The Spanish Government were somewhat effusive in their thanks. The Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to lose no time in expressing the opinion of his colleagues, and in the meantime desired to say how much gratified was King Alfonso's Government at the courtesy and consideration shown towards Spain.

The Portuguese Government simply expressed their thanks.

In a despatch to Mr. Wyndham, requesting him to lay the Circular before the Porte, Lord Granville wrote as follows:--

"Having regard to the exceptional position occupied by Turkey in relation to this important question, and to the special interests of His Majesty the Sultan which are involved in its solution, Her Majesty's Government desire, in the first place, to address the Sublime Porte separately on the subject: and they conceive that they could hardly adopt a more convenient and satisfactory mode of placing their views before the Sultan than by communicating to His Majesty a copy of the Circular which they propose to address to the Powers, and which resumes all that they have to state on the subject at the present time. You will accordingly deliver a copy of this despatch and of its inclosure to the Porte, and, in doing so, you will express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that His Majesty the Sultan will recognize the friendly sentiments which have prompted them to submit separately to the appreciation of the Porte their proposals with reference to Egypt, and that these proposals will commend themselves to the favourable opinion of His Majesty, as the result of the most anxious consideration on the part of Her Majesty's Government, and as embodying a system of reorganization in Egypt which, in their opinion, is best calculated to insure the stability of its inst.i.tutions, the prosperity and happiness of its people, and the peace of Europe in the East, and of the Ottoman Dominions."

On the 17th October Said Pasha had proposed to Lord Dufferin to open negotiations with regard to Egypt with a view to the maintenance of what he termed the _status quo ante_, and expressed the grat.i.tude of the Turkish Government for the a.s.surance of England's intention not to leave the English troops long in Egypt.

Lord Dufferin was instructed to say in reply that as the affairs of Egypt had advanced only partially towards their final settlement, any negotiation would be premature.

On the 23rd December Musurus Pasha asked Lord Granville for a reply as to the period of the occupation by the British troops. Lord Granville answered that he could not fix the exact date, but hoped to be in a short time able to make a communication to the Porte on the whole Egyptian question. The communication was the Circular Note of the 3rd January, 1883.

On the 25th January, Mr. Wyndham asked the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs if he could tell him what impression the proposals of Her Majesty's Government with regard to Egypt had made upon the Ottoman Government. Aarifi Pasha said that the different points presented had been examined by the Ministers, but that they had not yet come to a final decision as to what answer they should return.

One of the first results of the new position adopted by England in Egypt was the abolition of the Dual Control.

As has been already shown, the inst.i.tution had rendered great services to Egypt, and tended to protect the humbler cla.s.ses of natives from exaction and injustice. That it should have been so successful in its mission was due to the high character and administrative ability of the gentlemen selected for the duties of Controller-General. Major Baring[87] found a capable successor in Sir Auckland Colvin, and both in turn worked in the utmost harmony with their French colleague, M. de Blignieres, afterwards succeeded by M. Bredif, who displayed the same courtesy in his relations with his English colleague.

The objections to the Control were summarized in a Note addressed by the Egyptian Government to the two Western Powers on the 7th November, 1882.

But apart from any other objection to the Control, there was also a fear that circ.u.mstances might occur which would render that inst.i.tution a danger to the maintenance of cordial relations between England and France. Its maintenance, moreover, was obviously incompatible with the exclusive predominance of England in Egypt.

Lord Dufferin, on the 28th December, was accordingly instructed to reply, on behalf of England, "that Her Majesty's Government were not prepared, in opposition to the wishes of the Egyptian Government, and in face of the many objections which had been raised to the continuance of the Control, to insist on the maintenance of an arrangement which, in its last form, was only provisionally accorded. They thought, however, that for the present it would not be wise on the part of the Egyptian Government to deprive themselves of all European a.s.sistance in securing the good administration of the finances, on which must depend the prosperity and credit of the country, and its power to fulfil its international engagements without undue pressure on the Egyptian people.

Her Majesty's Government would recommend that, in place of the Control, His Highness the Khedive should appoint a single European financial adviser. This officer would attend Cabinet Councils, exercise powers of inquiry, and give advice on financial questions, but without authority to interfere in the direct administration of the country."

