103 From Sept. 24, 1867, Lieut. Gen. Blas Villate, to Dec. 12, 1867 Count of Valmaseda

104 From Dec. 13, 1867, Lieut. Gen. Francisco Lersundi to Jan. 4, 1869

105 From Jan. 4, 1869, Lieut. Gen. Domingo Dulce to June 2, 1869 y Garay, second time

106 From June 2, 1869, Lieut. Gen. Felipe Ginoves to June 28, 1869 del Espinar, provisional 107 From June 28, 1869, Lieut. Gen. Antonio Fernandez to Dec. 15, 1870 y Caballero de Rodas

108 From Dec. 15, 1870, Lieut. Gen. Blas Villate, to July 11, 1872 Count of Valmaseda

109 From July 11, 1872, Lieut. Gen. Francisco Ceballos to Apr. 18, 1873 y Vargas

110 From Apr. 18, 1873, Lieut. Gen. Candido Pieltain to Nov. 4, 1873 y Jove-Huelgo

111 From Nov. 4, 1873, Lieut. Gen. Joaquin Jovellar to Apr. 7, 1874 y Soler

112 From Apr. 7, 1874, Lieut. Gen. Jose Gutierrez to May 8, 1875 de la Concha, Marquis of Habana

113 From May 8, 1875, Lieut. Gen. Buenaventura to June 8, 1875 Carbo, provisional

114 From June 8, 1875, Lieut. Gen. Blas Villate, to Jan. 18, 1876 Count of Valmaseda, third time

115 From Jan. 18, 1876, Lieut. Gen. Joaquin Jovellar to June 18, 1878 y Soler. He was under Martinez Campos, who was the general in chief

116 From Oct. 8, 1876, Lieut. Gen. a.r.s.enio Martinez to Feb. 5, 1879 Campos

117 From Feb. 5, 1879, Lieut. Gen. Cayetano Figueroa to Apr. 17, 1879 y Garaondo, provisional

118 From Apr. 17, 1879, Lieut. Gen. Ramon Blanco to Nov. 28, 1881 y Erenas

119 From Nov. 28, 1881, Lieut. Gen. Luis Prendergast to Aug. 5, 1883 y Gordon, Marquis of Victoria de las Tunas

120 From. Aug. 5, 1883, Lieut. Gen. of Division to Sept. 28, 1883 Tomas de Reyan y Reyna, provisional

121 From Sept. 28, 1883, Lieut. Gen. Ignacio Maria to Nov. 8, 1884 del Castillo

122 From Nov. 8, 1884, Lieut. Gen. Ramon Fajardo to Mar. 25, 1886 e Izquierdo

123 From Mar. 25, 1886, Lieut. Gen. Emilio Calleja to July 15, 1887 e Isasi

124 From July 15, 1887, Lieut. Gen. Saba Marin y to Mar. 13, 1889 Gonzalez

125 From Mar. 13, 1889, Lieut. Gen. Manuel Salamanca died Feb. 6, 1890 y Begrete

126 From Mar. 13, 1889, General of Division Jose to Apr. 4, 1890 Sanchez Gomez, provisional

127 From Apr. 4, 1890, Lieut. Gen. Jose Chinchilla to Aug. 20, 1890 y Diez de Onate

128 From Aug. 20, 1890, Lieut. Gen. Camilo Polavieja to June 20, 1892 y del Castillo

129 From June 20, 1892; Lieut. Gen. Alejandro Rodriguez died July 15, 1893 Arias

130 From July 15, 1893, General of Division Jose to Sept. 5, 1893 Arderius y Garcia, provisional

131 From Sept. 5, 1893, Lieut. Gen. Emilio Calleja to Apr. 16, 1895 e Isasi

132 From Apr. 16, 1895, Captain Gen. a.r.s.enio Martinez to Jan. 20, 1896 Campos

133 From Jan. 20, 1896, Lieut. Gen. Savas Marin y to Feb. 11, 1896 Gonzalez

134 From Feb. 11, 1896, Lieut. Gen. Valeriano Weyler to Oct. 31, 1897 y Nicolau

135 From Oct. 31, 1897, Capt. Gen. Ramon Blanco to Nov. 30, 1898 y Erenas

136 From Nov. 30, 1898, Lieut. Gen. Adolfo Jimines to Jan. 1, 1899, Castellanos at 12 noon.

There must be added an unwelcome note. The Spaniards--not their high officials--left most ungraciously. It is not to be wondered at that they were sad, that they were sullen, that they were resentful; that they were fearful lest the Cubans should rise against them at the last moment and inflict upon them vengeance for the treasured wrongs of many years.

