The Marne, 1914.

The Opening of World War I and the Battle That Changed the World.

by Holger H. Herwig.

PROLOGUE.

"A DRAMA NEVER SURPa.s.sED"

Woe to him who sets Europe on fire, who throws the match into the powder box!-HELMUTH VON MOLTKE THE ELDER, MAY 1890 ON 2 AUGUST 1914, JUST A FEW HOURS BEFORE GERMAN TROOPS OCCUPIED Luxembourg and thirty hours before war was declared between France and Germany, Lieutenant Albert Mayer of 5th Baden Mounted Jager Regiment led a patrol of seven riders across a small ridge along the Allaine River near Joncherey, southeast of Belfort. Luxembourg and thirty hours before war was declared between France and Germany, Lieutenant Albert Mayer of 5th Baden Mounted Jager Regiment led a patrol of seven riders across a small ridge along the Allaine River near Joncherey, southeast of Belfort.1 Suddenly, French guards of the 44th Infantry Regiment appeared. Mayer charged. He struck the first Frenchman over the head with his broadsword, causing him to roll into a roadside ditch. Another Jager drove his lance into the chest of a second French soldier. A third Jager shot Corporal Jules-Andre Peugeot, making him the first French casualty of the war. The remaining group of twenty French soldiers took cover in the ditch and opened fire on the German sharpshooters. Mayer tumbled out of the saddle, dead. In this unexpected manner, the twenty-two-year-old Jager became the first German soldier killed in the war. And in this bizarre way, the first victim in what would collectively be called the Battle of the Marne. Suddenly, French guards of the 44th Infantry Regiment appeared. Mayer charged. He struck the first Frenchman over the head with his broadsword, causing him to roll into a roadside ditch. Another Jager drove his lance into the chest of a second French soldier. A third Jager shot Corporal Jules-Andre Peugeot, making him the first French casualty of the war. The remaining group of twenty French soldiers took cover in the ditch and opened fire on the German sharpshooters. Mayer tumbled out of the saddle, dead. In this unexpected manner, the twenty-two-year-old Jager became the first German soldier killed in the war. And in this bizarre way, the first victim in what would collectively be called the Battle of the Marne.

THE MARNE WAS THE most significant land battle of the twentieth century. I made that claim nearly a decade ago in a special issue of most significant land battle of the twentieth century. I made that claim nearly a decade ago in a special issue of MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History dedicated to "Greatest Military Events of the Twentieth Century." dedicated to "Greatest Military Events of the Twentieth Century."2 The research for this book has only reinforced that belief. In fact, I would argue that the Marne was the most decisive land battle since Waterloo (1815). First, the scale of the struggle was unheard of before 1914: France and Germany mobilized roughly two million men each, Britain some 130,000. During the momentous days between 5 and 11 September 1914, the two sides committed nearly two million men with six thousand guns to a desperate campaign along the Marne River on a front of just two hundred kilometers between the "horns of Verdun and Paris." Second, the technology of killing was unprecedented. Rapid small-arms fire, machine guns, hand grenades, 75mm and 77mm flat-trajectory guns, 150mm and 60-pounder heavy artillery, mammoth 305mm and 420mm howitzers, and even aircraft made the killing ground lethal. Third, the casualties ("wastage") suffered by both sides were unimaginable to prewar planners and civilian leaders alike: two hundred thousand men per side in the Battle of the Frontiers around the hills of Alsace-Lorraine and the Ardennes in August, followed by three hundred thousand along the chalky banks of the Marne in early September. No other year of the war compared to its first five months in terms of death. Fourth, the immediate impact of the draw on the Marne was spectacular: The great German a.s.sault on Paris had been halted, and the enemy driven behind the Aisne River. France was spared defeat and occupation. Germany was denied victory and hegemony over the Continent. Britain maintained its foothold on the Continent. Finally, the long-term repercussions of the Marne were tragic: It ushered in four more years of what the future German military historian Gerhard Ritter, a veteran of World War I, called the "monotonous mutual ma.s.s murder" of the trenches. The research for this book has only reinforced that belief. In fact, I would argue that the Marne was the most decisive land battle since Waterloo (1815). First, the scale of the struggle was unheard of before 1914: France and Germany mobilized roughly two million men each, Britain some 130,000. During the momentous days between 5 and 11 September 1914, the two sides committed nearly two million men with six thousand guns to a desperate campaign along the Marne River on a front of just two hundred kilometers between the "horns of Verdun and Paris." Second, the technology of killing was unprecedented. Rapid small-arms fire, machine guns, hand grenades, 75mm and 77mm flat-trajectory guns, 150mm and 60-pounder heavy artillery, mammoth 305mm and 420mm howitzers, and even aircraft made the killing ground lethal. Third, the casualties ("wastage") suffered by both sides were unimaginable to prewar planners and civilian leaders alike: two hundred thousand men per side in the Battle of the Frontiers around the hills of Alsace-Lorraine and the Ardennes in August, followed by three hundred thousand along the chalky banks of the Marne in early September. No other year of the war compared to its first five months in terms of death. Fourth, the immediate impact of the draw on the Marne was spectacular: The great German a.s.sault on Paris had been halted, and the enemy driven behind the Aisne River. France was spared defeat and occupation. Germany was denied victory and hegemony over the Continent. Britain maintained its foothold on the Continent. Finally, the long-term repercussions of the Marne were tragic: It ushered in four more years of what the future German military historian Gerhard Ritter, a veteran of World War I, called the "monotonous mutual ma.s.s murder" of the trenches.3 During that time, Britain and the empire sustained 3.5 million casualties, France 6 million, and Germany 7 million. During that time, Britain and the empire sustained 3.5 million casualties, France 6 million, and Germany 7 million.* Without the Battle of the Marne, places such as Pa.s.schendaele, the Somme, Verdun, and Ypres would not resonate with us as they do. Without the Battle of the Marne, most likely no Hitler; no Horthy; no Lenin; no Stalin. Without the Battle of the Marne, places such as Pa.s.schendaele, the Somme, Verdun, and Ypres would not resonate with us as they do. Without the Battle of the Marne, most likely no Hitler; no Horthy; no Lenin; no Stalin.

