Rosecrans' conduct of this battle caused his supersedure by Thomas, while several division commanders were suspended, pending an inquiry into their course. President Davis removed General Leonidas Polk, who was thought to have shown hesitancy of action at critical points. Bragg, however, was the most blamable, for, with the advantage overwhelmingly in his favor, he refused to permit Longstreet to follow up his success.

One of the peculiarities of the Confederate President was his strong likes and dislikes. He was a personal enemy of Jo Johnston, and more than once humiliated him, but he was also a friend of Bragg, and, in the face of indignant protests, retained him in chief command in the southwest.

As soon as the Union army reached Chattanooga intrenchments were thrown up. Bragg appeared before the town on the 23d, and, finding the position too strong to be carried by a.s.sault, he laid siege to it. The situation of the army became so dangerous that great uneasiness was felt in Washington, where the wise step was taken of sending General Grant thither, with his appointment to the command of the entire West.

Abundant reinforcements were hurried to the imperiled point, the entire Eleventh and Twelfth Corps from the Army of the Potomac forming the princ.i.p.al commands. The Federals became much the stronger, but Bragg did not abandon his siege of Chattanooga.

Recalling the advance of Burnside from the Ohio to the relief of Rosecrans, it should be stated that he did not arrive in time to take part in the battle of Chickamauga, but occupied Knoxville on the 9th of September. Bragg sent Longstreet with a strong force to attack Burnside, the Confederate commander thereby weakening his army, which could ill stand it. Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the night of October 20th, and telegraphed Burnside to hold Knoxville at all hazards, while he gave his attention to Bragg.

Sherman came up with his troops November 15th, and a week later Grant had an army of 80,000 men on the ground, while the removal of Longstreet left Bragg with only 50,000. His line, twelve miles long, embraced two elevations commanding a view of Chattanooga Valley. Lookout Mountain was on the south, while Missionary Ridge on the east was not quite so high.

The Confederate left wing rested on the former, and the right on Missionary Ridge, with the Chattanooga flowing between. Bragg was justified in considering his position impregnable.

THE BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS.

Grant, however, held a different opinion. On the night of the 23d the enemy's picket lines were forced back and an improved position secured.

The following morning, Hooker, having already crossed the river, was ordered to attack the position on Lookout Mountain. His movements were hidden for a time by a dense fog, and it was his intention to stop as soon as the enemy's rifle-pits at the base were captured; but, when this was accomplished, the men were carried away by their enthusiasm, noting which Hooker ordered them to charge the Confederate position. Up the mountain the cheering, eager fellows swept with irresistible valor. The Stars and Stripes was planted on the crest and 2,000 of the fleeing Confederates were made prisoners. The fog still lay heavy in the valley below, a fact which has led to the battle being called the "Battle above the Clouds."

DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES.

The following morning was also foggy, but, when it lifted, Sherman's corps was seen advancing against the Confederate right, close to Chickamauga station. In the face of a heavy artillery fire the Federals pressed on, but at the end of an hour they were compelled to retreat. By order of Grant the attack was renewed, but another severe repulse followed. Next a general movement against the left centre was ordered, and this was successful. The enemy was driven in confusion toward Ringgold, to the southeast, while a large number of prisoners and a vast amount of supplies were captured.

General Hooker pursued and drove the Confederates out of Ringgold, but they a.s.sumed so strong a position at Taylor's Ridge that Grant ordered him not to attack, but to remain and hold Ringgold, Sherman, in the meantime, marching against Longstreet. Bragg had blundered so much in conducting this disastrous campaign that President Davis was forced to replace him with Hardee.

RAISING OF THE SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.

Meanwhile, Longstreet was besieging Burnside at Knoxville, where the 15,000 Union troops were threatened with starvation. The town was invested November 17th, and the next day some of the outworks were carried. Well aware that Grant, after his defeat of Bragg, would hurry to the relief of Knoxville, Longstreet attacked on the 29th, but suffered a b.l.o.o.d.y repulse. He stubbornly held his ground until he learned that Sherman was close upon him, when he withdrew and started on his march to Virginia. The campaign soon ended in Tennessee, which was virtually recovered to the Union.

The reader will note that we have described the leading events in the West and Southwest from the opening of the year to its close. Once more it is necessary to return to January, 1863, in order to give a history of the most important campaign of all--that against Richmond, which was defended by the formidable Army of Northern Virginia, under the command of General Robert E. Lee.

