The latter was able to dodge the rushes of the larger craft and play all around her, but the terrible pounding worked damage to both, the _Monitor_ suffering the most. The iron plate of the pilot-house was lifted by a sh.e.l.l, which blinded Lieutenant Worden, and so disabled him that he was forced to turn over the command to Lieutenant Green. Worden, who lived to become an admiral, never fully recovered from his injuries.

The firing, dodging, ramming, and fighting continued for four hours, but the _Merrimac_ was unable to disable her nimble antagonist, and slowly steamed back to Norfolk, while the _Monitor_ returned to her former position, and was carefully kept in reserve by the government against future perils of a similar character.

FATE OF THE MERRIMAC AND MONITOR.

Neither of the vessels was permitted to do further service. Some months later, upon the evacuation of Norfolk, the _Merrimac_ was blown up to prevent her falling into the hands of the Unionists, and the _Monitor_ foundered off Hatteras in December, 1862. The battle wrought a complete revolution in naval warfare. The days of wooden ships ended, and all the navies of the world are now made up mainly of ironclads.

More important work was done by the Union fleets during this year. The government put forth every energy to build ships, with the result that hundreds were added to the naval force, many of which were partial and others wholly ironclad.

OTHER COAST OPERATIONS.

A month before the fight between the _Monitor_ and _Merrimac_, a formidable naval expedition under Commodore Goldsborough and General Ambrose E. Burnside pa.s.sed down the Atlantic coast and captured Roanoke Island. St. Augustine and a number of other places in Florida were captured by troops from Port Royal. Siege was laid to Fort Pulaski, at the mouth of the Savannah River, and it surrendered April 11th. The advantage of these and similar captures was that it gave the blockading fleets control of the princ.i.p.al harbors, and made it easier to enforce a rigid blockade. There were two ports, however, which the Union vessels were never able to capture until the close of the war. They were Charleston and Wilmington, North Carolina. The latter became the chief port from which the Confederate blockade-runners dashed out or entered and were enabled to bring the most-needed medical and other supplies to the Confederacy, while at the same time the owners and officers of the ships reaped fortunes for themselves.

CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS.

One of the primal purposes of the war was to open the Mississippi, which was locked by the enemy at Vicksburg and New Orleans. As a necessary step in the opening of the great river, an expedition was fitted out for the capture of New Orleans. Well aware of what was coming, the Confederates had done all they could to strengthen the defenses of the city. Thirty miles from the mouth of the Mississippi were the powerful Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on opposite sides of the river. They mounted 100 heavy guns, and six powerful chains were stretched across, supported by an immense raft of cypress logs. Thus the river was closed and no fleet could approach New Orleans until these obstructions were removed or overcome. When this should be done, it was still seventy-five miles to New Orleans.

Above the boom of hulks and logs was a fleet of fifteen Confederate vessels, including the ironclad ram _Mana.s.sas_, and a partly completed floating battery armored with railroad iron, and known as the _Louisiana_. It has been stated that the ironclads of those days were only partly protected by armor.

The naval and military expedition which sailed for New Orleans in the spring of 1862 consisted of six sloops of war, sixteen gunboats, five other vessels, and twenty-one mortar-schooners, the last being under charge of Captain David D. Porter, while Commodore David G. Farragut had command of the fleet. The troops, mostly from New England, were commanded by General B.F. Butler.

Farragut crossed the bar, April 8th, and spent several days in making his preparations for bombarding Forts Jackson and St. Philip. The bombardment began April 27th, 1,400 sh.e.l.ls being thrown in one day.

Farragut then called his captains together and told them he had resolved to run by the forts. The only question, therefore, was as to the best means of doing it. It was decided to make the attempt at night. The darkness, however, was of little benefit, since the enemy's huge bonfires on both sh.o.r.es lit up the river as if it were noonday. Previous to this, Lieutenant C.H.B. Caldwell, in the gunboat _Itasca_, had ascended the river undiscovered in the darkness and opened a way through the boom for the fleet.

Farragut arranged the fleet in two columns, his own firing upon Fort Jackson, while the other poured its broadsides into Fort St. Philip. The flagship _Hartford_ led the way under cover of Porter's mortar-boats and the others followed. There was a furious fight between the fleets, but every Confederate was either captured or destroyed.

Farragut steamed on to the city, silencing the batteries along the banks, and, at noon, a messenger was sent ash.o.r.e with a demand for the surrender of the city. General Lovell was in command of 3,000 troops, intended for the defense of New Orleans, but he fled. The mayor refusing to haul down the secession flag, the Union troops took possession, raised the Union banner over the mint, and placed the city in charge of General Butler. The citizens were in such a savage mood that Commodore Farragut had to bring them to their senses by a threat to bombard the city.

