The Contemporary Review, January 1883 - Part 10
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Part 10

[30] Warburton, a shrewd observer enough, expressed the same view a hundred years ago, with characteristic truculence:--"Mathematicians--I do not mean the inventors and geniuses amongst them, whom I honour, but the Demonstrators of others' inventions, who are ten times duller and prouder than a d.a.m.ned poet--have a strange aversion to everything that smacks of religion."--_Letters to Hurd_, xix.

[31] Preface to Second Edition, p. vii.

[32] _Ibid._, p. v.

[33] Summa, 1^ma 2^de qu. 60, art. 3.

[34] "Grammar of a.s.sent," p. 389. 5th ed.

[35] What Wordsworth says is--

"We live by Admiration, Hope, and Love, And, even as these are well and wisely fixed, In dignity of being we ascend."

This is widely different from the nude proposition that "we live by admiration."

[36] See also p. 127.

[37] A good deal of information about Theophilanthropy and the Theophilanthropists, in an undigested and, indeed, chaotic state, will be found in Gregoire's "Histoire des Sectes Religieuses," vol. i.

[38] The Theophilanthropists were most anxious that the object of their worship should not be supposed to be the Christian G.o.d. Thus in one of their hymns their Deity is invoked as follows:--

"Non, tu n'es pas le _Dieu_ dont le pretre est l'apotre, Tu n'as point par la Bible enseigne les humains."

[39] The author of "Natural Religion" says, Talleyrand; I do not know on what authority. Gregoire writes:--"Au Directoire meme on le raillait sur son zele theophilantropique. Un de ses collegues, dit-on, lui proposait de se faire pendre et de ressusciter le troisieme jour, comme l'infaillible moyen de faire triompher sa secte, et Carnot lui decoche dans son _Memoire_ des epigrammes sanglantes a ce sujet."--_Histoire des Sectes Religieuses_, vol. I. p. 406. Talleyrand was never a member of the Directory.

[40] Preface to second edition.

[41] "Eight Lectures on Miracles," p. 50.

[42] _Ibid._ See Dr. Mozley's note on this pa.s.sage.

[43] "a.n.a.logy." Part I. c. i. I give, of course, Bishop Butler's words as I find them, but, as will be seen a little later, I do not quite take his view of the supernatural.

[44] "Three Essays on Religion," p. 174.

[45] "Address to the British a.s.sociation," 1871.

[46] I say "_primary_ cause;" of course I do not deny _its own proper causality_ to the non-spiritual or matter.

[47] "Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection," p. 368. I am, of course, aware of Mr. Mill's remarks upon this view in his "Three Essays on Religion" (pp. 146-150). The subject is too great to be discussed in a footnote. But I may observe that he rests, at bottom, upon the a.s.sumption--surely an enormous a.s.sumption--that causation is order. Cardinal Newman's argument upon this matter in the "Grammar of a.s.sent" (pp. 66-72, 5th ed.) seems to me to be unanswerable; certainly, it is unanswered. I have no wish to dogmatize--the dogmatism, indeed, appears to be on the other side--but if we go by experience, as it is now the fashion to do, our initial elementary experience would certainly lead us to consider will the great or only cause. To guard against a possible misconception let me here say that I must not be supposed to adopt Mr. Wallace's view in its entirety or precisely as stated by him.

Of course, the a.n.a.logy between the human will and the Divine Will is imperfect, and Mr. Mill appears to me to be well founded in denying that _our_ volition originates. My contention is that Matter is inert until Force has been brought to bear upon it: that all Force must be due to a Primary Force of which it is the manifestation or the effect: that the Primary Force cannot exert itself unless it be self-determined: that to be self-determined is to be living: that to be primarily and utterly self-determined is to be an infinitely self-conscious volition: _ergo_, the primary cause of Force is the Will of G.o.d. This is the logical development of the famous argument of St. Thomas Aquinas. He contends that whatever things are moved must be moved by that which is not moved: _a movente non moto_. But Suarez and later writers complete the argument by a.n.a.lyzing the term _movens non motum_, which they consider equivalent to _Ens a se, in se, et per se_, or _Actus Purissimus_.

[48] "Contra Faustum," 22.

[49] Summa, 1, 2, qu. 83, art. 1. But on this and the preceding quotation, see the note on page 118.

[50] "Quotidiana Dei miracula ex a.s.siduitate vilesc.u.n.t."--_Hom. xxvi. in Evan_.

