Two companies of the South Staffordshire and two guns were placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Alleyne, who was instructed to take up a position on a rocky hillock facing the enemy's position, and, with the a.s.sistance of the Egyptian Camel Corps, to occupy the attention of the defenders in front, whilst, with six companies of the South Staffordshire and six companies of the Royal Highlanders, Earle marched about a mile and a half to his right front, thus completely turning the high ridge referred to in Butler's report, and the whole of the enemy's position.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BATTLE OF KIRBEKAN.]

Meanwhile fire was opened (at 8.30) by the two companies of the Staffordshire and the guns under Colonel Alleyne, the enemy replying with their Remingtons.

After turning the enemy's position, Earle's column, pivoting on its left, brought the right of the column round till it reached the rear of the enemy's lines, and then marched over broken and rocky ground through a valley in the direction of the river, keeping the high ridge on the left. It was found that the column formation, ready to form square, was unsuited to the nature of the ground, and the further advance was made by companies, but not in extended order, points of vantage in the rocky ground being occupied in succession.

The enemy had been seen crowding the high ridge as the column pa.s.sed its eastern end, but at first they appeared to take no notice. No sooner, however, had the force wheeled to the left than (at 9.15) fire was opened on it with Remingtons, hitting two or three men. As the fire became hotter Earle sent two companies of the South Staffordshire, under Colonel Eyre, to take the high ridge by working up its western shoulder.

The men advanced under a heavy fire, and climbed about a third of the way up the shoulder, till they reached a cl.u.s.ter of rocks under which they obtained partial shelter.

At the same time, two companies of the Highlanders and a company of the Staffords were directed to advance under cover of the river bank and take the knoll nearest the river, towards which parties of the enemy were seen making their way, and swimming to the other side. This knoll was speedily captured, and the enemy's position on the two princ.i.p.al knolls was thus enfiladed.

The remainder of the Highlanders and Staffords then advanced from one cl.u.s.ter of rocks to another towards the rear of the position, firing as they did so, till they reached the rocks nearest to the enemy's position, about 400 yards distant. From behind the enemy's works, consisting of earthworks and loopholed buildings, a steady and well-directed fusillade was kept up on the attacking force. This continued for some time, till, difficulty being found in dislodging the enemy by musketry fire, the order was about to be given to a.s.sault the position and carry it at the point of the bayonet, when suddenly a body of the enemy abandoned their works, and with spears and banners charged down upon the nearest of the Highlanders, who were somewhat advanced towards the British left front under Colonel Green.

The Highlanders, without changing their formation, received the a.s.sault with a withering fire, killing many. The rest turned to their left and made for the river, where several of them were shot in the water as they attempted to escape.

After repelling this onslaught the Highlanders advanced with their pipes skirling, scaled the rocks, and stormed the main position from front and flank in gallant style, killing every one of the enemy, who were in great numbers among the rocks and boulders.

At this time General Earle, who had accompanied the advance up the ridge, was killed by a bullet from a hut in which several of the defenders had taken refuge.

Meantime the two companies of the South Staffordshire sent to take the high ridge had been received by a heavy fire; Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre had been killed, and their ammunition was exhausted. Lieutenant-Colonel Beale was sent by General Brackenbury, who had a.s.sumed the command, to reinforce the attack and take the ridge, which duty was successfully accomplished, and the enemy were driven from their last position by 1.30 p.m. Most of the defending force were armed with Remington rifles, and their position, which was a formidable one, was defended with desperate courage.

When General Earle made his turning movement, and so placed the detachment he was leading between the enemy and their camp, Colonel Butler, who had guided the column to the rear of the enemy's position, made a wide sweeping detour with the cavalry to the enemy's camp, three miles further on, which he captured. So rapidly was this operation conducted that the camp was in his possession before the Highlanders had captured the main position.[128]

Leaving two companies of the Highlanders to guard the captured position, the remainder of the troops were sent back to the camp they had left in the morning.

