There is another piece of evidence, supplied by Rev. R. L. Dabney in the Southern Historical Society Papers, in a communication ent.i.tled "Colonel Baldwin's Interview with Mr. Lincoln." This purports to give the writer's recollections of an interview with Baldwin in March, 1865, at Petersburg, while the siege of that place was going on. Baldwin said that Secretary Seward sent Allan B. Magruder as a messenger to Mr.

Janney, president of the Virginia Convention, urging that one of the Union members come to Washington to confer with Lincoln. Baldwin was called out of the convention by Summers on the 3d of April to see Magruder, and the latter said that Seward had authorized him to say that Fort Sumter would be evacuated on Friday of the ensuing week. The gentlemen consulted urged Baldwin to go to Washington, and he consented and did go promptly. Seward accompanied him to the White House and Lincoln took him upstairs into his bedroom and locked the door. Lincoln "took a seat on the edge of the bed, spitting from time to time on the carpet." The two entered into a long dispute about the right of secession. Baldwin insisted that coercion would lead to war, in which case Virginia would join in behalf of the seceded states.

Lincoln's native good sense [the narrative proceeds], with Baldwin's evident sincerity, seemed now to open his eyes to the truth. He slid off the edge of the bed and began to stalk in his awkward manner across the chamber in great excitement and perplexity. He clutched his s.h.a.ggy hair as though he would jerk out handfuls by the roots. He frowned and contorted his features, exclaiming, "I ought to have known this sooner; you are too late, sir, _too late_. Why did you not come here four days ago and tell me all this?" Colonel Baldwin replied: "Why, Mr. President, you did not ask our advice."

The foregoing narrative involves the supposition that Lincoln, in the midst of preparations for sending a fleet to Fort Sumter, dispatched a messenger to Richmond to bring a man to Washington to discuss with him the abstract question of the right of a state to secede, and that, having procured the presence of such a person, he took him into a bedroom, locked the door, and had the debate with him, taking care that n.o.body else should hear a syllable of it. Not a word about Fort Sumter, although Magruder, the messenger, had said that it would be evacuated on the following Friday! Yet the Rev. Mr. Dabney did not see the incongruity of the situation.

Nicolay and Hay say that Lincoln did not make any offer to Baldwin to evacuate Sumter, but did tell him what he had intended to say to Summers, if the latter had come to Washington at the right time.[53]

Douglas in combating the Rebels, in contrast to the futile diplomacy of Seward:

A marvelous incident is related in Welles's Diary immediately after his narrative of the Harvey affair. It describes the activity and earnestness of Stephen A.

Two days preceding the attack on Sumter, I met Senator Douglas in front of the Treasury Building. He was in a carriage with Mrs. Douglas, driving rapidly up the street. When he saw me he checked his driver, jumped from the carriage, and came to me on the sidewalk, and in a very earnest and emphatic manner said the rebels were determined on war and were about to make an a.s.sault on Sumter. He thought immediate and decisive measures should be taken; considered it a mistake that there had not already been more energetic action; said the dilatory proceedings of the Government would bring on a terrible civil war; that the whole South was united and in earnest. Although he had differed with the Administration on important questions and would never be in accord with some of its members on measures and principles that were fundamental, yet he had no fellowship with traitors or disunionists. He was for the Union and would stand by the Administration and all others in its defense, regardless of party. [Welles proposed that they should step into the State Department and consult with Seward.] The look of mingled astonishment and incredulity which came over him I can never forget. "Then you," he said, "have faith in Seward! Have you made yourself acquainted with what has been going on here all winter? Seward has had an understanding with these men. If he has influence with them, why don't he use it?"

Douglas considered it a waste of time and effort to talk to Seward, considered him a dead weight and drag on the Administration; said that Lincoln was honest and meant to do right, but was benumbed by Seward; but finally yielded to Welles's desire that they should go into Seward's office, in front of which they were standing. They went in and Douglas told Seward what he had told Welles, that the rebels were determined on war and were about to make an a.s.sault on Sumter, and that the Administration ought not to delay another minute, but should make instant preparations for war. All the reply they got from Seward was that there were many rash and reckless men at Charleston and that if they were determined to a.s.sault Sumter he did not know how they were to be prevented from doing so.