The Marne was high drama. The Germans gambled all on a brilliant operational concept devised by Chief of the General Staff Alfred von Schlieffen in 1905 and carried out (in revised form) by his successor, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, in 1914: a lightning forty-day wheel through Belgium and northern France ending in a victorious entry march into Paris, followed by a redeployment of German armies to the east to halt the Russian steamroller. It was a single roll of the dice. There was no fallback, no Plan B. Speed was critical; delay was death. Every available soldier, active or reserve, was deployed from the first day of mobilization. The sounds and sights of two million men trudging across Belgium and northeastern France with their kit, guns, and horses in sweltering thirty-degree-Celsius heat, stifling humidity, and suffocating dust was stunning, and frightening. Tens of thousands of soldiers fell by the wayside due to exhaustion, heatstroke, blisters, thirst, hunger, and typhus. Others collapsed with gastroenteritis after devouring the half-ripe fruits in the orchards they pa.s.sed. Will Irwin, an American journalist observing the German "gray machine of death" marching across Belgium, reported on something he had never heard mentioned in any book on war-"the smell of a half-million un-bathed men. ... That smell lay for days over every town."4 Still, hundreds of thousands pushed on, a ragged and emaciated gray ma.s.s buoyed by the "short-war illusion" that the decisive battle was just around the next bend in the road. The home front waited anxiously for victory bulletins. Newspapers vied with one another for any sc.r.a.p of news or rumor from the front. The atmosphere was electric-in Berlin, in Paris, and in London. Winston S. Churchill, looking back on 1914, opined: "No part of the Great War compares in interest with its opening." The "measured, silent drawing together of gigantic forces," the uncertainty of their deployment and engagement, and the fickle role of chance "made the first collision a drama never surpa.s.sed." Never again would battle be waged "on so grand a scale." Never again would the slaughter "be so swift or the stakes so high."5 It is hard to argue with Churchill. It is hard to argue with Churchill.

The Marne has lost none of its fascination. The famous "taxis of the Marne," the six hundred Renault cabs that rushed some three thousand men of French 7th Infantry Division to the Ourcq River in time to "save" Paris from Alexander von Kluck's First Army, remain dear to every tourist who has bravely ventured forth in a Parisian taxi-cab. Joseph Gallieni, the military governor of the Paris Entrenched Camp, whose idea it was to use the taxis, remains in the popular mind the brilliant strategist who appreciated the significance of Kluck's turn southeast before Paris, and who rallied the capital's forces as well as French Sixth Army to deprive the Germans of victory.

Books on the Marne abound. A keyword search of the catalog of the Library of Congress shows ten thousand t.i.tles. A similar perusal of the Google website brings up 174,000 hits. Most of these works are from the British and French perspective. They deal with virtually every aspect of the Battle of the Marne, from the company to the corps level, from the human to the material dimension. Bitter disputes still rage over "reputations"6-from those of French chief of staff Joseph Joffre to his British counterpart, Sir John French, and from General Charles Lanrezac of French Fifth Army to Sir Douglas Haig of British I Corps. No stone is left unturned in this never-ending war of ink.

This book is different. For the first time, the Battle of the Marne is a.n.a.lyzed from the perspective of those who initiated it: the seven German armies that invaded Belgium and France. There was no "German army" before August 1914. Thus, the story is told on the basis of what was a ma.s.sive research effort in the archives of the various German federal contingents: Baden XIV Army Corps fighting in Alsace, Bavarian Sixth Army and Wurttemberg XIII Corps deployed in Lorraine, Saxon Third Army struggling in the Ardennes, and Prussian First, Second, and Fifth armies advancing in an arc from Antwerp to Verdun. The collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 198990 proved to be a boon for researchers: It gave me access to the records of Saxon Third Army at Dresden, and to roughly three thousand Prussian army files long thought destroyed by Allied air raids in 1945, but returned to Potsdam by the Soviet Union in 1988 and now housed at Freiburg. These allow a fresh and revealing look at the Marne.

This book raises a fundamental question: Was it truly the "Battle of the Marne"? The campaign in the west in 1914, as ill.u.s.trated by Lieutenant Albert Mayer's death in the Vosges, was an extended series of battles that raged from the Swiss border to the Belgian coast. During its initial phase, commonly referred to as the Battle of the Frontiers, major operations took place in Alsace, Lorraine, Belgium, the Ardennes, and the Argonne. Each is an integral part of the larger Battle of the Marne. In many ways, what is generally called the First Battle of the Marne*-the b.l.o.o.d.y campaigns of German First, Second, and Third armies against French Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth armies and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) between Paris and Verdun from 5 to 11 September-was but the final act in this great drama. Even then, the critical, desperate battles of German First Army and French Sixth Army took place along the Ourcq River and not the Marne. Still, when it came time for the victor to name the battle, French chief of staff Joffre chose Marne Marne mainly because most of the rivers in the region of decisive struggle-Ourcq, Grand Morin, Pet.i.t Morin, Saulz, and Ornain-all flowed into the Marne. mainly because most of the rivers in the region of decisive struggle-Ourcq, Grand Morin, Pet.i.t Morin, Saulz, and Ornain-all flowed into the Marne.7 The t.i.tanic clash of vast armies over an extended 480-kilometer front, then, was not one battle at all. Rather, in the words of Sewell Tyng, a distinguished historian of the Marne, it consisted of "a series of engagements fought simultaneously by army corps, divisions, brigades, and even battalions, for the most part independently of any central control and independently of the conduct of adjacent units."8 Hence, the story is told from the perspective of individual units in separate theaters. These range from the cadets of France's Saint-Cyr Military Academy advancing on Altkirch, in Alsace, in full-dress uniform to the desperate struggle of German First Army's hundred thousand grimy and grisly warriors marching to the very outskirts of Paris. Hence, the story is told from the perspective of individual units in separate theaters. These range from the cadets of France's Saint-Cyr Military Academy advancing on Altkirch, in Alsace, in full-dress uniform to the desperate struggle of German First Army's hundred thousand grimy and grisly warriors marching to the very outskirts of Paris.

The face of battle in each of these theaters is reconstructed on the basis of the diaries and letters of "common soldiers" on both sides, French poilus poilus and German and German Landser Landser. The much-neglected story of German atrocities committed in Belgium and Lorraine from fear of attack by enemy irregulars (francs-tireurs) likewise is rendered on the basis of the official reports, diaries, and letters of German unit commanders and soldiers in the field. The Bavarian archives reveal the horror of the atrocities at Nomeny, Gerbeviller, and Luneville, while the Saxon archives help sort out the terrible days when Third Army stormed Dinant. In the process, many of the victims' reports as well as much of the Allied wartime propaganda are reevaluated.

