The third stage in the development of const.i.tutional interpretation in reference to this subject was attained in the year 1822. In May of that year Congress pa.s.sed a bill appropriating money for the repair of the c.u.mberland road, and authorizing the President to cause the erection of toll-gates upon it, and to appoint toll-gatherers. The toll charges, and penalties for attempting to avoid paying them, and for not keeping to the left in pa.s.sing, were fixed in the bill itself.

That is, this bill a.s.sumed for the general Government not only the powers of appropriating and expending money for the construction of the road, but the power of operating the road and jurisdiction over it. The pa.s.sage of such a bill is certainly very good evidence that President Madison's views, as expressed in his veto message of March 3rd, 1817, were not the views of the country in 1822 upon the subject of internal improvements.

[Sidenote: Pa.s.sage of the bill, and a.n.a.lysis of the vote upon it.]

It is interesting and instructive to a.n.a.lyze the vote upon this bill.

In the House of Representatives the {119} members from the New England section were nearly evenly divided, pro and con. The majority of the New Yorkers voted against it. The Pennsylvanians were nearly balanced.

The Marylanders voted for it. The Virginians were against it by a decided majority. The North Carolinians were indifferent. The South Carolinians and Georgians abandoned their high national ground of 1817, and voted unanimously against it. The Representatives from the Northwest went unanimously for it; and those from Kentucky now wheeled into line with them. Lastly, while the Tennesseeans still maintained their att.i.tude of indifference, the members from the Commonwealths south of Tennessee, and west of Georgia, all voted for the bill.

In the Senate the majority in favor of the measure was very large.

Only the Senators from the Carolinas and Alabama, and one Senator from Missouri, voted against it.

There is somewhat more of an appearance of slavery influence in the vote upon this bill than upon the bill of 1817, in that South Carolina showed herself practically a unit against this bill. Still it is probable that this opposition rested upon other grounds. Certainly when we read in the "Annals of Congress," that so stanch a friend of free labor, so eminent a lawyer, and so honorable a man as John W.

Taylor, of New York, said of this bill that it was so important in its character, and proposed such a violation of the Const.i.tution, that he felt obliged to call for the yeas and nays upon it, we must concede that other motives may have influenced the statesmen of South Carolina than such as might have sprung from subserviency to the interests of slavery.

[Sidenote: The bill in the interests of the West.]

If we review the a.n.a.lysis of the vote in the House of Representatives we shall see that the entire {120} West--taking the Appalachian range as the dividing line, for that period, between the East and the West--was for the bill, while the whole East, with the exception of Maryland, which was specially interested in the road, was either against it or indifferent to it. The Eastern Commonwealths had made their roads with Commonwealth money, and did not wish to a.s.sist the Western Commonwealths to make theirs by giving them national money with which to do it. The West, on the other hand, was new and comparatively poor, and wanted the nation to help it out of the mud.

This is unquestionably the plain statement of the situation from the point of view of interests. The interests of slavery played but little part, if any at all, in the distribution of the vote.

[Sidenote: President Monroe's veto, and communication of May 4th, 1822.]

President Monroe promptly vetoed the bill, on the ground that it was in excess of the powers granted to Congress by the Const.i.tution. He also sent a communication, of the same date as the veto, to the House of Representatives, explaining his views upon those principles of the Const.i.tution generally, and upon those provisions specially, which could be regarded as vesting powers in the general Government concerning internal improvements. The paper is prolix, confused, and confusing, but, upon the specific question at issue, the propositions advanced are definite and intelligible. He held that the power of Congress in regard to internal improvements was to be found in the Const.i.tution only by implication, by implication from the power to appropriate money, and that, therefore, its nature and limitations were to be drawn from the character of the power to appropriate money.

He contended, on the one side, that the power of Congress to appropriate money was not limited to the objects enumerated in the {121} Const.i.tution, but was, on the other side, limited by the spirit of the Const.i.tution to national purposes. He concluded, therefore, that Congress was empowered to appropriate money to internal improvements of a national character. But he a.s.serted that Congress could not, under the power to appropriate money, establish jurisdiction over such improvements, or authorize the executive department of the Government to administer them. The bill in question did just that, and it was for this reason that the President returned it with his objections.

[Sidenote: President Monroe's argument, and the vote upon the veto.]

The President's views were apparently convincing to many who had voted for the bill. Upon its pa.s.sage, the vote in the House of Representatives was eighty-seven for, and sixty-eight against, the measure. After the veto, it stood sixty-eight yeas and seventy-two nays.

It may be safely a.s.sumed that the view expressed by President Monroe in the paper accompanying the veto of this bill was the view which prevailed throughout the country in the year 1824. It may be also said that the power of Congress to authorize the President to expend the appropriation by causing the improvements to be planned and constructed was generally regarded, in 1824, as a necessary consequence of the power to appropriate money for the same. The acts of Congress appropriating money for the construction and repair of roads, ca.n.a.ls, etc., after, as well as before, that date, seem to proceed upon this theory.

[Sidenote: Congressional Act of 1824 for distinguishing national from local improvements.]

