He stood upon a little mound Cast his lethargic eyes around, And said beneath his breath: "Whatever happens, we have got The Maxim Gun, and they have not."He marked them in their rude advance, He hushed their rebel cheers; With one extremely vulgar glance He broke the Mutineers.

(I have a picture in my book Of how he broke them with a look.) We shot and hanged a few, and then The rest became devoted men.

As General Kitchener was marching across the desert in 1897, Rudyard Kipling had already commandeered the word Maxim. Maxim. He made it a verb, describing a British sergeant, a man "with a charm for making riflemen from mud," training his colonial charges in the arts of military rule. He made it a verb, describing a British sergeant, a man "with a charm for making riflemen from mud," training his colonial charges in the arts of military rule.

Said England unto Pharaoh, "I must make a man of you, That will stand upon his feet and play the game; That will Maxim his oppressor as a Christian ought to do."69 In early 1899, Kipling followed with another poem, "The White Man's Burden," encouraging the United States to invade the Philippines. By now machine gunnery was a symbol with many meanings. Opponents of colonialism mocked Kipling's poem for its racist undertone. Henry Labouchere, a parliamentarian who had used his office to condemn the activities of the British military and trading companies abroad, wrote a jeering retort, "The Brown Man's Burden." It was an anticolonial and antimachine gun screed, summarized in verse.

Pile on the brown man's burden: And, if ye rouse his hate, Meet his old-fashioned reasons With Maxims up to date.

With sh.e.l.ls and dumdum bullets A hundred times made plain The brown man's loss must ever Imply the white man's gain.Pile on the brown man's burden, compel him to be free; Let all your manifestoes Reek with philanthropy.

And if with heathen folly He dares your will dispute, Then, in the name of freedom, Don't hesitate to shoot.

What did Maxim think? He seemed never to express misgiving at the uneven killing taking place under his name. There were signs he approved of and encouraged it. As his fame rose, Maxim became friends with Lord Wolseley, who by then had led two campaigns during which hand-cranked weapons had jammed at crucial times. The general took an early and sustained interest in Maxim's invention and saw it as a superior arm. Maxim in turn enjoyed Lord Wolseley's company, even seeing him as an equal, which, given Maxim's personality and sense of self, was a rare thing. "I sympathized with him deeply because he seemed to be afflicted with a very active imagination," he wrote, adding that it was "a trouble that I had suffered from for many years." When the two men discussed machine-gun use, Lord Wolseley asked Maxim to consider making a machine gun that would fire a larger cartridge, something that might pierce the side of ammunition carts from great distances. Maxim saw the request as a distraction from his gun's main purpose: killing men, especially of the uncivilized sort. "I told him that such a gun would not be so effective as the smaller gun in stopping the mad rush of savages, because it would not fire so many rounds in a minute, and that there was no necessity to have anything larger than the service cartridge to kill a man."70 The bloodletting that accompanied British colonialism, represented by the Maxim gun, disturbed liberal members of Parliament. After the initial reports of flattening native formations and shredding native defenses were circulated in London, some of the members decried machine gunnery, worrying even that Maxim guns undermined the cause of Christianity by having Christians a.s.sociated with such a fearsome thing. Maxim showed little interest; his mind was insulated by a st.u.r.dy disgust for all talk of the Christian faith, which he saw as a retreat for the mentally weak and a corrosive on modern life. "The Biblical story of the world and man is, even on broad lines, as far as possible removed from the truth," he wrote. The central narrative of the testaments, he said, "is indefensible." He relished insulting it. "Our civilization," he concluded, "has been r.e.t.a.r.ded more than a thousand years by the introduction of Christianity."71 His views on race were equally severe. "A black man," he declared, "has no rights that a white man is bound to respect." Late in life, he described belittling blacks in the United States in the service of his early business interests. Before taking a trip to Atlanta in the early 1870s to oversee the installation of one of his automatic gas machines at the grand Kimball House hotel, he bought a photograph of "a New Guinea n.i.g.g.e.r; it was the n.i.g.g.e.rest-looking n.i.g.g.e.r I had ever seen." Maxim thought the picture might charm his Southern hosts. At the time, Pinckney Pinchback, the son of a slave and the slave's master, was serving as governor of Louisiana, to many a white Southerner's dismay. Maxim wrote the words "Governor Pinchback" on the photograph and carried it in his pocket. At moments he deemed convenient, he produced his photograph for his white clients. It was a Maxim calling card. "Whenever we were discussing n.i.g.g.e.rs and politics I used to take out this photograph and hand it to them," he said. What are we coming to, What are we coming to, some of the men would exclaim. some of the men would exclaim. Next we will have a gorilla. Next we will have a gorilla. Maxim maintained his sense of racial superiority, and his disdain for blacks, throughout his life. Maxim maintained his sense of racial superiority, and his disdain for blacks, throughout his life.72 There were signs that some of Maxim's contemporaries understood the role Maxim and his guns had a.s.sumed, and were not positively impressed at the ease with which he accepted it. In 1900, Lord Salisbury, Britain's prime minister, attended a banquet of the British Empire League, where Maxim was being feted. The inventor was sixty now, white-haired and with a thick, jutting goatee. He had ama.s.sed wealth as his guns had been taken into service by armies across Europe. When Lord Salisbury's turn came to compliment him, the prime minister was ready with his toast.

"Well, gentlemen, do you know, I consider Mr. Maxim to be one of the greatest benefactors the world has ever known?" he said.

Maxim was curious. "And how?" he asked.

"Well," said Salisbury. "I should say that you have prevented more men from dying of old age than any other man that ever lived."73 If Maxim had a response, it was not reported by the newspaper correspondent in attendance. The premier's subtly caustic remark did not reflect the official stance. Maxim guns had brought victory to England. Maxim's place was secure. In victory was glory, and official grat.i.tude. He was knighted the following year.

i Maxim's difficult personality would not help him in his relations with Vickers. He would retire in February 1911. On a motion in March by Albert Vickers, one of Maxim's earliest supporters, the firm would quickly strike the word Maxim's difficult personality would not help him in his relations with Vickers. He would retire in February 1911. On a motion in March by Albert Vickers, one of Maxim's earliest supporters, the firm would quickly strike the word Maxim Maxim from the company name and its correspondence, becoming Vickers, Ltd. from the company name and its correspondence, becoming Vickers, Ltd.ii An estuary or creek; the Sudanese commander sought protection for his forces in a ditch. An estuary or creek; the Sudanese commander sought protection for his forces in a ditch.

