Such is the teaching of, _v.gr._, Professor Paulsen, of Berlin, in his "_System of Ethics_," in which he is at one with Scholasticism, though, I daresay, we should not follow him in all his applications of the principle. He prefers to call such instances "_necessary lies_," whereas we should say they were not lies at all, because they would not be rightly considered to imply _speaking_ strictly understood, that is, the communication of one's mind to another. There is no real speech where there are no relations of mutual confidence. Practically, however, it is so far a question of name rather than of reality, of theory rather than of fact.

The doctrine of _Mental Reservation_ seems to me to differ from that of _Equivocation_ only in this, that Equivocation implies the use of words which have a two-fold meaning in themselves, _apart from_ special circ.u.mstances, and are therefore _logical_ equivoques. Thus to the question: "_What do people think of me?_" one might diplomatically reply: "_Oh! they think a great deal!_" which leaves it undetermined whether the thinking be of a favourable or unfavourable character.

But more commonly words, apart from special circ.u.mstances, have one definite meaning, _e.gr._, "_Yes_" or "_No_." When Sir Walter Scott denied, as he himself tells us, the authorship of "_Waverley_" with a plain simple "_No_," he was guilty of no logical Equivocation: but the circ.u.mstance that it was generally known that the author intended to preserve anonymity gave his answer the signification, "_Mind your own business._" This is what I should call a _moral_ equivoque. The Scholastics call it _broad mental reservation_ (_restrictio late mentalis_). The origin of this terminology seems to me to lie in a bit of purism. Some moralists were not content with merely _moral_ equivoques: they appear to insist on the junction with them of _logical_ Equivocation; and so they would have directed the equivocator to _restrict_ (and so double) the meaning of a word in his own mind. Thus to Sir Walter they would have said: "Don't say '_No_' simply, but add in your own head, '_as far as the public is concerned_,'" or something similar.

When this addition could not be conjectured by the hearer, it received the name of _pure mental reservation_ (_restrictio pure_ [or _stricte_]

_mentalis_): as when one might say "_John is not here_" (meaning in his mind "not on the exact spot where the speaker stood"), though John was a yard off all the time. Such a position has not found favour in the body of Catholic moralists. They regard it as not only a useless proceeding, but as one which, although intended out of respect for truth, is liable, from its purely subjective character, to easy abuse.

But when objective circ.u.mstances (as in the case of Sir Walter) enable the hearer to guess at the double meaning and to suspend his judgment, then we have a case of _broad_ mental reservation: for it is writ large in social convention that, where a momentous secret exists, a negative answer carries with it the limitation (restriction, reservation), "_secrets apart_."

I trust I have made it sufficiently clear that the doctrine of Equivocation, properly understood, has been devised in the interests of Veracity. That we may find in some writers, whether St. Alphonsus de Liguori or Professor Paulsen, particular applications in which we do not concur, surely does not affect the validity of the principle.

I may add that _all_ Catholic theologians with whom I am acquainted limit its use by requiring many external conditions: _v.gr._, that the secret to be preserved should be of importance; that the questioner should have no right to its knowledge, etc. In one word, that the possible damage to mutual confidence resulting from the hearer's self-deception should be less than that which would certainly accrue from the revelation of a legitimate secret.

No one feels more keenly than we do that to have resort to Equivocation is an evil rendered tolerable only in presence of a greater evil of the same nature; and I venture to say, from an intimate knowledge of my brother "religious," that no one is less likely to recur to it, where only his own skin is concerned, than a Jesuit.

Believe me, Yours very sincerely, George Canning, S.J.[A]

[Footnote A: The above lucid explanation of the much and (_me judice_) stupidly maligned doctrine of Equivocation will place readers of this work, as well as the writer, under an obligation of grat.i.tude to the Rev.

George Canning, who is the Professor of Ethics at St. Mary's Hall, Stonyhurst, so I am informed by the Rev. Bernard Boedder, S.J., Professor of Natural Theology, at that seat of learning, whom I have had the honour of meeting in York on more than one occasion. "Wisdom builds her house for _all_ weathers." But England, relying too much on a long course of prosperity in her ruling cla.s.ses, and in the protected cla.s.ses immediately beneath her ruling cla.s.ses, has neglected the Truth and Justice contained in this eminently rational doctrine of Equivocation. The democracy must, and will, however, insist on amiable, self-contenting, self-pleasing delusions being speedily swept away. Reason and self-interest alike will compel and compa.s.s this.

The question of Equivocation is not a question of Protestant _versus_ Catholic, but of Wise Noddle _versus_ Foolish Noddle. This is a distinct gain.]

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

CIRc.u.mSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DEFINED AND DESCRIBED.

Circ.u.mstantial Evidence is indirect, as distinct from direct evidence. It is likewise mediate, as distinct from immediate.

Direct evidence is testimony that is a statement of what the witness himself has seen, heard, or perceived by the evidence of any one of his own five senses,[A] which testimony is directly given by a witness, to lead to the facts in issue, that is, the facts required to be proved in order to make out or to const.i.tute the criminal case, or the civil cause of action, sought to be established, according to some rule of Law.

[Footnote A: By sight, hearing, smell, taste, or touch.]

