CHAPTER XV

DISESTABLISHMENT

No distinction shall I make between Trojan and Tyrian.

The Federal grip upon Connecticut, one of the last strongholds of that party, was weakening. Preceding the deflection of the Episcopalians in Connecticut, there had been throughout New England a strong Federal opposition to the national government and its commands during the War of 1812. Such conduct had shattered party prestige, and when its opposition culminated in the Hartford Convention of 1814, it wrote its own death-warrant. The Republicans, on the contrary, had dropped local questions of const.i.tutional reform and religious liberty, preferring to bend all their energies to the support of the general government. When as a national party they humbled England and brought the war to a victorious close, the contrast of their loyalty to state and national interests steadily drew the popular favor. In the era of good feeling and prosperity that followed, the great national political parties dissolved somewhat and crystallized anew. In Connecticut a similar change took place in local politics. In the years immediately following the war, the Democratic-Republicans, the majority of the dissenters, and the dissatisfied among the Federalists, formed different coalitions that, under the general name of Toleration, [a] opposed the Standing Order. In 1816 the agitation for const.i.tutional reform was revived, and after three years resulted in the overthrow of the Federalists and the triumph of a peaceful revolution whereby religious liberty was a.s.sured.

The conduct of the Federal party, both within and without Connecticut from 1808 to 1815, was quite as much the real cause of their downfall in the state as that coalition between clergy and lawyers described by Dr. Beecher as causing the breakdown of party machinery and its ultimate ruin. Glancing somewhat hastily at some of the most far-reaching acts of the Federalists, we find first the Federal opposition to the embargo that from December 22, 1807, for over a year paralyzed New England commerce. In February, 1809, John Quincy Adams, who had recently resigned the Ma.s.sachusetts senatorship because of his unpopular support of the embargo, informed President Jefferson that the measure could no longer be enforced. He a.s.sured the President that the New England Federalist leaders, privily encouraged by England, were preparing to break that section off from the union of the states if the embargo were not speedily repealed. This information, whether accurate or not, so influenced the President and his advisers that the Non-intercourse Act, applying only to France and England, replaced the embargo, whose repeal took effect from March 4, 1809. In the following December, Madison's administration (in the belief that France had withdrawn her hostile decrees) limited non-intercourse to England alone, after having vainly urged upon her a repeal of her Orders in Council. With the embargo lifted, New England commerce revived, and Connecticut seamen, Connecticut farmers, [b] Connecticut merchants, together with artisans of all the allied industries that were called upon in the fitting out of ships and cargoes, enjoyed two years of prosperity. The period was given over to money-getting, and the ordinary rules of national or commercial honesty were flung to the winds. Napoleon sold licenses to British vessels to supply his famishing soldiers stationed in continental ports, while forged American and British papers were openly sold in London. So enormous were the profits of a successful voyage that the possibility of capture only added zest to the American ventures and contributed not a little to the daring of the privateers in the years of the war. So enriched was the state that by May, 1811, Connecticut had so far recovered from her late financial distress that the "state owed no debt and every tax was paid," while her exports were: domestic, $994,216; foreign, $38,138, or a total of $1,032,354.

The ninety days' embargo of 1812, the declaration of war (June 18,1812), and the patrolling of Long Island Sound by a British fleet, brought such desolation to Connecticut that ships again lay rotting at the wharves, ropewalks and warehouses were deserted, cargoes were without carriers, and seamen were either scattered or idling about, a constant menace to the public peace. National taxes to support a detested war were laid upon the people at a time when their incomes were ceasing, and their homes and property were laid bare to a plundering enemy. "A nation without fleets, without armies, with an impoverished treasury, with a frontier by sea and land extending many hundreds of miles, feebly defended" by fortifications old and neglected, had rushed headlong into war with the strongest nation of the earth without "counting the cost." Such was the opinion of the Federalists everywhere and, at first, of the large wing of the Republican party who preferred peace. The Federalists of Connecticut, when they saw a small majority sweep the nation into the conflict with Great Britain, believed the war threatened liberty of speech. They feared military despotism, when the general government demanded the control of the militia; and that the war would prostrate" their civil and religious inst.i.tutions by increasing taxation and loss of income."

[c] They feared "national dismemberment" when the war measures, together with the presence of the British fleet blockading the coast, alternately angered the people almost to rebellion against an apparently indifferent central government, or drove them into plans for self-defense. Much of the opposition in New England is in part accounted for by the rebound towards Federalism which the declaration of the war caused, and by the belief that the national election of 1812 would be a Federal victory. Though it turned out to be a defeat, it consolidated and so strengthened that party in New England that before the close of 1813 all the state executives were Federalists and were arrayed against the administration. The Republicans kept their hold upon the minority, partly by the diversion of the capital, thrown out of the carrying trade, into privateer ventures, war supplies, and manufactures.