CHAPTER 4

Slaughter Made Industrial:

The Great War

Must buck up as I am not dead yet.1 RICHARD GATLING'S VISION HAD BEEN WRONG. GIVING ONE SOLDIER the tool to do the killing of one hundred did not supersede large armies, and exposure to battle had not been diminished so that men might be saved for their countries. By the early twentieth century, industrialization had brought forward all manner of martial developments. Some were natural evolutions in well-established arms: more reliable ammunition that propelled bullets at extraordinary velocities, more powerful explosives, better steels that allowed for artillery to fire more lethal sh.e.l.ls with greater precision and over longer range. Others were breakthroughs that made long-awaited technologies ready for war: submarines, war planes, hand grenades, poison gas. All of these would become characteristic menaces of World War I. None of them worked the way Gatling had proposed. Weapons designed to cause more casualties tended to cause more casualties, not fewer. Machine guns fit into this intricate mix of killing tools, and more people were dying before them, many more people than Gatling's vision had allowed. The remaining questions were behavioral. When would the professional military cla.s.s realize that machine guns had become a permanent presence in battle? What would they do about it? Machine guns, and the possibilities they created for using ma.s.sed fire for killing ma.s.sed soldiers on a large scale, presented new puzzles for officers to ponder and solve. The killing fields of Omdurman and Lieutenant Parker's innovations in offensive tactics outside Santiago had been widely publicized, providing an impetus to explore the questions at hand. But battlefield results did not bring focus to the necessary minds. Machine gunnery remained misunderstood by senior officers in armies around the world. the tool to do the killing of one hundred did not supersede large armies, and exposure to battle had not been diminished so that men might be saved for their countries. By the early twentieth century, industrialization had brought forward all manner of martial developments. Some were natural evolutions in well-established arms: more reliable ammunition that propelled bullets at extraordinary velocities, more powerful explosives, better steels that allowed for artillery to fire more lethal sh.e.l.ls with greater precision and over longer range. Others were breakthroughs that made long-awaited technologies ready for war: submarines, war planes, hand grenades, poison gas. All of these would become characteristic menaces of World War I. None of them worked the way Gatling had proposed. Weapons designed to cause more casualties tended to cause more casualties, not fewer. Machine guns fit into this intricate mix of killing tools, and more people were dying before them, many more people than Gatling's vision had allowed. The remaining questions were behavioral. When would the professional military cla.s.s realize that machine guns had become a permanent presence in battle? What would they do about it? Machine guns, and the possibilities they created for using ma.s.sed fire for killing ma.s.sed soldiers on a large scale, presented new puzzles for officers to ponder and solve. The killing fields of Omdurman and Lieutenant Parker's innovations in offensive tactics outside Santiago had been widely publicized, providing an impetus to explore the questions at hand. But battlefield results did not bring focus to the necessary minds. Machine gunnery remained misunderstood by senior officers in armies around the world.

The marketplace, though, was enthused. Even before machine guns shaped the outcome of closely watched battles, Maxim guns had been finding customers near and far. Demand meant opportunity. Other designers wanted market share, too. New weapons emerged. In 1889, John Moses Browning, a second-generation American gunsmith whose father had operated a small gun works in Utah, began trying to harness another form of energy from a bullet's discharge: the muzzle blast. Like almost anyone who had fired a rifle, Browning had noticed that the report of a rifle was accompanied by the rush of gas that followed the bullet out of the muzzle. He had seen how the blast knocked aside bulrushes in marshes in Utah. This represented unused energy. Browning wanted to put that energy to work. But how to capture gas rushing through a barrel, especially with a bullet in the way, moving at more than two thousand feet per second? Browning held a series of firing experiments,2 and ultimately made a prototype weapon with a vent inside the barrel, near the muzzle, to provide an alternative route for a portion of the expanding gases; essentially, a tap. In this system, in the tiny fraction of a second after the bullet pa.s.sed the vent but before it left the barrel, gas whooshed at high pressure through the vent and forced a rod backward, down the length of the gun, toward the trigger. The excess gas was animating a lever. Now it was only a matter of mechanics for that pulse of energy to be converted to the work once done by hand: extracting the spent casing, loading and locking a new cartridge into the chamber, and, as long as the trigger remained depressed and ammunition available, firing the next round to start the cycle anew. By late November 1890, the Browning Brothers Armory, in Salt Lake City, had offered this new design to Colt's Patent Fire Arms Company in Hartford. Five years later, a gas-operated automatic and ultimately made a prototype weapon with a vent inside the barrel, near the muzzle, to provide an alternative route for a portion of the expanding gases; essentially, a tap. In this system, in the tiny fraction of a second after the bullet pa.s.sed the vent but before it left the barrel, gas whooshed at high pressure through the vent and forced a rod backward, down the length of the gun, toward the trigger. The excess gas was animating a lever. Now it was only a matter of mechanics for that pulse of energy to be converted to the work once done by hand: extracting the spent casing, loading and locking a new cartridge into the chamber, and, as long as the trigger remained depressed and ammunition available, firing the next round to start the cycle anew. By late November 1890, the Browning Brothers Armory, in Salt Lake City, had offered this new design to Colt's Patent Fire Arms Company in Hartford. Five years later, a gas-operated automatici sold under the name Colt Model 1895 entered the market. sold under the name Colt Model 1895 entered the market.3 All the while, as Maxim's guns were heading out on colonial expeditions, other weapons were being a.s.sembled in gun works around Europe. In Austria, a grand duke and a colonel had created the Skoda machine gun, which a factory in Pilsen produced in many calibers. An Austrian captain had designed another gas-operated machine gun by 1893, and the Hotchkiss firm in France purchased the patent. Nordenfelt introduced a true automatic in 1897, and by 1902 the Madsen automatic machine gun was being touted by the Danes; soon it was tested by the British and the Americans.4 The German gun works at Spandau, prodded by the kaiser, was busily producing its own Maxim knock-offs. Arms firms saw machine guns as weapons of the future. The era of the hand-cranked gun-the Gatling and its brethren-was all but over, even if a few Gatlings and Gardners remained in military armories. Richard Gatling died in 1903 at the age of eighty-four, at his son-in-law's home in Manhattan's Upper West Side, after returning from a meeting at the editorial offices of The German gun works at Spandau, prodded by the kaiser, was busily producing its own Maxim knock-offs. Arms firms saw machine guns as weapons of the future. The era of the hand-cranked gun-the Gatling and its brethren-was all but over, even if a few Gatlings and Gardners remained in military armories. Richard Gatling died in 1903 at the age of eighty-four, at his son-in-law's home in Manhattan's Upper West Side, after returning from a meeting at the editorial offices of Scientific American. Scientific American. His business had gone bust. His capital was gone. He had kept his entrepreneurial spirit to the end. Recently he had accepted five hundred dollars from one of his sons to help underwrite a new venture in agricultural plows. His business had gone bust. His capital was gone. He had kept his entrepreneurial spirit to the end. Recently he had accepted five hundred dollars from one of his sons to help underwrite a new venture in agricultural plows.5 But the armaments industry had moved on. Rapid-fire arms had entered the automatic age. But the armaments industry had moved on. Rapid-fire arms had entered the automatic age.

