As it is unlikely that the Austrian Government would have dealt directly with the Bavarian Government without similar communications to the German Foreign Office, it follows as a strong probability that the German Foreign Office and probably each of the const.i.tuent States of Germany knew on July the 23d that Austria intended to demand that which Servia had previously indicated its unalterable determination to refuse. Under these circ.u.mstances the repeated and insistent a.s.surances that the German Foreign Office gave to England, France, and Russia that it "_had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was handed in and had not exercised any influence on its contents_"[43] presents a policy of deception unworthy of a great nation or of the twentieth century.

[Footnote 43: _Ante_, p. 36.]

It regarded this policy of submarine diplomacy as necessary, not only to throw the other nations off their guard while Germany was arming, but also to support its contention that the quarrel between Servia and Austria was a local quarrel. If it appeared that Germany had instigated Austria in its course, it could not have supported its first contention that the quarrel was a local one and it could not reasonably dispute the right of Russia to intervene. For this purpose the fable was invented. It deceived no one.

The French _Yellow Book_ discloses another even more amazing feature of this policy of deception, for it shows on the authority of the Italian Foreign Minister that Germany and Austria did not even take their own ally into their confidence. The significance of this fact cannot be overestimated. Nothing in the whole record more clearly demonstrates the purpose of the German and Austrian diplomats to set a trap for the rest of Europe.

Under the terms of the Triple Alliance it was the duty of each member to submit to its a.s.sociates all matters which might involve the possibility of joint cooperation. Even if this had not been written in the very terms of the Alliance, it would follow as a necessary implication, for when each member obligated itself to cooperate with its allies in any attack upon either of them, but not in any _aggressive_ war, it necessarily followed that each ally had the right to the fullest information as to any controversy which might involve such action, so that it might determine whether it fell within the terms of the obligation.

Neither the German nor the Austrian Foreign Office have ever submitted any doc.u.mentary proof that they discharged this obligation to their ally and it may be added they have never pretended that they did so.

If further proof were needed, we find in the French _Yellow Book_ a report from the French Minister at Rome to his Foreign Office, under date July the 27th, reporting a conversation between the French Minister and the Italian Foreign Minister, the Marquis di San Giuliano, on that day, in which the latter spoke of the

contents of the Austrian note, _and a.s.sured me that he had had no previous knowledge of them whatever_.

He was well aware that the note was to be vigorous and energetic in character, but he had no idea that it could take such a form. I asked him if it was true, as is stated in certain newspapers, that in this connection he had expressed in Vienna approval of Austrian action, and had given the a.s.surance that Italy would fulfill her duties as an ally towards Austria. He replied, "_In no way have we been consulted; we have been told nothing whatever._ We have therefore had no reason to make any communication of this nature in Vienna."[44]

[Footnote 44: French _Yellow Book_, No. 72.]

The reason for this secrecy is not far to seek. Almost a year before the Archduke's death, Austria had sounded Italy as to its willingness to acquiesce or partic.i.p.ate in a war by Austria against Servia, and Italy had refused. For this reason and also because an Austrian war against Servia was not to the interests of Italy, Austria and Germany both recognized, without even consulting their ally, that they could not count upon its cooperation in such a war. To submit their proposed action to Italy was to invite a deliberate expression of disapproval, and this would make it more difficult for them to demand its cooperation, if they could carry out their policy of so flouting Russia as to compel it to initiate an aggressive war, as they clearly hoped to do.

There was, however, another and very practical reason for this failure to consult their ally. We have seen that the whole policy of the Austrian ultimatum was founded upon secrecy. The plan was to give to Europe no possible intimation of the intended action until it was accomplished and then to give to Europe only twenty-four hours within which to deliberate or act. If as a matter of courtesy Austria and Germany submitted to their ally their proposed course of action, Italy, being wholly opposed to any such unprovoked attack upon Servia, might find a way, either by open and public protest or by dropping a confidential intimation, to advise the other countries as to what was in preparation. This would defeat the princ.i.p.al purpose of Germany and Austria, to force a quick decision and to prepare for eventualities before any other country could make ready. Germany and Austria therefore wholly ignored their ally and pursued their stealthy policy to its discreditable end.

