They also made nightly attacks on Graham's camp. In order to check this, a series of automatic mines, to explode when trodden on, was placed outside the British lines. It does not appear that this measure answered the purpose intended, although an accidental explosion of one of the mines resulted in the loss of a promising young officer, Lieutenant Askwith, of the Royal Engineers.

Osman Digna's exact position at this period seems to have been somewhat of a puzzle to Graham, but on the 22nd he was able to telegraph that Osman was for the time without any large following, and that his people were greatly discouraged by their losses in the various engagements, and also in want of food.

The question of withdrawing the expedition now arose. Graham was most unwilling to retire without having achieved something decisive, and on the 26th he telegraphed that he strongly recommended crushing Osman before the expedition should be withdrawn. He added, that with Osman crushed, the country would be at peace, and the native allies safe; whereas if the British force were withdrawn he would soon become as strong as ever, would threaten Souakim, and punish the friendly tribes.

In the beginning of May Lord Wolseley arrived at Souakim and from that moment the question of what was to be done was taken out of Graham's hands.

The Government had made up its mind, so far as such an operation was possible, not to go on with the railway to Berber at all events for the present, and the inutility of keeping the expedition in Souakim in face of the policy of abandoning the Soudan, referred to in the following chapter, generally, naturally struck Lord Wolseley.

On the 4th May he telegraphed to Lord Hartington that if it was positively decided not to push forward the railway as part of the campaign against the Mahdi at Khartoum, he advised the immediate embarkation of the Guards, the navvies, and Australians, leaving only the Indian Contingent and one British battalion for a garrison at Souakim. He added, on the 5th, that the heat was increasing, and the men of the expedition would soon become sickly; that he did not think the further operations wished for by Graham were, in face of the hot weather, desirable. Among other suggestions he proposed to the Government to send back to England the ships laden with railway material, and to take up the railway before the troops fell back.

This despatch suggests the idea that Wolseley was beginning to get a little tired of giving advice to a Government which was always asking his opinion and never acting upon it.

On the 8th he was instructed that the Government adhered to the decision to adopt the proposal for defence of the frontier in his despatch of 14th April, but that the Government did not approve of his suggestion to take up the railway and ship off the plant; but that he should arrange to hold the line, pending consideration whether it would be carried onwards.

This last despatch was too much for Wolseley, who appears to have thought it hard enough to have to carry out a policy of which he disapproved, without having the initiation of it attributed to himself; and in his despatch of the 11th he replied, "What you term my proposals, were the military dispositions recommended in order to give effect to your policy at Souakim, to stop the railway, and send away as many troops as could be spared for service elsewhere. If the garrison here is to be seriously reduced, the railway must be either taken up or abandoned." He added, "Unless you have some clearly defined Soudan policy to initiate, any military operations, such as the extension of the railway would entail, would be to throw away uselessly valuable lives."

On the 13th Wolseley was instructed that the Government adopted the dispositions recommended in his telegram of the 5th. This was followed by preparations for the immediate embarkation of the expedition.

Before this, Graham had on the 5th made a raid on Takool, a village ten miles south of Otao, and twenty west of Souakim, and driven out the enemy, reported to be 700 strong. Graham's force burnt Takool, and captured between 1,500 and 2,000 sheep and goats in this the last exploit of the campaign.

The railway works were now discontinued, the troops called in from Otao, and the navvies withdrawn. As the last truckload came in from the front, it was followed and fired on by jeering Soudanese.

The store-ships, which had for weeks been lying in the roads with rails, plant, and machinery not yet unloaded, were ordered back to England with their cargoes.

On the 17th May Graham and his staff left Souakim with the Coldstream Guards. The Grenadiers, as well as the Australians and Scots Guards, sailed the following day.

The remainder of the troops followed shortly after, and before the end of the month the whole of the expedition, with the exception of the Shropshire Regiment and a portion of the Indian Contingent, had left Souakim.

Of the results obtained by the expedition, there is but little to say.

Its departure left Osman Digna still uncrushed, and the Souakim-Berber route still unopened; and Osman was enabled in 1885 to boast, as he had done in 1884, that he had driven the British out of the country.[136]

This expedition was of far greater strength than its predecessor, and it is no disparagement to the officers and men engaged in it to say that their exploits did not equal those of the expedition of 1884. Tamaai, Handoub, and other positions had been taken and occupied temporarily, and a small portion of the railway had been made. This represented about the sum total of results.[137]

CHAPTER LI.

EVACUATION.

Towards the end of March, 1885, the force at Korti was gradually withdrawn to the town of Dongola, where Wolseley again fixed his head-quarters. A small garrison of black troops only was left at Korti.

The detachment at Merawi, under Colonel Butler, still remained there as a rear guard.

Although it had been decided to postpone further operations until the autumn, there is no reason to suppose that Wolseley entertained any idea that the enterprise against Berber and Khartoum was ever going to be abandoned. But early in April an unexpected contingency had to be reckoned with. On 9th April Mr. Gladstone announced to the House of Commons the Russian attack on the Afghan frontier, and the calling out of the Reserves in the United Kingdom.

This led the British Government to reconsider the whole question of the Soudan Expedition, and Wolseley was instructed to proceed to Cairo and confer with Sir E. Baring and General Stephenson on the military situation.