The great difficulty which lay in the way of the realization of President Monroe's principle of the appropriation of national money for internal improvements of a national character was the proper determination of the question as to what improvements were really of that character. The danger was that the {122} appropriation bills would become log-rolling measures for the purpose of obtaining national money for matters of local concern. This difficulty was distinctly felt, and Congress undertook to meet it by the Act of April 30th, 1824, which authorized the President to cause "surveys, plans, and estimates to be made of the routes of such roads and ca.n.a.ls as he might deem of national importance," and required him to lay the same before Congress.

From all this it is apparent that, down to the presidential election of 1824, the development of a pro-slavery, strict-constructionist, "States' rights" party is hardly to be discovered in the att.i.tude of the different sections of the country toward the question of internal improvements. Despite the fact that the slaveholders had become conscious during the Missouri struggle that their interests demanded the establishment of a particularistic view of the Const.i.tution and a particularistic practice in the working of the governmental system of the country, not much progress had been made, in the period between 1820 and 1824, in the way of twisting the policies developed during the previous eight years into line with such a view. In fact the foreign relations of the United States were again, in 1822, of a somewhat threatening character, and the consideration of these relations was acting as a certain hindrance to the development of parties upon internal issues.

[Sidenote: Foreign relations during Monroe's second term.]

The menace, or perhaps it would be more correct to say the apparent menace, came from two quarters; but in neither case did it relate immediately to the territory or interests of the United States. In both cases it was consequential and more or less remote.

{123} [Sidenote: Russia and the northwest coast of America.]

In the first place, the movements of Russia in the North Pacific had created grave apprehensions. At the close of the first decade of the century the Russian American Company put forward a claim to the territory of the North American continent along the Pacific coast from Behring's Strait to the mouth of the Columbia River, and even to points south of the Columbia. Really this claim came into conflict only with the rights of Great Britain and Spain, but the United States, having the presentiment of its future, if not a legal claim to any part of this territory as a part of Louisiana, regarded the Russian movement with jealous discontent. And when, on September 16th, the Russian Czar issued an edict, a.s.serting Russia's rights to the North Pacific territory from Behring's Strait to the fifty-first parallel of north lat.i.tude, it was natural that this discontent should become hostile in its nature. The Government of the United States declared its dissent from the Russian pretensions, and the matter rested momentarily with that.

[Sidenote: The Holy Alliance.]

At the same time the other danger was developing. The European reaction against the terrible excesses of the Revolution and the despotism of Bonaparte had a.s.sumed the form of an alliance between the Governments of the great continental states, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France, for the purpose of maintaining each by the power of all against the reappearance of revolutionary movements anywhere. Great Britain had scented in this Holy Alliance a combination of continental powers which might prove, in some degree at least, as dangerous to her continental relations as the commercial system of Bonaparte had been.

There is no doubt, too, that there was a large party in England which repudiated the fundamental {124} political doctrine of the Holy Alliance Powers, the doctrine of the _jure divino_ monarchy. England had, in fact, repudiated that doctrine at the close of the seventeenth century. For these reasons the British Government had declined to enter the Holy League, and regarded it with suspicion and ill-concealed hostility.

[Sidenote: The Congress at Verona.]

The United States Government paid little attention to its workings so long as they were confined to purely European relations, but when, in 1822, at the congress of these powers at Verona, which had been a.s.sembled to consider the question of aiding the Spanish Government to suppress the insurrection against its authority in Spain, the subject of aiding that Government to re-establish its authority over Spain's revolting colonies in North and South America was discussed, serious apprehensions were roused in both Great Britain and the United States.

It was stated, and generally believed, in the United States, that the plan was the re-establishment of the Spanish power over all of Spain's American possessions, except Mexico and California, and the cession of Mexico to France, and of California to Russia, in consideration of the military aid to be rendered to Spain by these two great powers in the work of restoration.

[Sidenote: Mr. Adams' declaration to Baron Tuyl.]

To the United States the supposed intentions of Russia in respect to the Pacific coast appeared the more immediate danger, and the United States Government addressed its diplomacy to this question first. On July 17th, 1823, the Secretary of State, Mr. John Quincy Adams, declared to the Russian Minister at Washington, Baron Tuyl, that "we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should a.s.sume distinctly the principle that the American {125} continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments."

[Sidenote: Mr. Canning's proposal to Mr. Rush.]

The following month, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr.

George Canning, proposed to the Minister of the United States at the Court of St. James, Mr. Richard Rush, a joint declaration by the British Government and the Government of the United States to Europe, that the two Governments would not remain indifferent to an intervention by the Holy Alliance Powers to restore the Spanish authority over Spain's revolting American colonies. Both commercial interests and political principles moved the British Government to make this proposition.

[Sidenote: Mr. Canning's declaration to Prince Polignac.]

