Shortly thereafter Russia, casting aside all the traditional secrecy of Muscovite diplomacy, submitted to a candid world its acts and deeds in the form of the so-called Russian _Orange Paper_, with 79 appended doc.u.ments, and this was followed later by the publication by Belgium of the so-called Belgian _Gray Paper_.

Late in November France published its _Yellow Book_, the most comprehensive of these diplomatic records. Of the two groups of powers, therefore, only Austria and Italy have failed to disclose their diplomatic correspondence to the scrutiny of the world.

The former, as the originator of the controversy, should give as a matter of "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" its justification, if any, for what it did. So far, it has only given its ultimatum to Servia and Servia's reply.

Italy, as a nation that has elected to remain neutral, is not under the same moral obligation to disclose the secrets of its Foreign Office, and while it remains on friendly terms with all the Powers it probably feels some delicacy in disclosing confidential communications, but as the whole world is vitally interested in determining the justice of the quarrel and as it is wholly probable that the archives of the Italian Foreign Office would throw an illuminating searchlight upon the moral issues involved, Italy, in a spirit of loyalty to civilization, should without further delay disclose the doc.u.mentary evidence in its possession.

While it is to be regretted that the full diplomatic record is not made up, yet as we have the most substantial part of the record in the communications which pa.s.sed in those fateful days between Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, there is sufficient before the court to justify a judgment, especially as there is reason to believe that the doc.u.ments as yet withheld would only confirm the conclusions which the record already given to the world irresistibly suggests.

Thus we can reasonably a.s.sume that the Italian doc.u.mentary evidence would fairly justify the conclusion that the war was on the part of Germany and Austria a war of aggression, for Italy, by its refusal to act with its a.s.sociates of the Triple Alliance, has in the most significant manner thus adjudged it.

Under the terms of the Triple Alliance, Italy had obligated itself to support Germany and Austria in any purely _defensive_ war, and if therefore the communications, which undoubtedly pa.s.sed between Vienna and Berlin on the one hand, and Rome on the other, justified the conclusion that Germany and Austria had been a.s.sailed by Russia, England, and France or either of them, then we must a.s.sume that Italy would have respected its obligation, especially as it would thus relieve Italy from any possible charge of treachery to two allies, whose support and protection it had enjoyed from the time that the Triple Alliance was first made.

When Italy decided that it was under no obligation to support its allies, it effectually affirmed the fact that they had commenced a war of aggression, and until the contrary is shown, we must therefore a.s.sume that the archives of the Foreign Office at Rome would merely confirm the conclusions hereinafter set forth as to the moral responsibility for the war.

Similarly upon considerations that are familiar to all who have had any experience in the judicial investigation of truth, it must be a.s.sumed that if Austria had in its secret archives any doc.u.mentary evidence that would justify it in its pretension that it had been unjustly a.s.sailed by one or more of the Powers with which it is now at war, it would have published such doc.u.ments to the world in its own exculpation. The moral responsibility for this war is too great for any nation to accept it unnecessarily. Least of all could Austria--which on the face of the record commenced the controversy by its ultimatum to Servia--leave anything undone to acquit itself at the bar of public opinion of any responsibility for the great crime that is now drenching Europe with blood. The time is past when any nation can ignore the opinions of mankind or needlessly outrage its conscience. Germany has recognized this in publishing its defense and exhibiting a part of its doc.u.mentary proof, and if its ally, Austria, continues to withhold from the knowledge of the world the doc.u.ments in its possession, there can be but one conclusion as to its guilt.

Upon the record thus made up in the Supreme Court of Civilization, that tribunal need no more hesitate to proceed to judgment than would an ordinary court hesitate to enter a decree because one of the litigants has deliberately suppressed doc.u.ments known to be in its possession. It does not lie in the mouth of such a litigant to ask the court to suspend judgment or withhold its sentence until the full record is made up, when the incompleteness of that record is due to its own deliberate suppression of vital doc.u.mentary proofs.

CHAPTER III

THE SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE

The official defenses of England, Russia, France, and Belgium do not apparently show any failure on the part of either to submit any essential diplomatic doc.u.ment in their possession. They have respectively made certain contentions as to the proposals that they made to maintain the peace of the world, and in every instance have supported these contentions by putting into evidence the letters and communications in which such proposals were expressed.