The despatch continued that "Her Majesty's Government were aware of the great value which the French Government had attached in the past to the Dual Control. They did not deny the practical advantages which for a time attended the system--advantages which were owing to the common wish of this country and of France to promote the prosperity of Egypt; but they were convinced that this feeling on the part of France would not extend to thinking it possible that an arrangement of a temporary character should be continued after two of the three parties to it had become desirous to be freed from the obligation for reasons which they considered to be of grave importance."

It was scarcely to be expected that France would accept the arrangement, at all events, without a struggle, and M. Raindre, the French Consul-General in Cairo, was instructed to deny the right of the Egyptian Government to annul the existing arrangement. This in no way altered the programme of Cherif Pasha, who, a.s.sured of the support of England, proceeded with the measure; and on the 18th of January, 1883, a Decree was issued, stating that the dispositions of the various Decrees relating to the Control were repealed. The next day the Decree was published in the "Moniteur Egyptien," and the Control became a thing of the past.

On the Decree appearing in print, the French Consul-General addressed a despatch to Cherif Pasha, in which the former stated that his Government declined to recognize the right of the Egyptian Government to upset an arrangement which he maintained was part of an agreement between the French and the Egyptian Governments, and which, he said, formed an essential security for French interests. The despatch concluded with a formal reservation of the rights of the French Government.

The abolition of the Control excited a burst of indignation from the French Press; the action of the Egyptian Government was loudly condemned, and there the matter ended.

M. Bredif, the French Controller, obtained leave of absence; and on the 5th February, Sir Auckland Colvin, who, in the meantime, had resigned his post as English Controller, was appointed to the post of "Financial Adviser," created as a subst.i.tute for the defunct Control.

One of the first measures which had to be considered by Lord Dufferin was the reorganization of the Egyptian army. The rebellion and the measures taken in consequence had left Egypt absolutely without any army either to defend her frontiers or to maintain order in the interior. If, as was then contemplated, the British forces were ever to be withdrawn, it was necessary to provide others to take their place.

Lord Dufferin, in a despatch to the Foreign Office on the 18th November, 1882, combated the oft-repeated statement that Egypt required no army.

According to him "this was a mistake, for although an efficient gendarmerie might be able in ordinary times to prevent the Bedouins causing trouble along the desert border and the banks of the Suez Ca.n.a.l, it was essential that these unruly Arab communities should know that the Government held in reserve a military force capable of checking any serious attempt on their part to disturb the peace of the country; otherwise they would not hesitate to break through the necessarily spa.r.s.e and feeble frontier guards in the hope of plundering Cairo." Lord Dufferin estimated that the strength of the army ought not to exceed from 5,000 to 6,000 men.

On the question of officering the new force, he observed that the officering of the native army had always been its weak point. The fellah subaltern, captain, or colonel had seldom been able to acquire the prestige or authority necessary for maintaining discipline during peace and for effective leading in the presence of the enemy. To meet the difficulty, Lord Dufferin approved a proposal which he found under consideration for introducing into the Egyptian army a certain proportion of British officers. It was also suggested that an English General should be appointed to the chief command.

Both schemes were approved, a number of officers were selected from the English army to fill certain grades in the Egyptian forces, and on the 13th December, Sir Evelyn Wood left England to take the command with the t.i.tle of "Sirdar" (Commander-in-Chief).

The reorganization of the gendarmerie and police was at the same time proceeded with. In a despatch, dated the 1st January, 1883, Lord Dufferin said on the subject of the gendarmerie that, "in consequence of the proximity of the desert and the necessity of controlling the wild Arab tribes which infest its borders, it was desirable that this arm of the service should be in a great measure a mounted force, and impressed with a semi-military character. At the same time, for economical and other reasons, it should be also trained to discharge the civil duties of a rural police. Under certain aspects, therefore, it would possess the characteristics and qualifications of mounted infantry, and under others those of simple constabulary."

The administration of the gendarmerie, to the number of 4,400 men, was to be placed under the Minister of the Interior, and its chief was to be General Baker, with the t.i.tle of Inspector-General. Lord Dufferin in the same despatch dealt with the question of the reorganization of the Urban Police, and whilst pointing out the errors committed in the past, showed how they might be avoided in the future.