[51] "Stated, fixed, or settled" is a predicate common to natural and supernatural, not the _differentia_ of either. And here let me remark that the expression, "Laws of Nature," is a modern technical expression which the Catholic philosopher would require, probably, to have defined before employing it. "Natura," in St. Thomas Aquinas, is declared to be "Principium operationis cujusque rei," the Essence of a thing in relation to its activity, or the Essence as manifested _agendo_. Hence "Natura rerum," or "Universitas rerum" (which is the Latin for Nature in the phrase "Laws of Nature") means the Essences of all things created (finite) as manifested and related to each other by their proper inherent activities, which of course are stable or fixed. But since it is not a logical contradiction that these activities should be suspended, arrested, or annihilated (granting an Infinite Creator), it will not be contrary to _Reason_ should a miraculous intervention so deal with them, though their suspension or annihilation may be described, loosely and inaccurately, as against the Laws of Nature. By _Reason_ is here meant the declarations of necessary Thought as to possibility and impossibility, or the canons of contradiction, the only proper significance of the word in discussions about miracles. Hence, to say that miracles have their laws, is not to deny that they are by the Free Will of G.o.d. For creation is by the Fiat of Divine Power and Freedom, and yet proceeds upon law--that is to say, upon a settled plan and inherent sequence of cause and effect. But it is common with Mr.

Mill and his school to think of law as _necessary inviolable_ sequence; whereas it is but a fixed mode of action whether _necessarily or freely_ determined; and it is a part of law that some activities should be liable to suspension or arrestment by others, and especially by the First Cause.

[52] "Vie de Jesus," p. 247.

[53] When Mr. Mill says ("Three Essays on Religion," p. 224), "The argument that a miracle may be the fulfilment of a law in the same sense in which the ordinary events of Nature are fulfilments of laws, seems to indicate an imperfect conception of what is meant by a law and what const.i.tutes a miracle," all he really means is that this argument involves a conception of law and of miracle different from his own, which is undoubtedly true. Upon this subject I remark as follows: There is a necessary will (_spontaneum non liberum_) and a free will(_liberum non spontaneum_); and these are in G.o.d on the scale of infinite perfection, as they are in man finitely. With Mr. Mill, as I have observed in a previous note, Law is taken to signify "invariable, necessary sequence;" and its test is, that given the same circ.u.mstances, the same thing will occur. But it is essential to Free Will (whether in G.o.d or man) that given the same circ.u.mstances, the same thing need not, may not, and perhaps will not, occur. However, an act may be free _in causa_ which _hic et nunc must_ happen; the Free Will having done that by choice which brings as a necessary consequence something else. For there are many things which would involve contradiction and so be impossible, did not certain consequences follow them. This premised, it is clear that the ant.i.thesis of Mr. Mill's "Law" is Free Will. Law and antecedent necessity to Mr. Mill are one and the same. But Law in Catholic terminology means the Will of G.o.d decreeing freely or not freely, according to the subject-matter; and is not opposed to Free-Will. It guides, it need not coerce or necessitate, though it may.

Neither in one sense, is Law synonymous with Reason, for that is according to Reason, simply, which does not involve a contradiction, whether it be done freely or of necessity; and many things are possible, or non-contradictives, that Law does not prescribe. Nor again does Free-Will mean lawless in the sense of irrational; or causeless, in the sense of having no motive: "contra legem," "praeter legem" is not "contra rationem," "prater rationem." The Divine Will, then, may be free, yet act according to Law, namely, its own freely-determined Law. And it may act "not according to Law," and yet act according to Reason. In this sense, then, theologians identify the Divine Will with the Divine Reason--I mean, they insist that G.o.d's Will is always according to Reason--in this sense, but, as I think, not in any other. For the Divine Will is antecedently free as regards all things which are not G.o.d; but the Divine Intellect is not free in the same way. St. Augustine always tends to view things in the concrete, not distinguishing their "rationes formales," or distinguishing them vaguely. And Ratio with him does not mean Reason merely, but living Reason or the Reasoning Being, the Soul.

When St. Thomas Aquinas speaks of Lex aeterna he means the Necessary Law of Morality, concerning which G.o.d is not free, because in decreeing it, He is but decreeing that there is no Righteousness except by imitation of Him.