Military officers, especially senior officers, took longer to catch up. The gap between what the arms industry could see and what professional military circles could not created one of the most baffling chapters in the intertwined histories of military technology and tactics. As the services pondered machine guns, traditionalism permeated most Western officer corps. Old prejudices endured. Old arguments continued, though not quite as fiercely as in decades past; the sheer volume of killing at Omdurman had shown that machine guns had a place in battle. It was not because of hostility so much as because of conservatism, along with administrative disarray and sluggishness, that tactics did not adequately shift. The ignorance was not as total as sometimes portrayed.6 Many armies exchanged their bright uniforms of the nineteenth century for dull-colored field uniforms in khaki or gray. In such attire, soldiers became more difficult for enemy soldiers to spot in rifle and machine-gun sights. And soldiers were instructed to spread out in battle, five paces between each man, to avoid being struck in large numbers by single artillery rounds or bursts of fire. But these changes should have been obvious enough. The blindness that afflicted the senior officer cla.s.s was extraordinary. In addressing the more difficult questions of developing tactics and doctrine for fighting with and against modern automatic arms, inst.i.tutional inertia trumped individual intellect. For a range of reasons related to how armies often work, the brighter officers, the gadflies, and the converted who advocated for a material and intellectual investment in machine gunnery were not heard. Some of these officers recognized the potential of concentrated firepower. Others saw the obsolescence of nineteenth-century battlefield tactics and the cherished traditions that adhered to them (one well-known officer observed that "the only advantage in cavalry is the smarter uniform"). Many armies exchanged their bright uniforms of the nineteenth century for dull-colored field uniforms in khaki or gray. In such attire, soldiers became more difficult for enemy soldiers to spot in rifle and machine-gun sights. And soldiers were instructed to spread out in battle, five paces between each man, to avoid being struck in large numbers by single artillery rounds or bursts of fire. But these changes should have been obvious enough. The blindness that afflicted the senior officer cla.s.s was extraordinary. In addressing the more difficult questions of developing tactics and doctrine for fighting with and against modern automatic arms, inst.i.tutional inertia trumped individual intellect. For a range of reasons related to how armies often work, the brighter officers, the gadflies, and the converted who advocated for a material and intellectual investment in machine gunnery were not heard. Some of these officers recognized the potential of concentrated firepower. Others saw the obsolescence of nineteenth-century battlefield tactics and the cherished traditions that adhered to them (one well-known officer observed that "the only advantage in cavalry is the smarter uniform").7 Some were simply curious, enlivened by tangible shifts in technology or a.s.sessments of battles past. Evidence had shown that modern weapons had become sufficiently lethal that opposing soldiers rarely were able to maneuver close enough to one another for a hand-to-hand fight; combatants were getting shot or torn by shrapnel before they could engage in those old-fashioned scrums. One French officer noticed from a review of war records that of sixty-five thousand German casualties listed in the Franco-Prussian War, swords had killed six men. Some were simply curious, enlivened by tangible shifts in technology or a.s.sessments of battles past. Evidence had shown that modern weapons had become sufficiently lethal that opposing soldiers rarely were able to maneuver close enough to one another for a hand-to-hand fight; combatants were getting shot or torn by shrapnel before they could engage in those old-fashioned scrums. One French officer noticed from a review of war records that of sixty-five thousand German casualties listed in the Franco-Prussian War, swords had killed six men.8 But many advocates of machine gunnery either were of junior grade or had achieved their experience in colonial campaigns in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Having used machine guns on practice ranges or to turn back aboriginal rushes, not professional armies, they were regarded as insufficiently schooled in the ways of war between European states. But many advocates of machine gunnery either were of junior grade or had achieved their experience in colonial campaigns in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Having used machine guns on practice ranges or to turn back aboriginal rushes, not professional armies, they were regarded as insufficiently schooled in the ways of war between European states.

In the United States, John H. Parker, now an army captain, had published two books on machine gunnery and proposed tactics for the offense and defense. By the early 1900s, he was busy testing a cart that could carry the guns, equipment, and ammunition swiftly about battlefields.9 He had also proposed an organization for a separate machine-gun service, with units dedicated solely to automatic guns. This followed a kernel first put forth in 1880 by William W. Kimball, an American navy officer, who had recommended selecting American sailors for duty with machine guns for sh.o.r.e defense, for firing from ship to ship, and for pummeling the types of close-in targets that the navy antic.i.p.ated facing, such as a hostile landing party or torpedo boat. Lieutenant Kimball and Captain Parker were radicals. They sketched out the notion of a professional machine gunner, a specialist who would work within a team. In their visions, these men were to be selected for their stamina, daring, and smarts. "In order that the gun may work up to its full effectiveness, the machine gunners must have a very considerable degree of intelligence, and the utmost steadiness; compared with infantrymen armed with single loading shoulder pieces, they must be as clever mechanics are to common laborers-they must be capable of working with a killing machine instead of a killing tool." He had also proposed an organization for a separate machine-gun service, with units dedicated solely to automatic guns. This followed a kernel first put forth in 1880 by William W. Kimball, an American navy officer, who had recommended selecting American sailors for duty with machine guns for sh.o.r.e defense, for firing from ship to ship, and for pummeling the types of close-in targets that the navy antic.i.p.ated facing, such as a hostile landing party or torpedo boat. Lieutenant Kimball and Captain Parker were radicals. They sketched out the notion of a professional machine gunner, a specialist who would work within a team. In their visions, these men were to be selected for their stamina, daring, and smarts. "In order that the gun may work up to its full effectiveness, the machine gunners must have a very considerable degree of intelligence, and the utmost steadiness; compared with infantrymen armed with single loading shoulder pieces, they must be as clever mechanics are to common laborers-they must be capable of working with a killing machine instead of a killing tool."10 These officers' precise organizational proposals would never be accepted, but their underlying idea was sound. Professional machine gunners, with separate training and distinct duties, would in time become common. But not yet. These officers' precise organizational proposals would never be accepted, but their underlying idea was sound. Professional machine gunners, with separate training and distinct duties, would in time become common. But not yet.