Mr. Rush had not been instructed by his Government in antic.i.p.ation of the British advances, but he offered to a.s.sume the responsibility of joining for the United States in the declaration, provided the British Government would acknowledge the independence of the revolting Spanish colonies in America, as the Government of the United States had already done. The British minister was not then prepared to go so far, and the plan of the joint declaration fell through. But Mr. Canning declared for his Government to the French amba.s.sador at St. James, Prince Polignac, that Great Britain would resist any intervention on the part of the Holy Alliance Powers in the question between Spain and her revolting American colonies, and the President of the United States, in his annual message of December 2nd, 1823, stated the position which the United States Government and the people of the United States ought, in his opinion, to a.s.sume, and would, in his opinion, a.s.sume, in regard to the whole subject.

[Sidenote: The "Monroe Doctrine."]

Mr. Monroe dealt first with the question of Russian {126} colonization upon the Pacific coast. After informing Congress of the instructions which had been given to the Minister representing the United States at St. Petersburg for negotiating with the Czar's Government, he said: "In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for a.s.serting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have a.s.sumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."

Toward the close of the message Mr. Monroe addressed himself to the other question, the question of intervention by the Holy Alliance Powers in the contest between Spain and her revolting American colonies in the following language: "In the wars of European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments, and to the defence of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of our most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United {127} States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere, but with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.... It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and these new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course."

[Sidenote: The meaning of the Monroe propositions in 1824.]

These statements by Mr. Monroe of his opinion as to what the diplomacy of the United States ought to be, and would be, upon the subjects of the establishment of new European colonies in America, the intervention of the Holy Alliance Powers in the question between Spain and her revolting American colonies, and the forcible imposition by these powers of the _jure divino_ monarchy {128} upon these peoples, who had established republican forms of government for themselves, have had the name fixed upon them by a later generation of "The Monroe Doctrine." There is no difficulty in understanding these statements as Mr. Monroe understood them.

Neither he nor his Secretary of State ever called them a "Doctrine."

With them they were simply the opinions of the Administration in regard to the course which the United States ought to pursue, and would probably pursue, in meeting certain exigencies, the possibility of the arising of which pa.s.sed entirely away before the close of the first half of this century. These opinions were simply that the United States ought to resist, and would resist, the planting of any new colonial establishments in America, or the intervention of the Holy Alliance Powers in the question between Spain and her revolting American colonies, or the forcible imposition of the _jure divino_ monarchy, the political system of these powers, upon the new republican governments of South and Middle America.

[Sidenote: Failure to commit Congress to these propositions.]

The month following the publication of this message, January, 1824, Mr. Clay attempted to move Congress to indorse that part of the President's opinions which referred to the intervention of the Allied Powers in the conflict between Spain and her revolting colonies, but the resolution which he offered to that effect was laid on the table, and never called up. Mr. Poinsett, of South Carolina, made a like attempt later, but with no more success. The Congress of that day had altogether too much intelligence to make diplomatic opinions, advanced by the Administration, either laws of the land, or joint or concurrent resolutions of the legislative department of the Government.

{129} [Sidenote: The particularistic reaction scarcely discoverable before 1824.]

Thus neither in the question of the tariff, nor in that of internal improvements, nor, naturally, in the diplomatic questions, is anything more than the faint beginnings of the particularistic reaction to be discovered in the period between 1820 and 1824. In fact, it may be said that the year 1820 marks roughly the date of the extinction of the old Federal party, and of the almost complete absorption of the whole voting population in the Republican party. In the presidential election of that year the candidate of the Republican party, Mr.

Monroe, received two hundred and thirty-one of the two hundred and thirty-two electoral votes cast, and the one elector who did not vote for him was a Republican. The Federal party did not even undertake to present a ticket. From the point of view of the preservation of its own dominance, the Federal party had committed two grave errors, one of principle and one of policy. It had held to the principle that the ma.s.s of men are not fit to govern themselves, but should be governed by the few who are wise and good; and it had adopted the policy of too close alliance with the commercial interests of the country. The levelling, not to say debasing, influences of the French political philosophy, which rolled like a tidal wave over the country during the last decade of the eighteenth century, and was worked up into a political dogma by Jefferson and his disciples, together with the reflex influence of the practical equality which established itself among the first adventurers who settled the lands beyond the Alleghanies, destroyed the Federal party, upon the side of principle; while the great extension of the agricultural interests, produced by these same settlements, made it intolerable upon the side of policy.

The earlier advantage which the Federal party, as the upholder of centralization, enjoyed {130} over the Republican party, as the champion of "States'-rights," had been lost by the nationalization of the Republican party through the War of 1812, and the denationalization of the Federal party through the same experiences.

In 1820, therefore, there was only one party in fact and in principle.

It is undoubtedly true that the struggle of the years 1819 and 1820 over the Missouri question had sowed the seeds of dissension in this all-comprehending party; but four years did not const.i.tute a period of time sufficient for their completed growth and fructification. The presidential contest of 1824 could not, therefore, he fought under the issues of party principles. It was little more, and, under the circ.u.mstances, it could be little more, than a personal contest between the leaders of the Republican party. The result of it, however, contributed very largely to the development of political differences, and to the organization of parties upon the basis of these differences. It must, therefore, be described with some particularity.

{131}

CHAPTER VI.