Chapter III. Subjectivism And Its Freedom.

The tendency of the modern intellect to independence in its own peculiar sphere of thinking and knowing, cannot fail to work itself out energetically. In this sphere it leads naturally to that view of human reasoning called subjectivism: the thinking or reasoning subject is its own law, the autonomous creator and guide of its thought. Herein lies the _essential presumption_, the very core, of the liberal freedom of science.

Wherever we turn we meet subjectivism with its autonomous rejection of all authority, its arbitrary separation of knowledge from faith, its agnosticism, its relativity to truth as the moving factor of, and the ostensible warrant for, this freedom, especially in the sphere which it considers peculiarly its own, philosophy and religion. Only when we look closer into its philosophical premises will it be possible to form a judgment of the "scientific method" it employs in this, its peculiar sphere, and of the justice of its claim to be the sole administrator of man's ideal possessions, and to be altogether "independent of every view not conforming to this scientific method." Before considering subjectivism let us by way of preface set down a few considerations on the nature of human, intellectual perception.

Objectivism and Subjectivism.

It always has been, and still is, the firm conviction of unbia.s.sed men,-a conviction which irresistibly forces itself upon us,-that in our intellectual perception and thought we grasp an _objective, exterior order of things, an existence distinct from our thought_; of this objective reality we reproduce an image in our minds, and thus grasp it intellectually. _Cognitio est similitudo rei_, says the old school; that is, Knowledge is the reproduction of an objective reality, which thus becomes the criterion of cognition. The reproduction is a counterpart of the original. In this perfect resemblance of our cognition to the objective reality there has ever been recognized the _truth_ of knowledge.

When the thinking mind has arrived at the mathematical truth that the circ.u.mference of a circle is the product of the diameter multiplied by _Ludolph's_ number, it knows-unless indeed it has lost its natural candour-that it has not of itself produced this result of reasoning, but that it has recognized in it an objective reality of truth, distinct from its own thought, and has reproduced that truth in itself. And because this reproduction corresponds to the reality, it is called true cognition.

Similarly, when the intellect expresses the general law of causality, namely, everything that happens has a cause, the intellect is again convinced that it has not of itself produced this result of reasoning, but has only reproduced it by a.s.similating to itself an objective truth which is necessarily so and cannot be otherwise, and which the mind must a.s.similate if it wants to think aright. This is true not only when the mind is dealing with concrete things, but also when it would give expression to general principles, as in the present instance; these, too, are not subjective projections, but are independent of the thinking subject, and are eternal laws.

This view of the nature of human cognition and thought has gradually undergone an essential change, not indeed with those outside the influence of philosophical speculation, but with the representatives of modern philosophy, and those subject to its influence. Objectivism has been superseded by subjectivism. Its principle is this: cognition, imagination, and thought are not the intellectual apprehension of an objective world existing independent of us, of which we reproduce in ourselves a counterpart. No, _the mind creates its own results of reason and cognition_; the objects before us are the creatures of the imagining subject. At the utmost, we can but say that our reasoning is the manner in which a hidden exterior world appears to us. This manner must necessarily conform to the peculiarity of the subject, to his faculties and stage of development; but the exterior world as it is in itself we can never apprehend. _Descartes_, starting with the premise that consciousness is the beginning of all certainty, was the first modern philosopher to enter upon the way of subjectivism. He was followed by _Locke_, _Berkeley_, and _Kant_. It is due to them that in the modern theory of cognition the fundamental principle of idealistic subjectivism, no matter how difficult and unreasonable it may appear to an ordinary thinker, has obtained so many advocates who, nevertheless, cannot adhere to it, but contradict it at every step.