But there was of course no such uprising. The Cubans wished to make the day an occasion of great public celebration, but the authorities--Cuban and American as well as Spanish--would not permit it. It was not courteous to exult over a beaten foe. Besides, any such celebration would have caused great danger of trouble. What was inexcusable, however, was the condition in which the Spanish left all public buildings. They looted and gutted them of everything that could be removed. They destroyed the plumbing and lighting fixtures. They broke or choked up the drains. They left every place in an indescribably filthy condition. There was nothing in all their record in Cuba more unbecoming than their manner of leaving it. Such was the last detail of the settlement with Spain.

The settlement with Cuba came next. Indeed, it was concurrently undertaken. And it was by far the more formidable task of the two. It was necessary to arrange for the transfer of the temporary trust of the United States to a permanent Cuban authority, and to do so in circ.u.mstances and conditions which would afford the largest possible degree of a.s.surance of success. It is said that when the American flag was raised at Havana in token of temporary sovereignty, on January 1, 1899, an American Senator among the spectators exclaimed, "That flag will never come down!" There were also, doubtless, those among the Cuban spectators who thought and said that it should never have been raised, but that sovereignty should have been transferred directly from Spain to Cuba.

Both were wrong; as both in time came to realize. It was necessary for the sake of good faith and justice that the American flag should in time come down and give place to the flag of Cuba. It was equally necessary for the sake of the welfare of Cuba and of its future prosperity and tranquillity that there should be a period of American stewardship preparatory to full independence.

There was, as we have already indicated, some friction between Cubans and Americans at the time of intervention in the Spring of 1898. The Cubans thought that the American army should not enter Cuba at all, save with an artillery force to serve as an adjunct to the Cuban army. On the other hand, Americans were too much inclined to disregard the Cuban army and Provisional Government, to forget what the Cubans had already achieved, and to act as though the war were solely between the United States and Spain. When the actual landing of Shafter's army was made, however, the Cubans accepted the fact loyally and gracefully, and gave the fullest possible measure of helpful cooperation.

The Provisional Government of the Cuban Republic, as soon as hostilities were ended and negotiations for peace had begun, decided to summon another National a.s.sembly to determine what should be done during the interval which should elapse before the United States placed the destinies of Cuba in the hands of Cubans. This decision was made at a meeting at Santa Cruz on September 1, at which were present the President, Bartolome Maso; the Vice-President, Mendez Capote; and the three Secretaries, Aleman, Fonts-Sterling and Moreno de la Torre. It was felt, and not without reason, that the Insular government and its forces had not received the recognition which was their due. Calixto Garcia and Francisco Estrada had given valuable partic.i.p.ation in the siege and capture of Santiago, yet they were not permitted by General Shafter to partic.i.p.ate in the ceremony of the surrender of the Spanish forces, or even to be present on that exultant occasion. When the Americans thus took possession of Santiago and Oriente, the Cuban government, military and civil, was ignored, and General Leonard Wood was made Military Governor just as though there was no Cuban government in existence.

[Ill.u.s.tration: OLD AND NEW IN HAVANA

The architecture of Havana ranges from the sixteenth century to the twentieth, and specimens of all five centuries may in some places be found grouped within a single scene; with electric lights and telephones in buildings which were standing when Francis Drake threatened the city with conquest.]

During the months of the American blockade of the island, moreover, the Cubans had suffered perhaps even more than the Spanish from lack of supplies. It was felt that while it was well thus to deprive the Spanish army of supplies, the Cuban people ought not to have been left to suffer. After the armistice affairs remained in a distressing condition.

The Cuban army was without food and without pay with which to purchase food; and the Provisional Government was powerless to help it or to help the starving civilian population. It had no funds, and of course could not now raise any either by taxation or by loans. Late in November some relief was afforded by the sending of food from the United States, but on the whole the conditions were unsatisfactory, and did not conduce to cordial confidence between the Cubans and the Americans.