Obviously, the Battle of the Marne did not end the war. Nor did it suddenly and irrevocably halt the war of maneuver envisioned by all sides before 1914. To be sure, many historians have argued that the Marne brought a formal end to maneuver warfare and that the military commanders thereafter callously accepted an inevitable and indeterminate war of attrition. This simply is a post facto post facto construction. On the Allied side, General Joffre and Field Marshal French saw the Battle of the Marne first as a radical reversal of the Allies' "Great Retreat," and then as an opportunity to drive the Germans out of France and Belgium and to take the war into the heartland of the Second Reich. On the German side, Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke, First Army's Alexander von Kluck, Second Army's Karl von Bulow, and Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch saw the withdrawal from the Marne as a temporary course correction, after which the drive on Paris would be renewed by refreshed and replenished armies. Only Wilhelm II, always p.r.o.ne to sudden mood swings, recognized the Marne as a defeat, as construction. On the Allied side, General Joffre and Field Marshal French saw the Battle of the Marne first as a radical reversal of the Allies' "Great Retreat," and then as an opportunity to drive the Germans out of France and Belgium and to take the war into the heartland of the Second Reich. On the German side, Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke, First Army's Alexander von Kluck, Second Army's Karl von Bulow, and Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch saw the withdrawal from the Marne as a temporary course correction, after which the drive on Paris would be renewed by refreshed and replenished armies. Only Wilhelm II, always p.r.o.ne to sudden mood swings, recognized the Marne as a defeat, as "the "the great turning point" in his life. great turning point" in his life.9 Given its undisputed centrality in the history of World War I, the Battle of the Marne not surprisingly has raised many "what if?" questions and created myths and legends that have withstood almost a century of investigation. The greatest of these is the most obvious: What if the German operations plan had succeeded and Paris had fallen? The French government already had fled to Bordeaux. Civilians were rushing to train stations to evacuate the capital. And Kaiser Wilhelm II was not in a charitable mood. On the eve of the Battle of the Marne, when he learned that German Eighth Army had taken ninety-two thousand Russian prisoners of war during the Battle of Tannenberg, he suggested they be driven on to a barren peninsula at Courland along the Baltic sh.o.r.e and "starved to death."10 The Marne, in fact, already was seen as a clash of civilizations, one pitting the German "ideas of 1914"-duty, order, justice-against the French "ideas of 1789"-liberty, fraternity, equality. Or, in Wilhelm II's simpler a.n.a.logy, as a clash between "monarchy and democracy." The Marne, in fact, already was seen as a clash of civilizations, one pitting the German "ideas of 1914"-duty, order, justice-against the French "ideas of 1789"-liberty, fraternity, equality. Or, in Wilhelm II's simpler a.n.a.logy, as a clash between "monarchy and democracy."11 On the basis of three decades of research on imperial Germany and World War I, I can state that the record on the implications of a German victory in 1914 is clear: The result would have been a German "condominium" over the Continent "for all imaginable time." The Low Countries would have become German va.s.sal states, parts of northeastern France and its Channel coast would have come under Berlin's control, the countries between Scandinavia and Turkey would have been forced to join a German "economic union," and Russia would have been reduced to its borders under Peter the Great.12 The British policy of the balance of power-that is, of not allowing any European hegemony to emerge-would have lain in tatters. The Battle of the Marne was consequential in blocking these developments. In the succinct words of General Jean-Jacques Senant, military commander of the French Army Archives at the Chateau de Vincennes, to an international gathering of scholars in 2004, "The Battle of the Marne saved France and the rest of Europe from German domination. ... Indisputably, it is the first turning point of the war." The British policy of the balance of power-that is, of not allowing any European hegemony to emerge-would have lain in tatters. The Battle of the Marne was consequential in blocking these developments. In the succinct words of General Jean-Jacques Senant, military commander of the French Army Archives at the Chateau de Vincennes, to an international gathering of scholars in 2004, "The Battle of the Marne saved France and the rest of Europe from German domination. ... Indisputably, it is the first turning point of the war."13 As well, a host of lesser myths and legends enshrouded the Marne in Carl von Clausewitz's famous "fog of uncertainty" and refuse to disappear from the pages of contemporary accounts of the battle.14 Some were simply propaganda designed for public consumption: the Kaiser's planned entry into Nancy sitting astride a white charger in the white dress uniform of the Guard Cuira.s.siers; the twenty-meter-long German flag specially made to fly from the top of the Eiffel Tower; the ten railroad cars loaded with commemorative medals for the fall of Paris that accompanied Kluck's First Army; and the twenty thousand Saxon soldiers who opted to be taken prisoner at the climax of the Battle of the Marne rather than to fight on. Others were the products of ambitious writers and mythmakers: General edouard de Castelnau's alleged disobeying of Joffre's orders to abandon Nancy early in September (when the reverse was the case); General Ferdinand Foch's putative communique that while his position at the Saint-Gond Marshes was "impossible ... I attack;" Joffre's reported command to his staff on the eve of the battle, accentuated by pounding his fist on the operations table, "Gentlemen, we shall fight it out on the Marne;" and General Maurice Sarrail's outrageous claim that he had refused Joffre's "order to abandon Verdun" and in the process a.s.sumed the t.i.tle "Savior of Verdun." Some were simply propaganda designed for public consumption: the Kaiser's planned entry into Nancy sitting astride a white charger in the white dress uniform of the Guard Cuira.s.siers; the twenty-meter-long German flag specially made to fly from the top of the Eiffel Tower; the ten railroad cars loaded with commemorative medals for the fall of Paris that accompanied Kluck's First Army; and the twenty thousand Saxon soldiers who opted to be taken prisoner at the climax of the Battle of the Marne rather than to fight on. Others were the products of ambitious writers and mythmakers: General edouard de Castelnau's alleged disobeying of Joffre's orders to abandon Nancy early in September (when the reverse was the case); General Ferdinand Foch's putative communique that while his position at the Saint-Gond Marshes was "impossible ... I attack;" Joffre's reported command to his staff on the eve of the battle, accentuated by pounding his fist on the operations table, "Gentlemen, we shall fight it out on the Marne;" and General Maurice Sarrail's outrageous claim that he had refused Joffre's "order to abandon Verdun" and in the process a.s.sumed the t.i.tle "Savior of Verdun."

Indeed, the Allies were not short on creating myths and legends of their own. On the British side of the ledger, there remains the legend that the BEF "discovered" the gap at the Marne between German First and Second armies; that it thereafter brilliantly "exploited" the gap; and that, in the process, it "saved" France. On the French side, there persists the myth of the putative miracle de la Marne. miracle de la Marne.15 For too long, this has served to obscure the fact that Joffre and his staff had not been the benefactors of a divine "miracle," but rather had brought about what Louis Muller, the chief of staff's orderly, called For too long, this has served to obscure the fact that Joffre and his staff had not been the benefactors of a divine "miracle," but rather had brought about what Louis Muller, the chief of staff's orderly, called "une victoire strategique" "une victoire strategique" and and "un miracle merite." "un miracle merite."16 This book will set the record straight. This book will set the record straight.

Other myths were much more harmful, and again attest to the centrality of the Marne in the history of what was later called the Great War. Certainly, that of Richard Hentsch, a mere lieutenant colonel on the German General Staff, s.n.a.t.c.hing victory from the hands of Generals von Kluck and von Bulow at the moment of certain triumph by ordering them to retreat behind the Marne was among the most damaging. It obscured for decades the truth behind the German retreat: a flawed command structure, an inadequate logistical system, an antiquated communications arm, and inept field commanders. In the verdict of the Germany official history of the war, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, General von Bulow of Second Army had been hesitant and insecure; General von Kluck of First Army, overly aggressive and unwilling to adhere to commands; and Chief of Staff von Moltke, not up to the strains of command. "In the hour of decision over the future of the German people," the official historians concluded, "its leader on the field of battle completely broke down psychologically and physically."17 Perhaps most damaging, after the war numerous former commanders brought to the public the myth that the German armies had not been defeated in the field but rather denied victory by a "sinister conspiracy" on the part of Freemasons and Jews. Erich Ludendorff, the "victor" of the Battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes in 1914 and Germany's "silent dictator" from 1916 to 1918, championed this school. In postwar writings, such as The Marne Drama The Marne Drama, he a.s.sured a defeated nation that the "secret forces of Freemasonry," the machinations of world Jewry, and the baleful influence of Rudolf Steiner's "occult" theosophy on General von Moltke's wife, Eliza, had combined forces against Germany.18 Ludendorff's absurd claims, of course, helped to launch the infamous "stab-in-the-back" postwar legend. This book judges the performance of the German armies and their commanders at the Marne on the basis of official operational records rather than on mischievous mythmaking. Ludendorff's absurd claims, of course, helped to launch the infamous "stab-in-the-back" postwar legend. This book judges the performance of the German armies and their commanders at the Marne on the basis of official operational records rather than on mischievous mythmaking.

