; but before giving the formal invitation they asked to know if it would be accepted. They stated to Mr. Clay that they did not expect the United States to abandon the att.i.tude of neutrality, or to take part in those deliberations of the congress which might relate to the prosecution of the existing war.

[Sidenote: The President's hesitation to accept the invitation.]

Clay's genial spirit was much excited by the grand prospect of a league of the American states under the {148} hegemony of the United States. It satisfied the plan of his daring imagination. It filled the bounds of his far-reaching vision. He immediately communicated the propositions of the two ministers, Mr. Salazar and Mr. Obregon, to President Adams, and urged the President to allow him to give them the a.s.surance that the invitation to send representatives to the congress, to be held the following October at Panama, would be accepted by the United States. The President, however, proceeded rather cautiously. He was, indeed, very friendly in his feelings toward the Spanish-American states, and was ready to aid their cause in any manner consistent with the duties of a neutral. But he had a calmer way of regarding things than his brilliant Secretary of State, and, moreover, upon him rested the ultimate responsibility. He required Mr. Clay to procure from Messrs. Salazar and Obregon some information in regard to the subjects which would be considered by the congress, the nature and form of the powers to be given to the diplomatic agents which were to compose it, and the mode of its organization and procedure. At the same time he allowed Mr. Clay to encourage them to believe that, if satisfactory answers should be returned to these inquiries, their invitation would be accepted. He also caused Mr. Clay to warn them that the United States could not become a party to the existing war with Spain, or give any counsel in regard to its further prosecution.

[Sidenote: The acceptance of the invitation.]

The answers to these inquiries were not received until the following November, and in Mr. Clay's letter acknowledging their receipt, they were said to be not entirely satisfactory to the President. The ministers were informed, however, that the President had resolved to send {149} commissioners to the congress at Panama, in case the Senate, which was to a.s.semble in a few days, should a.s.sent to it; but that the commissioners would not be empowered to do or say anything which would compromise the neutrality of the United States.

[Sidenote: The President too hasty after all.]

As a matter of fact, the replies from the Governments of Colombia and Mexico to President Adams' questions would have been regarded as highly unsatisfactory by any judicious mind, entirely uncommitted; for, while they left the President's second and third questions entirely unanswered, they suggested a joint resistance of all the American states to European interference in American affairs, and to any further European colonization upon the American continents, as the princ.i.p.al subjects in the discussion and determination of which the United States would be expected to take part. They referred to the fact that President Monroe in his noted message had characterized these things as being matters of common interest to both North and South America.

[Sidenote: Opposition in the Senate to the sending of representatives to Panama.]

Here was certainly a fine opportunity for all sorts of entanglements; and it is not at all astonishing that, when the subject was brought before the Senate of the United States by the President's message of December 26th, 1825, asking the Senate to approve his nominations of Richard C. Anderson and John Sergeant as ministers from the United States to the "a.s.sembly of American Nations at Panama," a very strong opposition to the project was developed in that body. The Senate referred the nominations to a committee, and called for the diplomatic correspondence and other papers relating to the subject, which, upon examination, revealed the facts briefly stated above.

The committee, which was the regular committee on {150} Foreign Relations, reported against the nominations, or rather against the policy of having representatives at the congress at all, on the ground that it might compromise the neutrality of the United States, and involve the United States in entangling connections with foreign powers. This report was made to the Senate on January 16th, 1826. The Senate debated, in secret session, the questions involved in the report during the latter half of February and the first half of March.

The view held by those who favored the report was that the Panama congress was to have the character of a military confederation, and that membership in it would be inconsistent with a status of neutrality toward Spain and her revolting American colonies. The view of those who opposed the report and desired to send representatives to the congress was, that the congress was only a meeting, in one place, of the plenipotentiaries of the different states for an interchange of opinions, and would not necessarily alter the att.i.tude of any of the powers taking part in it upon any subject, or toward any other power.

[Sidenote: Popular sympathy in the United States for the South-American states.]

The strong sympathy of the people of the United States for the cause of independence in Middle and South America really violated the spirit of neutrality, and the influence of this sympathy upon the Senators and Representatives in Congress was very disturbing to a cool and judicial consideration of the att.i.tude which the Government should preserve in the matter of the Panama mission.

[Sidenote: The President's nominations confirmed.]

[Sidenote: No influence of slavery perceptible in the vote upon the nominations.]

The friends of the mission at last won the day by a vote of twenty-four to nineteen. Fifteen Northern Senators voted to send representatives to the congress, and seven voted against doing so.

Nine Southern Senators voted to send representatives, and twelve voted against doing so. This {151} vote hardly sustains the claim of certain of the historians, that the slavery interest was the primal cause of the opposition to the Panama mission. One of the most eminent among these says that the historical significance of the contest over the question was that slavery threw aside its munic.i.p.al character, its character as a Commonwealth inst.i.tution, and demanded to prescribe both the internal and external policies of the nation. This sounds dramatic, but if it means, as it appears to mean, that when, in a federal system of government, any interest or inst.i.tution regulated by Commonwealth law asks protection from the general Government against foreign influence and interference it thereby a.s.serts command over the nation, it is a proposition which also sounds decidedly _outre_ to an American lawyer. The Const.i.tution of the United States imposed the international protection of all such interests and inst.i.tutions upon the general Government when it reserved such interests and inst.i.tutions to the jurisdiction of the Commonwealths and gave the general Government alone international standing. When, then, such interests and inst.i.tutions claim that protection, they are only asking for a right guaranteed to them by the Const.i.tution, and are by no means a.s.serting an authority over the Const.i.tution and the country.