"The world," _Schopenhauer_ is convinced, "is the projection of my idea.... No truth is more certain, more independent of all others, less in need of proof, than this, that all there is to be known, hence the whole world, is an object only in relation to a subject, a vision of the beholder; in a word, the projection of my own idea. Hence the subject is the bearer of the world" (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, I, ---- 1-2). "It is evidently true that knowledge cannot go beyond our consciousness, and hence the existence of things outside of our sphere of consciousness must, to say the least, remain problematical" (Der Gegenstand der Erkenntniss, 1892, p. 2). In like manner _O. Liebmann_ says: "We can never go beyond our individual sphere of ideas (projection of our ideas), even though we apprehend what is independent of us, still the absolute reality of it is known to us only as our own idea" (Zur a.n.a.lysis der Wirklichkeit, 1900, p. 28). Therefore "the contrast between 'I' and the world," says _E. Mach_, "between feeling or apprehension and the reality, falls away" (Die a.n.a.lysis der Empfindungen, 2d ed., 1900, p. 9). And a disciple of _Mach_ says: "It is important to hold fast to the idea that a self-existent, divine Truth, independent of the subject, objectively binding, enthroned, so to say, above men and G.o.ds, is meaningless.... Such a Truth is nonsense" (_H. Kleinpeter_, Kantstudien, VIII, 1903, p. 314).

None of these representatives of worldly wisdom are able to fulfil the first duty of the wise man: "Live according to what you teach." Even the sceptic _Hume_ has to admit that in the common affairs of life he feels himself compelled of necessity to talk and act like other people.

Subjectivism is really nothing but _scepticism_, for it eliminates the knowableness of objective truth. But it is a masked-if you will, a reformed-scepticism. Cognition is given another purpose; its task is not at all, so it is said, to reproduce or a.s.similate a world distinct from itself, but to create its own contents. The very nature of cognition is reversed.

The Autonomy of Reason.

It was _Kant_, the herald of a new era in philosophy, who gave to this gradually maturing subjectivism its scientific form and basis. At the same time he gave prominence to that element of subjectivism which seems to give justification to freedom of thought, to wit, autonomism, the creative power of the intellect which makes its own laws. Independence of reason and free thought have become catchwords since _Kant's_ time. They are a precious ingredient of the autonomy of modern man.

When the flaming blaze of the French Revolution was reddening the skies of Europe, and inaugurating the restoration of the rights of man, _Kant_ was sitting in his study at Konigsberg, his heart beating strongly in sympathy with the Revolution, for he saw in it a hopeful turn of the times. An old man of nearly seventy, he followed the events with most pa.s.sionate interest. _Varnhagen_ records in his Memoirs, based on the stories of _Staegemann_, that, when the proclamation of the Republic was announced in the newspapers, _Kant_, with tears in his eyes, said to some friends: "Now can I say with Simeon, 'Now dost Thou, O Lord, dismiss Thy servant in peace, because mine eyes have seen Thy Salvation' " (_H. Hettner_, Literaturgeschichte des 18. Jahrh. III, 4th ed., 3, 2, 1894, p. 38). While on the other side of the Rhine the Jacobins were doing their b.l.o.o.d.y work of political liberation, the German philosopher, the herald of a new era and an ardent admirer of _Rousseau_, sat in his study labouring for man's intellectual liberation. To give man the right of autonomous self-determination in action and thought was the work of his life.

Autonomy was indeed to him " 'the source' of all dignity of man and of every rational nature" (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, II). And hence it was that his ardent followers beheld in him "the first perfect model of a really free German, one who had purged himself from every trace of Roman absolutism, dogmatism, and anti-individualism" (_H. St.

Chamberlain_, Die Grundlagen des 19. Jahrh., 8th ed., 1907, II, 1127).