When the German _White Paper_ is examined it discloses on its very face the suppression of doc.u.ments of vital importance. The fact that communications pa.s.sed between Berlin and Vienna, the text of which has never been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture. Germany a.s.serts as part of its defense that it faithfully exercised its mediatory influence on Austria, but not only is such influence not disclosed by any practical results, such as we would expect in view of her dominating relations with Austria, but the _text_ of these vital communications is still kept in the secret archives of Berlin and Vienna. Germany has carefully selected a part of her diplomatic records for publication but withheld others. Austria has withheld all.

Thus in the official apology for Germany it is stated that, in spite of the refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey to treat the Servian reply "as a basis for further conversations,"

we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and _advised_ Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy.[3]

[Footnote 3: German _White Paper_.]

This would be more convincing if the German Foreign Office had added the _text_ of the advice which it thus gave Vienna.

A like significant omission will be found when the same official defense states that on July 29th the German Government advised Austria "to begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof." But here again the _text_ is not found among the doc.u.ments which the German Foreign Office has given to the world. The communications, which pa.s.sed between that office and its amba.s.sadors in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, are given _in extenso_, but among the twenty-seven communications appended to the German _White Paper it is most significant that not a single communication is given of the many which pa.s.sed from the Foreign Office of Berlin to that of Vienna and only two which pa.s.sed from the German Amba.s.sador in Vienna to the German Chancellor_. While the Kaiser has favored the world with his messages to the Czar and King George, he has wholly failed to give us any message that he sent in those critical days to the Austrian Emperor or the King of Italy. We shall have occasion to refer hereafter to the frequent failure to produce doc.u.ments, the existence of which is admitted by the exhibits which Germany appended to its _White Paper_.

This cannot be an accident. The German Foreign Office has seen fit to throw the veil of secrecy over the text of its communications to Vienna, although professing to give the purport of a few of them. The purpose of this suppression is even more clearly indicated by the complete failure of Austria to submit any of its diplomatic records to the scrutiny of a candid world. Until Germany and Austria are willing to put the most important doc.u.ments in their possession in evidence, they must not be surprised that the World, remembering Bismarck's garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated the Franco-Prussian War, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of their pacific protestations.

ADDENDUM

The Austrian _Red Book_, published more than six months after the declaration of war, simply emphasizes the policy of suppression of vital doc.u.ments, which we have already discussed. Of its 69 doc.u.mentary exhibits, _there is not one which pa.s.sed directly between the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna_. The text of the communications, in which Germany claims to have exercised a mediatory and conciliatory influence with its ally, is still withheld. _Not a single doc.u.ment is produced which was sent between July the 6th and July the 21st_, the period when the great _coup_ was secretly planned by Berlin and Vienna.

In the _Red Book_ we find eight communications from Count Berchtold to the Austrian Amba.s.sador at Berlin and four replies from that official, but not a letter or telegram pa.s.sing between Berchtold and von Bethmann-Hollweg or between the German and Austrian Kaisers. The Austrian _Red Book_ gives additional evidence that at the eleventh hour, and shortly before Germany issued its ultimatum to Russia, Austria did finally agree to discuss the Servian question with Russia; but the information, which Germany presumably gave to its ally of its intention to send the ultimatum to Russia, is carefully withheld. Notwithstanding this suppression of vital doc.u.ments, the diplomatic papers of Germany and Austria, now _partially_ given to the world, disclose an unmistakable purpose, amounting to an open confession, that they intended to force their will upon Europe, even though this course involved the most stupendous war in the history of mankind.

March 1, 1915.

CHAPTER IV

GERMANY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM

On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Crown Prince was murdered at Serajevo.

For nearly a month thereafter there was no public statement by Austria of its intentions, with the exception of a few semi-inspired dispatches to the effect that it would act with the greatest moderation and self-restraint. A careful examination made of the files of two leading American newspapers, each having a separate news service, from June 28, 1914, to July 23, 1914, has failed to disclose a single dispatch from Vienna which gave any intimation as to the drastic action which Austria was about to take.