Seward's aims were patriotic but futile. He wished to save the Union without bloodshed, but the steps which he took were almost suicidal.

What the country then needed was a jettison of compromises, and a resolution of doubts. Providence supplied these. The bombardment of Sumter accomplished the object as nothing else could have done. Nothing could have been contrived so sure to awaken the volcanic forces that ended in the destruction of slavery as the spectacle in Charleston Harbor.

FOOTNOTES:

[51] _Diary of Gideon Welles_, I, 32.

[52] _Letters and Diaries of John Hay_, 1, 47.

[53] Nicolay and Hay, III, 428. Probably the entry in Hay's Diary had been forgotten when the History was written, twenty-five years later.

CHAPTER X

BULL RUN--THE CONFISCATION ACT

In company with other Senators, Trumbull went to the battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861. His experience there he communicated to his wife, first by a brief telegram, and afterwards by letter. The telegram was suppressed by the authorities in charge of the telegraph office, who subst.i.tuted one of their own in place of it and appended his name to it.

The letter follows:

WASHINGTON, July 22nd, 1861.

We started over into Virginia about 9 o'clock A.M., and drove to Centreville, which is a high commanding position and a village of perhaps fifty houses. Bull Run, where the battle occurred, is South about 3 miles and the creek on the main road, looking West, is about 4-1/2 miles distant. The country is timbered for perhaps a mile West of the creek, between which and Centreville there are a good many cleared fields. At Centreville, Grimes and I got saddles and rode horseback down the main road towards the creek about three miles toward a hospital where were some few wounded soldiers and a few prisoners who had been sent back. This was about half-past three o'clock P.M. Here we met with Col. Vandever of Iowa, who gave us a very clear account of the battle. He had been with Gen. McDowell and Gen. Hunter, who with the strongest part of the army, had gone early in the morning a few miles north of the main road and crossed the creek to take the enemy in the flank. His division had very serious fighting, but had driven the enemy back and taken three of his batteries. At the hospital we were about one and a half miles from Generals Tyler and Schenck, Col. Sherman, etc., who were down the road in the woods and out of sight, with several regiments and a number of guns. Their troops, Vandever told us, were a good deal demoralized, and he feared an attack from the South towards Bull Run where the battle of a few days ago was fought. About this time a battery, apparently not more than a mile and a half distant and from the South, fired on the battery where Sherman and Schenck were. The firing was not rapid. On the hill at Centreville we could see quite beyond the timber of the creek off towards Mana.s.sas and see the smoke and hear the report of the artillery, but not very rapid as I thought. This we observed before leaving Centreville, and were told it was our main army driving the enemy back, but slowly and with great difficulty.

While at the hospital McDougall of California came up from the neighborhood of Gen. Schenck and said he was going back towards Centreville to a convenient place where he could get water and take lunch. As Grimes and myself had got separated from Messrs.

Wade and Chandler and Brown, who had with them our supplies, we concluded to go back with McD. and partake with him. We returned on the road towards Centreville and turned up towards a house fifty or a hundred yards from the road, where we quietly took our lunch, the firing continuing about as before.

Just as we were putting away the things we heard a great noise, and looking up towards the road saw it filled with wagons, hors.e.m.e.n and footmen in full run towards Centreville. We immediately mounted our horses and galloped to the road, by which time it was crowded, hundreds being in advance on the way to Centreville and two guns of the Sherman battery having already pa.s.sed in full retreat. We kept on with the crowd, not knowing what else to do. On the way to Centreville many soldiers threw away their guns, knapsacks, etc. Gov. Grimes and I each picked up a gun. I soon came up to Senator Lane of Indiana, and the gun being heavy to carry and he better able to manage it, I gave it to him. Efforts were made to rally the men by civilians and others on their way to Centreville, but all to no purpose. Literally, three could have chased ten thousand.

All this stampede was occasioned, as I understand, by a charge of not exceeding two hundred cavalry upon Schenck's column down in the woods, which, instead of repulsing as they could easily have done (having before become disordered and having lost some of their officers), broke and ran, communicating the panic to everybody they met. The rebel cavalry, or about one hundred of them, charged up past the hospital where we had been and took there some prisoners, as I am told, and released those we had.