BURNSIDE SUPERSEDED BY HOOKER.

Burnside's management of the attack on Fredericksburg in December, 1862, was so incompetent and disastrous that it was impossible for him to retain the chief command. Knowing that several of his generals had severely criticised him, Burnside sent a list of names to Washington, giving the government the choice of removing them or accepting his resignation. Prominent on Burnside's "black list" was the name of Hooker. On the 26th of January Burnside's resignation was accepted, and Hooker was made his successor.

The morale of the grand organization had been injured by its wretched leadership, but the material itself could not have been finer. Hooker set resolutely to work, and, by the 1st of May, the army was well trained and disciplined, and numbered 130,000 men, of whom fully 12,000 were cavalry. Lee had about half as many troops.

Knowing it would not do to remain idle when the beautiful spring weather came, Hooker had been carefully planning for another campaign against Richmond. He had won a fine reputation for himself as a fighter and skillful corps commander, and the hopes were high that he would lead his superb army directly into the rebel capital. Everything seemed to be in his favor, and the campaign opened promisingly.

THE NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST RICHMOND.

Hooker's plan was to a.s.sail Lee at two points. The Rappahannock and Rapidan were to be crossed a short distance west of Fredericksburg, and the left wing attacked. While this was going on, Hooker's own left wing was to occupy the heights and secure possession of the Richmond Railroad. The powerful Union cavalry were to ride around Lee's position and cut off his retreat to Richmond. This involved the destruction of the railroads and bridges over the North and South Anna Rivers.

This important movement was begun April 27th. The main portion of the corps of Meade, Howard, and Sloc.u.m, numbering 36,000 men, marched thirty miles up the Rappahannock and crossed the stream without resistance. A force then moved ten miles down the other side of the river, driving away several Confederate detachments, and opened the way for Couch with 12,000 men to cross and join the other three corps. Taking different routes, the 48,000 advanced toward Chancellorsville, which had been named as the rendezvous. They were soon followed by Sickles with 18,000 men.

It was not until the Union movement had progressed thus far that Lee read its purpose. He hastily called in his divisions, and, on the forenoon of May 1st, the Army of Northern Virginia was drawn up in battle-line in front of that dense-wooded district known as the Wilderness.

Exultingly confident, Hooker ordered an advance that day from near Chancellorsville toward Fredericksburg. Hardly had he started when he learned that Lee was moving against him; he, therefore, paused and threw up defenses. His aim was to flank Lee, and, to prevent it, the Confederate commander took desperate chances. Keeping up a rattling demonstration in front he sent Stonewall Jackson with 30,000 men around the right of the Union army. Had Hooker known of this daring movement, he could easily have crushed each division in detail.

STONEWALL JACKSON'S FLANK MOVEMENT.

Jackson carried out his programme with fearful completeness. Without his purpose being suspected, he traveled fifteen miles, reaching the road leading from Orange to Fredericksburg, on the southern side of the Rapidan. He was thus within two miles of General Howard's Eleventh Corps. The men were preparing supper with no thought of danger, when the air was suddenly split by thousands of "rebel yells," and the graybacks rushed out of the woods and swept everything before them. The whole Eleventh Corps broke into a wild panic, and ran for their lives toward Chancellorsville.

The German division especially, under the command of Carl Schurz, were irrestrainable in their terror.

The majority, however, stood their ground bravely, and their commanders put forth every effort to stop the wild stampede. A partial success was attained, and the artillery poured in a fire which checked the pursuit.

Fortunately night was at hand, and the fighting soon ceased. The position of the Union army was critical in the extreme. It was squeezed in between Chancellorsville and the fork of the two rivers. What fate awaited it on the morrow?

[Ill.u.s.tration: THOMAS J. ("STONEWALL") JACKSON.]

At this juncture, the Confederate cause received the severest blow in its history. That remarkable man, Stonewall Jackson, was confident that the destruction of the Union army was at hand, and he was impatient for the morrow that he might complete the fearful work. In the dusk of early evening he rode forward, accompanied by several of his staff, to reconnoitre the Union position. Pa.s.sing beyond the outer line of skirmishers, the party halted in the gloom and peered toward the Federal lines. Dimly discerned by a South Carolina regiment, they were mistaken for the enemy, and a volley was fired at them. One of the staff was killed and two wounded. Comprehending the blunder, Jackson wheeled and galloped into the woods, but before the shelter could be reached, the South Carolinians fired a second time.