The root of all these difficulties and of all the confusion in speech which they have brought forth is this: the mystery of Free-Will in G.o.d, the Unchangeable and Eternal, The great truth taught in the words of the Vatican Council, "Deus, _liberrimo consilio_ condidit universa," must ever be borne in mind. Undoubtedly, there are no afterthoughts in G.o.d.

But neither is there a past in which He decreed once for all what was to be and what was not to be. He is the Eternal Now. But still all events are the fulfilment of His Will, and contribute to the working out of the scheme which He has traced for creation. Feeble is human speech to deal with such high matters, serving, at the best, but dimly to adumbrate ineffable truths. As Goethe somewhere says, "Words are good, but not the best: the best cannot be expressed in words. My point, however, is that there is, on the one hand, a connection of events with events all through creation and an intelligible sequence, while, on the other, the Free-Will of man is a determining force as regards his own spiritual actions, as is the Free-Will of G.o.d in respect of the whole creation, and that miracles are neither afterthoughts, nor irregularities, nor contradictions, but at once free and according to law. Miracles are not abnormal, unless Free-Will is a reduction of Kosmos to Chaos, and the negation of Reason altogether."

[54] I say "the doctrine of the Divine goodness," because that is, as I think, what the author of "Natural Religion" means. As to the "simple, absolute benevolence"--"benevolence," indeed, is a milk-and-water expression; "G.o.d is love"--which "some men seem to think the only character of the Author of Nature," it is enough to refer to Bishop Butler's striking chapter on "The Moral Government of G.o.d," (a.n.a.logy, Part I. c. iii). I will here merely observe that although, doubtless, G.o.d's attribute is Love of the creation, He is not only Love, but Sanct.i.ty, Justice, Creative Power, Force, Providence; and whereas, considered as a Unit He is infinite, He is not infinite--I speak under correction--viewed in those aspects, abstractions, or attributes which, separately taken, are necessary for our subjective view of Him. I allow that G.o.d's power and His "benevolence" may in some cases work out different ends, as if separate ent.i.ties, but still maintain--what the author of "Natural Religion" ignores--that G.o.d in His very essence is not only "Benevolence," but Sanct.i.ty, &c. also; _all as One in His Oneness_.

[55] "Three Essays on Religion," p. 38.

SYRIAN COLONIZATION.

During the past few years many proposals have been made, and schemes formed, for repeopling the wastes of Syria and Palestine with the surplus population of Europe. These schemes, sometimes philanthropic, sometimes commercial, are always advocated on the a.s.sumption that the current of European emigration and capital might be turned to Syria and Palestine in accordance with sound economic and financial considerations. In this paper I propose--

_First._ To take a survey of the agricultural resources of the country.

_Second._ To draw attention to the difficulties which immigrants would experience in obtaining secure t.i.tles to landed property.

_Third._ To give a summary of the different kinds of land tenure, and the burdens on agriculture.

_Fourth._ To point out some of the dangers and inconveniences to which immigrants would be exposed.

I. In the first place we may say broadly that the natural resources of Syria and Palestine are agricultural. On the eastern slopes of Mount Hermon there are a few bitumen pits from which a small quant.i.ty of ore of excellent quality is yearly exported to England. Small deposits of coal and iron exist in several localities, and there are chemical deposits about the sh.o.r.es of the Dead Sea. Gypsum and coloured marble are found in Syria, and along the coast opposite the Lebanon range sponges are fished annually to the value of 20,000. Hot sulphur springs exist at Palmyra and the Sea of Galilee, and there are ruined baths on the way between Damascus and Palmyra and in the Yarmuk Valley; but none of these natural products are of sufficient importance to attract European labour or capital.

Forests can scarcely be said to exist in Syria or Palestine. A few groves of cedars of Lebanon, which escaped the axes of Hiram, are fast disappearing. On the limestone ridges and in some of the valleys there are clumps of pine, and throughout a great part of the country there is a considerable quant.i.ty of scrub oak which the peasants reduce to charcoal, and carry into the cities. In Galilee one comes on places where the trees give a pleasing character to the landscape. On Mount Carmel there are jungles and thickets of oak, and on the slopes towards Nazareth there are considerable groves, but the nearest approach to a forest is where the oaks of Bashan, which recall the beauties of an English park, a.s.sert their ancient supremacy.