The Egyptian Camel Corps did excellent service in the fight. The position which they had taken up at the commencement of the day enabled them to protect the flank of the infantry in its advance. They remained in that position throughout the day, a.s.sisting by their rifles to keep down the fire from the high ridge and shooting, and in some instances pursuing and capturing, such of the enemy as attempted to escape towards the east on the southern slope of the hill. When the Staffords stormed the shoulder of the hill one Egyptian soldier charged up alone on their extreme right and joined in the attack.

Besides forty-one donkeys and camels captured at Kirbekan, fifty-eight rifles, four fowling-pieces, two flint-lock muskets, one revolver, twenty-two swords, fifty-three spears, and ten standards fell into the hands of the English. Some prisoners were taken, and, according to their statements, the enemy were surprised by General Earle attacking their rear, and thought the soldiers who got behind their position were coming from Berber.

Owing to the way in which the position was surrounded, it is difficult to see how many of the enemy could have escaped. They lay thick in every nook and crevice, and on the open ground where they charged the troops, and the Staffordshires killed many on the main ridge of hills.

Nevertheless, their losses are only put in the General's report as 200.

As no account mentions more than 125 bodies having been counted on the field of battle, this appears a liberal estimate, even after allowing for the bodies swept away by the stream. The return of rifle ammunition expended gives a total of 24,040 rounds, or rather more than 120 for each man killed, leaving out of the calculation twenty-three sh.e.l.ls fired from the Camel Battery. The English force engaged only numbered 1,200, owing to the Gordon Highlanders and the half battalion of the Duke of Cornwall's Regiment not having come up; the former, in fact, had not succeeded in getting further than Berti.

The enemy's force at Kirbekan was stated by prisoners as being from 1,500 to 2,000. General Brackenbury, however, has put the number who held the works at 800, and says that at least half of these escaped before the attack. The resistance made was due to the almost impregnable position taken up.

Owing to the excellent tactics adopted in taking the works in the rear, the loss of the attacking force was but small. The death of General Earle, however, made Kirbekan a dearly purchased victory. He met his death shortly after the a.s.sault which resulted in the capture of the ridges. The troops were at the time being collected and formed up.

Between the crests of the two main knolls there was a depression forming a small flat plateau, on which stood a stone hut with a thatched roof.

Earle was forming up the ranks only ten yards from the hut, when it was discovered that there were men in it. One of the latter fired from the hut and shot a soldier. The General thereupon ordered the roof to be set on fire, at the same time approaching the hut. The roof commenced to burn, and a native rushed out, and was at once bayoneted. At this moment a shot was fired from a window of the hut, and the General fell, shot through the head. The back of the skull was shattered, and he lived only a few minutes.

In addition to General Earle, the British and Egyptian loss was as follows:--

_South Staffordshire Regiment_--Killed, Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre and 3 men; wounded, 2 officers and 20 men.

_Royal Highlanders_--Killed, Lieutenant-Colonel Coveney and 4 men; wounded, 2 officers and 18 men; missing, 1 man.

_Egyptian Camel Corps_--Killed, 2 men; wounded, 1 man.

Total killed, 11; wounded and missing, 44.

On the 11th, General Brackenbury received further instructions, according to which the Expedition was to stay in the country till the Mahdi's power at Khartoum was destroyed, and arrangements were to be made for co-operation with General Buller in an attack on Berber. The instructions further stated that the column was to push on with all possible speed pursuant to orders.

On the same day, the column continued its progress, the wounded officers and men being conveyed in the boats. The difficult pa.s.s of Shukook was got through without opposition, though it bore signs of having been prepared for defence throughout its entire length of six miles.

On the 17th Salamat was occupied, and the force destroyed the house, palm-trees, and sakheas of Suleiman Wad Gamr, the chief author of Colonel Stewart's murder. Many relics of the murder were found, such as cards, papers, photographs, &c.

On the 20th, Hebbeh, close to the scene of the murder, was reached, and on that and the following day the 800 horses and camels of the force swam over to the opposite bank, the equipments and loads being ferried across in boats.

The wreck of Stewart's steamer was seen fixed upon a rock about 200 yards from the bank of the river. She was pitted with bullet-marks, and torn by fragments of sh.e.l.l. The natives had stripped her of everything useful.

