On the 25th powder and ball were given out to the soldiers, and inhabitants, the sick with some raw soldiers being left to guard this old sort of fort.

From this place to the fort of the Chicasaws are seven leagues: this day they marched five leagues and a half in two columns and in file, across the woods. On the wings marched the Chactaws, to the number of twelve hundred at least, commanded by their Grand Chief. In the evening they encamped in a meadow, surrounded with wood.

{90} On the 26th of May they marched to the enemy's fort, across thin woods; and with water up to the waist, pa.s.sed over a rivulet, which traverses a small wood; on coming out of which, they entered a fine plain: in this plain stood the fort of the Chicasaws, with a village defended by it. This fort is situated on an eminence, with an easy ascent; around it stood several huts, and at a greater distance towards the bottom, other huts, which appeared to have been put in a state of defence: quite close to the fort ran a little brook, which watered a part of the plain.

The Chactaws no sooner espied the enemy's fort, than they rent the air with their death-cries, and instantly flew to the fort: but their ardour flagged at a carabin-shot from the place. The French marched in good order, and got beyond a small wood, which they left in their rear, within cannon-shot of the enemy's fort, where an English flag was seen flying. At the same time four Englishmen, coming from the huts, were seen to go up the ascent, and enter the fort, where their flag was set up.

Upon this, it was imagined, they would be summoned to quit the enemy's fort, and to surrender, as would in like manner the Chicasaws: but nothing of this was once proposed. The General gave orders to the Majors to form large detachments of each of their corps, in order to go and take the enemy's fort. These orders were in part executed: three large detachments were made; namely, one of grenadiers, one of soldiers, and another of militia, or train-bands; who, to the number of twelve hundred men, advanced with ardour towards the enemy's fort, crying out aloud several times, _Vive le Roi_, as if already masters of the place; which, doubtless, they imagined to carry sword in hand; for in the whole army there was not a single iron tool to remove the earth, and form the attacks.

The rest of the army marched in battle-array, ten men deep; mounted the eminence whereon the fort stood, and being come there, set fire to some huts, with wild-fire thrown at the ends of darts; but the smoke stifled the army.

The regular troops marched in front, and the militia, or train-bands, in rear. According to rule these train-bands {91} made a quarter turn to right and left, with intent to go and invest the place. But M. de Jusan, Aid-Major of the troops, stopt short their ardor, and sent them to their proper post, reserving for his own corps the glory of carrying the place, which continued to make a brisk defence.

Biainville remained at the quarters of reserve; where he observed what would be the issue of the attack, than which none could be more disadvantageous.

Both the regulars and inhabitants, or train-bands, gave instances of the greatest valour: but what could they do, open and exposed as they were, against a fort, whose stakes or wooden posts were a fathom in compa.s.s, and their joinings again lined with other posts, almost as big? From this fort, which was well garrisoned, issued a shower of b.a.l.l.s; which would have mowed down at least half the a.s.sailants, if directed by men who knew how to fire. The enemy were under cover from all the attacks of the French, and could have defended themselves by their loop-holes.

Besides, they formed a gallery of flat pallisadoes quite round, covered with earth, which screened it from the effects of grenadoes. In this manner the troops lavished their ammunition against the wooden posts, or stakes, of the enemy's fort, without any other effect than having thirty-two men killed, and almost seventy wounded; which last were carried to the body of reserve; from whence the General, seeing the bad success of the attack, ordered to beat the retreat, and sent a large detachment to favour it. It was now five in the evening, and the attack had been begun at half an hour after one. The troops rejoined the body of the army, without being able to carry off their dead, which were left on the field of battle, exposed to the rage of the enemy.

After taking some refreshment, they directly fortified themselves, by felling trees, in order to pa.s.s the night secure from the insults of the enemy, by being carefully on their guard. Next day it was observed the enemy had availed themselves of that night to demolish some huts, where the French, during the attack, had put themselves under cover, in order from thence to batter the fort.

{92} On the 27th, the day after the attack, the army began its march, and lay at a league from the enemy. The day following, at a league from the landing-place, whither they arrived next day, the French embarked for Fort Mobile, and from thence for the Capital, from which each returned to his own home.