It was the most shameful rout you can conceive of. I suppose two thousand soldiers came rushing into Centreville in this disorganized condition. The cavalry which made the charge I did not see, but suppose they disappeared in double-quick time, not dreaming that they had put a whole division to flight. Several guns were left down in the woods, though I believe two were brought off. What became of Schenck I do not know. Tyler, I understand, was at Centreville when I got back there. Whether other portions of our army were shamefully routed just at the close of the day, after we had really won the battle, it seems impossible for me to learn, though I was told that McDowell was at Centreville when we were there and that his column had also been driven back. If this be so it is a terrible defeat. At Centreville there was a reserve of 8000 or 10,000 men under Col. Miles who had not been in the action and they were formed in line of battle when we left there, but the enemy did not, I presume, advance to that point last night, as we heard no firing. We fed our horses at Centreville and left there at six o'clock last evening. Came on to Fairfax Court House, where we got supper, and leaving there at ten o'clock reached home at half-past two this morning, having had a sad day and witnessed scenes I hope never to see again. Not very many baggage wagons, perhaps not more than fifty, were advanced beyond Centreville.

From them the horses were mostly unhitched and the wagons left standing in the road when the stampede took place. This side of Centreville there were a great many wagons, and the alarm if possible was greater than on the other. Thousands of shovels were thrown out upon the road, also axes, boxes of provisions, etc. In some instances wagons were upset to get them out of the road, and the road was full of four-horse wagons retreating as fast as possible, and also of flying soldiers who could not be made to stop at Centreville. The officers stopped the wagons and a good many of the retreating soldiers by putting a file of men across the road and not allowing them to pa.s.s. In this way all the teams were stopped, but a good many stragglers climbed the fences and got by. I fear that a great, and, of course, a terrible slaughter has overtaken the Union forces--G.o.d's ways are inscrutable. I am dreadfully disappointed and mortified.

Copy of telegram sent to Mrs. Lyman Trumbull, July 22, 1861:

The battle resulted unfavorably to our cause.

LYMAN T.

When received by Mrs. Trumbull, it read:

I came from near the battlefield last night. It was a desperately b.l.o.o.d.y fight.

The only bill of importance pa.s.sed at the July session of Congress at Trumbull's instance was one to declare free all slaves who might be employed by their owners, or with their owners' consent, on any military or naval work against the Government, and who might fall into our hands.

It was called a Confiscation Act, but it did not confiscate any other than slave property. It was an entering wedge, however, for complete emanc.i.p.ation which came by successive steps later.

At the beginning of the regular session (December, 1861), I was sent to Washington City as correspondent of the Chicago _Tribune_, and was, for the first time, brought into close relations with Trumbull. He had rented a house on G Street, near the Post-Office Department.

Very few Senators at that period kept house in Washington. At Mrs.

Shipman's boarding-house on Seventh Street, lived Senators Fessenden, Grimes, Foot, and Representatives Morrill, of Vermont, and Washburne, of Illinois; and there I also found quarters. As this was only a block distant from the Trumbulls', and as I had received a cordial welcome from them, I was soon on terms of intimacy with the family. Mr. Trumbull was then forty-eight-years of age, five feet ten and one half inches in height, straight as an arrow, weighing one hundred and sixty-seven pounds, of faultless physique, in perfect health, and in manners a cultivated gentleman. Mrs. Trumbull was thirty-seven years old, of winning features, gracious manners, and n.o.ble presence. Five children had been born to them, all sons. Walter, fifteen years of age, the eldest then living, had recently returned from an ocean voyage on the warship Vandalia, under Commander S. Phillips Lee. A more attractive family group, or one more charming in a social way or more kindly affectioned one to another, I have never known. Civilization could show no finer type.

The Thirty-seventh Congress met in a state of great depression. Disaster had befallen the armies of the Union, but the defeat at Bull Run was not so disheartening as the subsequent inaction both east and west.

McClellan on the Potomac had done nothing but organize and parade.