When their diplomatic communications are disclosed in full, this feature of their policy may disclose some significant admissions.

We have already seen (_ante_, p. 35) that when on July the 20th, three days before the Austrian ultimatum was issued, Sir Edward Grey asked Prince Lichnowsky, the German Amba.s.sador in London, as to what news he had from Vienna with reference to the intentions of his country, Prince Lichnowsky affected to be ignorant. But it appears from a letter, which M. Paul Cambon[45] wrote to his Foreign Office on July the 24th, 1914, that Prince Lichnowsky had returned to London from Berlin about a month before and had "displayed pessimistic views as to the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin." Cambon adds that the English Foreign Office and his other diplomatic colleagues had all been struck "by the anxious appearance of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin."[46]

[Footnote 45: The French Amba.s.sador at London.]

[Footnote 46: French _Yellow Book_, No. 32.]

So designedly was the Austrian ultimatum withheld from the chancelleries of Europe, other than Vienna and Berlin, that on the day following its issuance at Belgrade, the only information which M.

Jules Cambon had of its issuance were the extracts in the press, and he thereupon saw the German Secretary of State and asked him whether such an ultimatum had been sent.

Herr von Jagow replied affirmatively, adding that the note was energetic, and that he approved it, the Servian Government having long since exhausted Austrian patience. He considers, moreover, that for Austria the question is one of a domestic nature, and he hopes that it will be localized. I then said to him that, not having received any instructions, I only wished to have with him an entirely personal exchange of views. I then asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been in complete ignorance of the Austrian claims before they were communicated to Belgrade, _and as he replied that this was so_, I expressed my surprise that he should thus undertake to support pretensions, the limit and nature of which he ignored.

"It is only," said Herr von Jagow, interrupting me, "because we are talking personally between ourselves that I allow you to say that to me."

"Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself Servia will probably be given over to internal troubles.

That will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where Vienna will lead you?" I added that the language of the German Press was not that of a people who were indifferent and foreign to the affair, but told of active support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time given to Servia in which to yield would make a bad impression upon Europe.

Herr von Jagow replied that he expected "_un peu d'emotion_," on the part of Servia's friends, but that he counted upon their giving Servia good advice.

"I do not doubt," I then said, "that Russia will make an effort in Belgrade to bring the Cabinet to make what concessions are acceptable, but if you ask something of one, why not ask it of the other? And if it be expected that advice will be given in Belgrade, is it not legitimate to expect that on the other hand advice will also be tendered to Vienna?"

The Secretary of State allowed himself to say that that would depend on circ.u.mstances, but, recovering himself immediately, declared that the matter must be localized. He asked me if really I considered the situation serious.

"a.s.suredly," I replied, "for, if what is going on has been pondered over, I do not understand why people have cut their bridges behind them."[47]

[Footnote 47: French _Yellow Book_, No. 30.]

The _Yellow Book_ throws further light upon the extraordinarily petty finesse, with which the chancelleries of Berlin and Vienna attempted to take a snap judgment upon the rest of Europe. We learn from Exhibit No. 55 that Count Berchtold had given to the Russian Amba.s.sador at Vienna, prior to the issuance of the ultimatum, an express a.s.surance "that the claims against Servia would be thoroughly acceptable," and that upon this a.s.surance Count Schebeko had left Vienna on a leave of absence. During his absence and at a time when the President of the French Republic, the French Premier, and its Minister of Foreign Affairs were far distant from Paris and on the high seas, the ultimatum was issued, and, as we have seen, Count Berchtold immediately betook himself to Ischl and remained there until the expiration of the brief time limit in the ultimatum.

The same policy was pursued with reference to other Amba.s.sadors, for when France instructed its representative in Vienna "to call the attention of the Austrian Government to the anxiety aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated to our Amba.s.sador that the tone of the Austrian note and the demands formulated by it permitted one to count upon a pacific denouement."[48]

[Footnote 48: French _Yellow Book_, No. 20.]

In the same communication, in which this information is embodied, we gain the important information that "in the Vienna Diplomatic Corps the German Amba.s.sador recommends violent resolutions whilst declaring ostensibly that the Imperial Chancellery is not _wholly_ in agreement with him on this point."