The house of Fakri Wad Etman, where the murder was committed, was visited by General Brackenbury. Fragments of books, Stewart's visiting cards, and a shirt-sleeve stained with blood, were found close by.

Whilst the crossing was being effected, the troops, not otherwise engaged, were employed in destroying the houses and property of Fakri Etman. The force then advanced along the right bank towards Abu Hamid.

On the night of the 23rd, the whole column with 215 boats was concentrated at the last cl.u.s.ter of huts in the Mona.s.sir country, twenty-six miles from Abu Hamid, and the Cavalry, which had scouted six miles ahead, were still without touch of the enemy.

On the 24th, just as the further advance was being resumed, Brackenbury received Wolseley's instructions to discontinue the movement on Abu Hamid and return to Merawi. The despatch said, "Buller evacuated Gubat.

His main body went to Gakdul with sick and wounded. He remains with 1,500 at Abu Klea. I have abandoned all hope of going to Berber before the autumn campaign begins." This was a bitter disappointment to both officers and men. A strong patrol was advanced to within sight of Mograt Island (just opposite Abu Hamid), after which the column was reversed, reaching Hebbeh again the same day.

On the 25th it remained at the halting-place the whole day, as the horses and camels absolutely required rest.

Continuing his movement down the river on the following day, Brackenbury reached a village opposite Salamat. Here, leaving the mounted troops and convoy to move independently on the right bank under the command of Colonel Butler, the General descended the river himself with the boats.

On the 4th March Hamdab was reached, the force having descended with the boats in nine days, a distance that it had taken thirty-one days to ascend. On the following day the force arrived at Merawi. The crossing commenced at 2 p.m., and was completed at 11.30 a.m. on the 6th. On the 7th, Brackenbury, leaving the Black Watch, a troop of Hussars, the Egyptian Camel Corps, and a detachment of Engineers, to remain at Merawi under Colonel Butler, started with the rest for Korti, which was reached the following day.

Apart from the engagement at Kirbekan, the Nile column had no fighting exploit to boast of. The crushing effect of that action was, however, shown by the fact that after the fight, the enemy allowed General Brackenbury's force to march unmolested through the Mona.s.sir country, to take successively all the positions which had been prepared for defence, and subsequently to retire through the same positions without firing a shot or offering any opposition.

Credit is undoubtedly due to the column for the manner in which it triumphed over the difficulties caused by the nature of the river, which from a few miles above Merawi presented a succession of rapids. All these rapids, amongst the most formidable obstacles on the Nile, were ascended and descended at an unfavourable season, with a loss by drowning of only three lives throughout the entire operation.

CHAPTER XLVII.

WOLSELEY AND THE PROSECUTION OF THE CAMPAIGN.

To return to Lord Wolseley's head-quarters at Korti.

There is no doubt that the news of the fall of Khartoum was a severe blow to Wolseley. It seemed as if, for once, his star had deserted him.

All hope of adding the rescue of Gordon and the relief of Khartoum to his list of triumphs, was gone from the General who had so often been described as "the luckiest man in the British army."

On the 4th February Wolseley had telegraphed the disaster to the War Office. On the 5th he sent another message, saying that he had directed all the wounded to be removed as soon as possible from Abu Klea and Gubat, and added, "I only await the decision of Government to give further orders."

There is here a gap in the published Blue Book, some of the messages exchanged with the War Office being evidently suppressed. But in a despatch to Sir Evelyn Baring, dated the 6th February, it is stated that "Her Majesty's Government have given complete discretion to Lord Wolseley to take all such measures as he may deem necessary for the further conduct of his operations, and they have a.s.sured his Lordship that he will receive any further a.s.sistance which he may desire, either by the despatch of troops to Souakim and Berber, or in any other manner he may indicate."

That Wolseley, under the altered circ.u.mstances, was not prepared to advise an attempt to recapture Khartoum with the force at his disposal, appears clear from the following extracts from his despatch to Lord Hartington of the 9th February:--

"I shall not attempt to disguise from your Lordship how deeply the reported fall of Khartoum is felt by all ranks in the army under my command. If it be literally true--and it is difficult to disbelieve it--the mission of this force, which was the relief of Khartoum, falls to the ground.