"'If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a _casus foederis_ cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure.' (_Hear, hear._)

"This course was taken, and our interpretation was upheld and recognised as proper, since our action in no way disturbed our relations with the two Allied Powers. The declaration of neutrality made by the present Government conforms therefore in all respects to the precedents of Italian policy, and conforms also to an interpretation of the Treaty of Alliance which has been already accepted by the Allies.

"I wish to recall this, because I think it right that in the eyes of all Europe it should appear that Italy has remained completely loyal to the observance of her pledges." (_Loud applause._)[91]

As the _Times_ of December 11, 1914, said in a Leading Article:--

"In the face of these facts, what becomes of the pretence of the German White Book that it was the murders which forced Austria to take action; what of the contention that Russia, or that England, is answerable for the war? Germany had known Austria's purpose for a year when she granted that Power a free hand to deal with Serbia at her discretion." ... These contemporary telegrams read by Signor Giolitti "prove that the war is no result of Russian arrogance, of French revenge, or of English envy, as the German Chancellor avers, but that it is the consequence of schemes long harboured, carefully thought out, and deliberately adopted by Austria and by Germany."

On the occasion referred to above it was not the murder of the heir-apparent at Serajevo which was the pretext for aggression; the issue of the moment was the Treaty of Bucharest.

Two days after the delivery of the Ultimatum to Serbia in July, 1914, Herr von Jagow issued another denial. In his Report to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, the French Amba.s.sador at Berlin on July 25 wrote:--

"The English Charge d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the Austrian Note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria."[92]

On the same day (July 25) the Russian representative in Paris reports to his Government, that the German Amba.s.sador (Herr von Schoen) said:--

"that Austria had presented her Note to Serbia without any definite understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless approved of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly 'the bolt once fired' (these were his own words), Germany could only be guided by her duties as an ally."[93]

The next day the Acting Director of the "Direction Politique" in Paris, in a note on the visit to that Office paid by Herr von Schoen, the German Amba.s.sador, stated (Paris, Sunday, July 26):--

"Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian Note, and had only approved it after its delivery; she thought, however, that Serbia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He declared besides that he did not know the text of the Serbian reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often ill-informed, represented it to be."[94]

A denial by the German Amba.s.sador to England of his Government's cognisance of the Note is referred to in a despatch from the Russian Amba.s.sador in London (Count Benckendorff) to M. Sazonof, dated July 25, 1914:--

"Grey has told me that the German Amba.s.sador has declared to him that the German Government were not informed of the text of the Austrian Note, but that they entirely supported Austria's action."[95]

On July 25, 1914, a Note was handed by the German Amba.s.sador at Petrograd to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:--

"We learn from an authoritative source that the news spread by certain newspapers, to the effect that the action of the Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade was instigated by Germany is absolutely false. The German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian Note before it was presented, and exercised no influence upon its contents. A threatening att.i.tude is wrongly attributed to Germany.

"Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers justified."[96]

That this a.s.sumed ignorance was received with scepticism, and in some cases frank disbelief in other quarters, is apparent. The French Amba.s.sador in Berlin reported on July 25:--

"The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of events.... He does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's demarche.

"He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation."[97]

From the French Amba.s.sador in Vienna on July 28 came the following statement to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris:--

"Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed her on to aggressive action against Serbia in order to be able herself to enter into war with Russia and France, in circ.u.mstances which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under conditions which have been thoroughly considered."[98]

Up to this date, as the Russian Berlin representative reported to his Government the Official German Wolff Bureau (News Agency) had not published the text of the conciliatory Serbian reply, although it had been communicated to them; nor had it appeared _in extenso_ in any of the local papers--because of the _calming_ effect it would have had on German readers![99]

On the same day (July 28) the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris sent the following message to the French Amba.s.sadors abroad:--

"I have had another visit from the German Amba.s.sador this morning; he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's intentions, he declared that he did not know them and was ignorant of the nature of the means of coercion which she was preparing."[100]

But how does this compare with the following extract from a telegram sent the next day (July 29) by the Kaiser to the Tsar:--

"I cannot ... consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an 'ignominious war.' Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable."[101]

On July 29 the French Minister at Brussels reported:--

"I report the following impressions of my interview with M.

Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact information. The att.i.tude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, according to a preconceived plan, to a declaration of war, without previous arrangement with the Emperor William.

"The German Government stand 'with grounded arms' ready to take peaceful or warlike action as circ.u.mstances may require, but there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and English colleagues share this feeling."[102]

Finally, on July 30, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Amba.s.sador in Vienna, stated to Sir Edward Grey:--

="I have private information that the German Amba.s.sador knew the text of the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Amba.s.sador himself that he endorses every line of it."=[103]

Confirmation of the whole evidence is found in the commercial world, for as Sir E. H. Holden, Chairman of the London City and Midland Bank, stated on January 29, 1915:--

"On the 18th of July last (1914) the Dresdner Bank caused a great commotion by selling its securities and by advising its clients to sell their securities. This was recognised as the first semi-official intimation of a probable European conflagration...."

FOOTNOTES:

[84] Cd. 7717, No. 19.

[85] Cd. 7717, No. 21.

[86] Cd. 7717, No. 30.

[87] Cd. 7717, No. 32.

[88] Cd. 7717, No. 28.

[89] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 9.

[90] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 6.

[91] Cd. 7860, page 401.

[92] Cd. 7717, No. 41.

[93] Cd. 7626, No. 19.

[94] Cd. 7717, No. 57.

[95] Cd. 7626, No. 20.

[96] Cd. 7626, No. 18.

[97] Cd. 7717, No. 35.