Lord Dufferin next took in hand the question of the reform of Egyptian inst.i.tutions generally. On the 6th of February, his Lordship made his report in the form of a lengthy despatch to Lord Granville, in which he dealt with the occupation of Egypt, and the responsibilities thereby devolving on England; the establishment of a Legislative Council, and a Chamber of Notables elected by the people; the Tribunals, ca.n.a.lization and irrigation, the cadastral survey of Egypt, the indebtedness of the fellah, the a.s.sessment of the land revenue, agricultural taxes, national education and the Soudan, as to which last his Lordship observed that some persons were inclined to advise Egypt to withdraw altogether from the Soudan and her other acquisitions in that region; but she could hardly be expected to acquiesce in such a policy. Possessing the lower ranges of the Nile, she was naturally inclined to claim dominion along its entire course; and when it was remembered that the territories in question, if properly developed, were capable of producing inexhaustible supplies of sugar and cotton, we could not be surprised at her unwillingness to abandon them. Unhappily, Egyptian administration in the Soudan had been almost uniformly unfortunate. The success of the present Mahdi in raising the tribes and in extending his influence over great tracts of country, was a sufficient proof of the Government's inability either to reconcile the inhabitants to its rule, or to maintain order.

The consequences had been most disastrous. Within a year and a half the Egyptians lost something like 9,000 men, while it was estimated that 40,000 of their opponents had perished. His Lordship stated that, in the expectation that the fresh efforts then about to be made would result in the restoration of tranquillity, a plan should be carefully considered for the future administration of the country. Hitherto, it had caused a continual drain on the resources of the Egyptian Exchequer. The first step necessary was the construction of a railway from Souakim to Berber, or what, perhaps, would be still more advisable, to Shendy, on the Nile. The completion of this enterprise would at once change all the elements of the problem. Instead of being a burden on the Egyptian Exchequer, these Equatorial provinces ought to become, with anything like good management, a source of wealth to the Government.

Lord Dufferin then referred to the slave trade, the International Tribunals, the right of Egypt to make commercial conventions, and the exemption of Europeans from taxation. He then gave a retrospect of reforms accomplished and made observations on the Egyptian Budget and the Public Debt.

The report concluded as follows:--

"Having thus given a _resume_ of the steps already taken towards the reorganization of Egypt, and of the further measures in progress or in contemplation, it remains for me to consider how far we can depend upon the continued, steady, and frictionless operation of the machinery we shall have set up. A great part of what we are about to inaugurate will be of necessity tentative and experimental. This is especially true as regards the indigenous Courts of Justice and the new political inst.i.tutions, both of which will have to be worked by persons, the majority of whom will be without experience or instruction. Had I been commissioned to place affairs in Egypt on the footing of an Indian subject State, the outlook would have been different. The masterful hand of a Resident would have quickly bent everything to his will, and in the s.p.a.ce of five years we should have greatly added to the material wealth and well-being of the country by the extension of its cultivated area and the consequent expansion of its revenue; by the partial, if not the total, abolition of the _corvee_ and slavery; the establishment of justice, and other beneficent reforms. But the Egyptians would have justly considered these advantages as dearly purchased at the expense of their domestic independence.

Moreover, Her Majesty's Government and the public opinion of England have p.r.o.nounced against such an alternative. But though it be our fixed determination that the new _regime_ shall not surcharge us with the responsibility of permanently administering the country, whether directly or indirectly, it is absolutely necessary to prevent the fabric we have raised from tumbling to the ground the moment our sustaining hand is withdrawn. Such a catastrophe would be the signal for the return of confusion to this country and renewed discord in Europe. At the present moment we are labouring in the interests of the world at large. The desideratum of every one is an Egypt peaceful, prosperous, and contented, able to pay its debts, capable of maintaining order along the Ca.n.a.l, and offering no excuse in the troubled condition of its affairs for interference from outside. France, Turkey, every European Power, must be as anxious as ourselves for the attainment of these results, nor can they be jealous of the means we take to secure them.