Fritz Fischer, arguably Germany's most famous historian of the latter half of the twentieth century, placed the Battle of the Marne squarely in the pantheon of that mythmaking. In 1974, he stated that in addition to the two best-known and most "highly explosive" German "moral-psychological complexes" arising from World War I-the "war-guilt question" of 1914 and the "stab-in-the-back legend" of 1918-there needed to be added a third: the Battle of the Marne. Or, better put, "the secret of the Marne," that is, the "defeat at the Marne 1914." From the moment that German troops stumbled back from the fateful river on 9 September, Fischer argues, first the government of Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg and then the Army Supreme Command conspired "systematically to conceal" the enormity of the defeat from the public.19 At the end of that twenty-year journey of deception and deceit lay another bid at redemption: World War II. At the end of that twenty-year journey of deception and deceit lay another bid at redemption: World War II.

* Estimates by the U.S. War Department. Estimates by the U.S. War Department.* There was to be a second in the early summer of 1918. There was to be a second in the early summer of 1918.

CHAPTER ONE.

WAR: "NOW OR NEVER"

War is ... an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.-CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ "SINCE I HAVE BEEN AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE," ARTHUR NICOLSON noted at Whitehall in May 1914, "I have not seen such calm waters." noted at Whitehall in May 1914, "I have not seen such calm waters."1 Europe had, in fact, refused to tear itself to pieces over troubles in faraway lands: Morocco in 190506 and in 1911; Bosnia-Herzegovina in 190809; Libya in 191112; and the Balkans in 191213. The Anglo-German naval arms race had subsided, as had the fears about the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway, since Berlin had run out of money for such gargantuan enterprises. Russia had overcome its war with j.a.pan (190405), albeit at a heavy price in terms of men and ships lost and domestic discontent. Few desolate strips of African or Asian lands remained to be contested, and Berlin and London were preparing to negotiate a "settlement" of the Portuguese colonies. France and Germany had not been at war for forty-three years and Britain and Russia for fifty-eight. Europe had, in fact, refused to tear itself to pieces over troubles in faraway lands: Morocco in 190506 and in 1911; Bosnia-Herzegovina in 190809; Libya in 191112; and the Balkans in 191213. The Anglo-German naval arms race had subsided, as had the fears about the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway, since Berlin had run out of money for such gargantuan enterprises. Russia had overcome its war with j.a.pan (190405), albeit at a heavy price in terms of men and ships lost and domestic discontent. Few desolate strips of African or Asian lands remained to be contested, and Berlin and London were preparing to negotiate a "settlement" of the Portuguese colonies. France and Germany had not been at war for forty-three years and Britain and Russia for fifty-eight.

Part.i.tion of the Continent by 1907 into two nearly equal camps-the Triple Alliance of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy, and the Triple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia-seemed to militate against metropolitan Europe being dragged into petty wars on its periphery. Kurt Riezler, foreign-policy adviser to German chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, cagily argued that given this model of great-power balance, future wars "would no longer be fought but calculated."2 Guns would no longer fire, "but have a voice in the negotiations." In other words, no power would risk escalating minor conflicts into a continental war; instead, each would "bluff" the adversary up the escalatory ladder, stopping just short of war in favor of diplomatic settlement. Peace seemed a.s.sured. Guns would no longer fire, "but have a voice in the negotiations." In other words, no power would risk escalating minor conflicts into a continental war; instead, each would "bluff" the adversary up the escalatory ladder, stopping just short of war in favor of diplomatic settlement. Peace seemed a.s.sured.

EUROPE, 1914, SHOWING MAJOR RAIL LINES.

Domestically, for most well-off and law-abiding Europeans, the period prior to 1914 was a golden age of prosperity and decency. The "red specter" of Socialism had lost much of its threat. Real wages had shot up almost 50 percent between 1890 and 1913. Trade unions had largely won the right to collective bargaining, if not to striking, and their leaders sat in parliaments. Many workers had embraced social imperialism, believing that overseas trade and naval building translated into high-paying jobs at home. Germany had paved the path toward social welfare with state-sponsored health insurance, accident insurance, and old-age pensions. Others followed. Women were on the march for the vote. To be sure, there was trouble over Ireland, but then official London hardly viewed Ireland as a European matter.

Paris, as usual, was the exception. The capital had been seething with political excitement since January 1914, when Gaston Calmette, editor of Le Figaro Le Figaro, had launched a public campaign to discredit Finance Minister Joseph Caillaux-ostensibly over a new taxation bill.3 When Calmette published several letters from Caillaux's personal correspondence, Henriette Caillaux became alarmed. First, that correspondence could make public her husband's pacifist stance vis-a-vis Germany during the Second Moroccan Crisis in 1911; second, she knew that it included love letters from her to Joseph that showed she had conducted an affair with him at a time when he was still married. The elegant Madame Caillaux took matters into her own hands: On 16 March she walked into Calmette's office, drew a revolver from her m.u.f.f, and shot the editor four times at point-blank range. Her trial on charges of murder dominated Paris in the summer of 1914. Two shots fired by a Serbian youth at Sarajevo on 28 June paled in comparison. When Calmette published several letters from Caillaux's personal correspondence, Henriette Caillaux became alarmed. First, that correspondence could make public her husband's pacifist stance vis-a-vis Germany during the Second Moroccan Crisis in 1911; second, she knew that it included love letters from her to Joseph that showed she had conducted an affair with him at a time when he was still married. The elegant Madame Caillaux took matters into her own hands: On 16 March she walked into Calmette's office, drew a revolver from her m.u.f.f, and shot the editor four times at point-blank range. Her trial on charges of murder dominated Paris in the summer of 1914. Two shots fired by a Serbian youth at Sarajevo on 28 June paled in comparison.

Gavrilo Princip's murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the Habsburg throne, and his morganatic wife, Sophie Chotek, caused no immediate crisis in the major capitals. The dog days of summer were upon Europe. There ensued a mad rush to escape urban heat for cooler climes.4 French president Raymond Poincare and prime minister Rene Viviani were preparing to board the battleship French president Raymond Poincare and prime minister Rene Viviani were preparing to board the battleship France France for a leisurely cruise through the Baltic Sea to meet Tsar Nicholas II at St. Petersburg. Kaiser Franz Joseph took the waters at Bad Ischl. Wilhelm II was about to board the royal yacht for a leisurely cruise through the Baltic Sea to meet Tsar Nicholas II at St. Petersburg. Kaiser Franz Joseph took the waters at Bad Ischl. Wilhelm II was about to board the royal yacht Hohenzollern Hohenzollern for his annual cruise of the Norwegian fjords. Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg was off to the family estate at Hohenfinow to play Beethoven on the grand piano and to read Plato (in the original Greek). Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow saw no need to curtail his honeymoon at Lucerne. for his annual cruise of the Norwegian fjords. Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg was off to the family estate at Hohenfinow to play Beethoven on the grand piano and to read Plato (in the original Greek). Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow saw no need to curtail his honeymoon at Lucerne.