A little time after, a serjeant of the garrison of the Illinois arrived at New Orleans, who reported, that, in consequence of the General's orders, M. d'Artaguette had taken his measures so well, that on the 9th of May he arrived with his men near the Chicasaws, sent out scouts to discover the arrival of the French army; which he continued to do till the 20th: that the Indians in alliance hearing no accounts of the French, wanted either to return home, or to attack the Chicasaws; which last M. d'Artaguette resolved upon, on the 21st, with pretty good success at first, having forced the enemy to quit their village and fort: that he then attacked another village with the same success, but that pursuing the runaways, M. d'Artaguette had received two wounds, which the Indians finding, resolved to abandon that Commandant, with forty-six soldiers and two serjeants, who defended their Commandant all that day, but were at last obliged to surrender; that they were well used by the enemy, who understanding that the French were in their country, prevailed on M. d'Artaguette to write to the General: but that this deputation having had no success, and learning that the French were retired, and despairing of any ransom for their slaves, put them to death by a slow fire. The serjeant added, he had the happiness to fall into the hands of a good master, who favoured his escape to Mobile.

M. de Biainville, desirous to take vengeance of the Chicasaws, wrote to France for succours, which the Court sent, ordering also the Colony of Canada to send succours. In the mean time M. de Biainville sent off a large detachment for the river St. Francis, in order to build a fort there, called also St. Francis.

The squadron which brought the succours from France being arrived, they set out, by going up the Missisippi, for the fort that had been just built. This army consisted of Marines, {93} of the troops of the Colony, of several Inhabitants, many Negroes, and some Indians, our allies; and being a.s.sembled in this place, took water again, and still proceeded up the Missisippi to a little river called Margot, near the Cliffs called Prud'homme, and there the whole army landed. They encamped on a fine plain, at the foot of a hill, about fifteen leagues from the enemy; fortified themselves by way of precaution, and built in the fort a house for the Commandant, some cazerns, and a warehouse for the goods. This fort was called a.s.sumption, from the day on which they landed.

They had waggons and sledges made, and the roads cleared for transporting cannon, ammunition, and other necessaries for forming a regular siege. There and then it was the succours from Canada arrived, consisting of French, Iroquois, Hurons, Episingles, Algonquins, and other nations: and soon after arrived the new Commandant of the Illinois, with the garrison, inhabitants, and neighbouring Indians, all that he could bring together, with a great number of horses.

This formidable army, consisting of so many different nations, the greatest ever seen, and perhaps that ever will be seen, in those parts, remained in this camp without undertaking any thing, from the month of August 1739, to the March following. Provisions, which at first were in great plenty, came at last to be so scarce, that they were obliged to eat the horses which were to draw the artillery, ammunition, and provisions: afterwards sickness raged in the army. M.

de Biainville, who hitherto had attempted nothing against the Chicasaws, resolved to have recourse to mild methods. He therefore detached, about the 15th of March, the company of Cadets, with their Captain, M. de Celoron, their Lieutenant, M. de St. Laurent, and the Indians, who came with them from Canada, against the Chicasaws, with orders to offer peace to them in his name, if they sued for it.

What the General had foreseen, failed not to happen. As soon as the Chicasaws saw the French, followed by the Indians of Canada, they doubted not in the least, but the rest of that numerous army would soon follow; and they no sooner saw them approach, but they made signals of peace, and came out {94} of their fort in the most humble manner, exposing themselves to all the consequences that might ensue, in order to obtain peace. They solemnly protested that they actually were, and would continue to be inviolable friends of the French; that it was the English, who prevailed upon them to act in this manner; but that they had fallen out with them on this account, and at that very time had two of that nation, whom they made slaves; and that the French might go and see whether they spoke truth.

M. de St. Laurent asked to go, and accordingly went with a young slave: but he might have had reason to have repented it, had not the men been more prudent than the women, who demanded the head of the Frenchman: but the men, after consulting together, were resolved to save him, in order to obtain peace of the French, on giving up the two Englishmen. The women risk scarce any thing near so much as the men; these last are either slain in battle, or put to death by their enemies; whereas the women at worst are but slaves; and they all perfectly well know, that the Indian women are far better off when slaves to the French, than if married at home. M. de St. Laurent, highly pleased with this discovery, promised them peace in the name of M. de Biainville, and of all the French: after these a.s.surances, they went all in a body out of the fort, to present the Pipe to M. de Celoron, who accepted it, and repeated the same promise.