General Butler ruled with great strictness, and virtually held New Orleans under martial law. A Confederate won the applause of his friends by climbing to the top of the mint, hauling down the flag, dragging it through the mud, and then tearing it to shreds. Butler brought him to trial before a military commission, and, being found guilty of the unpardonable insult to the flag, he was hanged.

The fall of New Orleans, one of the leading cities, was a severe blow to the Confederacy. The only points where the Mississippi was strongly held by the enemy were at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and attention was already turned to them. Farragut having completed his work, for the time took command in the Gulf of Mexico.

[Ill.u.s.tration: LIBBY PRISON IN 1865.]

The most momentous events of the year occurred in the east and marked the struggle between the Army of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, as it came to be called.

THE ADVANCE AGAINST RICHMOND.

McClellan continued to drill and train his army through the fall of 1861, and well into the following year. It numbered nearly 200,000 men and was one of the finest organizations in the world. In reply to the expressions of impatience, the commander invariably replied that a forward movement would soon be begun, but the weeks and months pa.s.sed and the drilling went on, and nothing was done. Finally, the government gave the commander to understand that he must advance.

McClellan's plan was to move against Richmond, from the lower part of Chesapeake Bay, by way of Urbana on the Rappahannock. While this had many advantages, its fatal objection in the eyes of the President was that it would leave Washington unprotected. He issued an order on the 27th of January directing that on the 22d of February there should be a general land and naval movement against the enemy's position on the Potomac, and that, after providing for the defense of Washington, a force should seize and occupy a point upon the railway to the southwest of Mana.s.sas Junction. McClellan was offended by the act of the President and protested, but Mr. Lincoln clung in the main to his plan, and, since the delay continued, he issued orders directing the formation of the army into corps and naming the generals to command them. Another order made arrangements for the intended advance, and it was left to McClellan to carry them out.

[Ill.u.s.tration: LIBBY PRISON IN 1884, BEFORE ITS REMOVAL TO CHICAGO.]

Reliable information reached Washington that General Joseph E. Johnston, commander of the Confederate forces at Mana.s.sas, was engaged in withdrawing his lines with a view of taking a stronger position nearer Richmond. General McClellan began a forward movement with the Army of the Potomac on the 10th of March. The truth was that Confederate spies in Washington had apprised Johnston of the intended advance of McClellan from the lower Chesapeake, and his action was with a view of checkmating the Union commander. Instead of carrying out this plan, McClellan marched to Centreville and occupied the vacated intrenchments of the enemy. The general hope was that Johnston would be forced to give battle, but the roads in Virginia, at that season, were one sea of mud, which made progress so slow that the Confederates had time in which to withdraw at their leisure.

Crossing the Potomac into Virginia, with the main army, McClellan made his first headquarters at Fairfax Court-House. About that time he received news that he was relieved of the command of the other departments, his authority being confined to the direction of the Army of the Potomac. He was directed by the President to garrison Mana.s.sas securely, see that Washington was protected, and, with the rest of his force, a.s.sume a new base at Fort Monroe, or "anywhere between here and there," and, above all things, to pursue the enemy "by _some_ route."

McClellan's four corps commanders were Sumner, McDowell, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and they and he agreed upon a plan of campaign. The difficulties of transporting nearly 100,000 men to Fort Monroe were so great that two weeks were occupied in completing the transfer. In order to prevent the Confederates from getting in his rear, McClellan directed Banks to rebuild the railroad from Washington to Mana.s.sas and Strasburg, thus keeping open communication with the Shenandoah Valley, where the enemy were in force, a fact which caused the government much uneasiness for the national capital. Indeed, it was a part of the effective plan of Johnston to embarra.s.s the campaign against Richmond.

Banks occupied Winchester about the middle of March and sent a force under Shields to Strasburg. He found Stonewall Jackson there with such a strong force that he fell back to Winchester, where, after the withdrawal of the main body by Banks, he was attacked by Jackson, who was repulsed.

In pursuance of the new plan of campaign, McClellan made Fort Monroe his first base of operations, using the route through Yorktown and West Point for the advance to Richmond. He expected to fight a great battle on the way thither, for the enemy could not fail to read the meaning of his movements. McClellan reasoned that this battle would take place between West Point and Richmond, and his intention was to advance without delay to the former position and use it as his chief depot for supplies. His plan was to make a combined naval and military attack on Yorktown, send a strong force up the York River, aided by the gunboats, and thus establish his new base of operations within twenty-five miles of the Confederate capital.

It was not long before he began calling for reinforcements, and the government, instead of aiding him, took away piecemeal many of the troops upon which the commander had counted to aid him in his campaign.

He wanted 150,000 men and a large increase of cannon. The 10,000 men, composing Blenker's division, were detached, as the President informed him, to support Fremont, but Mr. Lincoln promised to withdraw no more from the main army.

McClellan remained at his headquarters near Alexandria until most of his forces were well on the road to the Yorktown peninsula. He left on the 1st of April and the troops were landed three days later. Then a force of 56,000 men with 100 guns started for Yorktown.