In the early twentieth century, the idea did not take hold. The military bureaucracy moved bureaucratically. Ordnance officials in the United States continued to test machine guns, and while there was a sense that machine guns had a place in battle, no one was quite sure where. One army major, commanding a battalion at Fort Leavenworth, requested a pair of machine guns for his battalion and the army provided them;11 this hardly signaled that the army as an inst.i.tution was fully invested in trying to find the weapons' ideal use. Enthusiasm was further dampened by lingering worries about reliability. The American army had purchased Colt's Model 1895 guns and used them in the war in the Philippines, but they were air-cooled and tended to overheat; officers in the field found them fussy. This enduring reputation for unreliability undercut the advocates' cause. Worries about ammunition consumption were also an obstacle. How was an army supposed to supply units with guns that fired 500, 600, 700, or 800 rounds a minute? The answer, which eluded the quarter-masters and generals, was that technical rates of fire were theoretical. In practice, machine gunners fired in short bursts. When facing machine-gun fire, targets were either knocked down or scattered. No target presented itself for very long. Ammunition consumption did pose new logistical challenges. That was irrefutably true. But these challenges were not the impossible demand that detractors imagined them to be. this hardly signaled that the army as an inst.i.tution was fully invested in trying to find the weapons' ideal use. Enthusiasm was further dampened by lingering worries about reliability. The American army had purchased Colt's Model 1895 guns and used them in the war in the Philippines, but they were air-cooled and tended to overheat; officers in the field found them fussy. This enduring reputation for unreliability undercut the advocates' cause. Worries about ammunition consumption were also an obstacle. How was an army supposed to supply units with guns that fired 500, 600, 700, or 800 rounds a minute? The answer, which eluded the quarter-masters and generals, was that technical rates of fire were theoretical. In practice, machine gunners fired in short bursts. When facing machine-gun fire, targets were either knocked down or scattered. No target presented itself for very long. Ammunition consumption did pose new logistical challenges. That was irrefutably true. But these challenges were not the impossible demand that detractors imagined them to be.

Richard Gatling, an inventor of killing technologies who cast himself as an idealist, had been a crusader for rapid-fire arms as instruments for peace. Hiram Maxim, the self-taught engineer and mischief-maker from backwoods Maine, became a premier vendor of machine guns in nearly perfected form and converted Gatling's dream into wealth. Under their hands, machine guns had sprouted from the industrial conditions of nineteenth-century America to become global products that allowed armies to arm themselves for killing on a prodigious scale. But machine gunnery in the United States military remained a haphazard field. The American military entered the twentieth century with inventories of weapons of different calibers and designs, without a machine-gun doctrine, and with neither a standard arm nor a clear training plan. In 1903, the army held new tests and selected a Maxim water-cooled gun as its new standard machine gun.12 This decision would not long hold. There was similar confusion in Britain, even though the British army had adopted the Maxim ten years earlier. Russia had already become a minor machine-gun power. It had embraced rapid-fire arms since the Gatling gun first became available after the Civil War, and had since procured Maxims and distributed them in the field. Otherwise, only Germany kept pressing ahead, manufacturing guns and designing a doctrine to use them in special machine-gun units, which colonels and generals could control, moving them about the battlefield as necessary so firepower could be ma.s.sed at critical moments and places, roughly as Captain Parker had suggested. This decision would not long hold. There was similar confusion in Britain, even though the British army had adopted the Maxim ten years earlier. Russia had already become a minor machine-gun power. It had embraced rapid-fire arms since the Gatling gun first became available after the Civil War, and had since procured Maxims and distributed them in the field. Otherwise, only Germany kept pressing ahead, manufacturing guns and designing a doctrine to use them in special machine-gun units, which colonels and generals could control, moving them about the battlefield as necessary so firepower could be ma.s.sed at critical moments and places, roughly as Captain Parker had suggested.13 Germany had certain psychological advantages over the other Western powers as it pursued its arming spree. It had not been interested in machine guns until Kaiser Wilhelm II saw Maxim's gun in 1887; this meant that it began its a.s.sociation with machine gunnery with a weapon that worked well, and it did not have to overcome an internal inst.i.tutional bias stemming from having invested in Gatlings or Gardners that jammed in the era when ammunition was unreliable. Germany had certain psychological advantages over the other Western powers as it pursued its arming spree. It had not been interested in machine guns until Kaiser Wilhelm II saw Maxim's gun in 1887; this meant that it began its a.s.sociation with machine gunnery with a weapon that worked well, and it did not have to overcome an internal inst.i.tutional bias stemming from having invested in Gatlings or Gardners that jammed in the era when ammunition was unreliable.

Elsewhere, as machine-gun salesmen worked European officer clubs and test ranges, armies hewed to their traditions, a.s.suming that when they fought again they would fight much as they had before, perhaps with victory to be carried by a decisive charge. Courage was praised, the philosophies of disciplined unit formations preached. War was seen as an activity to be carried by determined men, whose foes were broken by fright during a stoic advance to the bayonet fight. The att.i.tude was well established in successful military units: Moral force was superior to material might, and men were supreme. In its way, the att.i.tude marked one of the older and more enduring vulnerabilities of military units steeped in their past success and lore. Unleavened by an understanding of the changing tools available for battle, the att.i.tude led men who should have known better to believe that machine guns were mere devices. Years after officers had personally observed the effects of machine guns in war, the bra.s.s clung almost mystically to the romance of close-quarter battle and championed tactics that Maxim guns had made obsolete. In their bias some officers even scoffed at the rifle. "It must be accepted as a principle that the rifle, effective as it is, cannot replace the effect produced by the speed of the horse, the magnetism of the charge, and the terror of cold steel,"14 one turn-of-the-century British training manual said. one turn-of-the-century British training manual said.

Such were the daydreams. They could not be extinguished, even by clear accounts from distant wars. Military bureaucracies, as they considered incorporating machine guns into their armies, dawdled indecisively in every Western country but Germany. The thinking was fully blinkered. Senior officers recognized the effects of withering bursts of fire upon ma.s.sed combatants, having heard reports of the felling of heaps of Arabs and Africans who advanced in formation toward machine guns. They were somehow unable to accept what might happen when such fire was directed against their own ranks. And then they were given another chance.