The French Premier, Viviani, in his speech to the French Senate, and House of Deputies, on August 4, 1914, after referring to the fact that France, Russia, and Great Britain had cooperated in advising Servia to make any reasonable concession to Austria, added:

This advice was all the more valuable in view of the fact that Austria-Hungary's demands had been inadequately foreshadowed to the governments of the Triple Entente, _to whom during the three preceding weeks the Austro-Hungarian Government had repeatedly given a.s.surance that its demands would be extremely moderate_.

The movements of the leading statesmen and rulers of the Triple Entente clearly show that they, as well as the rest of the world, had been lulled into false security either by the silence of Austria, or, as Viviani avers, by its deliberate suggestion that its treatment of the Serajevo incident would be conciliatory, pacific, and moderate.

Thus, on July 20th, the Russian Amba.s.sador, obviously antic.i.p.ating no crisis, left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence. The President of the French Republic and its Premier were far distant from Paris.

Pachitch, the Servian Premier, was absent from Belgrade, when the ultimatum was issued.

The testimony of the British Amba.s.sador to Vienna is to the same effect. He reports to Sir Edward Grey:

The delivery at Belgrade on the 23d of July of the note to Servia was preceded by a period of _absolute silence_ at the Ballplatz.

He proceeds to say that with the exception of the German Amba.s.sador at Vienna (note the significance of the exception) not a single member of the Diplomatic Corps knew anything of the Austrian ultimatum and that the French Amba.s.sador, when he visited the Austrian Foreign Office on July 23d (the day of its issuance), was not only kept in ignorance that the ultimatum had actually been issued, but was given the impression that its tone would be moderate. Even the Italian Amba.s.sador was not taken into Count Berchtold's confidence.[4]

[Footnote 4: Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated September 1, 1914.]

The Servian Government had formally disclaimed any responsibility for the a.s.sa.s.sination and had pledged itself to punish any Servian citizen implicated therein. No word came from Vienna excepting the semi-official intimations as to its moderate and conciliatory course, and after the funeral of the Archduke, the world, then enjoying its summer holiday, had almost forgotten the Serajevo incident. The whole tragic occurrence simply survived in the sympathy which all felt with Austria in its new trouble, and especially with its aged monarch, who, like King Lear, was "as full of grief as age, wretched in both."

Never was it even hinted that Germany and Austria were about to apply in a time of peace a match to the powder magazine of Europe.

Can it be questioned that loyalty to the highest interests of civilization required that Germany and Austria, when they determined to make the murder of the Archduke by an irresponsible a.s.sa.s.sin the pretext for bringing up for final decision the long-standing troubles between Austria and Servia, should have given all the European nations some intimation of their intention, so that their _confreres_ in the family of nations could cooperate to adjust this trouble, as they had adjusted far more difficult questions after the close of the Balko-Turkish War?

Whatever the issue of the present conflict, it will always be to the lasting discredit of Germany and Austria that they were false to this great duty, and that they precipitated the greatest of all wars in a manner so underhanded as to suggest a trap. They knew, as no one else knew, in those quiet mid-summer days of July, that civilization was about to be suddenly and most cruelly torpedoed. The submarine was Germany and the torpedo, Austria, and the work was most effectually done.

This ignorance of the leading European statesmen (other than those of Germany and Austria) as to what was impending is strikingly shown by the first letter in the English _White Paper_ from Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, dated July 20, 1914. When this letter was written it is altogether probable that Austria's arrogant and unreasonable ultimatum had already been framed and approved in Vienna and Berlin, and yet Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister of a great and friendly country, had so little knowledge of Austria's policy that he

asked the German Amba.s.sador to-day (July 20th) if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna. He replied that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step.

Sir Edward Grey adds that he told the German Amba.s.sador that he had learned that Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister,

in speaking to the Italian Amba.s.sador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up.

The German Minister then replied that it would be desirable "if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia," so that the first suggestion of Russia playing the part of the peacemaker came from the German Amba.s.sador in London. Sir Edward Grey then adds that he told the German Amba.s.sador that he

a.s.sumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial,