Matters progressed for some time pretty quietly after the events referred to in the previous chapter, but in July, 1881, two incidents occurred which were followed by important results.

A native artilleryman was run over and killed in the streets of Alexandria. His comrades bore the dead body to the Palace and forced an entrance in defiance of the orders of their officers. They were tried, and the ringleaders were condemned to severe sentences. Next, nineteen Circa.s.sian officers brought charges against the colonel of their regiment, Abdel-el-Al, already mentioned. The charges were inquired into and found to be unfounded, whereupon the nineteen officers were removed from the active list of the army, but were restored subsequently by order of the Khedive.

These measures gave great umbrage to "the Colonels," who believed that the order was given with a view to encourage the insubordination of the officers towards them; and a letter was written by "the Colonels" to the Minister of War, contrasting the leniency shown towards the nineteen officers with the severity towards the soldiers in the case of the artilleryman.

The Khedive by this time had become completely dissatisfied with his new Minister of War, and alarmed at the bearing of "the Colonels." He determined to see if energetic measures would not be successful, and appointed his brother-in-law, Daoud Pasha, a Circa.s.sian, to the Ministry of War, in the place of Mahmoud Sami. Measures were at the same time taken for getting the disaffected regiments out of Cairo.

These steps were viewed with the greatest possible dissatisfaction by Arabi and his colleagues. Not only so, but they began to entertain considerable fear for their own personal safety. A story had got abroad that the Khedive had obtained a secret "Fetwah," or Decree, from the Sheikh-el-Islam, condemning them to death for high treason. There was no foundation for the story, but it was currently believed. Under these circ.u.mstances, all the chief officers signed a declaration of loyalty to the Khedive and his Government. Their next step was to organize the demonstration of the 9th September, 1881.

The immediate origin of the disturbance was the order given by the Minister of War for the removal from Cairo to Alexandria of the regiment of which Arabi was the Colonel.

On the 9th September the Minister of War received a communication from Arabi, informing him that the troops in Cairo were going at half-past three in the afternoon to the Palace of Abdin to obtain from the Khedive the dismissal of the Ministry, the convocation of the National a.s.sembly, and the increase of the army to 18,000 men.

When the terms of Arabi's communication were laid before the Khedive at his palace at Koobah, none of the Ministers were present. In the absence of the British Consul-General, Tewfik consulted the British Controller, Mr. (afterwards Sir Auckland) Colvin, who invited the Khedive to take the initiative himself.

Two regiments were said to be faithful. Colvin advised the Khedive to summon them to Abdin Square with all the military police available, to place himself at their head, and when Arabi arrived to arrest him.

Colvin accompanied the Khedive to the Abdin Barracks, where the first regiment of the Guard turned out and made the warmest protestations of loyalty. The same thing occurred with the soldiers at the Citadel, though it was ascertained that the troops there had, previously to the Khedive's arrival, been signalling to Arabi's regiment at Abba.s.sieh. The Khedive then announced his intention of driving to the Abba.s.sieh Barracks, some three miles distant. It was already past the time fixed for the demonstration, and Colvin urged him instead to proceed at once to Abdin, taking with him the Citadel regiment. Tewfik, however, wavered. Either he desired to a.s.sure himself of the support of more of his soldiers, or more probably he desired to put off the critical moment as long as possible. He persisted in driving to Abba.s.sieh. It was a long drive, and when he arrived there he found that Arabi had marched with his regiment to Cairo. The opportunity sought of antic.i.p.ating his movements was, therefore, lost. The carriages were turned round, and on entering Cairo took a long _detour_, and arrived at Abdin Palace by a side door. The Khedive at first desired to enter the Palace, but, on Colvin's entreaty, consented to come out into the square. They went together, followed by half-a-dozen native and European officers. The place was filled with soldiers, some 4,000 in number, with thirty guns placed in position.

The Khedive advanced firmly towards a little group of officers and men (some of whom were mounted) in the centre. Colvin said to him, "When Arabi presents himself, tell him to give up his sword and follow you.

Then go the round of the regiments, address each separately, and give them the 'order to disperse.'" The soldiers all this time were standing in easy att.i.tudes, chatting, laughing, rolling up cigarettes, and eating pistachio nuts, looking, in fact, as little like desperate mutineers as could well be imagined. They apparently were there in obedience only to orders, and, without being either loyal or disloyal, might almost be regarded as disinterested spectators.

Arabi approached on horseback: the Khedive called out to him to dismount. He did so, and came forward on foot with several others, and a guard with fixed bayonets, and saluted. As he advanced, Colvin said to the Khedive, "Now is your moment, give the word!" He replied, "We are between four fires. We shall be killed." Colvin said, "Have courage!"

Tewfik again wavered, he turned for counsel to a native officer at his side, and repeated, "What can I do? We are between four fires." He then told Arabi to sheathe his sword. Arabi did so at once, his hand trembling so with nervousness that he could scarcely get the weapon back into its scabbard. The moment was lost. Instead of following Colvin's advice, and arresting Arabi on the spot, a step which would at once have put an end to the whole disturbance, the Khedive then walked towards him and commenced to parley.

He demanded what was the meaning of the demonstration. Arabi replied by enumerating his demands, adding that the army had come there on behalf of the people to enforce them, and would not retire until they were conceded. The Khedive addressed Colvin, and said, "You hear what he says?" Colvin answered that it was not befitting for the sovereign to discuss questions of this kind with colonels, and suggested his retiring to the Palace, leaving others to speak to the military leaders. The Khedive did so, and Colvin remained for about an hour, explaining to them the gravity of the situation for themselves, and urging them to withdraw the troops whilst there was yet time.

At this moment Mr. (afterwards Sir Charles) Cookson, Acting British Consul-General, arrived, and Colvin left the continuation of the negotiations to Her Majesty's representative. The latter pointed out to Arabi the risk which he and those with him incurred by the menacing att.i.tude they had a.s.sumed. He told him that if they persisted in a.s.suming the government of the country, the army must be prepared to meet the united forces of the Sublime Porte and of the European Powers, both of whom were too much interested in the welfare and tranquillity of Egypt to allow the country to descend through a military government to anarchy. Arabi answered that the army was there to secure the liberties of the Egyptian people. Cookson replied that the Khedive and Europe could not recognize a mere military revolt as the expression of the will of the people, and added that even now, if the troops were withdrawn, any representations presented in the proper manner would be attended to, and he would guarantee Arabi's personal safety and that of his a.s.sociates.

Arabi, though civil, firmly refused to take the course proposed. He insisted on the adoption of the three points demanded. Cookson then communicated the result of the interview to the Khedive, adding that he was convinced that the only concession to which any real importance was attached was the dismissal of the Ministry. His Highness, after a conference with Riaz Pasha, consented to this, on the understanding that the other points demanded should be in suspense until the Porte could be communicated with.

Arabi accepted these terms, insisting only that no member of the Khedive's family should be included in the new Cabinet, and that the Minister of War should not be a Circa.s.sian. On these conditions Arabi promised to withdraw the troops. This, however, was not effected until an order had been signed announcing the dismissal of the Ministry and the nomination of Cherif Pasha as the new Premier.

After this, Arabi entered the Palace and made his submission to the Khedive, and the soldiers, with their bands playing and amid loud cheers for the "Effendina" (Sovereign), retired to their barracks. By eight o'clock all was over, and Cairo, which had been much excited, had relapsed into its ordinary tranquillity.

With regard to the outbreak--the third, it will be remarked, of its kind--it was on a larger scale than any previously organized, and was, as events showed, correspondingly more successful. The rebellious troops were, indeed, quieted, as on former occasions, but only by concessions which went far to place the whole government of the country under irregular military control.

With regard to the att.i.tude a.s.sumed by the Khedive on the occasion, considerable allowance must be made. Tewfik in the life-time of his father had never, or at all events until the latest period of Ismail's reign, been allowed to come to the front. He was, therefore, the less fitted for dealing with a crisis of so formidable a character as that of the 9th September. Born of one of Ismail's female slaves in the year 1853, Tewfik was never a favourite with his father, and when his brothers were sent to Europe to be educated, he himself was kept in Cairo and lived in quiet obscurity. Whilst they were made much of, both at home and abroad, Tewfik remained quietly cultivating his farm at Koobah.[6]

The difference in developing the character and dispositions of the Princes was natural enough, and yet the late ruler of Egypt was in many respects in no way inferior to the other members of his family. He possessed a remarkable degree of intelligence, and although a strict Mahomedan he was the husband of only one wife, to whom he was devotedly attached. Determined to avoid, in bringing up his children, the error perpetrated towards himself, he sent his sons to Europe to be educated.

In appearance he somewhat resembled his father, being short and inclined to stoutness.

Unlike Ismail, however, Tewfik was wanting in energy and determination.

With either Ismail, or his grandfather, Mehemet Ali, the demonstration of the 9th September would have been impossible. With Ismail--supposing such an event could have taken place--the end would not have been far off. The fate of Ismail Pasha Saddyk, Minister of Finance, known as the "Mofettish," sufficiently shows the means by which Arabi would have been disposed of.[7]

With Mehemet Ali the procedure would have been yet more summary. The report of a pistol would have been heard, and Arabi would have rolled lifeless on the square of Abdin. A volley of musketry would have dispersed his followers, and the incident would have been closed.

Tewfik, with his genial kindly disposition, was not the man to adopt either of the above expedients, and, as has been seen, Arabi triumphed.

CHAPTER V.

FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

Difficulty was at first experienced in getting Cherif Pasha to undertake the formation of a Ministry. His idea was that it was inconsistent with a due regard for his own reputation for him to pose before the world as the accomplice of the mutinous soldiery, and at one time, after an interview with Arabi, Cherif positively declined. Meanwhile, meetings of the officers were held in which the most violent appeared to have the upper hand, and the belief that they had nothing to fear from Turkish intervention emboldened them to reject an ultimatum of Cherif, which was that, on condition of his undertaking the government, and guaranteeing the safety of the leaders, they should withdraw their regiments to certain posts a.s.signed to them.

Public opinion, more particularly amongst the Europeans, became much alarmed, and the Khedive declared himself ready to yield everything in order to save public security.

On the 13th September, however, things took an unexpected turn for the better. Arabi, at the suggestion of Mahmoud Sami, who hoped to render Cherif impossible, and to get himself nominated in his place, summoned to Cairo the members of the Chamber of Notables. Cherif had acquired a good deal of popularity among the cla.s.s to which the Notables belonged, and at their first meeting he found arguments to induce them to adopt a tone hostile to Arabi and his friends, whom they told to attend to the army, and mind their own business. The Notables went even further, and signed an address to Cherif entreating him to form a Ministry, and giving their personal guarantee that if he consented, the army should yield absolute submission to his orders. Arabi, it will be remembered, had all along professed to act on behalf of the Egyptian people, and the att.i.tude of the Notables was a severe check to him, or rather to Mahmoud Sami, who was pulling the wires. This last individual, seeing that the Notables were playing into the hand of Cherif, at once declared himself the partisan of the latter and of the Chamber, and as a consequence Sami was reappointed Minister of War in the Cabinet which Cherif was eventually persuaded to form.

On the 14th of September the new Ministry was gazetted, and steps were taken for the dispersal of the disaffected regiments in the provinces.

On the 6th of October Arabi and his regiment left Cairo for the military station of El Ouady, in the Delta. Before he left he was received by the Khedive, whom he a.s.sured of his respect and entire devotion. When one remembers how often Arabi had gone through this ceremony, one can hardly help thinking that Tewfik must, by this time, have begun to get a little tired of it. Before leaving, Arabi made speeches to the troops, in which he exhorted them "to remain united, and to draw even more tightly, if possible, those bonds of fraternity of which they had already given such striking examples." Finally, after pointing out--it must be presumed by way of a joke--that obedience in a soldier was the first of virtues, he declared that as long as he possessed a drop of blood, or a living breath, both should belong to his beloved sovereign.

Meanwhile the elections for the Chamber of Notables, which had been convoked by the Khedive for the 23rd of December, were proceeding. The Chamber was called together under an old law of Ismail's time, made in 1866, under which the Notables possessed but very limited functions.

They were, in fact, simply a consultative body, with power only to discuss such matters as might be brought before them by the advisers of the Government.

There is no doubt that, apart from the military movement, there was a widespread feeling of discontent in the country at this time. Ismail's merciless exactions, and the pressure of foreign money-lenders, had given rise to a desire to limit the power of the Khedive, and, above all, to abolish the Anglo-French Control, which was considered as ruling the country simply for the benefit of the foreign bondholders. The Control was further hated by the large landowners, because the law of liquidation (with which the Controllers in the minds of the people were a.s.sociated) had in a measure sacrificed their claims for compensation in respect of the cancelling of a forced loan known as the "Moukabeleh,"

and it was still more detested by the Pashas and native officials, because it interfered with the reckless squandering of public money, and the many opportunities for corruption by which they had so long benefited.

In addition to this, there was a great deal of irritation at the increasing number of highly paid European officials which the reformed regime inaugurated in the latter days of Ismail involved. The people began to suspect that what was occurring was only part of a plan for handing the country over to Europeans. The examples lately set by England with regard to Cyprus, and by France in Tunis, were, it must be owned, but little calculated to inspire confidence in the political morality of either of these two Powers.

The prevailing irritation was kept alive by the native press, which began to indulge in the most violent abuse of Europeans. The army, too, continued to show signs of insubordination in many ways. To add to the difficulties of the situation, the colonels of the regiments which had been expressly sent away into the provinces had acquired the inconvenient habit of coming back to the capital, and joining in the many intrigues on foot.

Next followed a demand by the Minister of War for an augmentation of the War Budget, in order to increase the army to the maximum allowed by the Sultan's Firman.

Under these circ.u.mstances the Chamber of Notables a.s.sembled on the 25th of December, 1881.

The earliest trouble arose from the demand of the Notables that the law under which they were a.s.sembled should be modified so as to give them power to vote the Budget so far as it related to such of the revenues as were not a.s.signed to the Public Debt.

The claim of the Chamber, though plausible enough at first sight, was really, if granted, calculated to infringe all the international arrangements for the Debt. It was obvious that if the Chamber had the power and chose to vote an extravagant Budget so far as related to the _una.s.signed_ revenues, the administration of the country could not be carried on, national bankruptcy might ensue, and the collection of the a.s.signed revenues would become impossible.

The Chamber, however, not only refused to give way on the question of the Budget, but it demanded that the law should be further amended by giving the Notables other privileges, namely, the right to control the acts of public functionaries, to initiate legislation, and to hold the Ministers responsible to the Chamber. By getting the Notables to make these demands, which he knew could not be accepted, Mahmoud Sami's object was to bring about a crisis which could only end in the downfall of Cherif's Cabinet. He had already persuaded Cherif to make Arabi Sub-Minister of War, under the pretext of securing him on the side of the Ministry, and so neutralizing the influence which the army was exercising over the Chamber. In reality the appointment only afforded Mahmoud Sami and Arabi increased facilities for intriguing against Cherif. The result was soon seen.

The amendments to the law giving the Chamber increased power were inadmissible on many grounds. Were there no other objection, there was the insurmountable one that the Sultan had already refused a Const.i.tution to other parts of his dominions, and would certainly oppose its being granted to Egypt. To put it shortly, the amendments after being submitted to the English and French Governments were declared unacceptable.

This at once brought about a crisis, and the Chamber, on the 2nd February, sent a deputation to the Khedive to require him to summon a new Ministry.

At this period it was reported to the English and French Governments that activity was being displayed in putting all the coast fortifications in an efficient state, and that the strength of the army was being augmented under the provisions of the new War Budget.

These circ.u.mstances, taken in conjunction with the political events above recorded, led the English and French Governments to conclude that if the Khedive was to be maintained in power, the time was coming for them to think about doing something in Egypt. On the 20th of January, 1882, Sir Edward Malet wrote that "armed intervention had become necessary if the refusal to allow the Chamber to vote the Budget was to be agreed to, and yet it was impossible to do otherwise, as the measure only formed part of a complete scheme of revolution." As far back as December, 1881, M. Gambetta, then at the head of the French Ministry, had suggested that England and France should take "joint action in Egypt to strengthen the authority of the Khedive, and to cut short intrigues at Constantinople, as well as to make the Porte feel that any undue interference on its part would not be tolerated."

This proposal shortly after resulted in the famous Joint Note communicated by the English and the French representatives to the Khedive in Cairo, on the 8th January, 1882. The doc.u.ment was to the effect that the English and French Governments considered the maintenance of His Highness upon the throne in the terms laid down by the Sultan's Firmans, and officially recognized by the two Governments, as alone able to guarantee for the present and the future good order and prosperity in Egypt, in which England and France were equally interested. It continued to say that "the two Governments, being closely a.s.sociated in the resolve to guard by their united efforts against all cause of complication, internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt, did not doubt that the a.s.surance publicly given of their intention in this respect would tend to divert the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and which would certainly find England and France united to oppose them."

The parentage of the Joint Note is attributable to the French Government, which, up to this time, seemed bent on retaining the lead which it had from the first taken in regard to Egyptian affairs. The wording of the doc.u.ment had been altered more than once to suit the late Lord Granville, then Foreign Secretary, who appears to have been not quite sure how far he was getting out of his depth in regard to Egyptian matters.