In a few days after, he set out with a great company of Chicasaws, deputed to carry the Pipe to the French General, and deliver up the two Englishmen. When they came before M. de Biainville, they fell prostrate at his feet, and made him the same protestations of fidelity and friendship, as they had already made to M. de Celoron; threw the blame on the English; said they were entirely fallen out with them, and had taken these two, and put them in his hands, as enemies. They protested, in the most solemn manner, they would for ever be friends of the French and of their friends, and enemies of their enemies; in fine, that they would make war on the English, if it was thought proper, in order to shew that they renounced them as traitors.

{95} Thus ended the war with the Chicasaws, about the beginning of April, 1740. M. de Biainville dismissed the auxiliaries, after making them presents; razed the Fort a.s.sumption, thought to be no longer necessary, and embarked with his whole army; and in pa.s.sing down, caused the Fort St. Francis to be demolished, as it was now become useless; and he repaired to the Capital, after an absence of more than ten months.

Some years after, we had disputes with a part of the Chactaws, who followed the interests of the Red-Shoe, a Prince of that nation, who, in the first expedition against the Chicasaws, had some disputes with the French. This Indian, more insolent than any one of his nation, took a pretext to break out, and commit several hostilities against the French. M. de Vaudreuil, then Governor of Louisiana, being apprised of this, and of the occasion thereof, strictly forbad the French to frequent that nation, and to truck with them any arms or ammunition, in order to put a stop to that disorder in a short time, and without drawing the sword.

M. de Vaudreuil, after taking these precautions, sent to demand of the Grand Chief of the whole nation, whether, like the Red-Shoe, he was also displeased with the French. He made answer, he was their friend: but that the Red-Shoe was a young man, without understanding. Having returned this answer, they sent him a present: but he was greatly surprised to find neither arms, powder, nor ball in this present, at a time when they were friends as before. This manner of proceeding, joined to the prohibition made of trucking with them arms or ammunition, heightened their surprise, and put them on having an explication on this head with the Governor; who made answer, That neither arms nor ammunition would be trucked with them, as long as the Red-Shoe had no more understanding; that they would not fail, as being brethren, to share a good part of the ammunition and arms with the Warriors of the Red-Shoe. This answer put them on remonstrating to the Village that insulted us; told them, if they did not instantly make peace with the French, they would themselves make war upon them. This threatening declaration made them sue for peace with the French, who were not in a condition to maintain {96} a war against a nation so numerous. And thus the prudent policy of M. de Vaudreuil put a stop to this war, without either expence or the loss of a man.

CHAPTER XIV.

_Reflections on what gives Occasions to Wars in_ Louisiana. _The Means of avoiding Wars in that Province, as also the Manner of coming off with Advantage and little Expence in them._

The experience I have had in the art of war, from some campaigns I made in a regiment of dragoons till the peace of 1713, my application to the study of the wars of the Greeks, Romans, and other ancient people, and the wars I have seen carried on with the Indians of Louisiana, during the time I resided in that Province, gave me occasion to make several reflections on what could give rise to a war with the Indians, on the means of avoiding such a war, and on such methods as may be employed, in order either to make or maintain a war to advantage against them, when constrained thereto.

In the s.p.a.ce of sixteen years that I resided in Louisiana, I remarked, that the war, and even the bare disputes we have had with the Indians of this Colony, never had any other origin, but our too familiar intercourse with them.

In order to prove this, let us consider the evils produced by this familiarity. In the first place, it makes them gradually drop that respect, which they naturally entertain for our nation.

In the second place, the French traffickers, or traders, are generally young people without experience, who, in order to gain the good-will of these people, afford them lights, or instruction, prejudicial to our interest. These young merchants are not, it is true, sensible of these consequences: but again, these people never lose sight of what can be of any utility to them, and the detriment thence accruing is not less great, nor less real.

In the third place, this familiarity gives occasion to vices, whence dangerous distempers ensue, and corruption of blood, {97} which is naturally highly pure in this colony. These persons, who frequently resort to the Indians, imagined themselves authorized to give a loose to their vices, from the practice of these last, which is to give young women to their guests upon their arrival; a practice that greatly injures their health, and proves a detriment to their merchandizing.