On 13th April, Lord Hartington telegraphed to Wolseley as follows:--

"In the condition of Imperial affairs it is probable that the expedition to Khartoum may have to be abandoned, and the troops brought back as soon as possible to Egypt. Consider at once what measures should, in that case, be taken for safe withdrawal of troops. This would involve stopping advance from Souakim, but not hurried withdrawal."

On the 14th April Wolseley telegraphed that in the event of the Government determining to withdraw the troops from the Soudan, before completion of arrangements he must know whether it was intended to retain Dongola, Wady Halfa, Korosko, or a.s.souan, as the frontier post.

He said that if the position on the southern frontier of Egypt was to be exclusively one of defence, he would hold Wady Halfa and Korosko as outposts, with a strong brigade at a.s.souan. There would be no difficulty in withdrawing troops, but for the position in Egypt it was most essential that the announcement of withdrawal should be accompanied by an authoritative statement that the Government was determined to maintain a British garrison.

The next day Wolseley telegraphed his opinion on the question of withdrawal, strongly advising the retention of Dongola. His message, omitting irrelevant pa.s.sages, was as follows:--

"At, and south of a.s.souan, I have about 7,500 British fighting soldiers. Retreat policy will require at least 2,500 on the frontier, leaving 5,000 available. For the sake of this handful, is it advisable to reverse Soudan policy? Retreat from Dongola hands that province over to the Mahdi, and renders loyalty of Ababdehs and other frontier tribes very doubtful. Withdraw Graham's force if necessary; this will not seriously disturb Egypt; but hold on to Dongola province."

There are few unprejudiced persons who will not agree in the soundness of the views above expressed. The reply was as follows:--

"_War Office, April 15th, 1885._

"Your telegrams of the 14th and 15th received. Decision will probably be to adopt proposal for defence of Egyptian frontier at Wady Halfa and a.s.souan, as in your telegram of 14th. It is desirable that troops not required for this purpose should be concentrated as soon as possible, and available for any other service."

The Government at this time had fully made up their minds to withdraw from the Soudan altogether as early as possible.

Wolseley, on the other hand, was anxious that before this step should be finally taken, the Mahdi should be crushed once for all, and in a very able despatch, dated the 16th April, set forth his views.

The doc.u.ment, which reads very like a protest against the policy of the Gladstone Cabinet, omitting some pa.s.sages, is as follows:--

"Both from a military and financial point of view, and also with regard to the general well-being of Egypt proper, the growing power of the Mahdi must be met, not by a purely defensive policy on the frontier, whether at a.s.souan or Wady Halfa, but by his overthrow in the neighbourhood of Khartoum."

The despatch concludes:--

"To sum up. The struggle with the Mahdi, or rather, perhaps, with Mahdi-ism, must come sooner or later. We can accept it now, and have done with it once and for all, or we can allow all the military reputation we have gained at the cost of so much toil and hard fighting, all the bloodshed and all the expenditure of the past campaign, to go for nothing, and try and stave the final struggle off for a few years. These years will be years of trouble and disturbance for Egypt, of burden and strain to our military resources, and the contest that will come in the end will be no less than that which is in front of us now. This is all we shall gain by a defensive policy."

The Afghan question still troubled the Ministry, and on the 20th April Lord Hartington telegraphed that the "Government were about to announce that it was necessary to hold all the military resources of the Empire, including the forces in the Soudan, available for service wherever required. The Government would not," he said, "therefore make provision for further offensive operations in the Soudan, or for military preparations for an early advance on Khartoum, beyond such as could not be stopped with advantage, and did not involve hostile action, viz., river steamboats contracted for, and the completion of the Wady Halfa Railway. As to ulterior steps, the Government reserved their liberty of action. With the cessation of active operations on the Nile, any considerable extension of the Souakim-Berber Railway was to be suspended; but as Souakim must be held for the present, it might be necessary to occupy one or more stations in the neighbourhood, and the Government would retain a garrison in Egypt, and defend the frontier."

On the 23rd April Wolseley proposed that he should go to Souakim in order to form an opinion on the spot as to the points which it would be desirable to hold.

This was approved by the Government, and on the 24th Wolseley communicated the arrangements made for the disposition of the Nile force in his absence as follows:--

"On 1st June, troops at Merawi start for Dongola, at which place and Abu Fatmeh I propose to concentrate force now up the Nile.

This movement will be completed by 1st July.

"In the meantime, railway to Ferket will be in a forward state, and able to a.s.sist greatly in the movement of troops and Civil Government officers on Wady Halfa. At present nearly all the troops are in huts; to move them in this present hot weather will be very trying to their health.

"When troops are concentrated at Dongola and Abu Fatmeh I shall expect orders before I move them to Wady Halfa."

On the 27th April Wolseley was informed that he was to act in accordance with the proposals contained in his telegram of the 24th. The concentration, he was instructed, should be deliberate, but the movement from Merawi was to begin at once.

Wolseley and his staff left Cairo on April 29th and immediately embarked for Souakim.

General Buller and Sir Charles Wilson being asked their opinions, both reported strongly against a withdrawal from Dongola, and their views were supported by Sir Evelyn Baring.

All argument, however, was in vain. The Government remained unconvinced.