Inasmuch as the official message presented to-day by your Amba.s.sador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone, I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Servian problem to The Hague Conference. I trust in your wisdom and friendship."

The German Foreign Office has since explained that they regarded this telegram as too "_unimportant_" for publication. Comment is unnecessary.

It thus appears that the Czar at the beginning of his correspondence with the Kaiser suggested that the whole dispute be submitted to The Hague Tribunal for adjustment. Servia had already made the same suggestion.

As the world owes the first Hague Convention to the Czar's initiative, it can justly be said to his lasting credit that he at least was loyal to the pacific ideal of that great convention of the nations.

II

THE AUSTRIAN OFFER OF JULY 31, 1914

The author has noted (_ante_, p. 175) that as the belated offer of Austria on July the 31st "to discuss [with Russia] the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia" did not offer to suspend military preparations or operations, the concession was more nominal than real.

The Austrian _Red Book_ converts this inference into a certainty, and makes clear that Austria's pretended change of policy was only diplomatic finesse, as it contained no substantial modification of its uncompromising att.i.tude.

Russia had proposed on July the 30th (_ante_, p. 166) that "if Austria consents to stay the march of her armies upon Servian territory" and further agreed that the question of "the reparation which Servia could accord to the Government of Austria-Hungary" could be examined by the Great Powers, Russia would suspend her military preparations. As the underlying question was whether Austria should be permitted to subjugate Servia without interference, it was vital that that subjugation should not proceed pending an examination by all interested powers into its justice and ultimate ends.

Sir Edward Grey had previously requested Germany on July the 28th "to use its influence" with the Austrian Government "to the effect that the latter either consider the reply from Belgrade satisfactory or else accept it as a basis for discussion between the Cabinets." The German Foreign Office then instructed the German Amba.s.sador at Vienna "to submit the British proposal to the Vienna Cabinet for its consideration" (Austrian _Red Book_, No. 43). As a result of this suggestion, Count Berchtold on July the 29th (Austrian _Red Book_, No.

44) again shut the door upon any compromise by the contention that Austria

"no longer is in a position to meet the Servian reply in the spirit of the British suggestions, since at the time when the German request was presented here, a state of war already existed between the Dual Monarchy and Servia, _and thus the Servian reply had been superseded by events_."

The only counter-suggestion which Austria then made was as follows:

"Should the British Cabinet be prepared to exert its influence upon the Russian Government for the maintenance of peace among the Great Powers, and for a localization of the war, which had been forced upon us by the Servian agitation of many years' standing, such efforts would meet with the Imperial and Royal Government's appreciation." (Austrian _Red Book_, No. 44.)

On July 31st the German Amba.s.sador at Vienna, acting on instructions (which instructions are again not disclosed in the German _White Book_) informed Count Berchtold "of a conversation between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky," in the course of which the British Secretary of State declared to the German Amba.s.sador that Russia felt unable "to treat directly with Austria-Hungary and therefore requested Great Britain to resume her mediation" and that "as a condition of this mediation, however, the Russian Government stipulates the suspension of hostilities in the meanwhile." (Austrian _Red Book_, No.

51.)

Thereupon Count Berchtold made the eleventh hour offer in question by instructing the Austrian Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg

"to express our readiness to consider Sir Edward Grey's proposition to mediate between us and Servia despite the changes brought about in the situation by Russia's mobilization. _Our acceptance, however, is subject to the condition that our military action against Servia shall nevertheless proceed and that the British Cabinet shall induce the Russian Government to stop the mobilization directed against us. It is understood that in this case we would at once cancel our defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which had been forced upon us by Russia's mobilization._" (Austrian _Red Book_, No. 51.)

This suggestion was fatally objectionable in that it required Russia to suspend its preparations to defend its interests while permitting Austria to proceed with the subjugation of Servia. As the "bone of contention" was this subjugation of Servia, this belated and ostensibly conciliatory proposal of Austria amounted to an absurdity.

In that cla.s.sic of nonsense, _Alice in Wonderland_, the unreasonable and violent Queen announced in the trial of the Knave the similar procedure of "sentence first, verdict afterwards," and Austria's final proposal was essentially a like folly, for, stripped of diplomatic pretense, it amounted to this, that Austria, while tying Russia's hands, should proceed not merely to sentence but even to execute Servia and subsequently discuss the justice of its action when it had become irremediable.

The possible theory which we suggested (_ante_, p. 175), that Austria at the eleventh hour may have experienced a change of heart and had adopted a more conciliatory course, is apparently untenable.

III

THE INVASION OF FRANCE ON AUGUST 1ST

It has been Germany's contention that not only did the mobilization of Russia cause the war, but that its eastern and western frontiers were violated by Russian and French soldiers at a time when Germany's intentions were sincerely pacific.

At 7 P.M. on July the 31st, Germany had given France until 1 P.M. of the following day to declare whether it would remain neutral in the event of a Russian-German war, and at that hour Viviani advised the German Amba.s.sador that France "would do that which her interests dictated." (German _White Paper_, No. 27.) Notwithstanding France's virtual refusal to meet the demand of Germany, the latter did not declare war on France on that day, and this is the more significant as it immediately declared war on Russia. The German Amba.s.sador remained in Paris until August the 3d, and only then demanded his pa.s.sports when his position in the French Capitol had become untenable.

In the meantime Germany was awaiting some act of aggression on the part of France, that would enable it under the terms of the Triple Alliance to demand as of right the cooperation of Italy, while France, determined for this and other reasons not to be the aggressor, had withdrawn its troops ten kilometers from the frontier and refused to take any offensive step either before or after the expiration of the ultimatum.