Rows of poplars mark the courses of rivers and streams throughout the land, and supply beams for flat-roofed houses; but when churches or other important buildings have to be roofed, or timber is required for domestic purposes, it has to be imported from America, and carried into the interior on the backs of animals. There remain trees enough in some places to lend beauty to the landscape, and to show what the country may once have been, as well as to suggest what it may again become; but there are no forests to attract labour or capital.

The few manufactories of wool and cotton and soap and leather are chiefly limited to local want. Besides these there are the silk-spinning factories in the Lebanon, managed by Frenchmen and natives, and a manufactory of cotton thread on one of the rivers of Damascus.

The popular accounts of the agricultural resources of Syria and Palestine are very different. As instances of extremes:--Mark Twain tells us he saw the goats eating stones in Syria, and he a.s.sures us that he could not have been mistaken, for they had nothing else to eat; while Mr. Laurence Oliphant saw even in the Dead Sea "a vast source of wealth"

for his English Company. We read in his "Land of Gilead" these words: "There can be little doubt, in fact, that the Dead Sea is a mine of unexplored wealth which only needs the application of capital and enterprise to make it a most lucrative property."[56]

The tourists who traverse the country in spring, immediately after the latter rains, when there is some vegetation in the barest places, and when their horses are up to the fetlocks in flowers, never forget the beauty of the landscape. Others, who have been picturing to themselves a land flowing with milk and honey, hills waving with golden grain, and green meadows dappled with browsing flocks, and who pa.s.s through the land in autumn, find themselves bitterly disappointed. As they trudge along the white glaring pathways, and through the roadless and flinty wilderness, breasting the hot beating waves of a Syrian noonday, with only an ashy chocolate-coloured landscape around them, scorched as if by the breath of a furnace, they get an impression of dreary and blasted desolation which time can never efface. They looked for the garden of the Lord, and they find only the "burning marl." It was my fate, during a long residence in Syria, to hear autumn tourists criticize books written by spring tourists, and spring tourists criticize books written by autumn tourists, and generally in a manner by no means complimentary to the authors' veracity;--the fact being that the writers had given their impression of what they saw, with perhaps a little of American wit, which consists in exaggerating "the leading feature."

I think, however, that to most English travellers, who have no hobbies to ride, the barren appearance of Syria and Palestine is a disenchantment. Accustomed to their own moist climate and green fields, they are not prepared for the dry and parched, and abandoned appearance of the greater part of the country. With us an abundance of water spoils the crops; in Syria and Palestine the case is reversed, for unless water can be poured over the land the crops are stunted and uncertain. For six or seven months in the year scarcely any rain falls, and scarcely a cloud darkens the sky. In October the early rain commences, with much thunder and lightning; and in April the latter rain becomes light and uncertain, and generally ceases altogether. Then the sky becomes intensely blue, and the sun comes out in all his glory, or rather in all her glory, for with the Arabs the sun is feminine. Suddenly gra.s.s and vegetation wither up and become dry for the oven. The level country, except where there are rivers, becomes parched. The stones stick up out of the red soil like the white bones of a skeleton. Limestone, flint, and basalt, and th.o.r.n.y shrubs, cover the face of the wilderness country.

Here and there you may see a dwarf oak, or an olive tree, or a wild fig tree, and among the mountains you may notice little patches scratched and cultivated by the _fellahin_; but, unless on the great plains of Bashan and Esdraelon and Hamath, and on the uplands of Gilead, or where there is water for irrigation, you may ride for hours along the zigzag paths, over mountain and high-land, and before and behind extend the limestone and flinty rocks, white and blinding, and broken into fragments or burnt into powder. It thus happens that few tourists who pa.s.s along the beaten tracks of Syria and Palestine have any just conception of the vast agricultural resources of the land.

The most striking features in the Syrian landscape are two parallel mountain ranges, which appear on the map like two centipedes, running north and south. These are the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges. Lebanon proper lies along the sh.o.r.e of the Mediterranean. The narrow strip of land between the mountain and the sea was the home of the Ph[oe]nicians, who steered their white-winged ships to every land, and dipped their oars in every sea, before the Britons were heard of. The gardens of Sidon, luxuriant with bananas, oranges, figs, lemons, pomegranates, peaches, apricots, &c., extend across the plain for two miles to the mountain, and show what Ph[oe]nicia may once have been. The palm trees that adorn the fertile gardens of Beyrout are doubtless survivors of the groves from which the strip of land once took its name.[57]