In 1904, after years of compet.i.tion between the Russian and j.a.panese empires in the northwestern Pacific, the contest erupted into the Russo-j.a.panese War. Here machine guns and poor tactics were to combine for the bloodiest results yet. The origins of the war were simple. During the Boxer Uprising, from 1898 through 1901, Czar Nicholas II had dispatched Russian troops to Manchuria. He had not withdrawn them when the uprising ended. Instead, the Russian garrison grew, angering j.a.pan, which saw Russia encroaching on its sphere of influence. Negotiations for a Russian withdrawal led nowhere, and in 1904 j.a.pan struck, attacking the Russian navy at the Yellow Sea harbor of Port Arthur and sending infantry across the Yalu River to push overland for the port. En route, the j.a.panese divisions met Russian units, which were equipped with Maxim guns, organized into a company per division. Each company had sections of eight Maxims equipped with sixty-six hundred cartridges per gun.15 The czar's infantry was not highly regarded. "The Russian soldier, when sober and not brutalized by slaughter, is a great, strong, kind, superst.i.tious child; as good a fellow as ever stepped, but always a child," wrote the correspondent present for the The czar's infantry was not highly regarded. "The Russian soldier, when sober and not brutalized by slaughter, is a great, strong, kind, superst.i.tious child; as good a fellow as ever stepped, but always a child," wrote the correspondent present for the London Times, London Times, who was a former colonel himself. "Given an educated and highly trained corps of officers of a good cla.s.s, capable of instructing, caring for, and leading him with judgment and skill, the Russian soldier would go far. But there is no such corps of officers in Russia." who was a former colonel himself. "Given an educated and highly trained corps of officers of a good cla.s.s, capable of instructing, caring for, and leading him with judgment and skill, the Russian soldier would go far. But there is no such corps of officers in Russia."16 No matter the poor reputation, machine guns turned the Russians into lethal defenders of held ground. After a battle along the approaches to the port, a j.a.panese lieutenant, Tadayoshi Sakurai, examined captured Russian Maxims. The j.a.panese army had its own collection of Hotchkiss machine guns, and its officers were beginning to use them in effective ways, especially in firing in support of j.a.panese attacks. But Lieutenant Sakurai had seen machine gunnery from the other perspective. He knew what happened to j.a.panese units when they faced Maxim guns. He looked upon the captured Russian Maxims as almost otherworldly tools. His description marked one of the earliest first-person accounts of the experience of coming under modern automatic fire. "This was the firearm most dreaded by us," he wrote: No matter the poor reputation, machine guns turned the Russians into lethal defenders of held ground. After a battle along the approaches to the port, a j.a.panese lieutenant, Tadayoshi Sakurai, examined captured Russian Maxims. The j.a.panese army had its own collection of Hotchkiss machine guns, and its officers were beginning to use them in effective ways, especially in firing in support of j.a.panese attacks. But Lieutenant Sakurai had seen machine gunnery from the other perspective. He knew what happened to j.a.panese units when they faced Maxim guns. He looked upon the captured Russian Maxims as almost otherworldly tools. His description marked one of the earliest first-person accounts of the experience of coming under modern automatic fire. "This was the firearm most dreaded by us," he wrote: A large iron plate serves the purpose of a shield, through which aim is taken, and the trigger can be pulled while the gun is moving upward, downward, to the left, or to the right. More than six hundred bullets are pushed out automatically in one minute, as if a long continuous rod of b.a.l.l.s was being thrown out of the gun. It can also be made to sprinkle its shot as roads are watered with a hose. It can cover a larger or smaller s.p.a.ce, or fire to a greater or less distance as the gun wills. Therefore, if one becomes a target of this terrible engine of destruction, three or four shots may go through the same s.p.a.ce in rapid succession, making the wound very large. ... And the sound it makes! Heard close by, it is a rapid succession of tap, tap, tap; but from a distance it sounds like a power loom heard late at night when everything else is hushed. It is a sickening, horrible sound! The Russians regard this machine as their best friend, and certainly it did very much as a means of defense. They were wonderfully clever in the use of this machine. They would wait till our men came very near them, four or five ken kenii only, and just at the moment when we proposed to shout a triumphant Banzai, this dreadful machine would begin to sweep over us with the besom of destruction, the results being hills and mounds of dead. only, and just at the moment when we proposed to shout a triumphant Banzai, this dreadful machine would begin to sweep over us with the besom of destruction, the results being hills and mounds of dead.17 j.a.panese ground forces besieged Port Arthur late in summer 1904. They found that the Russians had prepared. The port was on a peninsula, and the soldiers had spent months fortifying the hills overlooking it. They had also dug extensive trenches and filled the lanes though which the j.a.panese soldiers might attack with barbed wire. Lights were rigged to cover the approaches in darkness. Maxim guns watched over it all; by one count, thirty-eight Maxims in all.18 Circ.u.mstances were ripe for disaster. The j.a.panese infantry was fired with a culture in which to die in a battle was a supreme honor, and its officers faced a tactical problem for which their training offered no obvious or doctrinal solution. This was not entirely their fault. Until that time, there were no widely understood tactics for overcoming the types of modern defenses before them; the book on machine gunnery and tactics had not yet been written. The result was a horror. Eager for battle, the j.a.panese officers ordered human wave attacks across the open ground. One of the attacks, the Ninth Division's a.s.sault on East Panlung, showed war's new shape. Circ.u.mstances were ripe for disaster. The j.a.panese infantry was fired with a culture in which to die in a battle was a supreme honor, and its officers faced a tactical problem for which their training offered no obvious or doctrinal solution. This was not entirely their fault. Until that time, there were no widely understood tactics for overcoming the types of modern defenses before them; the book on machine gunnery and tactics had not yet been written. The result was a horror. Eager for battle, the j.a.panese officers ordered human wave attacks across the open ground. One of the attacks, the Ninth Division's a.s.sault on East Panlung, showed war's new shape.

Sappers were sent first, at night, and managed to breach the Russian wire in several places, cutting open lanes through which the infantry of the Seventh Regiment might follow. The j.a.panese regimental commander ordered the First Battalion through the wire in the darkness before 5:00 A.M. A.M. The soldiers went up the hill without cover and were stopped in place by sweeping machine-gun fire; not a man advanced through the breaches. The regimental commander led the remaining battalion in a second attack over the same ground. He was quickly killed. The Second Battalion suffered the same fate as the first. In the predawn gloom, the division commander tried to watch from afar. He knew nothing of what was happening, beyond that the volume of Russian fire was deafening and the absence of a Banzai call was discouraging. The scene which revealed itself at daybreak was worse than any sense of foreboding had antic.i.p.ated: "The hillside was thickly strewn with dead and dying, and in front and around the gaps in the wire entanglements the dead bodies were piled three or four high. No progress had been made anywhere, and the small surviving force of the gallant 7th was cut off from retreat by the murderous fire." The soldiers went up the hill without cover and were stopped in place by sweeping machine-gun fire; not a man advanced through the breaches. The regimental commander led the remaining battalion in a second attack over the same ground. He was quickly killed. The Second Battalion suffered the same fate as the first. In the predawn gloom, the division commander tried to watch from afar. He knew nothing of what was happening, beyond that the volume of Russian fire was deafening and the absence of a Banzai call was discouraging. The scene which revealed itself at daybreak was worse than any sense of foreboding had antic.i.p.ated: "The hillside was thickly strewn with dead and dying, and in front and around the gaps in the wire entanglements the dead bodies were piled three or four high. No progress had been made anywhere, and the small surviving force of the gallant 7th was cut off from retreat by the murderous fire."19 The division attacked again by daylight, sending another regiment of men over the same ground, bayonets high. These men, too, were cut down. A night attack ended in the same fashion. The division attacked again by daylight, sending another regiment of men over the same ground, bayonets high. These men, too, were cut down. A night attack ended in the same fashion.