Nor were military men much concerned. German chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke struck out for Karlsbad, Bohemia, to meet his Austro-Hungarian counterpart, Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf. War Minister Erich von Falkenhayn was off to vacation in the East Frisian Islands. Navy Secretary Alfred von Tirpitz left Berlin for St. Blasien, in the Black Forest. Habsburg war minister Alexander von Krobatin took the cure at Bad Gastein.

Even the less prominent escaped the July heat. Sigmund and Martha Freud, like Moltke and Conrad, vacationed at Karlsbad. V. I. Lenin left Cracow to hike in the Tatra Mountains. Leon Trotsky took solace in a small apartment in the Vienna Woods. Adolf Hitler was back in Munich after a military court-martial at Salzburg had found the draft dodger unfit for military service ("too weak; incapable of bearing arms").5 But had the exodus of European leaders been all that innocent? Or had some deeper design lain at its root? The first move in what is popularly called the July Crisis rested with Vienna. Few in power lamented the pa.s.sing of Franz Ferdinand. He was too Catholic; he detested the Czechs, Magyars, and Poles within the empire; and he distrusted the ally in Rome. But the spilling of royal blood demanded an official response.

FOR MORE THAN HALF a dozen years prior to 1914, Conrad von Hotzendorf had pressed war on his government as the only solution to the perceived decline of the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire. Daily, the frail, thin, crew-cut chief of the General Staff had stood at his desk and drafted contingency war plans against "Austria's congenital foes" Italy and Serbia as well as against Albania, Montenegro, and Russia, or against combinations of these states. Each year, he had submitted them to Kaiser Franz Joseph and to Foreign Minister Aloys Lexa Count Aehrenthal. And each year, these two had steadfastly refused to act. a dozen years prior to 1914, Conrad von Hotzendorf had pressed war on his government as the only solution to the perceived decline of the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire. Daily, the frail, thin, crew-cut chief of the General Staff had stood at his desk and drafted contingency war plans against "Austria's congenital foes" Italy and Serbia as well as against Albania, Montenegro, and Russia, or against combinations of these states. Each year, he had submitted them to Kaiser Franz Joseph and to Foreign Minister Aloys Lexa Count Aehrenthal. And each year, these two had steadfastly refused to act.

Why, then, was July 1914 different?6 Conrad saw the murders at Sarajevo as a Serbian declaration of war. He cared little about the high school lads who had carried out the plot and about the secret organization "Union or Death," or the "Black Hand," that had planned it; his real enemy was Belgrade. He was determined not to let the last opportunity pa.s.s by "to settle accounts" with Serbia. He was haunted by the empire's failure to use the annexationist crisis over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 190809 to crush Serbian annexationist aspirations. There was also a personal motive: He informed his mistress Virginie "Gina" von Reininghaus that he was anxious to return from a war "crowned with success" so that he could "claim" her "as my dearest wife." Honor was at stake as well. While the war might be a "hopeless struggle" against overwhelming odds, Conrad informed Gina on the day of the Sarajevo killings, it had to be fought "because such an ancient monarchy and such an ancient army cannot perish ingloriously." Conrad saw the murders at Sarajevo as a Serbian declaration of war. He cared little about the high school lads who had carried out the plot and about the secret organization "Union or Death," or the "Black Hand," that had planned it; his real enemy was Belgrade. He was determined not to let the last opportunity pa.s.s by "to settle accounts" with Serbia. He was haunted by the empire's failure to use the annexationist crisis over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 190809 to crush Serbian annexationist aspirations. There was also a personal motive: He informed his mistress Virginie "Gina" von Reininghaus that he was anxious to return from a war "crowned with success" so that he could "claim" her "as my dearest wife." Honor was at stake as well. While the war might be a "hopeless struggle" against overwhelming odds, Conrad informed Gina on the day of the Sarajevo killings, it had to be fought "because such an ancient monarchy and such an ancient army cannot perish ingloriously."7 In a nutsh.e.l.l, Conrad's position in July 1914, in the words of the new foreign minister, Leopold Count Berchtold, was simply: "War, war, war." In a nutsh.e.l.l, Conrad's position in July 1914, in the words of the new foreign minister, Leopold Count Berchtold, was simply: "War, war, war."8 By 1914, Franz Joseph shared Conrad's "war at any price" mind-set. Serbian arrogance had to be rooted out, by force if necessary. The kaiser was plagued by nightmares-of Solferino, where in 1859 he had led Austrian armies to defeat at the hands of France and Piedmont-Sardinia; and of Koniggratz, where in 1866 his forces had been routed by those of King Wilhelm I of Prussia. Thus in July 1914, Franz Joseph was prepared to draw the sword. Honor demanded no less. "If we must go under," he confided to Conrad, "we better go under decently."9 That left the foreign minister. In the past, Berchtold, like Aehrenthal, had resisted Conrad's demands for war. But diplomacy had brought no security. Thus, Berchtold, emboldened by the hard-line stance of a small cohort of hawks at the Foreign Office, endorsed military measures. Just two days after the Sarajevo murders, he spoke of the need for a "final and fundamental reckoning" "final and fundamental reckoning" with Serbia. with Serbia.10 And he worked out a set of a.s.sumptions to underpin his decision: Early and decisive action by Berlin would deter possible Russian intervention and "localize" the war in the Balkans. And he worked out a set of a.s.sumptions to underpin his decision: Early and decisive action by Berlin would deter possible Russian intervention and "localize" the war in the Balkans.