"The very fact of our having endowed the country with representative inst.i.tutions is a proof of our disinterestedness. It is the last thing we should have done had we desired to retain its Government in leading-strings; for however irresistible may be the control of a protecting Power when brought to bear upon a feeble autocracy, its imperative character disappears in the presence of a popular a.s.sembly. The behests of 'the Agent' are at once confronted by the _non possumus_ of 'the Minister.' But before such a guarantee for Egypt's independence can be said to exist, the administrative system of which it is the leading characteristic must have time to consolidate, in order to resist disintegrating influences from within and without, and to acquire the use and knowledge of its own capacities. If the multiform and balanced organization we have contrived is to have a chance of success it must be allowed to operate _in vacuo_. Above all, the persons who have staked their future on its existence must have some guarantee that it will endure. How can we expect men born under a ruthless despotism to embark on the duties of an Opposition--which is the vital spark of const.i.tutional government--to criticise, condemn, and countervail the powers that be, if to-morrow the ark of the Const.i.tution to which they trusted is to break into fragments beneath their feet? Amidst the applause of the liberal world a Parliament was called into existence at Constantinople; a few months later it disappeared, and its champion and fugleman is now languishing in the dungeons of Taif. Unless they are convinced that we intend to shield and foster the system we have established it will be in vain to expect the timid politicians of the East to identify themselves with its existence. But even this will not be enough. We must also provide that the tasks intrusted to the new political apparatus do not overtax its untried strength.

The situation of the country is too critical, the problems immediately pressing on the attention of its rulers are too vital to be tampered with, even in the interests of political philosophy. Various circ.u.mstances have combined to render the actual condition of the Egyptian fellah extremely precarious.

His relations with his European creditors are becoming dangerously strained. The agriculture of the country is rapidly deteriorating, the soil having become exhausted by overcropping and other causes. The labour of the _corvee_ is no longer equal to the cleansing of the ca.n.a.ls. As a consequence the desert is encroaching on the cultivated land, and, unless some remedy be quickly found, the finances of the country will be compromised.

"With such an acc.u.mulation of difficulties, native statesmanship, even though supplemented by the new-born inst.i.tutions, will hardly be able to cope unless a.s.sisted for a time by our sympathy and guidance. Under these circ.u.mstances, I would venture to submit that we can hardly consider the work of reorganization complete, or the responsibilities imposed upon us by circ.u.mstances adequately discharged, until we have seen Egypt shake herself from the initial embarra.s.sments which I have enumerated. This point of departure once attained we can bid her G.o.d-speed with a clear conscience, and may fairly claim the approbation of Europe for having completed a labour which every one desired to see accomplished, though no one was willing to undertake it but ourselves. Even then the stability of our handiwork will not be a.s.sured unless it is clearly understood by all concerned that no subversive influence will intervene between England and the Egypt she has recreated."

The projects of Lord Dufferin were theoretically complete, and, taken together, formed a const.i.tution which, on paper, was nearly perfect. An army duly subordinate to the Executive was to form the ultimate guarantee for order. An efficient police, carrying out the decrees of independent and unbribed tribunals, was to offer complete security for personal rights and liberty. A Khedive checked by a Council of Ministers, which in turn was to be checked by a Legislative Council of twenty-six, while all three were to learn from an a.s.sembly of forty-six Notables what were the real wishes of the Egyptian people, was a triumph of const.i.tutional mechanics. A financial Councillor at once the servant and the monitor of the Khedive, and always ready when requested to bring the light of Western science to bear upon the lax ideas of Oriental finance, lent to the whole structure of government a rigidity and stability which could not be too greatly admired. In short, looking at the whole ingenious apparatus, one could not but feel that nothing was wanted to make it perfect except an Egyptian nation. The machine was beautifully constructed and finished, but one looked in vain for the motive power. In 1883 the Egypt of Lord Dufferin existed only in imagination. For the most part it was a dream, and far off in the haze of a remote future. The Const.i.tution was excellent as a model, but where did the strength reside that alone could make it work? One might search through all its parts, from the Khedive to the policeman, without finding a single trace of the vital force that was to work the whole. It had no organic connection with the people of Egypt; it had not sprung out of their wants or their apt.i.tudes; it did not express their history or embody their aspirations. The Ministers were responsible to the Khedive, and the army was to obey him. On what was the authority to rest which was to enable him to cope with intrigues in his Cabinet or conspiracy among his troops? There could at that time be only one answer, viz., the presence of the British Army of Occupation, and this was the very inst.i.tution which the project was intended to supersede.