This was but one episode among many. For weeks the j.a.panese attacked. The Russian garrisons were too isolated to resist indefinitely. In the end, the j.a.panese soldiers captured the port. But by the time Port Arthur changed hands in early 1905, the j.a.panese commanders had lost more than forty thousand20 of their army's soldiers in the war, and they had repeated their tactical mistakes throughout, sending exposed troops forward again and again. Lieutenant Sakurai, whose infantry company was annihilated, summed up the mentality of soldiers sent on a mission understood to be suicidal. "We were all ready for death when leaving j.a.pan," he wrote. "Men going to battle of course cannot expect to come back alive. But in this particular battle, to be ready for death was not enough; what was required of us was a determination not to fail to die." of their army's soldiers in the war, and they had repeated their tactical mistakes throughout, sending exposed troops forward again and again. Lieutenant Sakurai, whose infantry company was annihilated, summed up the mentality of soldiers sent on a mission understood to be suicidal. "We were all ready for death when leaving j.a.pan," he wrote. "Men going to battle of course cannot expect to come back alive. But in this particular battle, to be ready for death was not enough; what was required of us was a determination not to fail to die."21 In the lieutenant's last action, he almost got his wish. The soldiers set out on foot with twenty-inch bayonets affixed to their Type 30 carbines, picking their way through stacks of corpses from the waves before. The company commander, a captain, brandished a sword in the charge. He was killed. This was Lieutenant Sakurai's moment. "From henceforth I command Twelfth Company!" he shouted. His command would be brief. He ordered a renewed charge, but soon the fire was thick and the men around him were few. What had been a company was a handful of survivors, including the lieutenant, who had been shot through the right hand. The Russians counterattacked. The remnants of Twelfth Company fell back, consolidated, and were trapped as the Russians brought up machine guns to finish the fight. The lieutenant was wounded and suffered the indignity of survival. It meant that he was able to tell what happened at the end. "Men on both sides fell like gra.s.s," he said.22 This was not a distant colonial fight. It was a head-to-head conventional war between rival empires and soldiers bearing modern arms, fought in the presence of Western military attaches. The attaches observing the battles did a mixed job of a.s.sessing and reporting the discernable facts. Some noted that the Russian guns were effective. Lieutenant Colonel A. Haldane, a British attache, wrote that j.a.panese attacks were "checked by machine gun and rifle fire, and there is no doubt that a strong feeling exists in the infantry that the presence of machine guns with the Russian army confers upon it a distinct advantage."23 American reports were uneven. One officer reported that the j.a.panese had used their own machine guns quite effectively, and that j.a.panese officers had learned during the war that machine guns could be used offensively as well as in defense of held ground-an echo of what Captain Parker had proposed for ten years, and had proved outside Santiago. But another American officer wrote that "the machine gun [had] played a useful but not great part in the war." American reports were uneven. One officer reported that the j.a.panese had used their own machine guns quite effectively, and that j.a.panese officers had learned during the war that machine guns could be used offensively as well as in defense of held ground-an echo of what Captain Parker had proposed for ten years, and had proved outside Santiago. But another American officer wrote that "the machine gun [had] played a useful but not great part in the war."24 As a body, those who could carry the word out-military observers and war correspondents alike-were distracted from the obvious: that in the age of machine guns a.s.sault tactics urgently needed to be rethought. Colonel Louis A. La Garde, of the United States Army Medical Corps, later reviewed casualty data from the war and noticed something that should have been readily observable by any attache on hand: the military futility of a bayonet charge. Of 170,600 Russian soldiers doc.u.mented as wounded or killed, bayonet wounds accounted for 0.4 percent. As a body, those who could carry the word out-military observers and war correspondents alike-were distracted from the obvious: that in the age of machine guns a.s.sault tactics urgently needed to be rethought. Colonel Louis A. La Garde, of the United States Army Medical Corps, later reviewed casualty data from the war and noticed something that should have been readily observable by any attache on hand: the military futility of a bayonet charge. Of 170,600 Russian soldiers doc.u.mented as wounded or killed, bayonet wounds accounted for 0.4 percent.25 More wounds, Colonel La Garde found, were caused by stones. And yet some Westerners present at the war still succ.u.mbed to a fascination for the spirit of the j.a.panese soldiers, missing the technical and tactical points while filing dispatches describing what they regarded as fanaticism, whether bizarre or sublime. What did Westerners have to learn from the j.a.panese experience, after all, when everyone knew that no Western army would resort to attacks by human wave? One correspondent's dispatch was typical: More wounds, Colonel La Garde found, were caused by stones. And yet some Westerners present at the war still succ.u.mbed to a fascination for the spirit of the j.a.panese soldiers, missing the technical and tactical points while filing dispatches describing what they regarded as fanaticism, whether bizarre or sublime. What did Westerners have to learn from the j.a.panese experience, after all, when everyone knew that no Western army would resort to attacks by human wave? One correspondent's dispatch was typical: It is said that when men have made up their mind to die they act and speak like G.o.ds. That day, when the fight was at its fiercest and the bullets were falling like rain, Lieutenant Sakamoto, who had been sent out towards the right flank on scouting duty, found himself pressed by a greatly superior force of the enemy and unable either to advance or to retreat. He sent an orderly to ask the commanding officer for final instructions. The reply was, "Go back and say to the Lieutenant, 'Die.'" The orderly, saluting, rode off. What a grand order-"die." The one word, "die"!26 Germany drew a different lesson. Kaiser Wilhelm II had continued his support for machine guns, and by 1899 the German military had four-gun machine-gun batteries. In 1908, each regiment had batteries of six guns, and the German army underwrote extensive inquiry and experimentation into how best to use them. All the while, the gun works at Spandau were producing more of its Maxim clones. The other Western militaries breezed through the early twentieth century without clarity on how they might use machine guns in the next war. Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, the American army's chief of staff, noted that his service did not have a doctrine, or even a plan, for the guns on order.