The National a.s.sembly which had been called on September 1 met at Santa Cruz on November 7, and resolved upon the disbandment of the Provisional Government, and the appointment of a special Commission to look after Cuban interests during the period of American occupation. This Commission consisted of Domingo Mendez Capote, President; Ferdinand Freyre de Andrade, Vice-President; and Manuel M. Coronado and Dr.

Porfirio Caliente, Secretaries. The army organization was to be retained, for the present, with General Maximo Gomez as Commander-in-Chief.

The real crux of the situation, at the moment, was the demobilization of the Cuban army. This could not be done--Gomez would not consider it--until the men could be paid, and there was no money with which to pay them. Among the 36,000 men on the rosters, there were said to be 20,000 who had served two years or more, and who were ent.i.tled to pay.

Gomez issued an appeal to the army and to the Cuban people generally to accept loyally the temporary American occupation and to cooperate with the Americans in the reestablishment of order and the development of governmental inst.i.tutions, in order that at the earliest possible moment Cuba might be able to a.s.sume the whole task of self government. At the same time he urgently requested the United States government to advance money with which to pay off the soldiers, in order that the army might be disbanded and the men might return to their homes and their work, and thus restore the industrial prosperity of the island. For this purpose he suggested the sum of $60,000,000, not only for actual pay but also for compensation for the losses which the officers and men had suffered during the war. He was inclined to keep his men under arms until the United States should relinquish control of Cuba to the Cubans, or should fix a date for so doing; and toward the end of January, 1899, he mustered all his forces in the Province of Havana, and made his staff headquarters in the former palace of the Captain-General. Meantime the Commission of the Cuban National a.s.sembly recommended that the men be granted furloughs, to enable them to go to work in response to the great demand for labor that was arising throughout the island. This course was pursued to a considerable extent.

Ultimately the United States government granted the sum of $3,000,000 for the purpose of paying off the soldiers. This was not a loan, to be repaid, but was an outright gift, being the remainder of the sum of $50,000,000 which had been voted to the President at the beginning of the war to use at his discretion. It was given on the conditions that every recipient should prove his service in the army and should surrender a rifle. To this latter requirement, which meant the disarming of the Cubans, General Gomez strongly objected, but in the end he acquiesced and agreed to carry out the plan as soon as the money was at hand. Thereupon some other Cuban officers disputed his right to commit the Cuban army to any such arrangement. They were dissatisfied with the small amount, and they insisted that only the Cuban a.s.sembly had power to act upon the American offer. They added that they would refuse to obey the orders of General Gomez, and would look to the a.s.sembly for justice. It should be added that these officers were not those who had been most active and efficient in the field.

General Gomez ignored this mutinous demonstration, and proceeded with arrangements to receive and distribute the $3,000,000; whereupon the a.s.sembly came together and on March 12 impeached General Gomez and removed him from office as Commander-in-Chief, the charge being that he had failed in his military duties and had disobeyed the orders of the a.s.sembly. This scandalous performance was ignored by Gomez, and was condemned by the great majority of the Cuban people. It was also ignored by the American authorities. General Brooke continued his negotiations with Gomez, and finally reached an agreement. The terms were as follows: Every Cuban soldier who had been in service since before July 17, 1898, and who was not in receipt of salary from any public office, upon delivery of his arms and equipments was to receive $75 in United States gold. The arms and equipments were to be surrendered to munic.i.p.al authorities, and to be placed and kept in armories, under the charge of armorers appointed by General Gomez, as memorials of the War of Independence. The Cuban Commissioners protested against and resisted this settlement, but finally yielded when they saw all the soldiers accepting it. They continued for some time, however, to manifest disaffection and distrust toward the United States, and to propagate doubt whether that country would ever fulfill its promise to make Cuba independent. Some agitators went so far as to try to provoke insurrections against the American administration. But all such things met with no encouragement from General Gomez or from any of the real leaders of the Cuban people, who expressed the fullest confidence in the good faith of the United States and did their utmost to lead the nation to take advantage of the unparalleled opportunity which had been placed before it. Day by day the magnitude of that opportunity became more apparent, as did the practical beneficence of the American administration.

CHAPTER IX