In the fourth place, this resorting to the Indians puts these last under a constraint, as being fond of solitude; and this constraint is still more heightened, if the French settlement is near them; which procures them too frequent visits, that give them so much more uneasiness, as they care not on any account that people should see or know any of their affairs. And what fatal examples have we not of the dangers the settlements which are too near the Indians incur. Let but the ma.s.sacre of the French be recollected, and it will be evident that this proximity is extremely detrimental to the French.

In the fifth and last place, commerce, which is the princ.i.p.al allurement that draws us to this new world instead of flourishing, is, on the contrary, endangered by the too familiar resort to the Indians of North America. The proof of this is very simple.

All who resort to countries beyond sea, know by experience, that when there is but one ship in the harbour, the Captain sells his cargo at what price he pleases: and then we hear it said, such a ship gained two, three, and sometimes as high as four hundred per cent. Should another ship happen to arrive in that harbour, the profit abates at least one half; but should three arrive, or even four successively, the goods then are, so to speak, thrown at the head of the buyer: so that in this case a merchant has often great difficulty to recover his very expenses of fitting out. I should therefore be led to believe, that it would be for the interest of commerce, if the Indians were left to come to fetch what merchandize they wanted, who having none but us in their neighbourhood, would come for it, without the French running any risk in their commerce, much less in their lives.

For this purpose, let us suppose a nation of Indians on the banks of some river or rivulet, which is always the case, as all {98} men whatever have at all times occasion for water. This being supposed, I look out for a spot proper to build a small terras-fort on, with fraises or stakes, and pallisadoes. In this fort I would build two small places for lodgings, of no great height; one to lodge the officers, the other the soldiers: this fort to have an advanced work, a half-moon, or the like, according to the importance of the post. The pa.s.sage to be through this advanced work to the fort, and no Indian allowed to enter on any pretence whatever; not even to receive the Pipe of Peace there, but only in the advanced work; the gate of the fort to be kept shut day and night against all but the French. At the gate of the advanced work a sentinel to be posted, and that gate to be opened and shut on each person appearing before it. By these precautions we might be sure never to be surprised, either by avowed enemies, or by treachery. In the advanced work a small building to be made for the merchants, who should come thither to traffick or truck with the neighbouring Indians; of which last only three or four to be admitted at a time, all to have the merchandize at the same price, and no one to be favoured above another. No soldier or inhabitant to go to the villages of the neighbouring Indians, under severe penalties. By this conduct disputes would be avoided, as they only arise from too great a familiarity with them. These forts to be never nearer the villages than five leagues, or more distant than seven or eight. The Indians would make nothing of such a jaunt; it would be only a walk for them, and their want of goods would easily draw them, and in a little time they would become habituated to it. The merchants to pay a salary to an interpreter, who might be some orphan, brought up very young among these people.

This fort, thus distant a short journey, might be built without obstruction, or giving any umbrage to the Indians: as they might be told it was built in order to be at hand to truck their furs, and at the same time to give them no manner of uneasiness. One advantage would be, besides that of commerce, which would be carried on there, that these forts would prevent the English from having any communication with the Indians, as these last would find a great facility for their truck, and in forts so near them, every thing they could want.

{99} The examples of the surprise of the forts of the Natchez, the Yazoux, and the Missouris, shew but too plainly the fatal consequences of negligence in the service, and of a misplaced condescension in favour of the soldiers, by suffering them to build huts near the fort, and to lie in them. None should be allowed to lie out of the fort, not even the Officers. The Commandant of the Natchez, and the other Officers, and even the Serjeants, were killed in their houses without the fort. I should not be against the soldiers planting little fields of tobacco, potatoes, and other plants, too low to conceal a man: on the contrary, these employments would incline them to become settlers; but I would never allow them houses out of the fort. By this means a fort becomes impregnable against the most numerous; because they never will attack, should they have ever so much cause, as long as they see people on their guard.

Should it be objected that these forts would cost a great deal: I answer, that though there was to be a fort for each nation, which is not the case, it would not cost near so much as from time to time it takes to support wars, which in this country are very expensive, on account of the long journeys, and of transporting all the implements of war, hitherto made use of. Besides, we have a great part of these forts already built, so that we only want the advanced works; and two new forts more would suffice to compleat this design, and prevent the fraudulent commerce of the English traders.