The War Department is now confronted with this situation: We have adopted a type of gun, mount and pack outfit, and contracted for a considerable number [120 for field service and 75 for coastal fortifications], and actual deliveries [80 guns] are being made pursuant to this contract; but no plan for the distribution and use of these guns has been formulated.27Everything was set for disaster when World War I broke out.

In summer 1914, as one nation after another declared war, Germany invaded Belgium and made a thrust into France. Under prewar agreements, Great Britain was committed to provide France with military aid. Much of the British army was spread about the globe on imperial duty, but the British Expeditionary Force, or BEF-a contingent of six regular British infantry divisions and another division of cavalry-quickly crossed the Channel and took its place between the beleaguered Belgian and French militaries. Though the expeditionary force was small (Kaiser Wilhelm II called it a "contemptible little army"), it was experienced, highly trained, and professional, and it made a determined fight. But it was outnumbered and outgunned. Within weeks its ranks were thinned. Soon the BEF was joined by the British version of reserves, known as the Territorials. These units, too, suffered heavy losses.

The near destruction of the core of the British regular army meant that Britain resorted to a ma.s.sive recruiting drive to build what Lord Kitchener, now the minister of war, would call the New Army. "We have been asked who will volunteer for Foreign service and I have said I will," wrote Alfred Chater, one of the men mobilizing for war, in a note to his girlfriend as he made his choice that summer. "It was put to us in such a way that unless one is married it is almost impossible to say anything else." A letter soon after was rueful: "It would be a splendid experience for those who come back."28 The early months in Europe saw a war of movement, with armies racing across the countryside trying to outflank each other and check each other's advance. But gradually the lines extended, and extended more, and settled by the fall into the Western Front. The opposing sides faced each other across a maze of trenches, pillboxes, and barbed wire. A modern form of siege warfare set in, as the Allies waited for replacement units to reinforce the lines and allow for an offensive to dislodge the entrenched German troops. The early months in Europe saw a war of movement, with armies racing across the countryside trying to outflank each other and check each other's advance. But gradually the lines extended, and extended more, and settled by the fall into the Western Front. The opposing sides faced each other across a maze of trenches, pillboxes, and barbed wire. A modern form of siege warfare set in, as the Allies waited for replacement units to reinforce the lines and allow for an offensive to dislodge the entrenched German troops.

The imbalance of firepower was devastating. The German army went to war with more machine guns, and distributed them more widely, than any of their opponents. It began the war having issued sixteen machine guns to every infantry battalion, while the British army had issued two-thus part of the mismatch faced by the British Expeditionary Force in the war's opening months.29 In 1892 the German gun works at Spandau had entered into an agreement with Ludwig Loewe and Co. (later the Deutsche Waffen and Munitions Fabrik) that gave the German firm the right to manufacture Maxim-pattern machine guns for sales to Germany and its united governments. Though many German officers initially resisted machine guns, the events at Omdurman and the Russo-j.a.panese War had made their impression, and by the early twentieth century, manufacturing had begun in earnest of the German modification Maschinengewehr 08, or MG08. The German military had at least forty-nine hundred of these Maxims by the start of the war. Manufacturing accelerated after hostilities began. In 1892 the German gun works at Spandau had entered into an agreement with Ludwig Loewe and Co. (later the Deutsche Waffen and Munitions Fabrik) that gave the German firm the right to manufacture Maxim-pattern machine guns for sales to Germany and its united governments. Though many German officers initially resisted machine guns, the events at Omdurman and the Russo-j.a.panese War had made their impression, and by the early twentieth century, manufacturing had begun in earnest of the German modification Maschinengewehr 08, or MG08. The German military had at least forty-nine hundred of these Maxims by the start of the war. Manufacturing accelerated after hostilities began.30 Even Germany's colonial troops were equipped with machine guns, which led to one of the failed British actions outside of Europe and demonstrated yet again that the British military mind did not yet grasp matters at hand. Even Germany's colonial troops were equipped with machine guns, which led to one of the failed British actions outside of Europe and demonstrated yet again that the British military mind did not yet grasp matters at hand.

In November 1914, a British naval and infantry force moved against East Africa, hoping to push aside the thin contingent of German soldiers along the coast and a.s.sert British control over the continent. The crown's plan included an attack on Tanga, a seaport located in what is now Tanzania. An amphibious British force, accompanied by Indian units, landed outside the city and pa.s.sed through most of the tropical forest around the port. The enemy's pickets were waiting. As the invasion force drew within six hundred yards of Tanga's outskirts, the Germans and their colonial units opened fire. "Bullets came thick, men falling in all directions," wrote Captain Richard Meinertzhagen, a British intelligence officer who went ash.o.r.e in the landing party's little boats. "Half of the 13th Rajputs turned at once, broke into a rabble and bolted, carrying most of the 61st Pioneers with them." In the afternoon, the invasion force managed to round up enough of its scattered soldiers to push forward and into the city. "I had collected some 70 Rajputs and two private soldiers of the North Lancs and got them back to the firing line," the captain wrote. As these small contingents pressed on, they were met by machine guns in the hands of native African soldiers under German command. This was both a reversal and precursor. For decades the British had used machine guns to b.l.o.o.d.y effect in Africa. Now Africans were pointing machine guns back.

Machine guns were deadly and swept every approach, every house spitting fire. The Kashmir Infantry and two companies of Rajputs were doing well. I particularly admired the pluck of young Hammick of the Rajputs, quite a lad and appearing to revel in bullets. I joined on to some Kashmiri Dogras and we were doing well, taking house after house near the Customs House, when we came to a broad street which was an inferno of machine-gun and rifle fire. This brought us up short. My party was twenty-five men, and nine fell at the first attempt to cross.

Facing heavy fire, the British and Indian soldiers lost their hold on the city. Soon the troops had "dwindled away or were shot and I found myself with two men in the Customs House," Captain Meinertzhagen wrote. The British attack was broken. Soldiers were scattered along the route of their advance, many shaking with fear. Bullets had struck beehives in the trees, and the insects swarmed upon the miserable force, stinging soldiers cowering on the ground. A British ship, in the harbor, was sh.e.l.ling the sh.o.r.e randomly. Some of the incoming rounds exploded among the British troops. The breakdown was complete. "Most of the men had gone, we were all parched with thirst, ammunition was short and the last remnants of the British firing line were a few British officers, each fighting their own battle," the captain wrote. Tanga would remain in German hands. British plans were checked by machine-gun fire. Africa was not ever to be the same, though the salient point about machine gunnery was largely lost on the defeated soldiers, who commiserated not about the difficulties, even the pointlessness, of using old tactics against these modern weapons, but about being defeated by Africans.