[Sidenote: The Haytian question at the congress.]

It is true that Mr. Salazar said in his communication something about the status of Hayti being a subject of deliberation for the congress.

It was also true that Hayti had been for thirty years in a state of chronic insurrection and revolution, and that the former negro slave population had, by the a.s.sa.s.sination of their former masters and mistresses, freed themselves from bondage, taken possession of the country, and were reducing it to barbarism at a rapid {152} pace. It is furthermore true that the slaveholders in the United States did not wish their own homes to be made the scenes of any such ruin and savagery, or themselves or their families to be made subject to any such fate; and, it may be confidently hazarded, that no Northerner, at that day, viewed such possibilities with anything but aversion and horror. It required a quarter of a century of radical abolition recklessness, the blunder-crime of secession, and the desperation of long-continued, and at first unsuccessful, war, to make the men of the North regard without sympathy such dangers to their Southern brethren.

The North and the South simply could not have divided, at that time, upon the question of the relation to Hayti. There was only one view upon that subject, and that was that the example and influence of Hayti must be held far away from these sh.o.r.es. This could have been accomplished, however, as well by attending the congress as by staying away, perhaps better. At least, the Haytian question was no chief ground of opposition to the mission, and certainly no chief ground in favor of the mission.

[Sidenote: Cuba and Porto Rico.]

It is more probable that one of the reasons which moved President Adams and Mr. Clay to urge attendance upon the congress was to be in a position to restrain the Spanish-American states from attempting to seize Cuba and Porto Rico. During the latter half of the year 1825, at the very moment when the Government was communicating with the Spanish-American states in regard to the congress, Mr. Clay was urging the Czar of Russia, on the one side, to exercise his influence upon the Spanish court for the cessation of hostilities on the part of Spain against the revolting American colonies, on the ground that Spain could never resubjugate them, and would by a continuance of hostilities exasperate them and excite them to attack {153} Cuba and Porto Rico with the purpose of expelling the Spanish power from these islands, and was urging the Spanish-American states, on the other side, to refrain from such an attack, on the ground that if they did attempt to seize these islands the Czar would not only cease his good offices with the Spanish King to end the war, but might bring the entire power of the Holy Alliance to the aid of the Spanish King for the resubjection of his former American colonies. The policy of President Adams' Administration was clearly opposed to the occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico, either by the Spanish Americans or by any European state other than Spain herself. In this matter, also, the Administration and the opposition held the same view.

[Sidenote: Real nature of the opposition to the Panama mission.]

The only natural explanations of the determined opposition to the Panama mission were, thus, either the dread of embarra.s.sing entanglements with the Spanish-American states, and the consequent compromise of the status of neutrality toward them and their motherland, or the spirit of personal hostility to the Administration.

From the merits of the question the former would seem the more likely.

It was certainly, to any candid mind, a sufficient reason. On the other hand, an expression uttered by Mr. Van Buren as he left the Senate chamber, after having just made a most earnest appeal against the mission and cast his vote against it, would indicate that the opposition fought the Administration in this matter from factional motives purely. He is reported to have said: "They have beaten us by a few votes, after a hard battle; but if they had only taken the other side and refused the mission, we should have had them."

[Sidenote: The failure of the Panama congress.]

The debate continued so long, however, that the congress at Panama adjourned to Tacubaya before the {154} representatives from the United States appeared. Spain ceased to wage war against her former colonies.

The Holy Alliance did not interfere. The Spanish-American states suspended their operations against Cuba and Porto Rico. Hayti remained in isolated barbarism. And the congress of the American nations never rea.s.sembled.

It is possible that the jingo policy of the Administration may have helped to produce all these results. It is probable that the same results would have followed had the Senate refused the mission to Panama. It is certainly most fortunate that these results were attained without the attendance of the representatives of the United States upon the congress. All possible entanglements were thus avoided, while the purposes of the Administration, in so far at least as they subserved the true interests of the country, were substantially accomplished.

It is true that the special commercial advantages which Clay had hoped for were not secured, nor his dream of an American Confederacy under the protectorate of the United States realized. Neither were the President's ideas in regard to methods for settling mooted questions of international relations, nor those in regard to the advancement of religious liberty, fulfilled. But these things were all premature, to say the least, and none of them would, probably, have been helped onward by any discussion in the congress of the American nations. With the exception of the United States, those nations were altogether too immature to deal with such problems; and the United States itself was not sufficiently consolidated and powerful to a.s.sume the duties of instructor and guardian over them. It is not probable that any opportunity for doing good or receiving good was lost by the non-attendance of representatives {155} from the United States upon the deliberations of the Panama congress. It is far more probable that both the doing and the suffering of injury were escaped.

While the question of the relation of the United States to the other states upon the American continents is by no means transitory, the question of the Panama mission was so, at least so much so as not to serve well as an issue for the division of the Republican party into two permanently hostile forces.

[Sidenote: Adams on internal improvements in his message of December 6th, 1825.]