As to the manner of carrying on the war in Louisiana, as was. .h.i.therto done, it is very expensive, highly fatiguing, and the risk always great; because you must first transport the ammunition to the landing-place; from thence travel for many leagues; then drag the artillery along by main force, and carry the ammunition on men's shoulders, a thing that hara.s.ses and weakens the troops very much. Moreover, there is a great deal of risk in making war in this manner: you have the approaches of a fort to make, which cannot be done without loss of lives: and should you make a breach, how many brave men are lost, before you can force men who fight like desperadoes, because they prefer death to slavery.

{100} I say, should you make a breach; because in all the time I resided in this Province, I never saw nor heard that the cannon which were brought against the Indian forts, ever made a breach for a single man to pa.s.s: it is therefore quite useless to be at that expence, and to hara.s.s the troops to bring artillery, which can be of no manner of service.

That cannon can make no breach in Indian forts may appear strange: but not more strange than true; as will appear, if we consider that the wooden posts or stakes which surround these forts, are too big for a bullet of the size of those used in these wars, to cut them down, though it were even to hit their middle. If the bullet gives more towards the edge of the tree, it glides off, and strikes the next to it; should the ball hit exactly between two posts, it opens them, and meets the post of the lining, which stops it short: another ball may strike the same tree, at the other joining, then it closes the little aperture the other had made.

Were I to undertake such a war, I would bring only a few Indian allies; I could easily manage them; they would not stand me so much in presents, nor consume so much ammunition and provisions: a great saving this; and bringing no cannon with me, I should also save expences. I would have none but portable arms; and thus my troops would not be hara.s.sed. The country every where furnishes wherewithal to make moveable intrenchments and approaches, without opening the ground: and I would flatter myself to carry the fort in two days time.

There I stop: the reader has no need of this detail, nor I to make it public.

CHAPTER XV.

Pensacola _taken by Surprize by the_ French. _Retaken by the_ Spaniards.

_Again retaken by the_ French, _and demolished_.

Before I go any farther, I think it necessary to relate what happened with respect to the Fort of Pensacola in Virginia. [Footnote: The author must mean Carolina.] This fort belongs to the Spaniards, and serves for an {101} Entrepot, or harbour for the Spanish galleons to put into, in their pa.s.sage from La Vera Cruz to Europe.

Towards the beginning of the year 1719, the Commandant General having understood by the last ships which arrived, that war was declared between France and Spain, resolved to take the post of Pensacola from the Spaniards; which stands on the continent, about fifteen leagues from Isle Dauphine, is defended by a staccado-fort the entrance of the road: over against it stands a fortin, or small fort, on the west point of the Isle St. Rose; which, on that side, defends the entrance of the road: this fort has only a guard-house to defend it.

The Commandant General, persuaded it would be impossible to besiege the place in form, wanted to take it by surprise, confiding in the ardor of the French, and security of the Spaniards, who were as yet ignorant of our being at war with them in Europe. With that view he a.s.sembled the few troops he had, with several Canadian and French planters, newly arrived, who went as volunteers. M. de Chateauguier, the Commandant's brother, and King's Lieutenant, commanded under him; and next him, M. de Richebourg, Captain. After arming this body of men, and getting the necessary supplies of ammunition and provisions, he embarked with his small army, and by the favour of a prosperous wind, arrived in a short time at his place of destination. The French anch.o.r.ed near the Fortin, made their descent undiscovered, seized on the guard-house, and clapt the soldiers in irons; which was done in less than half an hour. Some French soldiers were ordered to put on the cloaths of the Spaniards, in order to facilitate the surprising the enemy. The thing succeeded to their wish. On the morrow at day-break, they perceived the boat which carried the detachment from Pensacola, in order to relieve the guard of the fortin; on which the Spanish march was caused to be beat up; and the French in disguise receiving them, and clapping them in irons, put on their cloaths; and stepping into the same boat, surprised the sentinel, the guard-house, and at last the garrison, to the very Governor himself, who was taken in bed; so that they all were made prisoners without any bloodshed.