At nine Graham brought up the reserve of the Mounted Infantry, leaving the two Infantry Brigades in the rear. Shortly after this, the enemy's fire slackened. Half-an-hour afterwards the 1st Brigade had advanced far enough for the 9-pounders to open fire on the enemy, of whom only small bodies could be seen.

At ten the cavalry skirmishers were within 100 yards of the Tamanieb Khor, and the Soudanese were seen retreating _en ma.s.se_ to the right and left. Close at hand were the wells, and the troops, instead of pursuing, were halted for a quarter of an hour to water the horses, which were suffering greatly from thirst. The soldiers, too, drank copiously after their march. When the cavalry formed up and moved along the wells to the village the enemy had disappeared. There was no resistance, and Graham ordered the burning of the village. This was immediately carried out, and the huts, some 300 in number, were soon in a blaze.

There were no casualties on the side of the British, nor do any of the accounts refer to any loss on the part of the enemy, who, according to one report, did not number over 100 altogether.

After this achievement the troops started on the return march to Souakim.

The whole of the force reached Souakim on the 28th, and with the exception of a battalion left to garrison that place was at once broken up, the troops from Egypt returning to Cairo, and the remainder proceeding to England. No trustworthy information was obtained as to the position or force of Osman Digna, though the village of Tamanieb showed signs of a recent occupation by his army. Under these circ.u.mstances, to attempt to pursue Osman further into the interior was considered to be impracticable. The troops, too, were again suffering from the heat, and it was deemed best to close the campaign for the season.

The rapidity of Graham's campaign was one of its most striking features.

The orders for the expedition were received in Cairo on the 12th February. By the 1st of March a force of over 4,000 men had been a.s.sembled at Trinkitat, had fought the battle of El-Teb, and had brought away the fugitives from Tokar. Starting from Souakim on the 11th March, the expedition had by the 28th fought the battle of Tamaai, occupied the enemy's position at Tamanieb, and terminated the campaign.

Besides serving to develop the admirable qualities of the British soldier under trying conditions, the campaign cannot be said to have achieved any permanent result, it having only shattered and not annihilated, Osman Digna.

The ill effects of the withdrawal of Graham's force upon the rebellious tribes cannot well be exaggerated. Notwithstanding their repeated defeats they easily persuaded themselves that they had driven the English out of the country, and the policy of "Rescue and retire"

pursued by the British Government was the means of laying up a store of future trouble for Souakim and the neighbourhood.

Although there was no further opportunity of fighting Osman Digna at this period, the question naturally arises, whether at all events part of Graham's force might not have been usefully employed in a.s.sisting Gordon in withdrawing the Egyptian garrisons.

One pretext for the battles of El-Teb and Tamaai was the necessity for opening the road to Berber. On March 25th Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice said:--"One thing was perfectly certain, that it was of the very greatest importance, with a view to keeping open communications with Khartoum, that the road between Souakim and Berber should itself be open." As the road between Souakim and Berber was the short cut out of the Soudan, the importance of keeping it open could hardly have been ignored by a Government concerned in the task of extricating from the Soudan an army of 29,000 men with all the civil employes and their wives and families. Gordon could hold Khartoum, but by no possible miracle could he keep open the road hundreds of miles in his rear by which he had to send the troops and refugees down to Egypt. Hence, he suggested to the Government that if they wished to intervene, they should open up the Souakim-Berber route by Indian Moslem troops.

After the victory at Tamaai Graham could have sent a few squadrons of cavalry through to Berber with ease, and he was anxious to do so. Two squadrons would, in the opinion of all the authorities in the Soudan, have sufficed to open the road and to save Berber, which was the key of the Soudan, and without the retention of which evacuation was hopeless.

General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood both agreed that the move was possible, although Stephenson disliked it, owing to the scarcity of water on the road.

On February 29th Gordon had telegraphed:--

"There is not much chance of the situation improving, and every chance of it getting worse; for we have nothing to rely on to make it better. You must, therefore, decide whether you will or will not make an attempt to save the two-thirds of the population who are well affected before these two-thirds retreat. Should you wish to intervene, send 200 British troops to Wady Halfa, and adjutants to inspect Dongola, and then open up Souakim-Berber road by Indian Moslem troops. This will cause an immediate collapse of the revolt."

On March 2nd he telegraphed:--

"I have no option about staying at Khartoum; it has pa.s.sed out of my hands, and as to sending a larger force than 200, I do not think it necessary to Wady Halfa. It is not the number, but the prestige which I need. I am sure the revolt will collapse if I can say that I have British troops at my back."

On the 5th Sir Evelyn Baring wrote to Lord Granville:--

"General Gordon has on several occasions pressed for 200 British troops to be sent to Wady Halfa. I agree with the military authorities in thinking that it would not be desirable to comply with this request."

On March 11th Lord Granville replied to Gordon's urgent entreaties that "Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to send troops to Berber."

Sir Evelyn Baring, who had opposed the despatch of troops to Wady Halfa and to Berber, on March 16th recognized the necessity for action. On that day he telegraphed home:--

"It has now become of the utmost importance not only to open the road between Souakim and Berber, but to come to terms with the tribes between Berber and Khartoum."

But Lord Granville still felt unable to authorize an advance of British troops.

On March 24th Sir E. Baring telegraphed:--

"Under present circ.u.mstances, I think that an effort should be made to help General Gordon from Souakim, if it is at all a possible military operation. General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood, whilst admitting the very great risk to the health of the troops, besides the extraordinary military risks, are of opinion that the undertaking is possible."