At the beginning of the war, Governor Griswold, of Connecticut, backed by both houses of the legislature, joined with Governor Strong of Ma.s.sachusetts (supported only by the House of Representatives) in a refusal to place the militia under regular officers of the United States army. They refused also to allow the quotas called for by General Dearborn (under the Act of Congress of April 10, 1812), for the expedition against Canada, to leave the state. These executives claimed that the troops were not needed to execute the laws of the United States, to suppress insurrection, or to repel invasion,--the only three const.i.tutional reasons giving the President the right to consider himself "commander in chief of the militia of the several states." [207] By taking such a stand, the state governors a.s.sumed to decide whether a necessity existed that gave the President his const.i.tutional right to call out the militia. Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, in his "Memoir of Governor Strong," exonerates that executive by pleading his intense convictions of duty, his loyal patriotism, and his later efficient aid [d] in defending the eastern coast of the state. Mr. Lodge reminds his reader that the governor's position was supported by the best lawyers, whom he had been at great pains to consult concerning state and federal rights, which, at that period, had not been so carefully examined and discriminated between as since. The same pleas may be urged for Governors Griswold [e] and Smith. The Connecticut legislature immediately pa.s.sed an act for raising twenty-six hundred men for state defense under state officers. Governor Griswold's successor, Gov. J. Cotton Smith, when Decatur was blockaded in the Thames, when the descent upon Saybrook was made, at the attack upon Stonington, and during those months when the enemy hovered upon the long exposed coast line, kept a large force of militia ready for duty. The state supported these troops, for, in the wrangle over officership, the national government refused the promised supplies.

The New England Federalists soon found seven great reasons for party action. They were the uncertain success of the war by land; the great commercial distress; [f] the possession by the enemy of a large part of Maine; the publication of the terms upon which England would grant peace; [g] the proposed legislation in the fall of 1814, providing for the increase of the United States army by draft or conscription; the proposed modified form of impressment of sailors; and the bill allowing army officers to enlist minors and apprentices over eighteen years of age, with or without consent of parents or guardians. [h]

These measures drove the New England Federalists, at the call of Ma.s.sachusetts, to the formation of the Hartford Convention. The Connecticut legislature approved the sending of delegates by a vote of 153 to 36 opposed. Ma.s.sachusetts and Rhode Island answered with like enthusiasm. New Hampshire and Vermont hesitated, but the counties of Cheshire and Grafton in the former state and of Windham in the latter sent each a delegate to the convention. Rhode Island sent four delegates and Ma.s.sachusetts twelve, of whom George Cabot was elected president of the convention. Connecticut furnished the secretary of the convention, and later its historian in Theodore Dwight of Hartford. She also sent seven other delegates, namely: Chauncey Goodrich, mayor of Hartford, and from 1814 to 1815 governor of the state; John Treadwell, ex-governor; James Hillhouse, who had served as United States representative and senator; Zephaniah Swift, United States representative and later chief judge of superior court of Connecticut; Calvin G.o.ddard, United States representative; Nathaniel Smith, United States representative and later judge of the supreme court; and Roger Minot Sherman, a distinguished lawyer and member of the state legislature. All the delegates to the Hartford Convention were men of high character, and most of them well-known leaders of the Federal party. The convention lasted for three weeks, and, as its sessions were conducted with the greatest secrecy, many prejudicial rumors and surmises arose. The Ma.s.sachusetts summons had bidden the delegates convene for measures of safety "not repugnant to our obligations as members of the Union," and the convention acknowledged that it found the greatest difficulty in "devising means of defense against dangers, and of relief from oppressions proceeding from the act of their own Government without violating const.i.tutional principles or disappointing the hopes of a suffering and injured people." The secrecy, the known antagonism to the Administration, the knowledge of New England's early disbelief in the cohesive power of the Union, and the convention's demands and resolutions, combined to give a bad and traitorous reputation to the Hartford Convention that has never been absolutely cleared away.

As early as 1796, over the signature "Pelham," there had appeared in the "Hartford Courant" a series of articles written with great ability and keen foresight as to the difficulties that would arise in making any impartial legislation for a nation composed of parts having such diverse economic systems as those of the North and the South. The articles suggested the development of two nations instead of one. During the War of 1812, various suggestions had been thrown out by different newspapers enlarging upon the resources of New England and hinting at a separate peace with England. There were not a few who, upon learning of the resolutions of the convention, felt that "Pelham" was a close adviser of its measures if not one of its delegates. Public opinion was so wrought up by the a.s.sumed disloyalty of the Hartford Convention that in 1815 it forced the publication of the convention's brief and non-committal "Journal." From it little more was learned than that the convention had resolved that the different states should take measures to protect themselves against draft by the national government, that New England should be allowed to defend herself, and for that purpose should have returned to each of her states a reasonable share of the national taxes to meet the expense of their arming. In addition, each New England state should set apart a certain portion of her militia under her governor to give aid in cases of extremity should she be called upon by the governor of another state. At the close of the convention, delegates were appointed to proceed to Washington with these resolutions and also with six proposed amendments [i] to the national const.i.tution. These demands and resolves were reinforced by the proposal that should the Administration refuse to consider the propositions, another convention should be held in the following summer to consider further action.

When the delegates arrived in Washington with the resolutions, of which two state legislatures had meantime approved, the news of peace had been declared. In the general jubilation they saw fit to leave their message undelivered. For years the taint of rebellion clung to the Hartford Convention, and forced its secretary, in 1833, to publish his "History," a defense of its members and their measures. Even this did not remove the stigma. The delegates had in their own communities always retained their reputation for high personal character, but politically they were irretrievably ruined by their partic.i.p.ation in the Hartford gathering. They had dealt their party in their states a mortal blow, and the Hartford Convention has been well named "the grave of the Federal party."

However much the members of the convention swathed their sentiments in expressions of allegiance to the Union, at least until extreme provocation should force a separation; or however much they declared their conviction that peace, not war, should be the time chosen for such a separation, and that, first of all, distinction should be carefully made between a bad const.i.tution and a bad government, and a good const.i.tution or government badly administered, there was no doubt but that they proposed to push nullification to the point of active resistance within what they considered their legal rights. They had also proposed a set of amendments which they knew stood no chance of meeting with approval from any number of the states. Moreover the Hartford Convention, whatever its intentions, seriously alarmed and embarra.s.sed the Administration. Because of the consequences of their policy, its members were culpable in the opinion of all who hold that, in the distress of war, to hamper one's own government is to lend a.s.sistance to the enemy. [j]

The war at first was not popular, but made friends for itself as it progressed. Connecticut sailors were among the seamen that England had impressed, and Connecticut captains had surrendered ships and rich cargoes at the command of the mistress of the seas. But the naval triumphs of the first year caught the popular fancy, for "not until the Guerriere's colors were struck to the Const.i.tution had a British frigate been humiliated on the ocean." The victories on land were about equally balanced. The disclosures of English perfidy in attempting through her secret agents [k] to detach New England from the Union before war should break out, and during the conflict, by favoritism to Ma.s.sachusetts, helped to increase the supporters of the war policy. Further, the war brought out the latent powers of the nation, both for defense and for prosperity. The gradual introduction of machinery since 1800 had enlarged the small manufactories of Connecticut, and begun the exchange of products between near localities. But before the War of 1812 no manufacturing in Connecticut had achieved a notable success. [l] There was invention and skill, [m]

and often profit, in the home market for the coa.r.s.er products, but there was a general tendency to prefer imported goods of finer make.

The war cut off such supplies, and the need created a paying demand and developed an ability to supply it. The political party that conducted the war to a successful finish developed the policy of protection of infant industries, and the tariff of 1816 gave birth to Connecticut as a manufacturing state. The repeal of the obnoxious war measures, the speedy reduction of the national expenses, and the promise of prosperity smoothed out lingering resentment. The Federal party was virtually extinct outside of its last strongholds in New England and Delaware. In the Era of Good Feeling following the war the whole people composed one party, with principles neither those of the original Federal party nor those of the original Republican party, but a combination of both." [n]

In New England during the War of 1812, as in the Revolution, the clergy had been the nucleus of the local dominant party, and with its leaders had been bitter opponents of the "unrighteous war." [208]

Consequently the Congregational clergy shared in the popular disapproval and condemnation that overtook the Federalists. In Connecticut, for a time, the Standing Order by its affiliation with the Federal party prolonged its control. of the state. But the tide was turning. Dr. Lyman Beecher, Dr. Dwight's able lieutenant, made vigorous and laudable efforts to uphold the Dwights, the Aaron and Moses, as it were, of the waning political power. The "Home Missionary Society," [o] Bible societies, the "Domestic Missionary Society for the Building up of Waste Places," and the many branches of the "Society for the Suppression of Vice and Promotion of Good Morals" [p]

did much good among those who welcomed them. Where their results were simply those of a morality enforced by law, they caused still greater dissatisfaction with the ruling party. [q] The union of the clergy and lawyers was not as influential as had been antic.i.p.ated in the early days of 1812. Soon after the war the clergy adopted a less vigorous policy, preferring an att.i.tude of defense against calumny and a withdrawal from politics. [r]

The elections showed the change in public opinion. At the April election, 1814, the Federals reelected Governor Smith, while the Republican candidate, Mr. Edward Boardman, received 1629 votes. The following year, notwithstanding Governor Smith's reelection, Mr.

Boardman polled 4876 votes, and the Republicans made a gain of twenty in the House of Representatives, while in the fall nominations for a.s.sistants, the highest Federal vote was 9008 and that of the Republicans was 4268. [209]

In January, 1816, "a meeting of citizens from various parts of the state" was held in New Haven to agree upon a nomination for governor and lieutenant-governor, which would bind together the Republicans and such of the Federalists as were opposed to the Standing Order. Oliver Wolcott and Jonathan Ingersll were unanimously agreed upon. Oliver Wolcott had been living out of the state for fourteen years, and for most of that time had not been in politics. His Republican supporters had had time to forget him as a staunch Federalist, and remembered him only as a man of parts who had held the secretaryship of the treasury under Washington and Adams, and who had "opposed the Hartford Convention; like Washington was a friend to the _Union_, a foe to rebellion; with mild means resisted bigotry, with a glowing heart favored toleration." [210] As he had approved the policy of the general government since the days of Madison, he was p.r.o.nounced an available candidate. A good Congregationalist, he would not offend the Federalists, would be acceptable to the Republicans, and would stand to the capitalists and farmers as favorable to a protective tariff and to more equitable taxation within the state. The prestige given him by the executive abilities of his father and grandfather in the gubernatorial chair also counted in his favor. The candidate for lieutenant-governor was Jonathan Ingersoll, a Federalist, an eminent New Haven lawyer, a prominent Episcopalian, senior warden of Trinity Church, and chairman of the Bishop's Fund. He had had political training in the Council, 1792-1798, and had been judge of the Superior Court, 1798-1801, and again from 1811 to 1816. His nomination was the price of the Episcopal vote, for "it was deemed expedient by giving the Episcopalians a fair opportunity to unite with the Republicans, to attempt to affect such change in the Government as should afford some prospect of satisfaction to their united demands." [s]

The "Connecticut Herald," indignant at the a.s.sembly's conduct in the Phoenix Bank affair, left the Federal party and independently nominated Jonathan Ingersoll for lieutenant-governor instead of the regular candidate of that party, Chauncey Goodrich. The "American Mercury," the organ of the American Toleration party, the union of Republicans, dissenters, and dissatisfied, in order "to produce that concord and harmony among parties which have too long, and without any real diversity of interests, been disturbed, and which every honest man must earnestly desire to see restored," nominated for governor, Oliver Wolcott; for lieutenant-governor, Jonathan Ingersoll. The Federal candidate for the executive was Governor John Cotton Smith, up for reelection. The Tolerationists failed by a few hundred votes to seat their candidate for the executive, with the result that the election of 1816 raised to office Governor Smith and Lieutenant-Governor Ingersoll. Governor Smith received 11,589 votes, Mr. Wolcott 10,170, while Lieutenant-Governor Ingersoll polled a majority of 1453 over his opponent, Mr. Calvin G.o.ddard. [t] It was the first time that a dissenter had held so high an office. The Federalists might have seized the opportunity to renew their former friendship with the Episcopalians had it not been for their stubbornness and for their old fear of Churchmen in political office. At the October town meetings, the returns from ninety-three towns gave a Federal vote of 7995 and a Republican of 6315 for representatives, with a Federal majority of about thirty in the House. [2ll]

The Federalists, realizing that the Episcopal vote was almost lost to them, that their domestic policy was in disfavor, and that their conduct during the war had damaged them and was leading to their downfall in Connecticut even as in the nation, resolved upon a desperate measure to conciliate a larger number of the dissenters.

This was the Act of October, 1816, for the Support of Literature and Religion. Briefly, it divided the balance of the money which the nation owed Connecticut for expenses during the war, namely $145,000, among the various denominations. To the Congregationalists it gave in round numbers, and including the grant to Yale, $68,000; to the Episcopalians, $20,000; to Methodists, $12,000; and to Baptists, $18,000; to Quakers, Sandemanians, etc., nothing. [u] The Quakers were a.s.sumed to be satisfied with their recent exemptions from military duty upon the payment of a small tax; Sandemanians and other insignificant sects to be conciliated by the act of the preceding April, which repealed, after a duration of nearly one hundred and eighty years, the fine of fifty cents for absence from church on Sunday. The people were at last free, not only to worship as they chose, but when they chose, or to omit worship. They had yet to obtain equal privileges for all denominations, and exemption from enforced support of religion. The pa.s.sage of the Act for the Support of Literature and Religion raised, as the Congregationalists ought to have known it would, a violent protest from every dissenter and from every political come-outer. Some of the towns in town-meetings opposed the bill as unnecessary for the support of schools and clergy; as wasteful, when it would be wiser to create a state fund; and as unduly favorable to Yale, where the policy was to create an intellectual cla.s.s and not to advance learning and literature among the commonalty. At Andover, February 1, 1817, Episcopalians, Baptists, and Methodists met together and denounced the act because they disapproved of the union of Church and State which it encouraged; because of Yale's tendency to bias religion; because they all approved of the voluntary support of religion; and because they all scorned such a political trick as the bill appeared to them, namely, an attempt to win by their acceptance of the money their apparent approval of the enforced support of religion. The Baptist societies in different towns met to condemn the measure on the same grounds, and on the additional ones that it was unfair to the Quakers, who had no paid preachers; to the Universalists, because they were numerically still too small to be of political importance; and indeed to many men, since, as every man had contributed to the expense of the war, every man ought to be rewarded proportionally. The Methodists agreed in all these criticisms, and were no more backward in denouncing a measure which forced on them money they did not seek, and for a purpose of which they disapproved. The Methodist Society of Glas...o...b..ry were most outspoken, declaring the law--

incompatible with sound policy and inconsistent with any former act of the legislature of the state; the ultimate consequence of which will prove a lasting curse to vital religion, which every candid and reflecting mind may easily foresee; and we view it as a very bold and desperate effort to effectuate a union between Church and State.... We are induced to believe that Pilate and Herod, and the chief Priests are still against us,... $12,000 to the contrary notwithstanding. Resolved--

(1) We don't want such reparation for being characterized as an illiterate set of enthusiasts devoid of character; our clergy a set of worthless ramblers, unworthy the protection of our civil laws.

(2) Pity and contempt for the Legislature should be expressed for bribery.

(3) We believe the money, if received, would be a lasting curse.

(4) The measure was intended for politics, not religion, and was a species of Tyranny.

(5) We should use our best endeavors to have the money used for state expenses.

(6) Thanks should be sent to the members of the Legislature who had opposed the measure.

All Methodists were further angered by the affront put upon them by the General a.s.sembly, which, in spite of their known determination not to receive the money, appointed Methodist trustees, of whom a majority were Federalists, to receive their share of the appropriation. The trustees accepted the money, defending their action on the ground that they believed that their claim would become void if they did not draw the money, and it might then be put to a worse use. But the Methodist societies did not uphold the trustees, and "regretted the committee imposed on us by the Legislature of the state." The chairman of the committee, the Rev. Augustus Bolles, refused to serve, and the societies rejected the money. [v]

As a result of the unwelcome legislation, the Republicans received the whole vote of the Methodists for the "Toleration and Reform Ticket" of 1817, which repeated the nominations of the preceding election. The Episcopalians of course favored the reelection of Lieutenant-Governor Ingersoll. One small provocation by the Congregationalists of the First Church of New Haven--the attempt to place the odium of expulsion upon a member who became an Episcopalian--did not tend to allay feeling. The Toleration party were sure of the votes of the more feeble dissenters, whose interests they promised to regard, as well as of those of the Baptists and of such Federalists as disapproved of the high-handed policy of the Standing Order. The Tolerationists were also counting upon a steady increase of recruits from the Federal ranks as soon as the appreciation of a recent attack by the legislature upon the judiciary and its danger should become more and more realized. Many such recruits, convinced of the necessity of const.i.tutional reform, had gathered at the general meeting of Republicans held in New Haven in October, 1816, to make up the ticket for the spring election of 1817. The campaign issue was "whether freemen shall be tolerated in the free exercise of their religious and political rights." It was met by the election of Governor Wolcott with a majority of 600 votes over ex-Governor J. Cotton Smith, and by no opposition to the reelection of Lieutenant-Governor Ingersoll. [w] At the same election many minor Republican officials were seated, and the House went Republican by an a.s.sured majority of nearly two to one, the Senate remaining strongly Federal.

Governor Wolcott's inaugural placed before the a.s.sembly the following subjects for consideration: (1) A new system of taxation; for, as the governor pointed out, the capitation tax was equivalent to about one-sixteenth of the laboring man's income. (2) Judges of the Superior Court should hold their office during good behavior instead of by annual appointment by the legislature. (3) There should be a complete separation of legislative and judicial powers of government. (4) Rights of conscience and the voluntary support of religion, though if necessary with "laws providing efficient remedies for enforcing the voluntary contracts for their [ministers'] support," should be considered; and (5) Freedom of suffrage. In concluding, the governor urged that "whenever the public mind appears to be considerably agitated on these subjects, prudence requires that the legislature should revise its measures, and by reasonable explanation or modifications of the law, restore public confidence and tranquillity."

[x]

To consider briefly these various points: Taxes upon mills, machinery, and manufactures needed to be light in order to secure their continued existence. The necessities of war-time had created a larger market for their products, but one that could not be continued after the close of the war allowed European products to enter free of duty. Nor could the factories exist if burdened with heavy taxes before the new tariff measures of 1816 had revived these depressed industries. In agriculture, taxes upon horses, oxen, stock, dairy products, and increased areas of tillage handicapped the farmer. Again, the tax upon fire-places, rather than upon houses, weighed heavily upon the poor and the moderately well-to-do, who built small and inexpensive houses with say three fireplaces, while the rich owners of older and more pretentious dwellings were often rated for fewer. [y] Money was scarce, rich men rare. So also was great poverty. There was a scanty living for the majority. Trades were few, wages low. A farm-hand averaged three shillings a day, paid in provisions. Women of all work drudged for two shillings and sixpence per week, while a farm overseer received a salary of seventy dollars a year. The children of people in average circ.u.mstances walked barefoot to church, carrying their shoes and stockings, which they put on under the shelter of the big tree nearest to the meeting-house. Their fathers made one Sunday suit last for years. The wealthy had small incomes, though relatively great. It was whispered that Pierpont Edwards, the rich and prosperous New Haven lawyer, had an income from his law practice of two thousand dollars per year.

Points (2) and (3) in the governor's address were prompted by the widespread interest created by the action of the legislature in October, 1815, when it had set aside the conviction, by a special Superior Court at Middletown, of Peter Lung for murder, on the ground that the court was irregularly and illegally convened. The chief judge was Zephaniah Swift of Windham, author of the "System of Connecticut Laws." [z] Judge Swift appealed to the public [aa] to vindicate his judicial character from the censure implied by the a.s.sembly's action. An ardent Federalist, who in the early days of statehood could see no need of a better const.i.tution than he then insisted Connecticut possessed through the adoption of her ancient charter, he had long opposed the ecclesiastical establishment which that charter upheld. In his defense of the const.i.tution he had maintained that "it ought to be deemed an inviolable maxim that _when proper courts of law are const.i.tuted, the legislature are divested of all judicial authority_." [2l2] But when the legislature claimed as const.i.tutional the right to call to account any court, magistrate, or other officer for misdemeanor or mal-administration, [ab] Judge Swift admitted the lack of "a written const.i.tution." He further argued that the one "made up of usages and customs, had always been understood to contain certain fundamental axioms which were held sacred and inviolable, and which were the basis on which rested the rights of the people." Of these self-evident principles one was that the three branches of government--the executive, legislative, and judicial--were coordinate and independent, and that the powers of one should never be exercised by the other. "It ought to be held as a fundamental axiom,"

the judge declared, "that _the Legislature should never encroach on the jurisdiction of the Judiciary,_ nor a.s.sume the province of interfering in private rights, nor of overhauling the decisions of the courts of law." Otherwise, "the legislature would become one great arbitration that would engulf all the courts of law, [ac] and _sovereign discretion_ would be 'the only rule of decision,--a state of things _equally favorable to lawyers and criminals."_ [213]

With respect to the fifth point in the governor's address, the right of suffrage, the Republicans and their allies demanded its extension from householders haying real estate rated at $7 (40s.), or personal estate of $134 (40), to "men who pay small taxes, work on highways, or do service in the militia."

In the fall of 1817, the reform party had forced the repeal of the obnoxious Stand-Up Law, and it demanded that other restrictive measures should be annulled. So bitter was the Federal antagonism in the Council that during all the spring session of 1817, the Tolerationists loudly complained that every reform measure proposed in the House was lost in the Federal Senate. The committees to which parts of the governor's speech had been referred for consideration did little. That on taxation made a report in the fall recommending that a careful investigation of conditions and resources should be made, because, as capital sought investment, in banks, manufacturing, and various commercial enterprises unknown to the earlier generations, [ad] the fairness of the old system of taxation was lapsing. The mixed committee, including several Tolerationists and having an Episcopal chairman, that was to report upon the religious situation, gave no encouragement to dissenters. The spring session allowed one barren act to pa.s.s, the "Act to secure equal rights, powers, and privileges to Christians of all denominations in this state." It enacted that henceforth certificates should be lodged with the _town clerk,_ and permitted a come-outer to return to the society from which he had separated. In the following spring, when an attempt was made to pa.s.s a bill to supersede this act, it was maintained that the law of 1817 "did not effect the object or answer the desire of the aggrieved party," for it retained the certificate clause and continued to deny to dissenters the measure of religious liberty freely accorded to the Established churches.

The Tolerationists were determined to carry the elections of 1818. In the fall elections of 1817, they again had a majority of nearly two to one in the House, and consequently the struggle was for the control of the Senate. At the fall meetings, they placed in nomination their candidates for senators, and all through the winter they agitated in town meetings and in every other way the discussion of their "Const.i.tution and Reform Ticket." Party pamphlets were scattered throughout the state. One of these, the most in favor, was "The Politics of Connecticut: by a Federal Republican" (George H. Richards of New London). At the spring elections of 1818, the Const.i.tution and Reform Ticket carried the day, seating the reflected governor and lieutenant-governor, eight anti-Federal senators, and preserving the anti-Federal majority in the House. The political revolution was complete, and the preliminary steps towards the construction of a new const.i.tution were at once begun. [ae]

The governor's inaugural address specified the main task before the a.s.sembly in the following words:--

As a portion of the people have expressed a desire that the form of civil government in this State should be revised, this highly interesting subject will probably engage your [the a.s.sembly's]

deliberations.... Considered merely as an instrument denning the powers and duties of magistrates and rulers, the Charter may justly be considered as unprovisional and imperfect. Yet it ought to be recollected that what is now its greatest defect was formerly a pre-eminent advantage, it being then highly important to the people to acquire the greatest lat.i.tude of authority with an exemption from British influence and control.

If I correctly comprehend the wishes which have been expressed by a portion of our fellow citizens, they are now desirous, as the sources of apprehension from external causes are at present happily closed, that the Legislative, Executive and Judicial authorities of their own government may be more precisely denned and limited, and the rights of the people declared and acknowledged. It is your province to dispose of this important subject in such manner as will best promote general satisfaction and tranquillity.

The House appointed a select committee of five to report upon the revision of the form of civil government. The Council appointed Hon. Elijah Boardman (Federalist) and Hon. William Bristol (Tolerationist) to act as joint committee with several gentlemen selected by the House. The joint committee reported that "the present was a period peculiarly auspicious for carrying into effect the wishes of our fellow-citizens,--the general desire for a revision and reformation of the structure of our civil government and the establishment of a Const.i.tutional Compact" and "that the organization of the different branches of government, the separation of their powers,the tenure of office, the elective franchise, liberty of speech and of the press, freedom of conscience, trial by jury, rights which relate to these deeply interesting subjects, ought not to be suffered to rest on the frail foundation of legislative will." [214]

Immediately, the House pa.s.sed a bill requiring the freemen of the towns to a.s.semble in town meeting on the following Fourth of July "to elect by ballot as many delegates as said towns now choose representatives to the General a.s.sembly," said delegates to meet in const.i.tutional convention at Hartford on the fourth Wednesday of the following August (Aug. 26) for "the formation of a Const.i.tution of Civil Government for the people of this state." The bill further declared that the const.i.tution when "ratified by such majority of the said qualified voters, convened as aforesaid, as shall be directed by said convention, shall be and remain the Supreme Law of this State."

An attempt was made to subst.i.tute "one delegate" for "as many delegates" as the towns sent. Upon the question in the convention, as to what majority should be required for ratification, there was considerable diversity of opinion. "Two-thirds of the whole number of _towns"_ was suggested, but was opposed on the ground that "two-thirds of the whole number of the _towns_ might not contain one-fourth of the people." _"Three-fifths_ of the legal voters of the state" was also suggested. In the final decision, the simple "majority of the freemen" was accepted. Had this not been the case, the const.i.tution would have failed of ratification, for, as Burlington made no returns, the vote stood 59 out of 120 towns for ratification, with 13,918 yeas to 12,364 nays, giving a majority of but 1554.

Several causes tended to bring about an eager, an amiable, or tolerant support of the work of the convention. Eepublicans and Tolerationists hoped for sweeping reforms. The Federalists were divided. Many there were who believed it dangerous for the state to continue dest.i.tute of fundamental laws defining and limiting the powers of the legislature, and to such as these the need of a bill of rights, and of the separation of the powers of the government, was immediate and imperative. The influential faction of the New Haven Federalists were moved to modify any opposition existing among them by the proposed change to annual sessions of the legislature with alternate sittings in the two capitals. There were still other Federalists who accepted the proposed change in government as inevitable, and who wisely forebore to block it, preferring to use all their influence toward saving as much as possible of the old inst.i.tutions under new forms. And in this resolve they were encouraged by the high character of the men that all parties chose as delegates to the const.i.tutional convention.

The convention met August 26,1818, at Hartford. Governor Wolcott, one of the delegates from Litchfield, was elected president, and Mr.

James Lanman, secretary. Mr. Pierpont Edwards was chosen chairman of a committee of three from each county to draft a const.i.tution. The estimated strength of the parties was one hundred and five Republicans to ninety-five Federalists, and, of the drafting committee, five members belonged to the political minority. [af] An idea of the character of the men chosen for this important task of framing a new const.i.tution is gained from a glance at some of the names. To begin with, over thirty-nine of the delegates to the convention either were Yale alumni or held its honorary degrees, and half of the drafting committee were her graduates. Ex-Governor Treadwell and Alexander Wolcott led the opposing parties, while their able seconds in command were General Nathaniel Terry of Hartford and Pierpont Edwards of New Haven. The latter still held the office of judge of the United States District Court, to which Jefferson had appointed him. Among the delegates, there were Mr. Amasa Learned, formerly representative in Congress, the ex-chief-judges Jesse Root and Stephen Mix Mitch.e.l.l, Aaron Austin, a member of the Council for over twenty years until the party elections of 1818 unseated him, ex-Governor John Treadwell, and Lemuel Sanford,--all of whom had been delegates to the convention of 1788, called to ratify the const.i.tution of the United States. Five members of the drafting committee were state senators, namely: Messrs. William Bristol, Sylvester Wells, James Lanman, Dr. John S. Peters of Hebron, and Peter Webb of Windham. Five others, Messrs. Elisha Phelps, Gideon Tomlinson, James Stevens, Orange Merwin, and Daniel Burrows were afterwards elected to that office, while Gideon Tomlinson and John S. Peters became in turn governors of the state. James Lanman, Nathan Smith (a member also of the committee), and Tomlinson entered the national Senate. Among the delegates, there were nearly a dozen well-known physicians, most of them to be found among the Tolerationists. Messrs. Webb, Christopher Manwaring of New London, Gideon Tomlinson of Fairfield, and General Joshua King of Ridgefield, together with Joshua Stow of Middletown (also on the drafting committee), had been for years the warhorses of the democracy, loyal followers of their leader Alexander Wolcott, who had been the Republican state manager from 1800 to 1817.

The method of procedure in the convention was to report from time to time a portion of the draft of the const.i.tution, of which each article was considered section by section, discussed, and amended. After each of the several sections had been so considered, the whole article was opened to amendment before the vote upon its acceptance was taken. When all articles had been approved, the const.i.tution was printed as so far accepted, and was again submitted to revision and amendment before receiving the final approval of the convention.

While the const.i.tutional convention was in session, the Baptists and Methodists resolved that no const.i.tution of civil government should receive their approbation and support unless it contained a provision that should secure the full and complete enjoyment of religious liberty. [2l5] And it was known that the Episcopalians were ready to second such resolutions. These expressions of opinion were of weight as foreshadowing the kind of reception that many of the towns where the dissenters were in the ascendant would accord any const.i.tution sent to them for ratification.

In the convention both the old Federal leader and the old Democratic chief objected to the incorporation in the const.i.tution of a bill of rights. Governor Treadwell opposed it on the ground that such _"unalterable"_ regulations were unnecessary where, as in a republic, all power was vested in the people. Alexander Wolcott objected that such a "bill would circ.u.mscribe the powers of the General a.s.sembly" and also because of his disapproval of some of its clauses. [216] When the draft of fourth section was under discussion, namely that "No preference shall be given by law to any religious sect or mode of worship," the Kev. Asahel Morse, a Baptist minister, offered the subst.i.tute,--

That rights of conscience are inalienable, that all persons have a natural right to worship Almighty G.o.d according to their own consciences; and no person shall be compelled to attend any place of worship, or contribute to the support of any minister, contrary to his own choice.

The subst.i.tute was rejected, and after some discussion, the wording of the section was changed by subst.i.tuting "Christian" in place of "religious" and this change retained in the final revision. [ag]