But would Berlin play the role of gallant second? During past Balkan crises, Wilhelm II and his advisers had refused to back Habsburg initiatives with military force. Would July 1914 confirm that pattern? Berchtold, knowing that he needed diplomatic and military backing from Berlin, on 4 July dispatched Alexander Count Hoyos, his chef de cabinet chef de cabinet, to sound out what the German position would be in the event that Vienna took actions to "eliminate" Serbia as a "political power factor in the Balkans."11 It was a clever move, given the kaiser's well-known propensity for personal diplomacy. In meetings the next two days with Wilhelm II, Bethmann Hollweg, Falkenhayn, and Undersecretary of the Foreign Office Arthur Zimmermann, Hoyos and Habsburg amba.s.sador Laszlo Count Szogyeny-Marich obtained promises of "full German backing" for whatever action Vienna took against Belgrade. There was no time to lose. "The present situation," the kaiser noted, "is so favorable to us." Diplomats and soldiers "considered the question of Russian intervention and accepted the risk of a general war." It was a clever move, given the kaiser's well-known propensity for personal diplomacy. In meetings the next two days with Wilhelm II, Bethmann Hollweg, Falkenhayn, and Undersecretary of the Foreign Office Arthur Zimmermann, Hoyos and Habsburg amba.s.sador Laszlo Count Szogyeny-Marich obtained promises of "full German backing" for whatever action Vienna took against Belgrade. There was no time to lose. "The present situation," the kaiser noted, "is so favorable to us." Diplomats and soldiers "considered the question of Russian intervention and accepted the risk of a general war."12 Austria-Hungary could count on "Germany's full support" even if "serious European complications"-war-resulted. And in the apparent interest of "localizing the war" in the Balkans, Berlin was ready to point to the soon-to-be-vacationing Wilhelm II, Moltke, and Falkenhayn as "evidence" that Germany would be "as surprised as the other powers" by any aggressive Austro-Hungarian action against Serbia. Austria-Hungary could count on "Germany's full support" even if "serious European complications"-war-resulted. And in the apparent interest of "localizing the war" in the Balkans, Berlin was ready to point to the soon-to-be-vacationing Wilhelm II, Moltke, and Falkenhayn as "evidence" that Germany would be "as surprised as the other powers" by any aggressive Austro-Hungarian action against Serbia.13 Having obtained what is often referred to as a blank check from Germany, Austria-Hungary was free to plot its actions. On 7 July, Berchtold convened a Common Council of Ministers at Vienna and apprised those present of Berlin's staunch support, "even though our operations against Serbia should bring about the great war."14 War Minister von Krobatin favored war "now better than later." Austrian premier Karl Count Sturgkh demanded "a military reckoning with Serbia." Conrad von Hotzendorf as always was set on war. Only Hungarian premier Istvan Tisza demurred. He desired no more Slavic subjects, given that his Magyars were already a minority within their half of the empire. And he feared that an attack on Serbia would bring on "the dreadful calamity of a European war." But within a week he joined the majority view-on condition that Belgrade be handed a stringent ultimatum that would allow Habsburg officials to enter Serbia to hunt down the a.s.sa.s.sins. War Minister von Krobatin favored war "now better than later." Austrian premier Karl Count Sturgkh demanded "a military reckoning with Serbia." Conrad von Hotzendorf as always was set on war. Only Hungarian premier Istvan Tisza demurred. He desired no more Slavic subjects, given that his Magyars were already a minority within their half of the empire. And he feared that an attack on Serbia would bring on "the dreadful calamity of a European war." But within a week he joined the majority view-on condition that Belgrade be handed a stringent ultimatum that would allow Habsburg officials to enter Serbia to hunt down the a.s.sa.s.sins.

The final decision for war was made at a special Common Council of Ministers convened at Berchtold's residence on 19 July. It was quickly decided to hand the ultimatum, carefully crafted by the foreign minister's staff to a.s.sure rejection, to Belgrade on 23 July and to demand acceptance within forty-eight hours. The day after the Common Council, Berchtold advised Conrad and Krobatin to begin their planned summer holidays "to preserve the appearance that nothing is being planned."15 Tisza's countryman Istvan Count Burian laconically noted: "The wheel of history rolls." Tisza's countryman Istvan Count Burian laconically noted: "The wheel of history rolls."16 Serbia rejected the ultimatum on 25 July. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Britain's envoy to Vienna, informed Whitehall: "Vienna bursts into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning." Serbia rejected the ultimatum on 25 July. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Britain's envoy to Vienna, informed Whitehall: "Vienna bursts into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning."17 Berchtold visited Franz Joseph at Bad Ischl. He informed the kaiser that Serbian gunboats had fired on Habsburg troops near Temes-Kubin (Kovin). It was a lie, but it served its purpose. "Hollow eyed," the aged Franz Joseph signed the order for mobilization. His only recorded comment, delivered "in a m.u.f.fled, choked voice," was "Also, doch!" "Also, doch!" ("So, after all!") Was it said in conviction? Or in relief? The next day, mobilization began and civil liberties were suspended. Vienna, in the words of historian Samuel R. Williamson Jr., "clearly initiated the violence in July 1914" and "plunged Europe into war." ("So, after all!") Was it said in conviction? Or in relief? The next day, mobilization began and civil liberties were suspended. Vienna, in the words of historian Samuel R. Williamson Jr., "clearly initiated the violence in July 1914" and "plunged Europe into war."18 It had set the tempo, defined the moves, and closed off all other options. In doing so, it was motivated by fear-of Pan-Slavic nationalism, of losing the military advantage to Serbia (and Russia), and of forfeiting Germany's promised support. It had set the tempo, defined the moves, and closed off all other options. In doing so, it was motivated by fear-of Pan-Slavic nationalism, of losing the military advantage to Serbia (and Russia), and of forfeiting Germany's promised support.

WHY WAR IN 1914? Why had Germany not drawn the sword during crises in 1905, 1908, 1911, 1912, or 1913? What made 1914 different? The answer lies in the seriousness of the Austro-Hungarian request for backing and in the changed mind-set at Berlin. First, a few myths need to be dispelled. Germany did not go to war in 1914 as part of a "grab for world power" as historian Fritz Fischer 1914? Why had Germany not drawn the sword during crises in 1905, 1908, 1911, 1912, or 1913? What made 1914 different? The answer lies in the seriousness of the Austro-Hungarian request for backing and in the changed mind-set at Berlin. First, a few myths need to be dispelled. Germany did not go to war in 1914 as part of a "grab for world power" as historian Fritz Fischer19 argued in 1961, but rather to defend (and expand) the borders of 1871. Second, the decision for war was made in late July 1914 and not at a much-publicized "war council" at Potsdam on 8 December 1912. argued in 1961, but rather to defend (and expand) the borders of 1871. Second, the decision for war was made in late July 1914 and not at a much-publicized "war council" at Potsdam on 8 December 1912.20 Third, no one planned for a European war before 1914; the absence of financial or economic blueprints for such an eventuality speaks for itself. And Germany did not go to war with plans for continental hegemony; its infamous shopping list of war aims was not drawn up by Bethmann Hollweg Third, no one planned for a European war before 1914; the absence of financial or economic blueprints for such an eventuality speaks for itself. And Germany did not go to war with plans for continental hegemony; its infamous shopping list of war aims was not drawn up by Bethmann Hollweg21 until 9 September, when French and German forces had squared off for their t.i.tanic encounter at the Marne River. until 9 September, when French and German forces had squared off for their t.i.tanic encounter at the Marne River.