Jackson was struck twice in the left arm and once in the right hand. His frightened horse whirled about and plunged away. A limb knocked off his hat and came near unseating him, but he managed to keep in the saddle and guide his steed into the road, where one of his staff helped him to the ground and supported him to the foot of a tree where he was laid down. He was suffering so keenly that he could not walk, and was carried on a litter to the rear. For a part of the way, all were exposed to such a hot artillery fire that they had to pause several times and lie down.

[Ill.u.s.tration: HOUSE IN WHICH STONEWALL JACKSON DIED.]

The wound grew so bad that the arm was amputated, but pneumonia followed, and Jackson died on Sunday, May 10th. His last words, uttered in his delirium, were: "Let us cross over the river and rest under the shadow of the trees."

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

The fighting at Chancellorsville was renewed at daylight, May 3d.

General Stuart succeeded to the command of Jackson's corps. The superior numbers of the Union army and its compact formation gave it all the advantage. It needed but one thing to insure overwhelming success: that was competent leadership, and that was the one thing which it did not have.

[Ill.u.s.tration: THE FATAL WOUNDING OF "STONEWALL" JACKSON

After his first great victory at Chancellorsville, "Stonewall" Jackson believed that the destruction of the Union army was at hand, and in his impatience for the morrow, that he might complete the work, he rode in the dusk of the evening beyond his outposts to reconnoiter. A South Carolina regiment mistook his party for the enemy and fired upon them, mortally wounding their great commander.]

With the weaker army still separated, it forced the Federals back toward the river, where Hooker was compelled to form a second line. Holding him there, Lee turned toward Sedgwick, who was at Fredericksburg with 25,000 men. He had a good opportunity to a.s.sail Lee in the rear, but failed to do so, and gave his efforts to capturing Marye's Heights, which was defended by a weak garrison. It was easily taken, and Sedgwick sent a column in the direction of Chancellorsville. On the road it encountered some breastworks, thrown up by the force which Lee had dispatched to check Sedgwick's advance. He was driven back, and the rebels, having been reinforced, recaptured Marye's Heights. Sedgwick made a hurried retreat, and thenceforward formed no factor in the battle.

Having disposed of him, Lee turned again upon Hooker. Early on the 5th, he placed a number of his guns within range of United States Ford and dropped a few sh.e.l.ls among the wagon trains. Nothing, however, was accomplished on this day, except that the dry and parched woods were set on fire, and many of the wounded who were unable to help themselves were burned to death. Every horror that can be conceived as to war was added to the awful scene.

RETREAT OF THE UNION ARMY.

A heavy rainstorm caused the Rapidan and Rappahannock to rise so rapidly that Hooker decided, after consulting his officers, to get back while he had the chance to do so. The bridges were covered with pine boughs, and, with the noise of the wheels deadened by the crashing thunder, the wagons and artillery made the pa.s.sage without discovery. By the following morning, the entire Army of the Potomac was once more across the Rappahannock and marching back to its old camp at Falmouth, and once more the advance against Richmond had ended in woeful disaster.

The losses of the Unionists at Chancellorsville were: killed, 1,606; wounded, 9,762; missing, 5,919; total, 17,287. The losses of the Confederates were: killed, 1,665; wounded, 9,081; captured and missing, 2,018; total, 12,764.

THE SECOND CONFEDERATE INVASION.

After such a frightful Union defeat, it was no wonder that the Confederates again decided to invade the North. Lee was not favorable to the plan, but he must have felt that the prospect of success was better than ever before. He made his preparations with great care, and strengthened his army to 75,000 men, divided into three corps, commanded respectively by Longstreet, Ewell, and A.P. Hill. He had in addition 15,000 cavalry under General J.E.B. ("Jeb") Stuart.

The northward march was begun the first week in June. Longstreet and Ewell advanced upon Culpeper, while Hill remained near Fredericksburg, aiming to deceive Hooker as to his intentions. Hooker quickly perceived that most of the rebel army had disappeared from his front, but it was a mystery to him where it had gone. A reconnoissance developed the direction taken by the two missing corps. Unsuspicious of the grand project that was in the mind of the Confederate commander, Hooker moved down the Shenandoah Valley, taking the same course as Lee, but with the Blue Ridge Mountains between them.