Pursuant to the same ostrich policy, the German Secretary of State, as we have previously seen (_ante_, pp. 71-75), gave to both the French and English Amba.s.sadors the absence of Count Berchtold at Ischl as an excuse for the failure of Germany to get any extension of the time limit, and not only did he a.s.sure them repeatedly and in the most unequivocal way that the German Foreign Office had no knowledge of, or responsibility for, the Austrian ultimatum, but when on July the 25th the Russian Charge requested a personal appointment with von Jagow in order to present his country's request for such an extension, the German Secretary of State only gave "him an appointment at the end of the afternoon, that is to say, _at the moment when the ultimatum will expire_," and in view of this illusory appointment the Russian Charge (M. Bronewsky)

sent, with all speed, a written note to the Secretary of State, in which he pointed out that the delay of the communication made by Austria to the Powers rendered the effect of the communication illusory, since it did not give the Powers time to become acquainted with the facts alleged before the expiry of the ultimatum. He insisted very urgently on the necessity of extending it, if one had not in view the creation of a great crisis.[49]

[Footnote 49: French _Yellow Book_, No. 42.]

Thus in Berlin and Vienna by concerted action the representatives of England, France, and Russia were evaded until the time limit for Servia had expired.

Contrast with this petty finesse the spirit with which Sazonof attempted to reach an agreement with the Austrian Amba.s.sador at St.

Petersburg on July 26th, as set forth in the report of the French Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg, under that date. He says:

The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful solution. "I shall show myself ready to negotiate up to the last instant," he said to me.

It is in this spirit that he has asked Count Szapary[50] to come and see him for a "frank and loyal explanation." In his presence M. Sazonof discussed the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article, showing clearly the insulting character of the different clauses. "The intention which inspired this doc.u.ment," he said, "is legitimate if you pursue no other aim but the protection of your territory against the agitation of Servian anarchists, but the step to which you have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded, "Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, _and I will guarantee the result_."[51]

[Footnote 50: The Austrian Amba.s.sador.]

[Footnote 51: French _Yellow Book_, No. 54.]

Upon one phase of Germany's foreign policy in this crisis the French _Yellow Book_ naturally throws more light than the other publications.

I refer to the attempt of Germany to coerce France into a position of neutrality, or possibly to secure from it some definition of its att.i.tude, which would compromise its relations with Russia. The _Yellow Book_ charges that the German Amba.s.sador, under the pretext of securing an authorized statement to the press to allay public excitement, thus attempted to compromise France. The doc.u.ments go far to suggest this possibility but are not wholly convincing.

The German Amba.s.sador on July the 24th, the very day that the ultimatum reached the chancelleries of Europe, and on the day when von Jagow untruthfully claimed that it had first reached Berlin, called upon the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and read to him a formal note, _of which he was unwilling to leave a copy_, although he characterized it as a note of importance.

It may be here noted that on more than one occasion in this diplomatic crisis the German representatives were unwilling to leave a copy of the diplomatic messages which they orally communicated.

In his memorandum the French Minister for Foreign Affairs says:

The German Amba.s.sador especially directed my attention to the last two paragraphs of his note before he read it. He indicated that in them lay the chief point. I took note of the actual text, which is as follows: "The German Government considers that the present question is a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Powers have the greatest interest in restricting it to the two interested parties. The German Government ardently desires the localization of the conflict, since by the natural play of alliances any intervention by another Power would have incalculable consequences."

I remarked to the German Amba.s.sador that just as it appeared to be legitimate to call for the punishment of all those concerned in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Servia; the Servian Government, even if it was willing to submit to them, would risk being carried away by a revolution.

I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen[52] that his note only took into account two hypotheses: that of a pure and simple refusal or that of a provocative att.i.tude on the part of Servia. The third hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an arrangement) should also be taken into consideration; that of Servia's acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the accomplices and full guarantees for the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity.

[Footnote 52: The German Amba.s.sador.]

I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be examined; if Servia gave obvious proof of goodwill it could not be thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the conversation.

Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third party Powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take interest in Servia, to take an att.i.tude which was in accord with the wishes of Germany to localize the dispute.