"We are daily expecting British troops. We cannot bring ourselves to believe that we are to be abandoned by the Government. Our existence depends on England," is what Mr. Power, British Consular Agent, telegraphed from Khartoum on March 23rd.

It was in vain; notwithstanding every appeal the British Government determined to refuse, until too late, the a.s.sistance asked for.

CHAPTER x.x.xVI.

THE GORDON RELIEF EXPEDITION.

Gordon's situation at Khartoum in the meantime may be learned from what follows.

On the 27th February, 1884, he issued a Proclamation to the inhabitants of the Soudan, stating that he would be compelled to use severe measures against those who did not desist from rebellion, and also that "British troops are now on their way, and in a few days will reach Khartoum."

In a despatch, on the same day, to Sir E. Baring, Gordon said:--

"You must remember that when evacuation is carried out the Mahdi will come down here, and by agents will not let Egypt be quiet.

Of course my duty is evacuation, and to do the best I can for establishing a quiet government. The first I hope to accomplish.

The second is a more difficult task, and with care and time can be accomplished. Remember that once Khartoum belongs to the Mahdi, the task will be more difficult.

"If you decide on smashing Mahdi, then send up another, 100,000, and send up 200 infantry troops to Wady Halfa, and an officer to Dongola under pretence to look out quarters for troops. Leave Souakim and Ma.s.sowah alone. I repeat that evacuation is possible, but you will feel the effect in Egypt and be forced to enter into a far more serious affair to guard Egypt."

While Gordon was sending almost daily expressions of his view as to the only way of carrying out the policy of eventual evacuation, it was becoming clear to him that he would very soon be cut off from the rest of Egypt. His first remark on this subject was to express "the conviction that I shall be caught in Khartoum;" and he wrote:--"Even if I was mean enough to escape, I have no power to do so." The accuracy of this forecast was speedily demonstrated. Within a few days communications with Khartoum were interrupted, and although subsequently restored for a time, the rising of the riparian tribes rendered the receipt and despatch of messages exceedingly uncertain. On the 8th of April, however, Gordon succeeded in getting the following message through to Sir Evelyn Baring:--

"I have telegraphed to Sir Samuel Baker to make an appeal to British and American millionaires to give me, 300,000 to engage Turkish troops from the Sultan and send them here. This will settle the Soudan and the Mahdi for ever. For my part I think you will agree with me. I do not see the fun of being caught here to walk about the streets for years as a dervish with sandalled feet; not that I will ever be taken alive."

Eight days later he wrote as follows:--

"As far as I can understand, the situation is this--You state your intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber. I consider myself free to act according to circ.u.mstances. I shall hold out here as long as I can, and if I can suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot I shall retire to the Equator."

The complete investment or siege of Khartoum may be considered as having commenced about this time.

When Gordon first began to perceive that he would get no material help from his Government, he made several propositions which would, if adopted, have relieved them from further responsibility. As indicated in the foregoing telegrams, one was to make an appeal to international philanthropy, and by employing Turkish troops to smash the Mahdi.

Another was that he should steam up the Nile, and taking Bahr Gazelle and the Equatorial Province in the name of the King of the Belgians, join hands with Stanley, or whoever else might represent the King, on the Congo.

While communications were still maintained, Gordon sent his account of his first action with the rebels, which showed not only the kind of enemy he had to deal with, but also the sort of men on whom he had to depend for the defence of Khartoum. On the 17th of March he described in the following words an action on the previous day:--

"At eight a.m. on the 16th two steamers started for Halfiyeh.

Bashi-Bazouks and some regulars advanced across plain towards rebels. At ten a.m. the regulars were in square opposite centre of rebels' position, and Bashi-Bazouks were extended in their line to their right. A gun with the regulars then opened fire.

Very soon after this a body of about sixty rebel hors.e.m.e.n charged down a little to the right of centre of the Bashi-Bazouks' line. The latter fired a volley, then turned and fled. The hors.e.m.e.n galloped towards the square, which they immediately broke. The whole force then retreated slowly towards the fort with their rifles shouldered. The hors.e.m.e.n continued to ride along the flanks cutting off stragglers. The men made no effort to stand, and the gun was abandoned, with sixty-three rounds and fifteen cases of reserve ammunition. The rebels advanced, and retreat of our men was so rapid that the Arabs on foot had no chance of attacking. Pursuit ceased about a mile from stockade, and the men rallied. We brought in the wounded.

Nothing could be more dismal than seeing these hors.e.m.e.n, and some men even on camels, pursuing close to troops, who, with arms shouldered, plodded their way back."

In fact, this fight was a ma.s.sacre, as the Egyptian soldiers did not attempt the least resistance. Colonel Stewart, who commanded in person, was wounded. The two Pashas under him were subsequently convicted of treachery and shot.

On the 25th of June the garrison heard of the fall of Berber. The news was brought by the English Consul, Mr. Cuzzi, who was sent in by the rebels to inform Gordon that the one connecting link between him and the outer world had fallen into the hands of the Mahdi.

Long before the summer of 1884, it was evident that the position of Gordon at Khartoum had become so critical that, if he were to be rescued at all, it could only be by the despatch of a British force. As far back as April 23rd, Earl Granville telegraphed to Mr. Egerton at Cairo, instructing him to forward a cypher message to Gordon asking what would "be the force necessary to secure his _removal_, its amount, character, the route for access to Khartoum, and time of operation."

Early in May, war preparations were commenced in England, and on the 10th of the month the military authorities in Cairo received instructions to prepare for the despatch in October of an expedition for the relief of the Soudanese capital. Twelve thousand camels were ordered to be purchased and held in readiness for a forward march in the autumn.