This having been said, Berlin issued Vienna the famous blank check on 5 July. Why? Neither treaty obligations nor military algebra demanded this offer. But civilian as well as military planners were dominated by a strike-now-better-than-later mentality. Time seemed to be running against them. Russia was launching its Big Program of rearmament, scheduled to be completed by 1917. Could one wait until then? Wilhelm II mused on the eve of the Sarajevo murders.22 The Anglo-French-Russian Entente Cordiale encircled Germany with what it perceived to be an iron ring of enemies. More, there circulated in public and official circles dire prognostications of what Bethmann Hollweg summarized for the Reichstag in April 1913 as the "inevitable struggle" between Slavs and Teutons-what historian Wolfgang J. Mommsen called the cla.s.sical rhetoric of "inevitable war." The Anglo-French-Russian Entente Cordiale encircled Germany with what it perceived to be an iron ring of enemies. More, there circulated in public and official circles dire prognostications of what Bethmann Hollweg summarized for the Reichstag in April 1913 as the "inevitable struggle" between Slavs and Teutons-what historian Wolfgang J. Mommsen called the cla.s.sical rhetoric of "inevitable war."23 On 3 July, when Amba.s.sador Heinrich von Tschirschky cabled Vienna's decision to avenge the Sarajevo killings, Wilhelm II noted "now or never" on the report.24 Three days later, the kaiser promised Austria-Hungary "Germany's full support" even if "serious European complications" resulted from this-and advised Vienna not to "delay the action" against Belgrade. Pilloried in the press for having been too "timid" and for having postured like a "valiant chicken" during past crises, Wilhelm on 6 July three times a.s.sured his dinner guest, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, that this time he would not "cave in." Three days later, the kaiser promised Austria-Hungary "Germany's full support" even if "serious European complications" resulted from this-and advised Vienna not to "delay the action" against Belgrade. Pilloried in the press for having been too "timid" and for having postured like a "valiant chicken" during past crises, Wilhelm on 6 July three times a.s.sured his dinner guest, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, that this time he would not "cave in."

Bethmann Hollweg likewise adopted a belligerent stance.25 Shortly after his meeting with the Austrians on 5 July, the chancellor informed Riezler that Russia "grows and grows and weighs on us like a nightmare." According to Hoyos, Bethmann Hollweg bluntly stated that "were war unavoidable, the present moment would be more advantageous than a later one." Two days later, the chancellor a.s.sured Vienna that he regarded a coup de main against Serbia to be the "best and most radical solution" to the Dual Monarchy's Balkan problems. For he had worked out a "calculated risk." If war came "from the east" and Germany entered it to preserve the Habsburg Empire, "then we have the prospect of winning it." If Russia remained idle, "then we have the prospect of having outmaneuvered the Entente in this matter." On 11 July, Bethmann Hollweg summarized his rationale for war: "A quick fait accompli and then friendly [stance] toward the Entente; then we can survive the shock." Whatever dark fate loomed over the Continent, the "Hamlet" of German politics was resigned to war. To have abandoned Austria-Hungary in July 1914, he wrote in his memoirs, would have been tantamount to "castration" on Germany's part. Shortly after his meeting with the Austrians on 5 July, the chancellor informed Riezler that Russia "grows and grows and weighs on us like a nightmare." According to Hoyos, Bethmann Hollweg bluntly stated that "were war unavoidable, the present moment would be more advantageous than a later one." Two days later, the chancellor a.s.sured Vienna that he regarded a coup de main against Serbia to be the "best and most radical solution" to the Dual Monarchy's Balkan problems. For he had worked out a "calculated risk." If war came "from the east" and Germany entered it to preserve the Habsburg Empire, "then we have the prospect of winning it." If Russia remained idle, "then we have the prospect of having outmaneuvered the Entente in this matter." On 11 July, Bethmann Hollweg summarized his rationale for war: "A quick fait accompli and then friendly [stance] toward the Entente; then we can survive the shock." Whatever dark fate loomed over the Continent, the "Hamlet" of German politics was resigned to war. To have abandoned Austria-Hungary in July 1914, he wrote in his memoirs, would have been tantamount to "castration" on Germany's part.26 That left Moltke.27 As early as 1911, he had informed the General Staff, "All are preparing themselves for the great war, which all sooner or later expect." One year later, he had pressed Wilhelm II for war with Russia, "and the sooner the better." During his meeting with Conrad von Hotzendorf at Karlsbad on 12 May 1914, Moltke had lectured his counterpart that "to wait any longer meant a diminishing of our chances." The "atmosphere was charged with a monstrous electrical tension," Moltke averred, and that "demanded to be discharged." As early as 1911, he had informed the General Staff, "All are preparing themselves for the great war, which all sooner or later expect." One year later, he had pressed Wilhelm II for war with Russia, "and the sooner the better." During his meeting with Conrad von Hotzendorf at Karlsbad on 12 May 1914, Moltke had lectured his counterpart that "to wait any longer meant a diminishing of our chances." The "atmosphere was charged with a monstrous electrical tension," Moltke averred, and that "demanded to be discharged."28 Two months before the Sarajevo tragedy, he had confided to Foreign Secretary von Jagow that "there was no alternative but to fight a preventive war so as to beat the enemy while we could still emerge fairly well from the struggle." To be sure, Moltke feared what he called a "horrible war," a "world war," one in which the "European cultural states" would "mutually tear themselves to pieces," and one "that will destroy civilization in almost all of Europe for decades to come." Two months before the Sarajevo tragedy, he had confided to Foreign Secretary von Jagow that "there was no alternative but to fight a preventive war so as to beat the enemy while we could still emerge fairly well from the struggle." To be sure, Moltke feared what he called a "horrible war," a "world war," one in which the "European cultural states" would "mutually tear themselves to pieces," and one "that will destroy civilization in almost all of Europe for decades to come."29 But he saw no alternative. On 29 July, he counseled Wilhelm II that the Reich would "never hit it again so well as we do now with France's and Russia's expansion of their armies incomplete." But he saw no alternative. On 29 July, he counseled Wilhelm II that the Reich would "never hit it again so well as we do now with France's and Russia's expansion of their armies incomplete."

How was the decision for war reached? The gravity of the moment hit Berlin with full force after Vienna handed Belgrade its ultimatum on 23 July-and Prime Minister Nikola Pai rejected it two days later. This greatly alarmed leaders in St. Petersburg, who felt that Austria-Hungary with this move was threatening Russia's standing as a great power and who believed that they needed to show solidarity with the "little Slavic brother," Serbia, to show resolve. On 2930 July, Berlin learned first of Russia's partial mobilization and then of its general mobilization. War Minister von Falkenhayn truncated his holidays on 24 July and rushed back to the capital. Austria-Hungary, he quickly deduced, "simply wants the final reckoning" with Serbia. Moltke returned from Karlsbad two days later. Wilhelm II left the fjords of Norway and was back in Berlin by 27 July. He hastily convened an ad hoc war council. Falkenhayn tersely summed up its result: "It has now been decided to fight the matter through, regardless of the cost."30 What historian Stig Forster has described as the bureaucratic chaos of the imperial system of government31 was fully in evidence in Berlin as the July Crisis entered its most critical stage. Bethmann Hollweg was in a panic to pa.s.s responsibility for the coming "European conflagration" on to Russia, and he drafted several telegrams for "w.i.l.l.y" to fire off to his cousin "Nicky," calling on Tsar Nicholas II to halt Russian mobilization-to no avail. Moltke and Falkenhayn raced in staff cars between Berlin and Potsdam. At times, they demanded that Wilhelm II and Bethmann Hollweg declare a state of "pre-mobilization;" at other times, they counseled against it. The chancellor conferred with the generals throughout 29 July. Moltke first lined up with the hawk Falkenhayn and pushed for the immediate declaration of a "threatening state of danger of war;" then he sided with Bethmann Hollweg and urged restraint. The chancellor sat on the fence, now supporting Falkenhayn, now Moltke, prevaricating on the issue of mobilization. At one point, he even dashed off a missive to Vienna asking its armies to "halt in Belgrade." was fully in evidence in Berlin as the July Crisis entered its most critical stage. Bethmann Hollweg was in a panic to pa.s.s responsibility for the coming "European conflagration" on to Russia, and he drafted several telegrams for "w.i.l.l.y" to fire off to his cousin "Nicky," calling on Tsar Nicholas II to halt Russian mobilization-to no avail. Moltke and Falkenhayn raced in staff cars between Berlin and Potsdam. At times, they demanded that Wilhelm II and Bethmann Hollweg declare a state of "pre-mobilization;" at other times, they counseled against it. The chancellor conferred with the generals throughout 29 July. Moltke first lined up with the hawk Falkenhayn and pushed for the immediate declaration of a "threatening state of danger of war;" then he sided with Bethmann Hollweg and urged restraint. The chancellor sat on the fence, now supporting Falkenhayn, now Moltke, prevaricating on the issue of mobilization. At one point, he even dashed off a missive to Vienna asking its armies to "halt in Belgrade."