"The Lancs are very dejected at having lost so many friends, for their best have gone," Meinertzhagen wrote. "They also feel the disgrace of losing a fight against black troops. They are not a first-cla.s.s battalion."31 The captain offered a similarly dismissive reaction to the Rajputs' fear when they first came under fire. The Indians, he wrote, "were all jabbering like terrified monkeys." Both comments were instructive. Racism still informed colonial operations. And Captain Meinertzhagen, who published his diaries years later and with the benefit of seeing the outcome on the Western Front, could not, even with the pa.s.sing of time, understand the technical picture for what it was: Intensive machine-gun fire could hardly be beaten back by men with rifles using tactics of yore. The captain offered a similarly dismissive reaction to the Rajputs' fear when they first came under fire. The Indians, he wrote, "were all jabbering like terrified monkeys." Both comments were instructive. Racism still informed colonial operations. And Captain Meinertzhagen, who published his diaries years later and with the benefit of seeing the outcome on the Western Front, could not, even with the pa.s.sing of time, understand the technical picture for what it was: Intensive machine-gun fire could hardly be beaten back by men with rifles using tactics of yore.

By this time, the Western Front was taking on an air of permanence, and the war in Europe was settling into the shape for which it would be remembered. The trench systems were a complicated and carefully considered network. A set of forward trenches served as the front line, supporting trenches were dug farther back, and the reserve trenches farther still-all part of a defense in depth that could absorb an enemy thrust. Along the lines, trenches rarely ran in straight lines for any distance; soldiers dug them according to the contours of the countryside-the sides of hills, across knolls, in positions overlooking concealed routes of approach-in ways that gave the occupants a commanding view of the ground out front. This maximized their defensive potential by providing clear fields of fire into likely infiltration routes. On level ground trenches were typically cut into the earth in zigs and zags, a precaution so that if an artillery or mortar sh.e.l.l landed squarely inside, or an enemy infantryman lobbed in a grenade, the blast would be contained and casualties would be limited to the few unlucky souls in one small bit of ditch. But the defense was not simply linear, weaving, and wide. It was b.u.t.tressed by strong points, concentrations of soldiers and weapons in woodlots or higher ground where they could fight from even more st.u.r.dy positions. These strong points were often near enough to one another to be mutually supporting by interlocking fire. In front of all this were listening posts, from which sentries could give early warning of an attack or approaching patrol. And throughout the front proper, snipers scanned the terrain from concealed positions, ready to shoot any man who dared to expose himself by day. When the sun was up, the warrens of earthworks could seem eerily deserted, save for noise and the smoke rising from cooking fires. Soldiers learned not to lift their heads above their parapets until after dark. This lesson was reinforced by the fate of the incautious, who often were shot by high-powered rifle bullets in the head.

Between the opposing trenches was No-Man's-Land, a ribbon of unoccupied territory that resembled the ground where j.a.panese soldiers had perished by the thousands at Port Arthur. No-Man's-Land was narrow in many areas, and soldiers listened to their enemies' voices. "In my part of the line the trenches are only 50 or 60 yards apart in some places, and we can hear the Germans talking," Captain Chater wrote his girlfriend after arriving in France. "They often shout to us in English and we respond with cries of 'waiter!'"32 In other places, one thousand yards separated the soldiers. This open ground was watched over by machine guns and by artillery observers, who were ready to call down fire onto troops in the open by day, or at night, to send flares aloft that might illuminate enemy patrols. The machine guns of the time only faintly resembled their predecessors of fifty years before. No longer were they wheeled about on heavy timber frames between carriage wheels, to be mistaken for cannon. They had shrunk, some of them to under one hundred pounds, including their tripod mounts and other gear, and could be rigged low to the ground. The tripod served as a stable firing platform, making the guns far more accurate than handheld rifles, and allowing gunners to traverse the barrels in sweeps. Smokeless powder in the cartridges of the time meant that gunners crouching behind a machine gun, firing through a slot in the earth, were difficult to spot. In other places, one thousand yards separated the soldiers. This open ground was watched over by machine guns and by artillery observers, who were ready to call down fire onto troops in the open by day, or at night, to send flares aloft that might illuminate enemy patrols. The machine guns of the time only faintly resembled their predecessors of fifty years before. No longer were they wheeled about on heavy timber frames between carriage wheels, to be mistaken for cannon. They had shrunk, some of them to under one hundred pounds, including their tripod mounts and other gear, and could be rigged low to the ground. The tripod served as a stable firing platform, making the guns far more accurate than handheld rifles, and allowing gunners to traverse the barrels in sweeps. Smokeless powder in the cartridges of the time meant that gunners crouching behind a machine gun, firing through a slot in the earth, were difficult to spot.

Given the intricacy of the defenses, and the difficulties they posed, large battles were rare. The soldiers on both sides of the trenches followed routines: a full alert, known as "stand-to," at dawn and dusk. Nightfall brought patrols or manual labor repairing earthworks, filling sandbags, and the like. The soldiers slept in s.n.a.t.c.hes by day. Helmets, the most valuable piece of personal defensive equipment in the entire war, were rarely issued to British soldiers during the first two years of fighting, and heads were unnecessarily exposed to shrapnel and ricochets. Front-line officers carried pistols and swords, weapons that were useless except at exceptionally short range. The British Lee-Enfield rifles were not often fired. Riflemen almost never saw a clear target. The large British bayonet was almost universally issued, though as one historian dryly observed, it was princ.i.p.ally "useful for chopping wood and other domestic work."33 New battalions arrived at the Western Front with roughly one thousand men. Without major battles, they could expect to lose thirty soldiers a month to injury or death, and another thirty to disease.34 Those not struck by German ordnance or weakened by illness endured a singular ordeal: a maze of rats, rot, tinned food, infection, and trash. They were soaked and muddy much of the year and bitterly cold in winter. Random violence-a sniper shot or an incoming artillery or mortar round-was a constant threat. To fortify the young soldiers, many officers issued swigs of rum before missions, hoping to lift spirits in the face of the fear and ugliness ahead. Those not struck by German ordnance or weakened by illness endured a singular ordeal: a maze of rats, rot, tinned food, infection, and trash. They were soaked and muddy much of the year and bitterly cold in winter. Random violence-a sniper shot or an incoming artillery or mortar round-was a constant threat. To fortify the young soldiers, many officers issued swigs of rum before missions, hoping to lift spirits in the face