But for the inherent timidity and distrust of McClellan, he might have captured Richmond, by marching straight ahead to the city, for the Confederate force opposed to him was but a fragment of his own, and could have been trampled underfoot. The Confederate intrenchments were a dozen miles in length, and were defended by Magruder with a force that allowed less than a thousand men for each mile.

Instead of pushing on, McClellan began a regular siege of Yorktown.

Immense siege guns were dragged through the muddy swamps, and the musket was laid aside for the spade and shovel, which the men applied week after week, until worn out and with thousands prostrated by sickness.

The delay, as a matter of course, was improved by the Confederates in strengthening the defenses of their capital. At the end of a month, the Union army advanced, whereupon Magruder fell back to other fortifications nearer Richmond. The whole month had been worse than thrown away by McClellan, for it had given the enemy all the time they needed to complete their defenses.

The Confederate army was increased, and reinforcements were sent to McClellan, whose forces were fully 20,000 in excess of those under Johnston, but the Union leader magnified the strength of the enemy and continued to call for more troops. It was this unvarying demand that brought the impatient remark from Secretary of War Stanton:

"If I gave McClellan a million men, he would swear the rebels had two millions, and sit down in the mud and refuse to move until he had three millions."

The Confederates fell back to Williamsburg, at the narrowest part of the peninsula, between the James and York Rivers, and began fortifying their position. The Union gunboats ascended to Yorktown, where the Federal depots were established. Longstreet, in command of the Confederate rear, halted and gave battle with a view of protecting his trains.

The engagement took place on May 5th. The Unionists were repulsed at first, but regained and held their ground, the night closing without any decided advantage to either army. Longstreet, however, had held the Federals in check as long as was necessary, and when he resumed his retreat McClellan did not attempt to pursue him.

The Confederates continued falling back, with McClellan cautiously following. The delay secured by the enemy enabled them to send their baggage and supply trains into Richmond, while the army stripped for the fray. They abandoned the Yorktown peninsula altogether and evacuated Norfolk, which was occupied by General Wool. It was this movement which caused the blowing up of the _Merrimac_, referred to elsewhere.

From this it will be seen that both sh.o.r.es of the James were in possession of the Union forces. The Confederate army withdrew within the defenses of Richmond on the 10th of May, and the Federal gunboats, after steaming up the river to within twelve miles of the city, were compelled to withdraw before the plunging shots of the batteries, which stood on the tops of the high bluffs.

Following the line of the Pamunkey, McClellan's advance-guard reached the Chickahominy on the 21st of May, and could plainly see the spires and steeples of Richmond, which was thrown into a state of great alarm.

Rain fell most of the time, and the rise of the Chickahominy carried away the bridges, made the surrounding country a swamp, and badly divided the Union army.

[Ill.u.s.tration: MOIST WEATHER AT THE FRONT.]

One of the most effective means employed by the Confederate commander against the Union advance was by creating a diversion in the Shenandoah Valley and fear for the safety of Washington. Rather than lose that, our government would have sacrificed the Army of the Potomac. General Johnston had sent Stonewall Jackson into the Valley, where Banks was in command. He was another of the political generals, wholly unfitted for the responsibilities placed in his hands.

At the opening of hostilities, Banks was so confident that he telegraphed the government that Jackson was on the eve of being crushed; but it proved the other way. Banks was completely outgeneraled and sent flying toward Washington. His troops marched more than thirty miles a day, and would have been captured or destroyed to a man had Jackson continued his pursuit, but his forces were fewer in numbers, and he allowed the exhausted and panic-stricken fugitives to find refuge in Washington.

This routing of Banks frightened Washington again, and McDowell was hastily called from Fredericksburg to the defense of the capital. This was the very thing for which the Confederates had planned, since it kept those reinforcements away from McClellan, who was ordered by President Lincoln to attack at once or give up his plan. Still cautious and wishing to feel every foot of the way, McClellan pushed a reconnaissance in the direction of Hanover Court-House.

When fire was opened on the Confederates most of them fell back to Richmond. General Jo Johnston, perceiving that the Union army was divided by the swollen Chickahominy, quickly took advantage of it, and prepared to hurl a force of 50,000 against the Union corps, which numbered a little more than half as many. A violent rain so interfered with his plans that 10,000 of his troops were unable to take part in the battle. In the disjointed struggle which followed, the Confederates were successful at what is known as the battle of Seven Pines, but were defeated at Fair Oaks. Both were fought on June 1st.

GENERAL LEE BECOMES CONFEDERATE COMMANDER.

In the fighting on the morrow, General Johnston, while directing the attack of the right, was desperately wounded by an exploding sh.e.l.l, which broke several ribs and knocked him from his horse. General G.W.

Smith succeeded him in command, but three days later gave way to General R.E. Lee, who in time became the supreme head of the military forces of the Confederacy, and retained his command to the last.