In fact, Bethmann Hollweg was waiting for the right moment to play his trump card. Shortly before midnight on 29 July, he called Amba.s.sador Sir Edward Goschen to his residence and made him an offer: If Britain remained neutral in the coming war, Germany would offer London a neutrality pact, guarantee the independence of the Netherlands, and promise not to undertake "territorial gains at the expense of France."32 Goschen was flabbergasted by what he called the chancellor's "astounding proposals;" a livid Sir Edward Grey, secretary of state for foreign affairs, called them "shameful." With that, Bethmann Hollweg ruefully informed the Prussian Ministry of State the next day that "the hope for England [was now] zero." Goschen was flabbergasted by what he called the chancellor's "astounding proposals;" a livid Sir Edward Grey, secretary of state for foreign affairs, called them "shameful." With that, Bethmann Hollweg ruefully informed the Prussian Ministry of State the next day that "the hope for England [was now] zero."33 Bethmann Hollweg withdrew behind a veil of fatalism. "All governments," he moaned, had "lost control" over the July Crisis. Europe was rushing headlong down the steep slope to war. "The stone has begun to roll."34 The night of 30 July, at Moltke's insistence, the chancellor agreed to inst.i.tute a state of emergency, the precondition for mobilization. The night of 30 July, at Moltke's insistence, the chancellor agreed to inst.i.tute a state of emergency, the precondition for mobilization.

Around 2 PM PM on 31 July, Wilhelm II ordered the government to issue a decree stating that a "threatening state of danger of war" existed. Falkenhayn rushed to the palace through cheering crowds to sign the decree and to record the high drama. "Thereupon the Kaiser shook my hand for a long time; tears stood in both of our eyes." on 31 July, Wilhelm II ordered the government to issue a decree stating that a "threatening state of danger of war" existed. Falkenhayn rushed to the palace through cheering crowds to sign the decree and to record the high drama. "Thereupon the Kaiser shook my hand for a long time; tears stood in both of our eyes."35 The decision brought relief and joy to official Berlin. The decision brought relief and joy to official Berlin.36 The strain and stress of the past few days lay behind. At the Chancellery, Bethmann Hollweg, ever the pessimist, worried about what he termed a "leap into the dark," but concluded that it was his "solemn duty" to undertake it. At the Navy Cabinet, Admiral Georg Alexander von Muller crowed: "The mood is brilliant. The government has managed brilliantly to make us appear the attacked." At the General Staff, Moltke detected "an atmosphere of happiness." At the Prussian War Office, Bavarian military plenipotentiary Karl von Wenninger noted "beaming faces, shaking of hands in the corridors; one congratulates one's self for having taken the hurdle." Berlin was about "to begin the most serious, b.l.o.o.d.y business that the world has ever seen." Wenninger took "malicious delight" while riding in the Grunewald to note that "the army would soon expropriate the superb steeds of the city's wealthy Jews." The strain and stress of the past few days lay behind. At the Chancellery, Bethmann Hollweg, ever the pessimist, worried about what he termed a "leap into the dark," but concluded that it was his "solemn duty" to undertake it. At the Navy Cabinet, Admiral Georg Alexander von Muller crowed: "The mood is brilliant. The government has managed brilliantly to make us appear the attacked." At the General Staff, Moltke detected "an atmosphere of happiness." At the Prussian War Office, Bavarian military plenipotentiary Karl von Wenninger noted "beaming faces, shaking of hands in the corridors; one congratulates one's self for having taken the hurdle." Berlin was about "to begin the most serious, b.l.o.o.d.y business that the world has ever seen." Wenninger took "malicious delight" while riding in the Grunewald to note that "the army would soon expropriate the superb steeds of the city's wealthy Jews."37 Wilhelm II signed the order for general mobilization at 5 PM PM on 1 August-in the Star Chamber of the Neues Palais at Potsdam, on the desk made from the planking of Horatio Nelson's flagship HMS on 1 August-in the Star Chamber of the Neues Palais at Potsdam, on the desk made from the planking of Horatio Nelson's flagship HMS Victory Victory, a present from his grandmother Queen-Empress Victoria. Cousins "Nicholas and Georgie," he informed his inner circle, "have played me false! If my grandmother had been alive, she would never have allowed it."38 Champagne was served to celebrate the momentous moment. Champagne was served to celebrate the momentous moment.

But all had not gone as smoothly as the mere recitation of events would indicate. Late on the afternoon of 1 August, Moltke headed back to Berlin after the kaiser had signed the mobilization order. He was ordered to return to the Neues Palais at once. An important dispatch had arrived from Karl Prince von Lichnowsky in London: Grey had a.s.sured the amba.s.sador that London would "a.s.sume the obligation" of keeping Paris out of the war if Germany did not attack France. "Jubilant mood," the chief of the General Staff noted.39 An ecstatic Wilhelm II redirected Moltke, "Thus we simply a.s.semble our entire army in the east!" Moltke was thunderstruck. The deployment of an army of millions could not simply be "improvised," he reminded the kaiser. The An ecstatic Wilhelm II redirected Moltke, "Thus we simply a.s.semble our entire army in the east!" Moltke was thunderstruck. The deployment of an army of millions could not simply be "improvised," he reminded the kaiser. The Aufmarschplan Aufmarschplan represented the labor of many years; radically overturning it at the last minute would result in the "ragged a.s.sembly" of a "wild heap of disorderly armed men" along the Russian frontier. In a highly agitated state, Wilhelm II shot back: "Your uncle [Moltke the Elder] would have given me a different answer." represented the labor of many years; radically overturning it at the last minute would result in the "ragged a.s.sembly" of a "wild heap of disorderly armed men" along the Russian frontier. In a highly agitated state, Wilhelm II shot back: "Your uncle [Moltke the Elder