The British forces in Egypt on the 31st of December, 1882, had been reduced to 12,000 men.

At the opening of Parliament on the 15th February, 1883, Egyptian affairs were referred to in the Queen's Speech in the following terms:--"I continue to maintain relations of friendship with all the Powers; order is now re-established in Egypt, and the British troops will be withdrawn as promptly as may be permitted by a prudent examination of the country."

The repeated declarations by the British Government of their intention to withdraw the Army of Occupation excited the utmost alarm amongst the European inhabitants of Egypt. These last, driven from their homes by the events to a great extent brought about by England's intervention in 1882, had now, trusting to the protection of the British force, returned to the country and resumed their former avocations. Upon this cla.s.s the Ministerial utterances produced the worst possible effect. Owing to the feeling of uncertainty which in consequence prevailed, all large operations were at a standstill. No one was disposed to lay out his money in a country which might at any moment be handed back to the care of a native administration, and at Alexandria miles of blackened ruins still marked the results of British interference.

Whether the feeling of alarm was justified or not, there is no doubt that at this time the sentiments of the natives were not friendly towards Europeans. In the provinces Europeans were openly insulted and threatened by the natives, and in many of the villages acts of brigandage were of frequent occurrence.

The repeated Ministerial declarations of an impending withdrawal from Egypt not only created anxiety amongst the European population, and to a great extent paralyzed commerce and prevented the inflow of capital, but they exercised a most injurious effect upon the reforms which the British Government professed such anxiety to push forward. On every side the same story was told. The natives, daily given to understand that the rule of the English was shortly coming to an end, opposed a pa.s.sive obstructiveness, in those cases where they did not offer active opposition, to the intended changes. "What is the use of your making all these alterations," reasoned the Egyptian official, "if they are not to last?" That they _could_ last after the departure of the English was an idea which never appeared worthy of a moment's consideration by him.

This was the condition of things when, early in the month of March, a pet.i.tion in English, French, Italian, and Greek was drawn up and addressed to Lord Dufferin. The doc.u.ment pointed out that whilst recognizing that it was by the British forces that the disturbances of 1882 had been suppressed, the state of affairs in Egypt was such as to show that the permanent retention of a European force was the only means by which order could be maintained, and the security of the European population a.s.sured. The pet.i.tion bore 2,600 signatures, mostly of influential persons of all nationalities. It was presented to Lord Dufferin by a deputation, and by him transmitted to the Foreign Office.

From that date nothing more was heard of it, and it was probably placed in the same pigeon-hole as the memorial for protection sent by the British residents just previous to the riots of the 11th June.

On the 29th April, Lieutenant-General F. C. A. Stephenson was appointed to the command of the Army of Occupation, in succession to Sir Archibald Alison.

Lord Dufferin left the carrying out of his scheme of Egyptian reform in the able hands of Sir Evelyn Baring, and returned to Constantinople on the 3rd May.[88]

CHAPTER XXVIII.

OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MAHDI.

The situation in the Soudan at the period referred to at the close of Chapter XXVI. was, it must be confessed, critical enough, and it is not surprising that, on the 7th November, 1882, Lord Granville caused the Khedive to be informed that the British Government were unwilling to take any responsibility in regard to it. Left to their own resources, the Egyptian Government had no alternative but to re-enlist about 10,000 of Arabi's old officers and men for service in the South.

Early in November the collection of these soldiers and their concentration at the Barrage, near Cairo, began. Most of them had to be brought in chains, and desertions were frequent. They were transported by detachments to Berber, via Souakim, their arms and ammunition being sent separately. Altogether, 9,500 were collected and despatched.

Most of these troops were deplorably ignorant of all notions of drill, and were little more than an armed mob. Their officers were no better.

Many of them had been engaged in the recent operations in Lower Egypt, which did not tend to increase their military spirit. Others looked on service in the Soudan as a sentence of death, and deemed that the Khedive's purpose in sending them was to get rid of them. Considering, also, the superst.i.tious notions which many of them had of the power and invincibility of the Mahdi, and of the valour of his savage followers, it can hardly be supposed that the new levies were such as to inspire confidence, or that to advance with such a rabble was to court anything else but defeat.