Fremont on the Mississippi had done worse than nothing. He had surrounded himself with a gang of thieves whose plundering threatened to bankrupt the treasury, and when he saw exposure threatening he issued a military order emanc.i.p.ating slaves, the revocation of which by the President very nearly upset the Government. The popular demand for a blow at slavery as the cause of the rebellion had increased in proportion as the military operations had been disappointing. Lincoln believed that the time had not yet come for using that weapon. He revoked Fremont's order. He thereby saved Kentucky to the Union, and he still held emanc.i.p.ation in reserve for a later day; but he incurred the risk of alienating the radical element of the Republican party--an honest, fiery, valiant, indispensable wing of the forces supporting the Union. The explosion which took place in this division of the party was almost but not quite fatal. Many letters received by Trumbull at this juncture were angry and some mournful in the extreme. The following written by Mr. M. Carey Lea, of Philadelphia, touches upon a danger threatening the national finances, in consequence of this episode:

PHILADELPHIA, Nov. 1, 1861.

DEAR SIR: The ability of our Government to carry on this war depends upon its being able to continue to obtain the enormous amounts of money requisite. Of late, within a week or so, an alarming falling off in the bond subscriptions has taken place.

Now it is upon these private subscriptions that the ability of the banks to continue to lend the Government money depends, and unless a change takes place they will be unable to take the fifty millions remaining of the one hundred and fifty millions loan. A member of the committee informed me lately that the banks had positively declined to pledge themselves before the 1st of December, notwithstanding Mr. Chase's desire that they should do so.

This sudden diminution of subscriptions arises from the course taken by some of our friends in the West. Even suppose that Gen. Fremont is treated unfairly by the Government (and I think he is fairly termed incapable)--but suppose there should be injustice done him--you might disapprove it, but the moment there is any serious idea of _resisting_ the act of the President, _this_ war is ended. For the bare suggestion of such a thing has almost stopped subscriptions, and the serious discussion, much more the attempt, would instantly put an end to them.

I beg to remind you that in what I say I have no prejudice against Fremont. I voted for him and have always concurred in opinions with the Republican party, but we have now reached a point where, if we look to _men_ and not to _principles_, we are shipwrecked. Fremont is not more anti-slavery in his views than Lincoln and Seward, and if he were in their place would adopt the same cautious policy. The state of affairs must be my excuse for intruding upon you these views. We _all_ have _all_ at stake and such a crisis leads those to speak who are ordinarily silent. I remain, my dear Sir,

Yours respectfully,

M. CAREY LEA.

To this weighty communication Trumbull made the following reply:

WASHINGTON, Nov. 5th, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR: Thanks for your kind letter just received. I was not aware of a disposition in the West to resist the act of the President in regard to Gen. Fremont; though I was aware that there was very great dissatisfaction in that part of the country at the want of enterprise and energy on that part of our Grand Army of the Potomac. We are fighting to sustain const.i.tutional government and regulated liberty, and, of course, to set up any military leader in opposition to the const.i.tuted authorities would be utterly destructive of the very purpose for which the people of the loyal states are now so liberally contributing their blood and treasure, and could only be justified in case those charged with the administration of affairs were betraying their trusts or had shown themselves utterly incompetent and unable to maintain the Government. In my opinion this rebellion ought to and might have been crushed before this.

I have entire confidence in the integrity and patriotism of the President. He means well and in ordinary times would have made one of the best of Presidents, but he lacks confidence in himself and the _will_ necessary in this great emergency, and he is most miserably surrounded. Now that Gen. Scott has retired, I hope for more activity and should confidently expect it did I not know that there is still remaining an influence almost if not quite controlling, which I fear is looking more to some grand diplomatic move for the settlement of our troubles than to the strengthening of our arms. It is only by making this war terrible to traitors that our difficulties can be permanently settled. War means desolation, and they who have brought it on must be made to feel all its horrors, and our armies must go forth using all the means which G.o.d and nature have put in their hands to put down this wicked rebellion. This in the end will be done, and if our armies are vigorously and actively led will soon give us peace. I trust that Gen.

McClellan will now drive the enemy from the vicinity of the Capital--that he has the means to do it, I have no doubt. If the case were reversed and the South had our means and our arms and men, and we theirs, they would before this have driven us to the St. Lawrence. If our army should go into winter quarters with the Capital besieged, I very much fear the result would be a recognition of the Confederates by foreign Governments, the demoralization of our own people, and of course an inability to raise either men or money another season. Such must not be.

Action, action is what we want and must have. G.o.d grant that McClellan may prove equal to the emergency.

Yours very truly,

LYMAN TRUMBULL.