The confidential telegram of the Kaiser to King George suggests the possibility that on August the 1st, about the time that the eighteen-hour ultimatum had expired, Germany was ready and intended to commence an immediate invasion of France, for on that day the Kaiser telegraphs to King George:

"_I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on my frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into France._" (_Ante_, p. 187.)

The exact hour when the Kaiser sent the King this message is conjectural. We know from the German _White Paper_ that at 11 A.M.

on that day Sir Edward Grey inquired of Prince Lichnowsky over the telephone whether Germany was "in a position to declare that we would not attack France in a war between Germany and Russia in case France should remain neutral."

This message prompted the Kaiser's telegram to King George. How soon thereafter the Kaiser sent his telegram we do not know, but as the impossibility of France's neutrality was recognized in Berlin on receipt of Lichnowsky's telegram by 5 P.M. on that day, it is altogether probable that the Kaiser's telegram was sent between those hours.

If the telegram in question is now a.n.a.lyzed and the fair natural import is given to the Kaiser's language, it would seem that the invasion of France, either before or in any event simultaneously with the expiration of the eighteen-hour ultimatum, had been determined upon by the Kaiser and his military staff, for the Kaiser's intimation that he has "stopped by telegraph and telephone [his army] from crossing into France" fairly implies that previous orders had been given to commence such invasion and that these orders had been hurriedly recalled in the most expeditious way, upon the supposed intimation of Sir Edward Grey that England might guarantee the neutrality of France.

Under these circ.u.mstances, with the German Amba.s.sador still at Paris and ostensibly preserving friendly relations, it is evident that the invasion was either to precede or to follow immediately upon the severance of diplomatic relations. This in itself may not be indefensible under international law, but it throws a searchlight upon the contention of Germany that its intentions were pacific and that it had been surprised by a sudden and treacherous attack on the part of Russia, France, and England.

The difficulty, however, is to reconcile this apparent intention of the Kaiser's military staff to invade France on August the 1st and the action of his Foreign Office in failing to make any declaration of war against France and in retaining its Amba.s.sador at Paris and permitting the French Amba.s.sador to remain at Berlin. The diplomatic records abundantly show that this latter policy of the German Foreign Office was followed in the hope that France would become the aggressor, but its inconsistency with the policy of the War Office implied in the Kaiser's telegram is obvious.

Possibly the Kaiser's soldiers and diplomats were not working in complete harmony. It may be true that the many blunders of German diplomats were in part due to the reckless impetuosity of the War Office and it is possible that some of von Bethmann-Hollweg's and von Jagow's diplomatic blunders are more properly attributable to the Kaiser and Moltke.

It is also possible that the natural inference from the Kaiser's language above quoted is misleading and that the telegram to King George did not mean to imply that any orders for an invasion had been cancelled but simply that the army leaders on the Western frontier had been cautioned not to cross the frontier until further orders.

Another possible theory is that the Kaiser for political reasons may have exaggerated the extent of his concession, and magnified the urgency of the situation to induce prompt and favorable action by Great Britain.

But the readiness of Germany to strike a quick and fatal blow at Paris cannot be gainsaid and strangely contrasts with the "injured innocence" protestations that it was treacherously surprised by an unexpected attack. Always with Prussia, "the readiness is all."

IV

THE USE OF THE WORD "ENGLAND"

In making these scattered _addenda_, I take this occasion to make the _amende honorable_ to some of my readers, who since the first editions of this book appeared have taken exception to my use of the word "England" and "English," where obviously "Great Britain" and "British"

were meant. These critics are technically correct, but I hope that they will acquit me of any intention of ignoring any part of the British Empire in using a term, which by common and immemorial usage has been applied throughout the world as synonymous with the great Empire. I should deeply regret it, if any other intention were imputed to me, for in the magnificent struggle which Great Britain has made for the highest ideals of civilization and the basic rights of humanity, no one now or hereafter can ever ignore the heroic part which has been played by Scotland, Ireland, Canada, and the over-sea dominions

May I not plead that the word "England," has to common intent a broader as well as a more restricted meaning and that when the poet, the historian or--as in my case--the student uses the word "England"

in reference to a world-wide controversy, no one is likely to misapprehend his meaning. Such use is certainly as common and as generally understood as that of the word "American" as applied to a Citizen of the United States, although in both cases the characterization is not strictly accurate. To my critics in Scotland and Ireland who have made this criticism of my book, I can only say:

"Let my disclaiming from a purposed evil Free me so far in your most generous thoughts, That I have shot mine arrow o'er the house, And hurt my brother."

CHAPTER IX

THE CASE OF BELGIUM

The callous disregard by Germany of the rights of Belgium is one of the most shocking exhibitions of political iniquity in the history of the world.

That it has had its parallel in other and less civilized ages may be freely admitted, but until German scientists, philosophers, educators, and even doctors of divinity attempted to justify this wanton outrage, it had been hoped that mankind had made some progress since the times of Wallenstein and Tilly.

The verdict of Civilization in this respect will be little affected by the ultimate result of the war, for even if Germany should emerge from this t.i.tanic conflict as victor, and become, as it would then undoubtedly become, the first power in the world, it would none the less be a figure for the "time of scorn to point his slow unmoving finger at." To the eulogists of Alexander the Great, Seneca was wont to say, "Yes, but he murdered Callisthenes," and to the eulogists of victorious Germany, if indeed it shall prove victorious, the wise and just of all future ages will say, "Yes, but it devastated Belgium."