In his "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten" (The Foundation of the Metaphysics of Ethics) and "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft" (Critique of Practical Reason) _Kant_ sought to establish _autonomy in moral life_ and action. Man himself, his practical reason, is the ultimate foundation of all moral obligation; did man lead a good life out of obedience to G.o.d it would be a heteronomy unworthy of the name of "moral." "The autonomy of the will," he teaches, "is the sole principle of all moral laws and the duties allied to them; all arbitrary heteronomy, on the contrary, far from having any binding force, is contrary to the principle of morality of the will" (Kritik der prakt. Vern., Elementarlehre, I, 1, 4. Lehrsatz). Or, as amplified by a faithful interpreter of the master: "In the moral world the individual should be not only a member but also a ruler; he is a member of the moral order when he obeys its law; he is its ruler when he enacts the law.... The distinction between autonomy and heteronomy separates true from false ethics, the system of _Kant_ from all other systems. All moral systems, except that of _Kant_, are based on the principles of heteronomy; they can have no other. And critical philosophy was the first to grasp the principle of autonomy" (_Kuno Fischer_, Geschichte der neuen Philosophie, IV, 2d ed., 1869, p. 114 _seq._). _Kant's_ just man no longer prays "Thy will be done"; he identifies the law with himself. _Nietzsche's_ transcendental man is seen in the background.

_Autonomy of thought_ is the result of the "Critique of Pure Reason," and in spite of its inconsistency of expression, its involved sentences, its extremely tiresome style, it is and will long continue to be the text-book of modern philosophy. According to _Kant_ our cognition consists in our fashioning the substance of our perceptions and reasoning after innate, purely subjective, views and conceptions. Time and place, and especially the abstract notions of existence and non-existence, necessity, causality, substance, have no truth independent of our thought; they are but forms and patterns according to which we are forced to picture the world. Their first matter is supplied by sense experience, such as sound, colour, feeling; but these, too, according to _Kant_, are not objective. Nothing then remains to our cognition that is not purely subjective, having existence in ourselves alone. Our cognition is no longer a reproduction, but a creation of its object; our thought is no longer subject to an external truth that may be forced upon it. "Hitherto," says _Kant_, "it has been generally supposed that our cognition must be governed by objects.... Let us see if we cannot make better headway in the province of metaphysics by supposing that objects must be governed by our cognition"

(Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Vorrede zur zweiten Ausgabe).

This is, indeed, nothing but a complete falsification of human cognition.

It is evident to an unbia.s.sed mind that there must be a reason for everything, not because I so think, but I think so because such is the fact; that the multiplication table is right, not because I think so, but I must multiply according to it simply because it is right. My thought is subject to objective truth. But _Kant's_ autonomy means emanc.i.p.ation from objective truth, and hence, though _Kant_ himself held fast to the unchangeable laws of thinking and acting, he energetically opened the way for subjectivism with all its consequences. This was _Kant's_ doing, and history credits him with it. It was one of those events which have made men famous: the giving to the ideas and sentiments of a period their scientific formula, and thereby also their apparent justification.

_Schiller_ wrote in 1805 to _W. von Humboldt_: "The profound fundamental ideas of ideal philosophy remain an enduring treasure, and for this reason alone one should think himself fortunate for having lived at the present time.... Finally, we are both idealists, and should be ashamed to have it said of us that things made us and not we the things." _Fr. Paulsen_ gives expression to the opinion of many when he says: "_Kant_ gives to the intellect the self-determination that is essential to it, and the position in the world which it deserves. He has raised the intellect's creative power to a position of honour: the essence of the intellect is freedom" (Immanuel Kant, 1898, p. 386). "The autonomy of reason ... we cannot give up" (_Kant_, Der Philosoph des Protestantismus, in Philosophia militans, 2d ed., 1901, p. 51).

"It is indeed the offspring of Protestantism." "To me it is beyond doubt," _Paulsen_ continues, "that the fundamental tendency of primitive Protestantism has here been carried out in all clearness" (Ibid. 43). _Luther_, too, found in the heart of the individual the unfailing source of truth. For that reason _Kant_ has been called the philosopher of Protestantism.

Hence the well-known historian, _J. Scherr_, may not be wrong when he calls the philosophy of _Kant_ "the foundation of granite whereon is built the freedom of the German intellect."

Now, indeed, we easily understand the demand for freedom of thought. It is unintelligible how an external authority, a divine revelation or infallible Church, could have ever approached man, a.s.sured him of the truth of its teaching, and laid upon him in consequence of this testimony the obligation of accepting it as true. "An external authority," we are a.s.sured, "be it ever so great, will never succeed in arousing in us a sense of obligation; its laws, be they ever so lofty and earnest, will be deemed arbitrary, simply because they come from without" (_Sabatier_, La Religion et la Culture moderne, apud _Fonsegrive_, Die Stellung der Katholiken gegenueber der Wissenschaft, Deutsch von _Schieser_ (1903), 10). Man accepts only what he himself has produced, what is congenial to his individuality, what is in harmony with his personal intellectual life.

In the place of truth steps "personal conviction," the shaping of one's views and ideals; in the place of unselfish submission to the truth steps the "development of one's intellectual individuality," the "evolution of one's intellectual personality"; in a word, free-thought. Exterior authority can no longer impose an obligation. "Is there on earth," asks _Paulsen_, "an instance where authority can decide for us in matters of belief and thought?" And he answers: "There is none; there cannot be on this earth an infallible teaching authority." And why not? "Philosophy and science must refuse to recognize such an authority.... If I could believe all that the Church or the Pope teaches, this one thing I could never believe, that they are infallible; it would include a resolution, once for all, to renounce my own judgment regarding whatever they declare true or false, good or bad; it would be the utter renunciation of the use of my reason and conscience." (Ibid. 51-53. We shall often cite the testimony of _Paulsen_ for the purpose of ill.u.s.trating modern thought, partly because he is no longer living, partly because he is quite an outspoken representative of the modern view of the world, though generally regarded as moderate. Moreover, he is without doubt one of the most widely read of the modern German philosophers.)

The demonstration of all this is quite unique. Here it is in brief: Were there an infallible authority, one which necessarily taught the truth, then thought and science would be irrevocably subjected to this authority: that will not do; therefore there is no such authority. Or thus: Were there an infallible teaching, then we should have to accept it without contradiction: that is impossible; therefore there is no infallibility.

Hence it is clear, the protest against an infallible authority, even though divine,-for the argument holds good also in regard to such an authority,-is not based on the impossibility of teaching the truth, for the authority is supposed to be infallible, but on man's refusal to be taught. And this refusal is made in accordance with that sovereign freedom of thought which is the natural offspring of subjectivism; the princ.i.p.al renunciation is based on its denial of objective truth. _It is the rejection of the truth._

"In advanced progress," _Paulsen_ continues, "the individual is also separating himself from the intellectual ma.s.s of the people in order to enjoy a separate mental existence.... The individual is beginning to have his own ideas about things; he is no longer satisfied with the common opinions and notions about the world and life which have been dealt out to him by religion and mythology: all philosophy begins with freeing the individual from common notions." "If the individual ideals of a personality, gifted with extraordinary power of mind and will, happen to come in conflict with the objective morality of the time, then there results one of those struggles which cause the dramatic crises of history. They who thus struggled were the real heroes of mankind. They rose against the conventional and indifferent ideals which had grown obsolete, against untrue appearances, against the salt that had lost its savour; they preached a new truth, pointed out new aspirations and ideals which breathed a new strength into life and raised it to a higher plane" (System der Ethik, 8th ed., 1906, I, 372 f.).

Truly encouraging words for the modern agitator and reformer. To summon the courage to rise above the level of the ma.s.ses, to feel within himself the centre of gravity, and to fashion his thoughts regardless of the whole world, this is nothing less than the beginning of philosophy and wisdom.

And should he feel himself strong-minded he may simply change all moral and religious values which do not square with his individual judgments.

"To remain faithful to one's own self," we are told again, "that is the essence of this ideal bravery. No one can possess this virtue who does not feel within himself the centre about which life gravitates; whoever pursues exterior things as his ultimate end cannot penetrate to interior freedom. _Spinoza_, by life and teaching, is a great preacher of this freedom" (Ibid. II, p. 27). Self-consciousness as arrogant as that of a pantheist like _Spinoza_, who indeed did not pursue "exterior things as the ultimate end," nor G.o.d either; the self-consciousness in which man feels himself the centre about which world and life revolve; the will which now directs thought on its way,-these are the life-nerves of autonomous free-thought.

In fact, inclination and will, not objective truth, are the measure and norm of free-thought. This _Paulsen_ again expresses with astonishing candour. According to him, intelligence is after all nothing else than a transformation of the will, this doctrine is rooted in the more modern voluntaristic monism, and is akin to subjectivism. If our cognition itself forms its object, then the real concept of cognition has been lost to us, and in its place we have the will determining the action even of the intellect.

_Paulsen_ says emphatically, "Intelligence is an instrument of the will in the service of preservation of life.... Perhaps it can be said that even the elementary formations of thought, the logical and metaphysical forms of reality, are already codetermined by the will. If the forms of abstract thought are at all the result of biological evolution, then this must be accepted: they are formations and conceptions of reality, which have proved effective and life-preserving, and have therefore attained their object. The principle of ident.i.ty is in reality not a mere statement, not an indicative, but an imperative: A is A; that is, what I have put down as A shall be A and remain A.... If this be so, if thought and cognition be determined fundamentally by the will, then it is altogether unintelligible how it might finally turn against the will, and force upon it a view against its will" (_Kant's_ Verhaeltniss zur Metaphysik, 1900, p. 31 f.).

We have to do here with a confusion of ideas possible only when correct reasoning has sunk to a surprisingly low level. To think with the will, to draw conclusions with intention, is degenerate thinking. But now we understand better what is meant by autonomy of thought. It gives man license to disregard by shallow reasoning everything that clashes with his own will. "What I have put down as A shall be A and remain A!"

It is now clear that subjectivism and autonomism in thinking are rooted in the positive disregard of objective truth, in the refusal of an unconditional subjection to it; they mean _emanc.i.p.ation from the truth_.

Here we have the most striking and _deepest difference_ between modern subjectivistic and Christian objective thought. The latter adheres to the old conviction that our thoughts do not make the truth, but are subject to an objective order of things as a norm. For this reason autonomous freedom and subjective caprice, a manner of reasoning that would approach truth as a lawgiver, and even change it according to time and circ.u.mstance, are unintelligible in the Christian objective thought. This thought submits unselfishly to truth wherever met, be it without a divine revelation or with it, if the revelation be but vouched for. And the reward of this unselfishness is the preservation of the truth.

But subjectivism, with its freedom, leads inevitably to the loss of the truth; it is scepticism in principle, in fact, if my thoughts are not a counterpart of an objective world, but only a subjectively produced image; not knowledge of an external reality, but only a figment of the imagination, a projection, then I can have no a.s.surance that they are more than an empty dream.

The Modern Separation of Knowledge and Faith.

Of course it would be too much to expect that subjectivism in modern thought and scientific work should go to the very limit, viz., to disregard all reasoning, to advance at will any theory whatever, to silence disagreeable critics by merely referring to one's autonomy in thinking, and denying that any one can attain to absolute truth. Errors in empirical speculation never prosper as others do; the power of natural evidence a.s.serts itself at every step, and tears down the artificial cobwebs of apparently scientific scepticism. It a.s.serts itself less strongly where the opposing power of natural evidence is weaker, than is the case in matters of actual sense-experience. Here indeed one sees the objective reality before him, which he cannot fashion according to his caprice. The astronomer has no thought of creating his own starry sky, nor does the archaeologist wish to create out of his own mind the history of ancient nations. They both desire to know and to reveal the reality. But in the _suprasensible sphere_, in dealing with questions of the whence and whither of human life, where there is question of religion and morals, there autonomy and scepticism a.s.sert themselves as though they were in their own country, there the free-thinker steps in, boasting of his independence and taking for his motto the axiom of ancient sophistry: the measure of all things is man.

Here at the same time the natural product of subjectivism, sceptic agnosticism, has full sway. In such matters, we are told, there is no certain truth; nothing can be proved, nothing refuted: they are all matters of _faith_-not faith, of course, in the Catholic sense. The latter is the acceptance by reason of recognized divine testimony, hence an act of the intellect. The modern so-called faith, on the contrary, is not an act of the intellect, but is supposed to be a vague _feeling_, a want, a longing and striving after the divine in one's innermost soul, which divine is then to be grasped by the soul in some mysterious way as something immediately present in it. This feeling is said to emerge from the subconsciousness of the soul, and to raise in the mind those images and symbols which we encounter in the doctrines of the various religions, varying according to times and men. They are only the symbols for that unutterable experience of the divine, which can be as little expressed by definitions and tenets as sounds can by colour. It is a conviction of the ideal and divine, but different from the conviction of reason; it is an inner, actual experience. Hence there can no longer be absolute religious truth, no unchangeable dogmas, which would have to be adhered to forever.

In religion, in views of the world and life, the free feeling of the human subject holds sway, a feeling that experiences and weaves together those thoughts and ideals that are in accord with his individuality. This is the modern doctrine.

The dark mysticism of the ancient East and the agnosticism of modern times here join hands. This modern method of separating knowledge and faith is, as we all know, a prominent feature of modern thought. Knowledge, that is, cognition by reason, is said to exist only in the domain of the natural sciences and history. Of what may be beyond these we can have no true knowledge. Here, too, _Kant_ has led the way; for the important result of his criticism is his incessant injunction: we can have true knowledge only of empiric objects, never of things lying beyond the experience of the senses; our ideas are merely subjective constructions of the reason which obtain weight and meaning only by applying them to objects of sense experiment. Hence G.o.d, immortality, freedom, and the like, remain forever outside the field of our theoretical or cognitive reason. Nevertheless _Kant_ did not like to drop these truths. Hence he constructed for himself a conviction of another kind. The "practical reason" is to guide man's action in accomplishing the task in which her more timid sister, theoretical reason, failed. And it does it, too. It simply "postulates"

these truths; they are its "_postulates_," since without them moral life and moral order, which it is bound to recognize, would be impossible. No one knows, of course, whether this be truth, but it ought to be truth.

_Stat pro ratione voluntas._ The Gordian knot is cut. "It is so," the will now cries from the depths of the soul, "I believe it"; while the intellect stands hesitatingly by protesting "I don't know whether it is so or not."

Doubt and conviction embrace each other; Yes and No meet peacefully. "I had to suspend knowledge," _Kant_ suggests, "in order to make room for faith" (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2. Vorrede). "It is an exigency of pure practical reason based on duty," he further comments on his postulate, "to make something the highest good, the object of my will, in order to further it with all my power. Herein, however, I have to a.s.sume its possibility, and therefore its conditions, viz., G.o.d, freedom, and immortality, because I cannot prove them by speculative reason, nor yet disprove them." Thus "the just man may say I wish that there be a G.o.d; I insist upon it, I will not have my faith taken from me" (Kritik der prakt.

Vernunft, 1. Teil, 2. Buch, 2 VIII).

Others have followed the lead of _Kant_. For philosophers, Protestant theologians, and modernists, he has become the pilot in whom they trust.

"_Kant's_ critical philosophy," says _Paulsen_, "gives to knowledge what belongs to it-the entire world of phenomena, for the freest investigation; on the other hand, it gives to faith its eternal right, viz., the interpretation of life and the world according to their value" (Immanuel Kant, 1898, 6). "Faith does not simply rest upon proofs, but upon practical necessity"; "it does not come from the intellect, but from the heart and will"

(Einleitung in die Philosophie, 10th ed., 1903, 271, 269).