Indirect or mediate evidence is _inferred_ from a relatively minor fact or relatively minor facts already directly proved.

This _inference_ is drawn by a valid process of reasoning from a relatively minor fact or minor facts already directly deposed to by a witness, who may be a party interested in the case or cause, or a stranger-witness, either friendly or hostile.

Hence, Circ.u.mstantial Evidence is _specially_ inferential and c.u.mulative in its nature. It denotes the resultant of a method of knowledge, which has carried the Inquirer forward by successive stages of advancement.

It implies the _inferring_ of the unknown from the known; but from a known which has been itself trans.m.u.ted from the unknown, at some point of time anterior to the making of the successive stage of advancement in the knowledge of the facts sought to be proved, and vindicated by some rule of Law.

The following interesting account of Evidence generally is from the pen of Mr. Frank Pick, of Burton Lodge, York, a student of the Law:--

Evidence is the collective term used to denote the facts whereby some proposition, statement, or conclusion is sought to be established or confirmed.

While, as thus defined, the term Evidence primarily denotes the actual _known_ facts themselves which form the basis or point of departure, it connotes also a method or process in the development of those known facts to a resultant fact or opinion: and the resultant fact or opinion so obtained. The former is often styled _Testimony_.

This will be ill.u.s.trated in Circ.u.mstantial Evidence, and in what is commonly styled "Expert Evidence," though better, "Evidence of Opinion,"

where a person from a consideration of certain facts not necessarily expressed (being likewise one specially competent to form an opinion where such certain facts are involved) gives an opinion which may be used as, and for similar purposes with, evidence as above defined.

The value of evidence, _i.e._, the completeness and efficiency with which it serves these ends, varies with, and the weight accorded to it in judgment is determined from, a review of the character or quality of the source whence these facts proceed; and the nature or proximity of the relation which they bear to the proposition, statement, or conclusion to be supported.

As regards the character or quality of its source, evidence is distinguished into primary and secondary.

Primary Evidence is the witness or testimony of personal experience, whether shown in the spoken or written word or by conduct. Or it may be described as, on its positive side, the avowal or confession of fact of a person present knowingly, at the manifestation, in consciousness of the phenomenon to which the fact corresponds: on its negative side, as the denial or negation of fact similarly conditioned.

Secondary Evidence comprises all the manifold degrees of nearness or remoteness to primary evidence.

As all degrees are here included, it is sometimes said that there are no degrees of secondary evidence. This must not be misunderstood to mean that all secondary evidence is ent.i.tled to be received as of the same degree of credibility. For a further, and in some respects parallel, distinction to that lastly taken, arises as the speech is or is not deliberate, the writing authenticated, the conduct reasoned. And in every case partiality, bias, and prejudice are grounds not to be neglected in the ascertainment of accuracy and trustworthiness.

So far as regards the nature or proximity of the relation, evidence is either direct and immediate, or indirect and mediate, called circ.u.mstantial; as concerned rather with the surrounding circ.u.mstances leading to the proof of the presumed truth of a fact than with the fact itself.

Direct Evidence comprises those facts from which, if proved, the truth of the proposition, statement, or conclusion necessarily follows.

Circ.u.mstantial Evidence comprises those facts from which again may be inferred facts, whence the truth of the proposition, statement, or conclusion must necessarily follow.

This inferential method is especially involved in Circ.u.mstantial Evidence.

In all evidence there is a presumption open more or less to reb.u.t.tal, and evidence on this account is qualified as, _e.g._, _prima facie_, conclusive. In Direct Evidence there is the presumption of the truth of the proposition, statement, or conclusion from the proven facts. In Circ.u.mstantial Evidence there is first an inference of directly connected facts, otherwise unknown or unevidenced from remotely connected facts, known or given in evidence; then there is further a presumption of the truth of the proposition, statement, or conclusion from these mediately established facts.

APPENDIX B.

DISCREPANCY AS TO DATE WHEN NOT MATERIAL TO ISSUE, NO DISPROOF OF TRUTH OF THE REST OF THE a.s.sERTION.

The above doctrine of the law of Evidence applies, of course, to whatever may be the nature or purpose of the Inquiry, whether conducted in a Court of Law, in the library of the historical scholar, or elsewhere.

The principle was soundly stated at the trial of "the Venerable" Martyrs, Fathers Whitbread, Harcourt, Fenwick, Gavan, and Turner, at the Old Bailey, by Sir William Scroggs, Knt., the Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench, on the occasion of the Popish Plot Trials, in the year 1679.

"If it should be a _mistake only in point of time_, it destroys not the evidence, _unless you think it necessary to the substance of the thing_.

"If you charge one in the month of August to have done such a fact, if he deny that he was in that place at that time, and proves it by witnesses, it may go to invalidate the credibility of the man's testimony, _but it does not invalidate the truth of the thing itself_, which may be true in substance, though the circ.u.mstance of time differ; and the question is, _whether the thing be true?_" Quoted in Morris's "_Troubles: The Southcote Family_," first series, p. 378 (Burns & Oates). (The italics are mine.)

APPENDIX C.

PART I.

BRITISH MUSEUM--ADD. MS. 5847, FO. 322.

_List of such as were apprehended for the Gun-Powder Plot._